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Abstract 
The thesis is a study of religion and social change seen from the perspective of Brazil's 
Roman Catholic Church and urban Labour Movement. The relationship between 
Catholicism and urban trade union struggles is explored within the specific institutional 
setting of the metalworkers' unions and Roman Catholic dioceses of Greater Sao Paulo 
during the period 1970-1986. 
Although the value of the study derives partly from the quantitative significance of the 
institutions selected (Sao Paulo' archdiocese is the world's largest and the metalworkers' 
union of the region is the largest in Latin America), it is their qualitative make-up that is 
of most interest. On the one hand, this is marked by a church firmly committed to 
liberation theology perspectives; and on the other hand by a deeply divided labour 
movement which is split into radical and conservative factions. 
By exploring relations between these respective groupings, the thesis highlights the 
contradictions and dilemmas faced by a radical church seeking to reconcile traditional 
catholic themes of unity with its more recent acceptance of the class-divided nature of 
society and the so-called "preferential option for the poor". 
The study also discusses in detail the profound historical realignment of relations 
between radical sectors of the Church and the progressive Labour Movement during the 
1970's and early 1980's. It examines the pivotal role of Catholic labour militancy in this 
process of rapprochement, together with the institutional as well as self-imposed limits to 
this process. 
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Introduction 
"Unity is one of the notes of the Church and yet the class struggle divides men; is 
the unity of the Church compatible with class struggle? " 
G. Guti&rrez, A Theology of Liberations 
X 
I. 1 Catholic Unity and Class Conflict 
Liberation Theology2 originally emerged in Latin America in the 1960's and early 
1970's. It was especially with regard to the Roman Catholic Church's social teaching and 
mission that this new theology stood many traditional concepts on their head. Amongst 
other things, liberation theologians argued for an increasingly historicised vision of the 
Church, i. e., one which was rooted in the social problems of the day. More significantly 
still, they coupled that call with the demand that the Church should operate from the 
perspective of the poorest members of society and not, as had been the case for centuries 
in Latin America, from the perspective of the ruling classes. 
It is not the aim of this study to explain how and why these changes came about since 
such issues have already been dealt with in considerable detail by other authors. 
3 For 
present purposes, what is of significance is that some of these concepts, particularly the 
emphasis on the poor, came to permeate the discourse of Latin American bishops 
themselves. 
Clear evidence of this shift comes in the conclusions of the second and third 
extraordinary conferences of the Latin American Episcopal Council (Conselho Episcopal 
Latino-Americano, CELAM). In 1968, the CELAM Bishops' Conference, the key 
gathering of bishops from all over Latin America, undertook the rhetorical break with the 
Church's past of power and privilege. This was at its Second Extraordinary Conference, 
in the Colombian city of Medellin. There, in a document on "Poverty and the Church", 
the bishops focused upon the example of Christ "Who 'being rich became poor' (cf. 2 
Cor. 8: 9) in order to redeem us. " They went on to assert that: 
a poor Church: - Denounces the unjust lack of this world's goods and the sins that begets it; - 
Preaches and lives in spiritual poverty, as an attitude of spiritual childhood and openness to the Lord; 
- Is herself bound to material poverty. The poverty of the Church is, in effect, a constant 
factor in the 
history of salvation (nos. 45). 4 
To a certain extent, the Third Latin American Bishops' Conference (held in the 
Mexican city of Puebla in 1979) merely took the process a stage further by officially 
adopting what it termed "A Preferential Option for the Poor". Here the bishops 
emphasised, for example, 
the need for conversion on the part of the whole Church to a preferential option for the poor aimed at 
their integral liberations 
It was this preferential option which, above all, came to symbolise the historic about- 
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face of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America. However, this comparatively 
recent conversion to an option for the poor not only brought with it a new agenda, in the 
sense of a reorientation of priorities, but simultaneously highlighted a number of major 
dilemmas. One of the most fundamental of these, and a central theme which this thesis 
seeks to address in the context of the Catholic Church and metalworkers of Sao Paulo, is 
that of how Catholicism can effectively hope to square its own multi-class composition 
and universalising discourses with (a), the fact of a society divided amongst conflicting 
classes, and (b), its stated desire for a preferential option for the poor. 
41 1.2 The Brazilian Context - The Resurg¢nce of Union Militancy and the Development of 
Links Between the Church and the Trade Unions 
Between 1978 and 1980 Brazil was gripped by a massive strike wave. At its height, in 
1979, more than three million workers were directly involved and fifteen out of the 
nation's twenty-three states were affected. 
What rendered these events of such historical significance was the fact that not since 
well before the establishment of a repressive military dictatorship, in 1964, had the 
country witnessed strike action on anything like this scale or with this degree of success. 
On the contrary, under military rule the nearest comparable form of industrial action (in 
terms of its open defiance of labour legislation) had involved only a few hundred 
workers in 1968, and their efforts had been quickly liquidated by sheer brute force. The 
strikes of 1978-80 therefore underlined the end of an era. Not only did they challenge 
military might, but they also took the working classes out of their years of isolation and 
defensiveness and showed to both themselves and the country at large that they were 
alive and ready to kick. 
The centre of the resurgence in this trade union militancy was confined to one 
geographical area and one group of workers in particular: the metalworkers of the 
industrial belt based in and around the city of Säo Paulo. Their level of spatial 
concentration, political organisation and sheer numbers, provided a central reference 
point and bulwark to the labour movement as a whole. Taken collectively, metalworkers 
from this region were (a), the first to go out on strike, and (b), the largest single body of 
workers to do so. In addition to this, they possessed a disproportionately high strategic 
significance of an economic and, therefore, political nature. This was because they were 
present in the lucrative automotive and engineering industry, one of the most dynamic 
and powerful sectors of the Brazilian economy, and a key contributor to the country's so- 
called economic miracle of the late 1960's and early 1970's. 6 Thus, in contrast to a 
numerically significant group like the teachers, for instance, a strike amongst 
metalworkers would quickly be felt in the rest of the economy as well as the country's 
trade exports. 
It is in the light of these characteristics that a growing body of academic study has been 
devoted to the metalworkers of this region.? The onset of political democratisation in the 
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1980's, and a new phase in the politics of the labour movement, has done little to 
diminish the strategic importance of the metalworkers. It was during this decade of 
liberalisation that Brazil finally gained trade union confederations free from government 
tutelage. Once again, the metalworkers of the Säo Paulo region were at the forefront of 
these developments. 
What is striking, however, is just how little attention has been devoted to the issue of 
whether there are any linkages between the dramatic events of the 1970's and 1980's and 
the Roman Catholic Church of the region. 8 
To some observers, this may appear to be a somewhat artificial line of enquiry. Even 
the briefest look at the events, however, demonstrates that the Catholic Church was 
closely involved in the strikes of 1978-80. Just to give a few examples: at various stages 
during the disputes: (a) union headquarters were transfered to Catholic churches; (b) the 
bishop of the region was involved in negotiations on behalf of the workers; (c) parishes 
collected foodstuffs and money for the strikers; (d) pickets were organised through 
Church organisations; (e) the local bishop attended picket lines; (f) the Catholic Church 
officially took over union strike funds; (g) a Catholic priest was given leave to live in the 
house of one strike leader during the dispute; (h) the Church issued public statements of 
solidarity with the strikers; and (i), the President of Brazil, General Figueiredo, accused 
the Archbishop of Sao Paulo of "inciting the strike" -a crime punishable by 
imprisonment. 
Thus, it was obvious for all, even General Figueiredo himself, that a connection 
between the Catholic Church and the trade unions existed. But what was not so clear at 
the time - or since, for that matter - was the real substance of this relationship. Most 
leading studies which have dealt with the metalworkers, either only make passing 
reference to the presence of the Catholic Church, or, when the linkages are touched upon 
in a little more detail, largely confine themselves to noting the concrete instances of 
solidarity rather than situating the relationship in its historical and institutional contexts. 
9 
In part, then, this study is an attempt to redress the balance. It deliberately sets out to 
make the linkages between the Catholic Church and the trade unions the principal object 
of sociological attention. 
1.3 The Significance of Greater Säo Paulo as a Case Study of Brazilian Unionism 
The decision to take Greater Säo Paulo (see figure 1 overleaf) as the geographic area 
analysis stemmed not so much from the actual preponderance of a strategic group of 
workers within this area (central though that was), as from factors which made 
comparative analysis possible. In essence, the region encompasses not one, but two 
radically contrasting and, more importantly, dominant models of trade unionism. 
The older, numerically stronger, and more conservative is based in the capital's 
400,000 strong Sao Paulo Metalworkers' Union (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores 
Metalürgicos de Säo Paulo). At critical moments in its history the leadership of this 
9 
Fig. 1. 
Map of Greater Sao Paulo municipalities showing territorial limits of the 
Metalworkers' Unions of Sl[o Paulo, Sao Bernardo do Campo 
and Santo Andre. 
\\\ . 
tý` ;. `I 
Territorial hmi( of the Sao Paulo Metalworkers' Union (includes the municipality of S: +o Paulo). 
Territorial limit of the Sao Bernardo Metalworkers' Union (includes the municipalities of Säo 
Bernardo do Campo and Diadema). 
Territorial limit of the Santo Andre Metalworkers' Union (includes the rnunicipaht'es of Santo 
Andree, Maui, Riberio Pires and Rio Grande da Serra). 
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union received backing from the forces of the military dictatorship. The other, younger, 
numerically weaker, and more radical form of union politics, is based in the Sao 
Bernardo do Campo and Diadema Metalworkers' Union (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores de 
Sao Bemardo do Campo e Diadema; hereafter know as the Säo Bernardo Metalworkers' 
Union), and the Santo Andre Metalworkers' Union (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores de 
Santo Andre), which between them have some 200,000 members. By contrast, at critical 
moments in their history, such as the strikes of the late 1970's, these leaderships 
encountered sustained verbal and physical opposition from the military dictatorship. 
In effect, then, a study within the Greater Sao Paulo region allows observers to gauge 
how the Catholic Church situated itself in relationship to two contrasting styles of trade 
unionism. If, as will be shown, there is a difference in treatment on the part of the 
Church, then that, in turn, will help us to identity not only its own short term 
conjunctural objectives, but longer term ones as well. 
The validity of these comparative dimensions is not merely confined to the local level 
either. Through an examination of conflicts within Greater Säo Paulo, it is possible to 
gain useful insights into the national situation. That is because during the 1980's, and the 
relaxation of military rule, the unions mentioned above were at the heart of moves to 
found nationwide trade union confederations in their own political immage. The radicals, 
in alliance with unionists from all over the country, went on to found the Single 
Workers' Confederation (Central Ünica dos Trabalhadores, CUT) in 1983, whilst the 
conservatives, again in alliance with unionists throughout Brazil, went on to found the 
General Workers' Confederation (Central Geral dos Trabalhadores, CGT), in 1986. 
It is in the light of this national polarisation, which partially reflected the situation in 
Greater Säo Paulo, that the question arises as to whether the differences in treatment 
accorded by the Churches of this region were similarly transposed on to the national 
stage. In short, was there a difference in policy towards the new confederations?, and, 
what does this tell us about the Church? 
1.4 Three Reasons Why a Study is Needed 
Earlier in this introduction it was noted just how little the issue of Catholicism and 
metalworkers had been dealt with despite the Church's obvious presence on certain 
occasions. To some extent this is understandable given the justifiable concern of social 
scientists with the relationship of metalworkers to more traditional themes like union 
reorganisation; the democratisation process; the formation of political parties; class 
consciousness; factory militancy; and so on. That is why, for instance, regarding his own 
study of SSo Bernardo metalworkers, Humphrey openly states that his chosen: 
strategy of taking the workplace and union as a point of departure entails a corresponding weakness 
in discussing the role of the Church... within the labour movement. 
10 
But whilst all social science necessarily involves choices like the one above, in the case 
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of the Catholic Church at least, there has been a cumulative price to be paid: ignorance as 
to its motives and actions regarding labour. In many other cases this would not be such a 
big problem; but precisely because it is ignorance about one organisation in particular, 
the Catholic Church, it represents a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs. This is for three 
main reasons. 
Firstly, because one is speaking of an institution of tremendous socio-political and 
cultural significance, and not a marginal entity. Even if, as has been established, its 
position is gradually being eroded by secularism and the advent of new religious sects, it 
nevertheless remains the dominant religion throughout Brazil as, indeed, the rest of Latin 
America. 11 
On a general level, this overwhelming presence has provoked many social scientists 
researching the Church to ask whether it has it affected the prospects for social change in 
Brazil. Over the past two decades, much of the emphasis has been channeled towards the 
issue of relations between Church and state, the democratic transition, political parties, 
and so on. 12 In sharp contrast to this, however, comparatively little attention has been 
directed towards the issue of whether an institution of such socio-cultural significance 
might affect the prospects of change in the field of labour relations. 
The second reason for exploring the question arises from the simple fact that the 
Roman Catholic Church has, indeed, affected the prospects of change in this area. The 
Church has proved to be anything but a sleeping giant. This thesis will demonstrate that 
it can and has flexed its muscles to considerable effect. The fact is that labour has 
become a major issue within the Church, which in turn has become a significant 
consideration amongst trade union ranks. The late 1970's is a case in point, and thereby 
tends to act as the natural focus of attention, but closer examination shows varying forms 
and intensities of involvement throughout the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's. There is, 
therefore, an urgent need for a deeper and wider examination of these events and 
processes together with the issues involved. 
Finally, the third motive for exploring this question arises from the nature of that 
involvement. A clear linkage exists with progressive currents of thought - in particular, 
Liberation Theology perspectives - which have come to influence not only large sectors 
of the Brazilian Catholic Church, but also, substantial sectors of the Church throughout 
Latin America. To this extent, therefore, the case of Sao Paulo represents the practical 
implementation of one leading theoretical approach to a question of great relevance. 
1.5 The Significance of Greater Säo Paulo as a Case Study of Brazilian Catholicism 
Although questions about how the Church theoretically and practically mediates such 
contradictory elements as its own unity with the class divided nature of society can only 
receive limited treatment in a study such as the present, the example of Sao Paulo's 
metalworkers and Catholic Church does, nevertheless, represent an important test case. 
This is for two reasons. First, is Säo Paulo's aforementioned status as a key centre of 
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Brazilian urban class struggles. Second, as detailed below, is the unique qualitative and 
quantitative ecclesiastical dimensions to the Catholic Church in the Säo Paulo area. 
In common with the metalworkers of the region, the Catholic Church is both large and 
dynamic. Infact, the Archdiocese of Säo Paulo far outstrips the metalworkers insofar as it 
can claim to be not merely the largest unit of its kind in Brazil or South America (as is 
the case of the Metalworkers' Union of Säo Paulo), but in the world. 13 It is worth 
bearing in mind, for instance, that population of the tiny country of Nicaragua, which has 
received considerable attention from scholars of the Church and social change, can fit 
into the archdiocese several times over. 
Size alone has tended to accord the archdiocese a place of strategic and symbolic 
importance within the Brazilian Catholic Church. In 1986, for instance, 11 out of 47 Säo 
Paulo state bishops came from the archdiocese, i. e., almost 25% of total votes. Over the 
past decades this has been reflected in the frequent choice of bishops from the 
archdiocese to occupy the top posts of Sul-1, the ecclesiastical name for Säo Paulo state 
(see figure 2 overleaf). As a proportion of the country's total of 371 bishops, Sul-1 is 
comparatively small, but it does represent one out of a much more limited 14 
ecclesiastical divisions covering the whole of Brazil. Given that the state is able to feed 
initiatives of its own into the highest levels in the National Brazilian Bishops' 
Conference (Conferencia Nacional dos Bispos Brasileiros, CNBB) this means that the 
bishops of Säo Paulo possess a very strong institutional platform within the CNBB. Their 
institutional weight is further complemented by the presence of one cardinal, out a 
nationwide total of four, within the archdiocese. 14 
In international terms too, Säo Paulo gains a certain status as the largest archdiocese in 
the most populous Catholic nation and continent on earth. 
What has really tended to mark out the archdiocese, however, is its dynamism. Part of 
this dynamism is attributable to secular factors. That is to say, insofar as the Church is 
present in a region as politically and economically sensitive as Sao Paulo, there is a 
unique socio-political backdrop against which to compare the institution's theory and 
practice. Much more, though, is owed to the figure of Dom Paulo Evaristo Ams, who 
was appointed archbishop in 1970. 
Under his leadership the Catholic Church took an active stance against the military 
dictatorship's human rights abuses. It was this courageous policy which helped to bring 
the archdiocese to world attention. Away from the glare of publicity, however, other 
major changes were also taking place. These included Dom Paulo's championing of a 
more democratic form of decision-making within the Church; the production of pastoral 
plans in key social mission areas, which included urban labour; the support of Liberation 
Theology perspectives within teaching seminaries; the support of grassroots initiatives; 
and the firm support of the preferential option for the poor. In other words, unlike many 
other instances in Latin America and Brazil, Dom Paulo's Church undertook the 
implementation of a preferential option for the poor from a radical perspective. 
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Fig. 2. 
CNBB REGIONAL SUL-I 
The State of Säo Paulo 
0F 
Regional Limit 
Ecclesiastical Limit 
& Diocesan Headquarters 
Archdiocesan Headquarters C 0 
a I it 
Source: Adapted from CNBB, Igreia no Brasil: Diretörio Litürgico 1967., CNBB, Brasflia, 1986, p. 57. 
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It is the simultaneous presence of these qualitative and quantitative factors (secular as 
well as religious) that makes an analysis of this particular diocese of much wider 
significance. In effect, it provides a privileged opportunity of seeing how, when it is 
favourably disposed, the Church seeks to come to grips with the thorny issue of its own 
identity in a society divided amongst classes. 
With regard to the choice of the Diocese of Santo Andre for study, this arose 
principally because within its borders lie the Metalworkers' Unions of Sao Bernardo and 
Santo Andre, i. e., the radical end of the labour specturm. As will be made clear later on, 
one reason why the Archdiocese of Sio Paulo became involved with the strikes of the 
late 1970's was because it shared common borders with the Diocese of Santo Andre (see 
figure 3 overleaf). The fact remains, however, that it was the Diocese of Santo Andre 
which remained at the forefront of relations between these more radical metalworkers' 
unions and the wider Catholic Church. Given my aim of conducting a comparative study 
of the metalworker unions, there therefore existed a corresponding need to examine this 
diocese as well. 
1.6 The Church and Social Change -A Theoretical Framework 
The principal focus of the present work is upon the urban Brazilian labour movement 
and the Roman Catholic Church in a given place and at a given moment in time. 
Underlying many of the questions posed, however, is an implicit vision of the Church 
and society. In order to put the more specific concerns of the present study into 
perspective, it is to these broader issues that I must now briefly turn. 
Approaches to the study of Roman Catholicism in Latin American society have 
variously emphasised two key factors at work. One concerns institutional dynamics, and 
the other, class dynamics. It would be wrong to suggest that two distinctive schools exist, 
but certainly there are marked differences of approach to the question. 
The institutional dimension to the Church has been stressed by a wide variety of 
authors. Ivan Vallier, in his Catholicism, Social Control and Modernisation in Latin 
America, 15 was one of the first to suggest that the Church should essentially be 
conceived as an influence maximising organisation. Albeit with certain criticisms and 
different emphases, many others have held to elements of this organisational analysis 
approach. A central theme common amongst authors of the Brazilian situation, like 
Bruneau, Della Cava, and Moreira Alves, 16 is that the Church is somewhat akin to an 
elaborate self-defence mechanism. In essence, it attempts to preserve a given series of 
interests in an ever-changing social framework which, in the twentieth century at least, 
has done much to undermine these interests. Thus, for example, its disestablishment from 
the state posed problems, i. e., loss of political power, for which the Church sought 
solutions in the shape of informal alliances with leading political figures during the 
1930's. Similarly, the rise of secularism and Protestantism, the declining numbers 
attending mass and entering the priesthood are the kinds of challenges to which the 
15 
The Archdiocese of Säo Paulo 
(with episcopal subdivisions) 
Fig. 3. 
AND The Diocese of Santo Andre 
THE ARCHDIOCESE OF SAO PAULO 
Municipalities: Bauen, Carapicuiba, Cotia, Embu, Embu-GuaSu, Ibiüna, 
titapecerica da Serra, 
Itapevi, Jandira, Juquitiba, Mairinque. Osasco, Säo Paulo, Sao Roque, Taboo da Serra. Vargem 
Grande Paulista. 
Population: 9,781,022 (1980 census) 
Area: 5,060 km2 
THE DIOCESE OF SANTO ANDRE 
Municipalities: Diadema, Maul, Ribcräo Pires, Rio Grande da Serra, Santo Andre, Säo Bernardo 
do Campo, Säo Caetano do Sul. 
Population: 1,652,781 (1980 census) 
Area: 742 km2 
Sources: Adapted from CNBB, Igrcja no Bra il: Uirrlýirio Lilürgico 1987., CNBB, Brasilia, 1986, p-58" 
Centro Estatfstica Religiosa e Investigacoes Sociais (CERIS), Anutrio Catßlico d Brasil: 1985., CERIS, 
Rio de Janeiro, 1985, pp. 971 and 1039., Follia de Sao Paulo. 
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Catholic Church is said to have been forced to adapt. 
One of the difficulties associated with the organisational approach, however, concerns 
the fact that ecclesiastical interests are much more than just a series of objective and 
unambiguous givens. They are hierarchically ordered and, more often than not, a 
partially or even wholly contradictory totality. It is for this reason that one observer of 
the Brazilian situation, Scott Mainwaring, rightly notes how: 
Most organisational analysts have understated the conflicts between different conceptions of 
institutional objectives - different models of the Church. Defending the Church's interests includes 
such potentially contradictory goals as encouraging high mass attendance, fighting Communism, 
fighting for social justice, and having a close relationship with the elite. 17 
In no way does this kind of criticism imply that institutional dynamics are of marginal 
significance. Instead, what it seeks to do is to draw attention to their potentially 
conflictual as well as consensual make-up. 
My own thesis underlines the presence of these dualities and contradictions. It shows 
that whilst there are indeed remarkably wide areas of consensus which circumscribe the 
activities of all groups within the Church in relation to labour issues, there are, 
simultaneously, starkly differing conceptions as to what the interests and the role of the 
Church on this issue are and should be. Unfortunately, the institutional peculiarities of 
the Church, especially its desire to present a consensual line and a united front, tend to 
conceal these conflicts from the outside world; one is not dealing with the adversarialism 
of, for example, the British legal system, which is built around the polarisaton of 
positions. One of the aims of the present study, therefore, is to tease out the Church's 
conflicting positions. 
Another criticism of organisational approaches to the study of the Church concerns 
their undue emphasis on the role of leadership to the exclusion of other groups and 
dynamics. That leadership occupies a special role within the Church is not in question. 
Catholic bishops possess executive powers which are conferred upon them from above 
(ultimately from the Pope himself), rather than democratically from below (i. e., from 
clerical or lay followers). This notoriously centralised and vertically structured system of 
power relations has, quite understandably, given rise to the view that hierarchy is the key 
determinant of ecclesiastical outlooks and activity. Much weight, therefore, has been 
attached to the work of progressive bishops, like Dom Helder Cämara in the north east of 
Brazil and Dom Paulo Evaristo Ams in the south east, for having shifted the stance of the 
Church away from its conservative past and in a more liberal direction as one means of 
preserving its influence. 
The author Luiz Gonzaga de Souza Lima provides one of the most effective critiques 
of this overemphasis upon leadership. In his book, Evolucäo Politica dos Catolicos e da 
Igreja no Brasil, ' 8 he draws attention to alternative foci of change, in particular, to the 
role and significance of radical lay Catholic militants. He begins, quite correctly, in my 
view, from the premise that these Catholic militants belong first and foremost to social 
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classes and their attendant dynamics of conflict, and only then constitute agents of 
change within the Church itself. In essence, he argues that the radicalisation of certain 
lay Catholic groups (like Brazilian Catholic Action (Acäo Catolica Brasileira, ACB) and 
Popular Action (ASS1o Popular, AP)) during the 1950's and 1960's must be seen not as a 
purely infra-ecclesiastical phenomenon but as part of a wider process, i. e., in the context 
of the political crisis (the break up of populist alliances) through which Brazil was going. 
Similarly, it was with the repression of political expression following the military coup 
of 1964, that some sectors of the institutional Church increasingly assumed the struggles 
of these Catholic militants and thereby constituted one of the few available channels of 
popular expression and resistance. The Church increasingly became a locus of class 
struggle as it came under attack for its defence of these groups. According to Souza 
Lima, the reorientation of ecclesiastical perspectives which came to favour the working 
classes was much more than the result of mere episcopal volition and the desire for 
institutional self-preservation. It was, amongst other things, the result of sustained 
pressure from these groups which were themselves inserted in a class divided society. 
One leading Catholic intellectual and friar, Frei Betto, takes a not dissimilar view. He 
rightly argues that: 
it was not exactly the Church which opted for the poor, but, due to the repression against the popular 
movement and the trade union movement, the poor made an option for the Church, in other words, 
within it they sought a space where they could maintain themselves organised, articulated, conscious 
and active. ... T us, to the extent that the poor invaded the Church, priests and bishops began to 
convert themselves to Christianity. 19 
It is in the very nature of complex relationships of this kind that one cannot attribute 
change to a single factor (be it hierarchy, militancy, class conflict, Catholic doctrine, etc) 
especially when the weight of these factors is itself historically variable. If one takes the 
specific case of the Archdiocese of Säo Paulo during the period examined by this thesis, 
it becomes apparent that prior to 1970 the hierarchy constituted a significant block upon 
radical Catholic struggles. Thereafter, with the appointment of a new archbishop, the 
hierarchy began to act as a major support to radical Catholic struggles. It is also becomes 
clear, however, that the adoption of an increasingly class conflictive line by the Church 
came about not simply as a result of this shift in personnel (critical though that was), but 
also through the sustained pressure of Catholic militants themselves. As far as the case of 
Santo Andre is concerned, matters are somewhat different. There too, as will be 
demonstrated in a later chapter, hierarchy played a highly significant role in the 
rearticulation of the Church, but it did so (a), in the context of a sustained dialogue with 
militants, and (b), in the context of a massive labour-capital conflict. 
It should be clear from the above that any a-priori attempt to oppose institutional to 
class dynamics is by definition a false juxta-position. 
One of the most important theoretical contributions to the study of politico-religious 
questions, especially in the Latin American context, comes from the author Otto Maduro. 
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His book, Religion and Social Conflicts, puts forward a theoretical framework which 
correctly, in my view, conceives of religion as both a "product" of social conflicts, and 
also, as a mediator of conflict, i. e., with its own specificities and capacities for acting 
upon society. What follows is a brief summary of his arguments. 
Maduro adopts a materialist perspective insofar as he says that any mode of production 
is the conditio sine qua non of all else, including religion. He goes on to argue that: 
in a class society every religious activity is an activity by no means outside or above class conflicts. 
In a class society every religious activity is carried out within class conflicts, and as such is an 
activity permeated, limited, and oriented by these conflicts. 20 
... class resistance to domination will impose its own orientations and limitations upon the reading, 
interpretation, and official definitions of the foundational message of any religion operating within 
subordinate classes. 21 
He further adds that: 
the conflict between the opposing interests of autonomy on the part of the dominated and hegemony 
on the dominating will translate into a latent or open conflict in the religious field between the 
religious agents espousing these respective tendencies. 22 
Both these sets of propositions appear to be strongly borne out by my own findings. As 
will be shown in the course of the thesis, without any exceptions whatsoever, those 
figures (be they bishops or militants) who were pushing for a Church strongly committed 
to the working classes admitted to the presence of these ideological byass! their own 
reading of foundational texts, and production of new documents. This was 
notwithstanding their simultaneous and self-confessed desire to avoid ideological 
interpretations. As for the question of conflict within the religious field, despite the 
claims of high-ranking figures to the contrary, it was evident that here too, there were 
indeed both latent and open conflicts. These divisions became all the more apparent as 
one descended clerical ranks and passed into lay ranks. 
Turning to the second major argument advanced by Maduro, i. e., religion as a 
relatively autonomous field of social conflicts, he suggests that: 
the tendential effect of social structures, struggles, and transformations upon religious teachings and 
practices is a mediate effect - mediated by the religious field as such - and a variable effect - 
dependent upon the internal situation of the religious field. 23 
In each concrete religious conjuncture, there will be a determinate set of possibilities, and 
impossibilities, apertures and blockages, facing the religious demands of the laity. They will limit 
and orientate the specific form and content of production [of religious discourses and practises] 
tending transactionally (that is, partially and unequally) to satisfy these demands. 
In other words, the religious field, whilst critically circumscribed by external factors, 
does not directly and mechanically reproduce them, but rather, it represents a complex 
and indirect institutional mediation of these social forces and conflicts. The fact that it is 
able to act as a blocking or filtering mechanism - neither totally determined by, nor 
independent of, wider social forces - explains why one must always have regard to its 
internal specificities at any given moment in time. This is particularly so in the case of an 
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organisation like the Catholic Church which, over the course of centuries, and not just 
decades, has built up a vast bureacratic machine, an extended division of labour, 
centralised power structures - in short, a series of interests which are largely concerned 
with the maintainance of the status quo. Indeed, it is precisely this kind of factor which 
helps to explain, for example, the innate conservatism of the Church, and why its whole 
history throughout Latin America has largely been one of adaptive rather than innovative 
change. 
A third major proposition advanced by Maduro, and a question which is of central 
importance to my own thesis, is notion that: 
Religions do not necessarily constitute an obstacle to the autonomy of subordinate classes, or to their 
alliances against domination. 25 
He goes much further than this, however, and argues that religion may carry out a 
"revolutionary" role insofar as it reinforces the autonomy and alliances of dominated 
classes. It is suggested that this may be done at the level of (a) "class consciousness" (by 
which he means anything ranging from the mere collective self-perception of a 
dominated existence, to the advancement of strategies for overcomming this situation), 
(b) at the level of "class organisation" (by which he understands anything ranging from 
periodic meetings of the dominated to sustained meetings with the explicit aim of 
fighting domination in mind), and finally (c), at the level of "class mobilization" (which 
he takes to be evident in isolated acts of protest, or, in its most potent form, as systematic 
and continuous act of protest). 26 
One of the most potent examples of this revolutionary potential was the Nicaraguan 
revolution of 1979. In October 1980, the victorious Sandinistas even produced a 
document on the question of Christian participation in the revolution. There they publicly 
stated that: 
our experience demonstrates that when Christians, supported by their faith, are capable of responding 
to the necessities of the people and of history, their very religious convictions lead them to 
revolutionary militancy. 
It is clear that this situation contrasts sharply with that of Brazil during the period 1970- 
1986 insofar as the politics of the latter nation were characterised by a painfully slow 
transition from military dictatorship to presidential democracy, rather than any dramatic 
revolutionary socialist break with the past. Inspite of this difference, however, there 
is 
plenty of evidence to substantiate Maduro's main hypotheses. Viewed within the specific 
context of labour struggles in Brazil, which is the main concern of the present thesis, it 
becomes clear that the Church acted as a buttress to working class autonomy on all the 
levels mentioned and, what is more, 'over a sustained period of time. 
It is at this point that one must be careful to make certain conceptual distinctions and 
qualifications regarding the term Church since it is somewhat all-inclusive, and, in this 
sense, imprecise. The comments of the Brazilian friar, and one of the world's leading 
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theologians of liberation, Frei Leonardo Boff, shed some light on this question. In a 1979 
article, published on the eve of the Third CELAM conference, when a polarization of 
views and forces was underway between different sectors of the Church, he said that: 
The opposition that one presently notes - it should be well understood - does not establish itself 
between an official Church and a popular Church, but between Christendom (Church encarnated in 
the begemonic classes) and the popular Church. The latter Church is articulated with the hierarchical 
Church but establishes an antagonism towards the project of a new Christendom, which would 
attempt-to subordinate the pastoral action of the Church to its own articulation with the hegemonic 
classes 2s 
We must not view the Church at the base as a parallel Church to that great institution: the 
antagonism-is not established between institution and community but between Christendom 
(Church associated to the hegemonic powers of a class society) and popular Church (articulated with 
the bases). 29 
This distinction between the Church as an institution and as a community, combined 
with a corresponding emphasis upon the potential for the two to articulate favourably 
rather than antagonistically, is, I believe, essential to an understanding of the Catholic 
Church. This is for two broad reasons. First, because observers must be careful not to 
frame conflicts (of which there are many) in terms of false juxtapositions. The fact is, on 
a large range of theoretical issues, persons throughout the ethico-political spectrum (a 
spectunn in which, for instance, I would place both the current Pope, the bishops of Säo 
Paulo, the CNBB, radical Catholic militants, and leading liberation theologians) stand 
together rather than in mutually divided and antagonistic camps. Naturally, the presence 
of agreement over many fundamental orienting principles does not preclude conflict over 
the precise forms by which these principles are mediated. Indeed, this theme of 
conflicting mediations - the adaptation of Catholic theology to conflicting historical 
specificities - is a recurrent theme throughout the present thesis and is discussed in some 
detail in the fifth chapter. 
The second motive for making a distinction between Church as community and as 
institution, is that without it, one is either confined to a monolithic concept of what is 
infact a class fractured entity; or, when the possibility of a favourable articulation is not 
taken into account, one asserts the existence of divisions, but exclusively in terms of a 
crude bipolarity of forces which are horizontally constructed and circumscribed. 
Even the most cursory examination of the Latin American situation shows that the 
Church per se is neither monolithic, nor bipolar. Considerable plurality exists. In the case 
of Nicaragua, for example, there has been a marked division of the Church along 
horizontal lines, with open antagonisms emerging between the grass roots (who 
participated in the 1979 revolution) and the most senior hierarchy (which substantially 
resisted it). In this instance, there is nothing monolithic about the Church. In El Salvador, 
on the other hand, one is confronted with the figure of Archbishop Oscar Romero who, 
in 1980, was assassinated precisely because of his outspoken defence of a popular 
Church and his criticism of the right-wing military dictatorship. Here is an example 
where a powerful verticle linkage between grassroots radicals and the hierarchy existed. 
21 
What is required, then, is a case by case analysis. With regard to Brazil, and the 
Archdiocese of Sao Paulo, it will be shown that the relation of forces within the Church 
shifted substantially over time. Under Cardinal Agnelo Rossi (1964-1970), for instance, 
there was little or no articulation between hierarchy and popular Church. On the contrary, 
there was deep mutual hostility. But with the arrival of Dom Paulo, in 1970, that began to 
change, and one of Brazil's most solid examples of an interchange along verticle lines 
was developed. Significantly, it was this vertically integrated model of the Church, and 
not just any model, which came to act as a buttress to working class autonomy. That is 
precisely why, as noted earlier, care is needed with a term as all-embracing as "the 
Church". 
The final qualification to the concept of the Church which needs to be made, concerns 
its international character. It is perhaps easier, in the light of conflicts between national 
churches and the Vatican during the 1980's, to appreciate the specificity of the latter. 
Like class, it too represents a powerful - admittedly more direct - constraint upon the 
actions of any given national church. Quite literally, it sets the rules - be they 
organisational or theological. Furthermore, through its capacity to appoint bishops, it 
may substantially alter the balance of forces within a given diocese (indeed, as we shall 
see, this is precisely what happened in the case of Sao Paulo in the early 1970's and late 
1980's). But like class, however, it too is mediated. Vatican policy is always 
circumscribed by national peculiarities. It may seek to establish an abstract, i. e., 
universal, framework for the conduct of ecclesiastical policy; but it has little choice as to 
the extra-ecclesiastical conditions under which that policy is carried out. As has already 
been underlined in this section, and as will become clearer in the course of the thesis, 
these extra-institutional conditions are of essential importance if one is to understand the 
dynamics of change within the Brazilian Catholic Church. 
I. 7 Thesis Outline 
Turning to the structure and content of the study, the reader will observe that it is 
divided into five broadly chronological chapters. 
The first examines the processes behind the Archdiocese of Säo Paulo's reversal of 
attitudes in relation to issues of class conflict and labour militancy during the late 1960's 
and early 1970's. This shift, from what were essentially class conciliatory concepts 
towards more conflictive notions of social reality, is discussed with special reference to 
Catholic involvement in the metalworker politics of the region. 
The second chapter, which covers the period 1975-78, looks at the up-grading, or 
stabilisation, of radical Catholic labour militancy within the context of a new 
ecclesiastical organisational framework that gave increasing priority to lay sectors. Once 
again, attention is also given to the relationship between these changes and metalworker 
union dynamics. As will become clear, not only did this period witness the establishment 
of a highly complex and effective division of labour between lay Catholic activists and 
22 
the Church hierarchy; but it also saw the maturation of alliances of influence between the 
Catholic Church and radical metalworker union militants. 
The third chapter compares and contrasts the experiences in the Diocese of Santo 
Andre to those in Sao Paulo, with the main emphasis being upon the period 1975 to 
1980. Ironically, for a Church which came to be closely associated with metalworker 
struggles, the links between the Diocese Santo Andre and progressive unionism are 
shown to be far more tenuous than the events of the late 1970's would lead one to expect. 
It is only after and not before the first strike of 1978 that strong links really come to be 
forged. Prior to this moment, the Church is comparatively marginalised; it does not enjoy 
the privileged links of its Säo Paulo counterpart with radical metalworkers. The chapter 
also deals with the question of who benefitted from the closer integration of metalworker 
struggles with the Church. Amongst other things, it is argued that the events of 1978-80 
represented a golden opportunity for the Church to rehabilitate itself amongst this critical 
sector of the working class. 
In the light of all these developments, the fourth chapter (which spans the early to mid- 
1980's), goes onto examine the fundamental realignment of national trade union politics 
from the perspective of the Church's involvement in and response to the founding of the 
CUT and the CGT. Amongst other issues, the chapter discusses the suggestion that the 
labour movement's secular integrity has been violated and undermined through the 
involvement of the Church. 
The fifth and final chapter brings together the themes of class and Catholicism raised 
by the examples of the Greater Sao Paulo churches; but this time it also situates them in a 
theoretical and international institutional perspective. The chapter discusses some of the 
theoretical difficulties involved in reconciling Catholic unity with notions of class 
conflict and a preferential option for the poor. At the same time the section raises more 
immediate practical institutional conflicts and dilemmas - most notably, the question of 
how the Church hierarchies of Sao Paulo and Santo Andre can reconcile their progressive 
stance with the Vatican's determination to create a Church of the poor which, in the 
words of Pope John Paul H: 
does not wish to serve that which causes tensions and makes struggles explode between men. 
30 
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Chapter One: Church, Labour and Class - The Crisis of the Late 1960's and the 
Constitution of a New Ecclesiastical Identity 
1.1 Introduction 
The basic aim of this chapter is to examine the processes behind the Archdiocese of 
Säo Paulo's re-evaluation of class and labour issues during the late 1960's and early 
1970's. Inasmuch as that re-evaluation would involve a shift away from open support of 
the military dictatorship and theories of class colaboration, to criticism of that 
dictatorship and the support of left-wing working class militancy, it is the story of a 
remarkable about-face. 
In the first sections I will briefly describe the intra-ecclesiastical status quo of the late 
1960's, why it became untenable, and why the initial solution proposed by the hierarchy 
-a technical solution rather than the requisite shift in orientation and strategy - would 
itself prove a failure. The remaining sections are devoted to an examination of those 
processes which led to the formulation of a new, more class conflictive, consensus in the 
early 1970's. 
As well as focusing upon the hierarchy, the present chapter will examine the 
emergence of a new consensus in the context of five lay Catholic labour organisations 
which were, on various occasions, closely linked to metalworkers' struggles in the Säo 
Paulo area. The emphasis upon these militant groups arises for two reasons. The first, 
which was discussed in more detail in the introductory chapter, is my view that 
ecclesiastical change in this area cannot be explained without reference to lay militancy 
and its insertion in broader class dynamics. The second, stems from my specific concern 
with links between the Church and metalworkers of Säo Paulo. In the event it was the 
most left-wing of these Catholic militant groups which became the cutting edge of 
increasingly close ties between the Church and the most progressive sectors of the 
unions. Furthermore, it was these groups which would, with varying degrees of success, 
play a key role in the emergence of left oriented secular oppositions to the nominees or 
sympathisers of the dictatorship within the unions. 
1.2 Conflicting Ecclesiastical Approaches to the Question of Class 
At the heart of the conflict that convulsed the Church of Säo Paulo in the late 1960's 
lay a series of competing doctrinal interpretations and ecclesiastical stances on class. 
Above all, it was the military coup of 1964 that was to render their comparatively 
peaceful co-existence impossible. In effect, the dictatorship, and the tensions that its 
repressive social policies generated, deprived the Church of the luxury of indefinition 
which democracy had originally afforded it. It brought latent tensions to the fore. As with 
militants from left-wing secular orgailisations, Catholic militants who were involved with 
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the labour movement and opposed to the military regime became subject to military 
repression. This situation left the Church with a stark choice. Either it could turn its back 
on these individuals and events (which was the policy at a certain stage), or (as would 
later become the case), it could progressively be dragged into the conflict. The latter 
course, however, would entail not merely theoretical clarification and re-interpretation of 
its own doctrinal bases, but also, a practical response to the political challenges posed by 
attacks from without and the pressures which these generated within its ranks. The myth 
of neutrality would have to be cast aside. 
The reassessment of the Church's role in relation to the state and civil society was not 
an easy process. It was also full of historical irony. Firstly, because the immediate 
catalyst for change came not from within the Church but from without, in the form of the 
secular dictatorship it had helped to bring to power. Secondly, because that self-same 
dictatorship provided the Church with a tremendous opportunity for grasping 
fundamental issues that it had either been unwilling or incapable of dealing with during 
the years of post-war democracy. That is why, for instance, one of the regime's most 
consistent high-ranking ecclesiastical opponents suggested that "Nothing helped the 
Church more than the revolution of 1964. " 1 
There is, however, another longer term dimension to these shifts in orientation which 
must not be neglected. That is the broader conflict of ideas already present within the 
heart of the wider Roman Catholic Church prior to 1964. 
The redefinition of theological discourse from the centre, under the Papacy of John 
XXIII (1958-63), was a matter of far greater historical significance to the extent that it 
represented a departure from centuries of tradition. By re-drawing the theological map, it 
accorded increased legitimacy to the Catholic left, and weakened the Catholic right. This 
was irrespective of local conditions. 
In Latin America, these shifts in the theological terrain were recognised by the 
Bishops' Conference at Medellin (1968) which, as I indicated earlier, marked a decisive 
break with the Church's past of power and priviledge. What it did not mark, however, 
was the entire liquidation of conservative perspectives. On the contrary, as the case of the 
Archdiocese of Säo Paulo shows, the Church at that time was divided in relation to papal 
doctrine. What follows, is a brief synopsis of these conflicting approaches. 
The more conservative perspectives, which, it must be stressed, enjoyed most favour 
with the Cardinal of Säo Paulo, Dom Agnelo Rossi, were to varying degrees, based upon 
two major papal encyclicals. The first, by Pope Leo X111(1879-1903) entitled Rerum 
Novarum(1891), and the second, by Pope Pius Xl (1922-1939) entitled Quadragesimo 
Ano(1931). These were earlier Vatican answers to what was widely known as the "social 
question". They offered a Catholic analysis of class society which at the very least was 
flawed as a sociological analysis, and at its worst, represented a complete mystification 
of social problems and relations. Inequalities between people, for instance, were 
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characterised as both natural and desirable: 
The differences which exist naturally between men are great and many. There is no equality in talent, 
or skill, or health, or strength, and these unavoidable differences lead of themselves to inequalitites of 
fortune. This is clearly of advantage to both individuals and to society. 
x 
Adopting this pseudo-scientific line of reasoning, the encyclical went on: 
it is a mistake to imagine that class is spontaneously hostile to class, as if nature had matched 
together the wealthy owners of the means of production and the unpropertied workers to persist in 
laying wildly about each other... Just as the different parts of the body unite to form a whole so well 
proportioned as to be symmetrical, so also nature has decreed that in the state these twin classes 
should correspond to each other in concord and create an equilibrium. Each stands in need of the 
other. there can be no capital without labour, nor labour without capital. 3 
Utilising this kind of analysis of the difficulties engendered by a class-divided society, 
the Catholic Church attacked two great evils: unbridled capitalism, and socialist inspired 
class conflict. The way out of the impass, it was argued, was by means of a process of 
give and take between the various forces leading to the harmonisation rather than 
polarisation of classes. 
Such views contrasted with those of the Catholic left which, to varying degrees, took 
its source of inspiration from the encyclicals Mater et Magistra(1961), Pacem in 
Terris(1963), and most especially from the Second Vatican Council. All had their origins 
in the Papacy of John XX1 I. The two encyclicals marked a determined shift away from 
an organicist conception of society with its consequent stress upon hierarchy, order, anti- 
Communism, class paternalism and harmony. They focused instead upon the just roads 
to development, particularly those that would lead to the reduction of global inequalities. 
As for the Second Vatican Council, some of its key documents, like Gaudiam et Spes, 
shifted from natural law theorising to empirically based and more radical forms of action 
which sought to adapt themselves to the realides of a class-divided society rather than 
forcing society to adapt itself to a series of divinely ordained abstract principles. As 
Clearey says: 
Instead of proceeding in the time honoured fashion, discussing theological or biblical principles and 
then applying them to the present-day situation, Gaudiam et Spes reverses the process: it begins with 
a careful analysis of the de facto situation, then turns to sacred scripture and theology for reflection 
on that situation, and finally, as a third step, makes pastoral applicatons. Theological reflection thus becomes the second, and not the first, step. 4 
For the purposes of abstract comparison it is possible to identify neatly the theological' 
watershed that separated radical from conservative perspectives, but in practice these did 
not always find such clear-cut organisational expression. Groups on the left frequently 
made reference to Rerum er Novarum, and others, on the centre-right, made use of more 
radical documents such as the findings of Medellin. In part this was due to the Church's 
traditionally eclectic use of its own documents, each being accorded a certain degree of 
legitimacy, but, more significantly, it was also a reflection of the frequently ambiguous 
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ideological roots of those movements, particularly of the centre-left, and the fact that at 
this point they were in the throes of re-defining their identities. 
Not all groups of the left suffered from this problem of theoretical in-definition. Some 
indviduals were so clear as to their mission that they felt compelled to leave the ranks of 
the Church and seek new organisational expressions (hence the emergence of Popular 
Action (AFIao Popular, AP) which was pledged to revolutionary struggle). A number of 
left groups which stayed within the Church, especially the student groups, also had a 
clear and well articulated idea as to their own mission. They opted for a path which 
explicitly distanced itself from the rule of the hierarchy. 5 
In the sections that follow, however, my concern is exclusively with those lay and 
clerical organisations whose main defining characteristics were (a), a specific devotion to 
labour issues, and (b), whose activities were directly channeled into metalworkers' 
struggles in Säo Paulo. Five groups stand out as being of special significance: the 
Circulos Operärios; UNICOR; Acäo Cato'lica Operäria; the Frente Nacional do Trabalho; 
and Pastoral Operäria. As will become clear, they each possessed not merely distinctive 
political characteristics and approaches to the question of labour and class within the 
Archdiocese of Sao Paulo, but also organisational ones. Their degree of autonomy from 
the Church hierarchy varied considerably, as did their political weight within both the 
Church and union movement. 
1.2.1 The Circulos Operärios - Class Collaboration 
The Catholic labour organisation of most numerical weight in Säo Paulo until the mid 
1960's was the Workers' Circles (Circulos Operärios, COs). In 1964 there were 60 COs 
in the state of Säo Paulo (15 in the capital and 45 in the interior) with a total of some 
200,000 members. 6 With the coup of that year the COs began to enjoy even greater 
success, this time at a leadership level, as a number of their members were drafted into 
unions as "interventors", i. e., government imposed rather than democratically elected 
union leaders. 
Although in organisational terms the COs were comparatively autonomous, there is 
little doubt that the Catholic Church was their principal intellectual patron. Many priests 
were involved as advisers to the COs at all levels. The origins of the COs as a national 
force lay in the 1930's when their brand of anti-Communism and labour assistance 
(based upon the encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadraggesimo Anno) appeared to 
blend in well with the anti-Communism of the Vargas regime and its desire to implant a 
non-conflictual system of labour relations. Sponsorship therefore came from two 
quarters, Rio de Janeiro's Cardinal Sebastiäo Leme, who was pushing for the 
rapprochement of Church and state, and President Getulio Vargas himself, who like the 
COs, was keen to purge the labour movement of its Communist and anarcho-syndicalist 
tendencies. This is how it came about that in 1941 the COs received official recognition 
as a "technical and consultative organ" to the Ministry of Labour Industry and 
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Commerce. 8 
Whilst many of their objectives could be regarded as trade unionist in orientation - 
especially those concerning the reduction of the working day and the improvement of 
working conditions for both men and women, the COs were not trade unions in the 
accepted sense of the term; their emphasis was upon education and welfare rather than 
mass mobilisation - particularly one that might involve any form of strike action. As the 
COs' own manual pointed out, the group's objective was: 
a) to lend efficient spiritual, moral, intellectual, physical and professional assistance to its members 
and to workers in general by means of schools, colleges, courses, emergency and general clinics, 
hospitals, co-operatives, loans organisations, recreational and sports departments, etc... b) to give the 
workers an adequate education... d) to compete for the harmonisation of the relations between 
employees and employers... f) to co-operate with the Ministry of Labour in what pertains to the 
legitimate interests of the workers... 9 
X 
In many respects the COs showed a great resemblance to the corporatist-type unions set 
up by Vargas during this era. So much so, in fact, that there were debates as to what the 
proper functions of the two should be. 
Despite the limitations which the COs set themselves, we find that amongst the 
metalworkers of Säo Paulo their influence was quite pronounced. Having targeted the 
Sao Paulo Metalworkers' Union for action in 1961 they supported a former CO member 
and candidate of the right, Joaquim dos Santos Andrade (better known as "Joaquinzzo"), 
in his campaign against the incumbent left-wing leadership. This was for what he 
described as having "excessively party-politicised the union"; 10 another way of saying 
that it had become too subject to the influence of the Communist Party. On this occasion 
their campaign failed, but as Affonso Delellis, the former president of the union from 
1963 to 1964 (before he was barred from office by the dictatorship) noted in a later 
interview, the person who would eventually give the introductory speech at Joaquinzäo's 
inauguration in 1965 was none other than the leader of the COs, Frei Celso. 
1 I 
By this time Joaquinzäo himself was no longer a CO member, but this public support 
leaves no doubt as to where their mutual sympathies lay. Indeed, his subsequent policies 
within the union can be regarded as a fine secular expression of the CO's philosophy with 
its stress upon the social service aspects of unions, together with its opposition to class 
combativity generally and left-wing goups in particular. 
This and other successes in the 1960's, like the government imposed appointment of 
many members as union leaders after the 1964 coup, 12 belied the fact that the COs were 
already entering a period of deep crisis. Thus, by 1968 they were in a process of selling- 
off a number of their headquarters, and by the 1970's had all but lost their mass base and 
the influence they once excercised within Säo Paulo's labour movement. The causes of 
this precipitous decline have not yet been sufficiently explained and require more 
research. 13 However, three factors do stand out. 
The first concerns changes in Vatican social teaching then taking place under the 
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papacy of John XXIU (and sustained in his successor's, Pope Paul VI's, Octogesima 
Adveniens(1971)). These left the COs theologically and, to a lesser extent, politically 
outmoded as far as the wider institution was concerned (although this would only 
become fully apparent later when Brazilian conservative clerical Catholicism itself 
entered into crisis). Whilst the COs as a whole were slow to adapt, some members did 
begin to question their theological bases in the light of recent changes in Catholic social 
teaching. 
A, second factor was the relationship between the COs' leadership and the wider 
membership. A former member explained to me how the top jobs, in virtue of the 
education they required, went to the middle classes and, intentionally or not, these 
marginalised the struggle of the workers in the factories. As he put it: 
There was always a distance between the true worker and the leaderships of the Circles.... the 
problem is not so much that these leaderships were anti-Communist, but in the fact that they did not 
assume the struggle of the workers, they did not have a project for the workers because they were not 
workers suffering their needs. 14 
X 
The final factor concerns the political outlook of the leadership. Although there was 
considerable regional variation throughout Brazil, in the specific case of Säo Paulo state 
the marginalisation of the workers' struggle was no accident. More than anywhere else, 
the leaders of the COs here were closely tied to the interests of the local industrial elites 
and therefore actively played the anti-Communist card. According to the above source, 
"everything was anti-Communism. "15 The problem, of course, was that one could only 
play this card for so long, especially when the dictatorship itself came to be perceived as 
the primary threat to workers' rights. 16 Given the unusually centralised and authoritarian 
nature of the COs, and the fact that from the outset it was the leadership which above all 
had supported the military's project and ideology, it was not surprising that the 
organisation as a whole proved incapable of modernising i9/order to save its own skin. 
1.2.2 UNICOR -A Modernising Conciliatory Approach 
Not all groups who espoused a class conciliatory line were as dogmatic as the Circulos 
Operärios. In the case of the Church in Säo Paulo there were modernising groups whose 
efforts broke free of the rigid anti-Communist constraints and which genuinely sought a 
more balanced approach to relations between labour and capital. In the late 1960's the 
most significant of these modernisers, both in intellectual17 and ecclesio-political terms, 
was the Fransiscan friar, Frei Luis Maria Alves Sartori. 
In many respects he was ahead of his time, capable of challenging the more 
anachronistic aspects of Church life. A one-time close colleague Frei Alamiro, described 
this aspect of his work thus: 
Sartori was one of the first, as I see it, to make this insertion into the world of work, that is to say this 
shift of socio-economic location and practice. The difficulty that Sartori faced was that a lot of the 
Church did not make this move. The Fransiscans did not make the move and continue to view him 
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with distance. He physically moved out..., abandoning the parochial structure, living in workers' 
neighbourhoods.. I think that for the Church it was a big thing for a friar not to live in a monastery, to 
live in a working class district, nob longer to use a habit but to dress in a monkeysuit, participating 
with the workers in the factory ... 
x 
I 
The overall strategy of Sartori and his group, Uniäo e Corar9äo - UNICOR (from the 
Latin unicum cor, "one heart only") was relatively simple. It envisaged the overcoming 
of the capital-labour division of the enterprise and forming a single unit. Once again, like 
the Workers' Circles, UNICOR was not subject to the dictates of the Church. It did not 
have a direct or organic link with the institution, rather, it too was heavily dependent 
upon the intellectual contribution of individual priests. 
Whilst it was more a question of coincidence that the work of UNICOR took place in 
metalworking firms, what was not accidental was the means of entering these firms - 
with the consent of the employers. Sartori, together with a number of priests and 
workers, would go to a factory at meal times and unite with the workers in groups where 
they would study the social doctrine of the Church. Unlike the Workers' Circles, 
however, the UNICOR conception of social doctrine was more broadly defined, 
including not only the writings of Leo Xlll and Pius Xl, but also the findings of Medellin 
which had recently come out. From this factory based study Sartori and his colleagues 
would also get to know the families of the workers and form family groups in the 
neighbourhoods. In the factory itself, Sartori encouraged the formation of a factory 
commisson through which the problems of the workers could be discussed. 
Testimony as to the inefficacy of the Sartori factory commissions, other than as a very 
limited consciousness raising exercise, comes in two forms. First, and one already h ded 
to above, is the fact that the group only got into a given factory with employer consent. 
More than this, 'The experience he developed in a factory gave him credentials before 
the boss and one boss would give a reference to another. "19 The same could not be said 
for the efforts of radical Catholics to start up factory commissions in metalworking firms 
(of which more later). On the contrary, they were openly persecuted by their employers. 
The second comes in the form of the attention it provoked amongst the Communists - not 
in terms of what progressive organisations the UNICOR commissions were, but the exact 
opposite - of how, with a little militant attention, they or their members could perhaps 
be 
given a few more teeth. 
These contradictions even led some of Sartori's closest allies to desert the organisation. 
Commenting on the broad objectives of the movement, Frei Alamiro said the following: 
I think that as utopia, fine and well, but as reality and method to go forward that is where I entered a 
little bit into a different line of thinking from Sartori's.... the route he used to enter into a factory was 
already a concession of the boss. We entered into a factory already with the concession of capital in 
order to work upon the workers. So there was a root problem with which I did not feel comfortable 
because it falsified the relation, because I see the factory as truly divided between labour and capital, 
and there is a conflict between the two, and they are antagonistic interests. 
J 
The principal reason for the failure of the Sartori approach, which despite its powerful 
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supporters in the Säo Paulo Catholic hierarchy never passed beyond the activity of a few 
militants and, more significantly, was later eclipsed by its left-wing critics, was the 
rapidly polarising political and labour situation in Brazil at that time. Perhaps, under a 
dictatorship, where only the tiniest of reforms were countenanced, Frei Sartori 
represented the most daring of legal means for Catholic militancy, but it was precisely 
the viability of these dictatorially circumscribed legal means that the generals were in 
effect forcing Catholic militants to question. In increasing numbers the latter either chose 
to abandon militancy altogether (for fear of their lives) or, alternately, as their room for 
S manoeuvre became progr6vely more restricted they chose to expand it dramatically by 
opting for measures, like strike action, which the law deemed unacceptable. 
1.2.3 Acäo Catölica Operäria -A Class Conflictive Approach 
No treatment of radical Catholic labour militancy can avoid some reference to the work 
of Catholic Workers Action (A? äo Catölica Operäria, ACO). Unlike the Workers' 
Circles, this organisation never achieved mass proportions, nor was it intended to do so, 
being geared instead to a specific - in many ways exclusive - brand of militancy. In the 
city of Sao Paulo, for example, it is estimated that there were only 50 ACO militants at 
the time of the 1964 coup, and that before the introduction of the Acto Institucional 
Cinco (AI-5) in 1968 (which directly hit the organisation) this figure had tripled. The 
dicoese of Santo Andre presented much the same picture with 150 militants. 
21 
Like the Workers' Circles and UNICOR, ACO was a workers' movement inspired by 
the Christian message. But whilst it was an autonomous lay movement, it was more 
closely linked to the Catholic Church. In its own words, the organisation sought to be: 
a movement that represents the worläng class within the Church, with the right to demand from the 
Church that it be faithful to the working class. - 
Furthermore, the organisation recognised that: 
ACO cannot exist without an ecclesiastical adviser capable of understanding the workers' struggle 
and of giving Christian encouragement to the militants. 23 
ACO's individuality and strength lay in three main areas: (a) its independence from 
local hierarchical control, (b) the power of its methodology and (c), the quality and 
commitment of the militants it produced. Officially founded in 1962, its significance 
quickly became apparent within the ranks of the labour movement, specifically, the 
metalworkers of the Greater Sao Paulo region. Militants were instrumental in setting up 
Osasco's National Labour Front (of which more later), in instituting a genuinely radical 
factory commission at the Cobrasma metalworking factory (in the city of Osasco), and, 
in 1968, with following these actions through by means of an illegal strike which had 
widespread repercussions. Within the city of Sao Paulo itself, other members, building 
upon previous struggles, were instrumental in the formation of an opposition to another 
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conservative metalworkers' union, that led by Joaquinzäo. The slate that was eventually 
mounted to combat the incumbent was led by Waldemar Rossi, ACO's leading militant. 
Part of ACO's success in capturing new members was explicable in terms of its ability 
to respond directly to the need amongst militants, either within or close to Catholic 
Youth Workers (Juventude Operaria Catolica, JOC), for an organisation devoted to the 
needs of adults. With the increased maturity and experience of some of the older cadres, 
like Waldemar Rossi himself, their: 
greater interest came to be less youth and more the context of the world of work. ... To the extent that the entrance into the world of work in a more conscious manner required a more incisive action 
within the factory, more present within the union, this required us to think less as youth and more as 
adults. 24 
I 
In other words, whilst JOC had been key in orienting Catholics towards the world of 
work, this had been done very much in the name of youth and the problems that it faced. 
A number of militants had quite literally outgrown these specific concerns and needed a 
broader means of inserting their struggles in the factories and trade unions. 
A second factor which accounts for ACO's success was the clarity of purpose of its 
membership which decisively rejected certain options whilst setting the movement 
limited but important and feasible goals. At the meeting of November 1-4 1962 in Silo 
Paulo, which constitued ACO, it was agreed that "political action must be assumed under 
the personal responsibility of the militant" and that the movement would not act as a 
"closed bloc" i. e., that "the organisation of militants around common actions would not 
be admitted except in the most exceptional of circumstances". 25 This approach in effect 
precluded any attempt by the movement to constitute itself either as a parallel political or 
trade union force, an important step and one that would be a model for other left-wing 
Catholic militant organisations that developed in the 1970's. Instead, the movement's 
impact was to be achieved by militants acting within the working class, and as part of the 
working class. 
Although the ultimate form that action took was a matter of personal choice, the 
movement had its own distinctive Christian ethic as well as method of training. The Sao 
Paulo meeting, for instance, included a structural critique of society, basing this upon the 
encyclical Mater et Magistra. It rejected individulaistic solutions, that is to say, 
improvement through changing the human person, which was typical of much Christian 
action, and used by the Workers' Circles, and, instead, adopted more structural 
approaches as set out in Pope John XXIII's encyclical. The key modus operandi adopted 
was that of the periodic "Revision of Working Life" by militants. 
Essentially this built upon ACO's JOC heritage of "See, Judge and Act". It provided 
the movement with such a dynamic method of action that again this would be adopted by 
other left-wing Catholic organisations in the 1970's. It is worth quoting at length from 
ACO's own account what the method entailed. 
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... In this pedagogy of SEE, 
JUDGE and ACT, five basic attitudes distinguish themselves: 
- The creative participation of the militants, who narrate the 
facts that occur daily and 
choose, amongst themselves, one to be the object of the Revision of Workers Life. 
- The analysis of the fact in a more global vision, so that its significance in the 
economic, social, political and ideological aspect, as far as the causes and consequences, are fully 
understood, thus enabling the creation of conscious and adequate proposals of transformative actions. 
- The discovery that sin is both social and personal, that it maintains the injustices and 
contradictions in society and the resistence to the just aspirations of the workers. 
- The comprehension of the workers' reality in the light of Biblical teachings, searching 
for the signs of Quist not merely in the JUDGING, but also in the SEEING and the ACIZNG. 
The decision to fight for the objective of radically transforming people and structures 
for the construction of a new society, just, free, egalitarian and fraternal. 
I 
The methodology was no longer introspective. It focused not only upon the individual 
aspects of sin (which was the traditional domain of the right, and practically speaking 
circumscribed the latter's activities), but also upon its structural manifestations and, 
ultimately, solutions. Not only was this structuralist dimension to the Catholic critique of 
society notably absent from groups like the Workers' Circles, but it was also absent from 
the centre-right, as was the case of Sartori's group. In the context of dictatorship, where 
small reforms within the system were out of the question, this ultimately proved the 
downfall of the Workers' Circles and UNICOR. Perhaps Sartori's power-sharing 
arrangement with the employers (which was recommended by Mater and Magistra and 
constituted an advance on individualism) would have met with greater success in a less 
polarised national situation. But as it was, in the context of the dictatorship, this 
gradualist-type solution could not even begin to address broader political fundamentals 
which both the radical Catholic movements and the trade union movement as a whole 
would eventually have to do. 
ACO, on the other hand, was one grouppýroceeded from the analysis of the individual, 
or small unit, to a more global critique, with the aim of constructing an altogether new 
society that could indeed satisfy the aspirations of its members, and most especially, the 
working class as a whole. 
To the extent that ACO permitted its membership to follow a number of broad class 
objectives rather than to subordinate their activity to organisational or ecclesiastical self- 
interest, one can describe ACO as methodologcally pluralist. This fact is well illustrated 
by the wide range of working class organisations - Catholic or otherwise - 
in which 
individual members could be found acting (and which were noted at the beginning of this 
section). Again, the reluctance to counterpose class objectives to movement objectives 
represented one of ACO's inherent strengths (one that would be taken on board by other 
left-wing Catholic labour organisations of the 1970's), giving it a remarkable penetration 
within the ranks of combative labour. In the context of the late 1960's, however, this 
proved a double-edged asset since it put ACO on a collision course not merely with 
employers or the state, but also the Church - the one body that could provide 
it with some 
form of protection. 
36 
1.2.4 The Frente Nacional do Trabalho - Transition to a Class Conflictive Approach 
Founded in 1960, the National Labour Front (Frente Nacional do Trabalho, FNT) was 
an independent Christian lay organisation of considerable political ambiguity. Whilst in 
effect it represented a practical grass roots critique of capitalism (it had, after all, 
emerged very much as a direct result of the strikes of cement workers at the Perus factory 
in the late fifties), it did not carry this out from a Christian socialist perspective as would 
later become that case. Instead, it relied on Catholic social teaching and all the 
ambiguities which that entailed. Indeed, the FNT's own pamphlet admits that: 
At that time [the early 1960's] it did not tackle with clarity the question of the class struggle within 
capitalism... The perspective was much more one of the concliating labour and capital, in the line of 
convertinýt the boss so that he, perceiving the true situation of the worker, would unite forces 
with us 2 
This conciliatory perspective should come as no surprise since many of the group's 
militants had come through courses in the social doctrine of the Church given by Frei 
Luis Sartori. He saw the FNT as an: 
area in which the worker could find application for the social doctrine of the Church... an area inside 
the Church where the concrete application of worker legislation could be made. 28 
.7 J 
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It is clear, however, that others within the FNT saw it as much more than this. Marcelino 
Pereira Martins, one of its founding members and a former president between the years 
1966 and 1972, describes how it: 
sought to promote a line of new unionism, allied to a means of combating unjust structures, political 
paternalism, union "peleguismo", 29 false leaderships, and the union tax. The Front positioned itself 
and sought to unite forces with those groups within the unions, aöe they very small, who combated 
this system that was tied to government. The Front came to affirm a position of "trade unionism of 
the base", a unionism from within the factory, with a factory delegate. 30 
In the context of the early 1960's, however, this combatting of "false leaderships" 
represented a de facto confrontation with the Communists who were very much the 
ruling block within the trade union movement. 
Now the precise extent to which that confrontation was the result of an underlying 
ideological hostility on the part of Catholics towards the Communists and a desire 
therefore to move into Communist areas of influence, or simply the inevitable conflict 
between on the one hand a decentralised and factory-based form of power and on the 
other a centralised and party oriented one is difficult to say. Current members, for 
example, emphasise that their grievance was not so much with Communism as an 
ideology per se, but rather with what they viewed as the anti-democratic activities of the 
Brazilian Communist parties' trade union followers. 31 However, historically speaking, it 
is difficult to ignore the FNT's close association with figures like Sartori or its roots in a 
doctrine that although undergoing a process of modernisation, had long sought to 
neutralise Communist influence, and, to all intents and purposes, appeared to be doing so 
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once more. One internal document, for example, was quite clear that the FNT was 
founded it order to carry out the social doctrine of the Church "in accordance with the 
principles of Rerum Novarum". 
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Whatever the underlying motives of FNT members prior to the coup, the fact is that by 
1965, with the purging of Communist leaderships from the unions, their principles and 
methods of action shifted toward an altogether different group of people. Unlike the 
Workers' Circles, the advent of the dictatorship did not represent the loss of the FNT's 
raison d'etre. On the contrary, it simply gave added urgency to the need to break with the 
fascist inspired labour system. As the following section will show, the FNT was one 
organisation which was able to make the transition from indirectly attacking Communists 
to attacking the nominees of the dictatorship (or those who avoided any form of conflict 
with the new milit regime). Whatever the ambiguities that might have remained, the 
events of 1968 gräfrally demonstrate, how the adoption of concrete class strategies by 
Catholic militants provided them with a road out of their sectarian divide and into radical 
secular forms of union resistance. In other words, they began to break out of the superior 
and objectivist Church mentality which had confidently hoped that society would be 
changed according to its principles and strategy, but which in reality had only succeeded 
in isolating it from society, and Catholic militants from union militancy generally. 
1.2.4.1 The Osasco Strike of 1968 -A Class Conflictive Approach in Action 
Fransisco Weffort, who carried out a study of the Osasco metalworkers' strike at the 
Cobrasma factory in 1968, describes this strike and the formation of a factory 
commission beforehand in terms of their implications for the trade union movement as a 
whole. He suggests that events marked a 
process of internal rupture of populist trade unionism... evidencing certain characteristics of worker 
independence which contrast in a very clear manner with the dominant tendencies in the trade union 
movement in the country since the 1950's. 33 
But for Catholic militancy too, the events of 1968 also marked an important stage in a 
process of rupture. This rupture, however, was not with populist trade unionism (which 
certain Catholic sectors had long since criticised for their own reasons), but with 
Catholicism's own more narrow trade union objectives and cold war past. 
Leading non-Catholic (i. e., secular) participants in the strike of 1968, like Jose Ibrahim, 
leader of the union at the time of the dispute. are quick to admit the significance that 
groups of the FNT had: 
In Osasco the question of the factory commission was already raised before 1964. In 1963, we had an 
experience of commission organisation in Cobrasma. There, there existed a group of Catholic 
militants who made part of the opposition to the union from the right. It was a group of people quite 
heavily laden with anti-Communist sentiment. It was these pe I who first began to raise the 
question of the commission. It is the famous "Commission of 10" which began with 10 militants 34 from the National Labour Front. 
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And yet it was precisely these militants who would come to an agreement with Ibrahim 
(whom they knew enjoyed the loyalty of the communists) over how best to take over the 
union as a joint slate. More than this, once their short term objectives were realised, the 
two groups did not enter into conflict with one another. On the contrary, as Zk Groff, a 
key member of the FNT and the leader of the factory commission says, '"The question of 
these ideological differences never got in the way of the union's work. "35 . 
It is Ibrahim's own comments which provide an important insight into how the two 
groups came closer together. Firstly, there was the question of a common critique of 
Brazilian trade unionism (albeit with differing ideological starting points), and a jointly 
shared interest in prioritising certain previously neglected areas for action: 
... 
inside Cobrasma, there existed a group of militants who did not fit into the perspective of the 
commission of 10. In truth, it was a committee which we called the factory committee, of which 
myself and a series of comrades formed a part. We too had a critical vision of the trade union 
structure and believed that another kind of trade unionism was necessary. We assumed the question 
of the organisation within the firm, by the base, something which at the time the union movement did 
not assume. 36 
Secondly, there was value attached to specific forms of local worker resistence: 
The principal aspect for the emergence of the comission of Cobrasma, as such, was the very struggle 
of the workers inside Cobrasma. For eximple, we had an "operation tortoise" [a go-slow], the 
problem of the restaurant, and we won many struggles. The idea of the commission, which already 
existed, began to gain force, but in a quite authentic manner and the dialogue with the leadership 
emerged from all this process of ferment. 37 
And finally, there was the capacity of the two groups, in virtue of the above, to hammer 
out a series of workable proposals: 
From there we came to an agreement with the people of the National Labour Front over a number of 
points: the legalisation of the commission, elections inside the factory and immunity of those elected 
- both the office-holders and their reserves. So we arrived at the legalisation of the comission, first, 
inside the struggle, and then, because we found a fairly favourable situation inside the factory. 
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Jose Groff, the FNT's leading militant at the time of the dispute, and leader of the 
factory commission in 1968, suggests that once the commission had begun to show 
results another even more ambitious series of common objectives came to the fore. These 
were: (a) the defeat of the corrupt union leaders and conquest of the union; (b) the 
strengthening of the Cobrasma factory comission; (c) the creation of new factory 
commissions in Osasco and elsewhere to serve as a the launchpad for a strong union 
movement throughout Brazil; and (d), the strengthening of the anti wage-squeeze 
movement 39 This meeting of minds in what later became a dispute between on the one 
hand, the union and commission, and the employers and government on the other, does 
not in any way imply that all differences between Ibrahim's and Groff's groups were 
resolved, let alone that their identities converged. Important differences, like the FNT's 
rejection of the "imposto sindical" (trade union tax40), still remained. But what it does 
demonstrate is just how far Catholic militancy had come, in particular, how its 
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immersion in the dynamics of the working class, now under a military dictatorship, was 
purging it of its sectarian past. It also highlights a number of themes with respect to trade 
union practice that would become a hallmark of left-wing Catholic militancy in Sao 
Paulo, namely its strong commitment to work within the factory (be it in terms of the 
valorisation of the base, small scale struggles as a means of raising consciousness, or 
factory commissions themselves). Some of these 
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of these-points will be tackled in 
greater detail when I deal with the Sao Paulo Metalworkers Opposition which also has its 
roots in this period and amongst Catholic militants. 
1.2.5 Pastoral Operäria - The Crisis of the Church and Militants Over the Issue of Class 
Whilst the events at Osasco represent an important victory of radical Catholicism over 
its sectarian isolation, and an important step forward in the lay sectors' own redefinition 
of the Church's social role, the strike also highlighted a number of critical 
insufficiencies. Foremost of these was the relationship between militants and the Church 
hierarchy. In the specific case of ACO militants who sought to inform the cardinal of the 
situation in Osasco before the strike, Groff describes how "he [Dom Agnelo Rossi] 
received us with the utmost coolness-not a drop of support from Agnelo Rossi, 
nothing! "41 
This reception was symptomatic of a much deeper conflict that had been developing 
since the coup of 1964. In their May day message of that year, the bishops of Sao Paulo 
state, via their regional secretariat, released a statement noting with "satisfaction" the 
implantation of the new military order for: 
trying to snuff-out the danger of Communism which was already assuming frightening proportions, 
infiltrating itself with unacceptable propositions in the most just and urgent reformist campaigns -. 
In that part of the statement which went on to deal specifically with the trade union 
situation, the bishops urged: 
That legitimate and free trade unionism, already a dream of Rerum Novarum for the promotion of the 
workers, be given encouragement by the government and understood by all those who pride 
themselves in adopting the social doctrine of the Church. 43 
They further argued that: 
It is not trade unionism that provokes the class struggle, but yes the impudence of false leaders and 
the incomprehensible resist¢nce of inhuman leaders. The same zeal that represses the abuses of trade 
union power must promote the authentic spirit of class. 44 
With this statement the Church was effectively condoning the repression of those ranks 
which it judged to be engaged in "the abuse of trade union power" by their promotion of 
class struggle. 
For groups like ACO, and more especially JOC, which had already been moving in a 
more radical direction at the time of the coup, the hierarchy's approach put their very 
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existence into question. The militants' concept of "the authentic spirit of class" appeared 
diametrically opposed to that of the bishops. Prior to the coup-d'etat that had not been 
such a big problem as their international links had afforded them some degree of 
autonomy from local ecclesiastical control and they could continue to pursue their affairs 
without too much interference. What was needed now, however, was some form of local 
insertion and above all protection. Both were singularly absent. Already, at a national 
level, JOC had rapidly lost its membership base and the capacity to articulate itself in an 
effective manner, such was the impact of government arrests, bans and interventions in 
its secretariats. In Säo Paulo, where the cardinal welcomed the coup as "a battle 
miraculously won" against the "communist plot", 45 matters hardly augured well for 
radical militancy. ACO militants were under the distinct impression that the cardinal: 
believed that certain of the militants of ACO and of JOC who were imprisoned should be imprisoned 
for being Communists. He never expressed this openly, but he had this conviction that that was the 
right way a6 
The cardinal's actions, or rather their conspicuous absence, would appear to confirm this 
view: 
We had a case of a sympathiser of ACO in the city of Osasco. which is in the Archdiocese of Sio 
Paulo, who was brutally tortured, and we sought out Agnelo Rossi two or three times and he avoided 
the subject, did not wish to know, said that he did not believe it47. 
Matters were quickly reaching a crisis point on two levels: externally, i. e., in terms of 
the repression meted out by the government to left-wing union militants; and internally, 
in relation to Sao Paulo's Church hierarchy. As one leading militant of the time confirms: 
In Sao Paulo we were working within the union movement, in the communities, despite Dom Agnelo 
Rossi. ... We felt that there was a major difficulty in using the name of JOC or ACO in 
fighting this 
question within the Church. 
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Although by no means exempt from government represssion, matters in the Diocese of 
Santo Andre were a little more favourable since the bishop there, Dom Jorge Marcos, 
was more critical of the government generally, and not afraid to associate himself with 
ACO. In May 1965, for instance, he was a signatory to a letter which cast doubt upon the 
supposedly good intentions of the Castello Branco government and which made no 
apologies for the lack of signatories, arguing that those who might have been expected to 
sign were "fearful that they would become victims of the persecution by elements linked 
to the government. "49 Also in that month he undersigned the local ACO's manifesto 
against unemployment. The situation of militants in Säo Paulo, on the other hand, was 
especially difficult, and the pressure to find a new modus vivendi was all the more acute. 
1.2.5.1 Pastoral Operäria -A New But Unworkable Modus Vivendi 
A qualified breakthrough finally came in 1968. It was known at that time that the 
cardinal was keen to set up an organisation that could unite all lay entities which had 
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anything to do with the world of work. From there came the idea of the Workers' 
Pastoral (Pastoral Operäria, PO) as a foundation between JOC, ACO, the Workers' 
Circles, UNICOR, and people from the parishes. The proposal was fraught with 
difficulties. The possible advantage for individuals inside JOC and ACO was that PO 
might act as a new vehicle, permitting them to transfer their proposals to the level of the 
community and avoiding the conflict which the groups' names attracted. If the shift came 
about, however, it would be more than simply tactical since it would involve the loss of 
movement characteristics and a correspondingly greater insertion in local ecclesiastical 
life and structures. 
Whilst many militants welcomed such a shift in strategy they did so only insofar as 
their broader class aims could simultaneously be maintained. A number of reservations 
therefore arose. Firstly, there was the question of Dom Agnelo's own motivations. One 
radical priest put it thus: 
I think that he had an extremely clear political vision. Agnelo Rossi was very frightened by the 
advance of the Catholic worker movements, and he believed, as the military believed, that any 
expression of unhappiness or rebellion was already Communism ... So under the wing of the 
Church, 
of the bishops, he tried to put the workers' movements who from there would loose their autonomy - 
the Workers' Circles, after all, had a certain degree of autonomy, ACO had autonomy, JOC had 
autonomy, and be put them inside a Workers' Pastoral which was a thing directed by the bishop. 
Compounding the left's fears of a loss of autonomy was the inevitable question as to 
what possible function an organisation embracing views as diverse as those espoused by 
ACO and the Workers' Circles could have, particularly at a moment of such intense 
polarisation. In fact, this problem was less serious than might have been expected 
because the Workers' Circles by this time had already lost credibility in the eyes of the 
labour movement and were in a process of selling off some of their local headquarters. 
The more serious conflict concerned Dom Agnelo's choice of Frei Luis Sartori as 
coordinator for the new pastoral. To some ACO militants, Sartori's views upon the 
harmony between labour and capital were simply unacceptable and they therefore stayed 
well clear of the organisation. Waldemar Rossi, on the other hand, was one of those 
militants who felt that it was better to take the bull by the horns, to participate in Dom 
Agnelo's pastoral, but to push it in a class conflictive direction. In the event, however, 
conditions proved too conflictual for PO to hold together in its envisaged form. The 
archdiocesan coordination was effectively suspended: 
that point of union disappeared, and each one returned to his own place to continue. 
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Although the break-up of Dom Agnelo's pastoral obviously represented a serious 
personal defeat, and a temporary defeat for the ideas of Frei Sartori, it hardly represented 
a victory for Catholic radicals given the absence of a clear alternative. On the contrary, 
the radical apostolic movements were themselves faced with the prospect of continuing 
fragmentation, of members either leaving militancy altogether, going underground, or of 
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conducting "independent" experiences with the support of progressive local priests and 
communities. The limitations of such a development were being recognised all over 
Brasil as militancy was forced into isolation. - 
1.3 The Appointment of Dom Paulo and a New Approach to Class 
The real breakthrough, which offered the prospect of resolving the impass, was finally 
achieved with the Vatican's appointment in 1970 of Dom Paulo Evaristo Ams as Sao 
Paulo's new archbishop. At the time, however, his promotion was not greeted with 
universal acclaim. Indeed, many militants viewed the matter with emotions ranging from 
scepticism to fear. One former priest described his own reaction as follows: 
At the beginning when we [a group of some thirty progressive priests working in the city's southern 
zone] heard about the nomination of Dom Paulo we got the shivers...! even suggested that we make a 
formal protest against the manner in which he had been appointed, without consultation, etc., and 
against him - we thought of him as a person who was more closed than open. 52 
The reasons for such fears are clear. Although, Dom Paulo was not new to the 
difficulties facing the working class - "I had already worked ten and a half years with 
workers in Petropolis and in the favelas and I knew well the workers' problems and I was 
still very interested in helping the poor"53 - his public profile was that of a loyal auxiliary 
to Dom Agnelo Rossi. In many respects Dom Paulo was simply an unknown quantity. 
From 1967 he had engaged in popular evangelisation, particularly in outlying areas of the 
city, but his attitude to sensitive ecclesio-political questions remained to be defined. 
1.3.1 The Emergence of a "Class Conscious" Pastoral Operaria and the Definition of its 
Trade Union Critique 
Immediately upon his promotion, Dom Paulo sought out those sectors associated with 
the previously abortive effort to form PO and entered into a dialogue - initially over the 
death of a Catholic militant, Luis Hirata - which subsequently broadened out to include 
all matters of interest to both sides. Over the following years PO would be reborn, but 
this time, in two senses. Firstly as an organisation, and secondly, as a method or 
framework of operation, in other words, as the sum total of the local Church's policies 
and actions in relation to workers' issues. Confusion sometimes arises because Church 
documents frequently use the term "Pastoral Operaria" to refer to both the broader 
framework (which was properly established in 1975) and to the organisation (which 
recommenced the process of official isation in 1970). Where possible, I have sought to 
eliminate this confusion by referring to the organisation in capitals as PO, or the 
Workers' Pastoral; whilst the framework is referred to variously as the Mission to the 
World of Work, or the Workers' Mission. 
Under Dom Paulo's cardinalship the Church was to take a view not dissimilar to that of 
the more left-wing Catholic militants, particularly in terms of the immediacy and nature 
of the problems faced. He characterises the early 1970's as "a time of the persecution of 
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the working class" where "there was almost no possibility of organising here in Sao 
Paulo" S4 But whilst the Church was predisposed to counterbalance this situation, it did 
not nurture any pretensions to organising the working classes (a task that would have 
proved both totally unrealistic and, indeed, unacceptable to both Catholic and non- 
Catholic militants alike). Instead, it sought to effect intra-ecclesiastic changes in a 
number of areas that would have a positive impact on the capacity to organise without in 
any way dictating the precise form this should take. That was left to labour movement 
activists themselves. I 
One of the most significant of these changes was the Church's gradual recognition, by 
a processs of dialogue and mutual exploration, of a certain strain of Catholic militancy. 
This was a significant step because for the first time since the 1964 coup, the Church was 
beginning to come alive not only to certain hitherto marginalised in i4 iduals, but also to 
hitherto marginalised themes and processes like the question of the class conflictual 
nature of society. Up until that moment, the more left-wing Catholic militants had been 
faced with the dilemma of whether or not to join a Workers' Pastoral of the kind 
envisaged by Dom Agnelo and Frei Sartori. Those who joined had done so on the 
following basis: 
We defended the idea that indeed we should be present precisely in rder to meet the challenge, 
rder to say 'look, the conflict is here, the class struggle is a reali, and the struggle to overcome 
c divisions is a Gospel imperative. So we have to enter and guarantee this. 'ss 
In 1972 came one of the most significant results of this encounter: the completion of 
the first stage in the consolidation of a class conscious position by the hierarchy of Sao 
Paulo. Dom Paulo gave firm backing to militants, like Waldemar Rossi, who were 
pushing for Church recognition of the class struggle as a phenomenon caused by the very 
nature and structure of capitalism and thus necessitating more radical forms of 
intervention on behalf of the working class. This new position of the hierarchy 
represented a bitter setback for those militants grouped around Frei Sartori after months 
of internal struggle. In the words of Dom Paulo: 
Frei Luis Maria Sartori worked more in the sense of socialising the products of the factories, and of 
socalising the role of Christian workers and employers whilst, I believe, our struggle was broader, 
also supporting the formation of unions that would have popular support and would struggle for the 
rights of the workers and not merely for the relief of the workers' world. 
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Despite the significance of this shift its direct impact upon the labour movement in the 
short-term was not remarkable. This was not surprising. In organisational terms all that 
had happened was that the Church had finally chosen to come to terms with and 
legitimise an already existing state of affairs. It had chosen to give recognition to a 
certain brand of militancy over which it had never excercised a veto. During those years 
when cooperation had not been forthcoming from the hierarchy, the militants had 
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simply sought out those individual priests - like the worker priests and advisers to 
JOC 
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and ACO - who were sympathetic and willing to risk continued support, in the form of 
providing safe houses, secretly running messages between comrades in clandestinity, 
participating indirectly in strikes, providing community education of a more critical 
nature, training new militants, and so on. In the case, for example, of the metalworkers' 
resistance in Säo Paulo (with whom, as we shall see, Catholic militants enjoyed close 
ties), one finds that on repeated occasions metalworker militants were harboured by 
priests or held their meetings in churches. Infact, such was the measure of Catholic 
militant autonomy that at one stage they were even able to organise a secret meeting of 
metalworker militants opposed to the presidency of Joaquinzäo within the precincts of 
the cardinal's own palace, behind Dom Agnelo's back. 58 
To the extent, therefore, that a Catholic labour support network existed prior to this 
change in the attitudes of the hierarchy. its direct impact was bound to be a limited one. 
A further factor is that under the extremely repressive conditions of the time there was 
hardly likely to be a sudden flourishing of Catholic militancy; rather, what could be 
expected was the aggregation of hitherto disparate efforts as militants saw more scope for 
their kinds of struggles and regrouped. 
Evidence of such an aggregation comes in the form of the sustained period of growth 
which PO enjoyed between the years 1970 and 1974. This was only cut short by direct 
military repression and the arrest and torture of leading members. However, in 1975 that 
sustained growth resumed, clearly indicating that P0 was widely perceived as both a 
necessary and viable vehicle for social and ecclesiastical change. 
Although Dom Paulo was legitimising certain more combative forms of militancy, he 
A did so largely out of the public gaze and very disc y- at a relative distance - avoiding 
the mistake of identifying himself too closely with one or other faction or ideology. 
Whilst, therefore, he might open up new possibilities to the persons grouped around 
Waldemar Rossi, a group which identified itself with notions of class struggle, and give 
them to understand that he supported their more combative form of militancy, he was not 
about to identify himself directly with this group nor was he about to oppose alternative 
approaches. This is evident in comments he made at a 1973 meeting concerning "the 
Church in the world of work", at which activists from all regions of the city and members 
of UNICOR, ACO and JOC were present. In it he was keen to stress the need for a multi- 
class approach by the Church. 
The Mission to the World of Work cannot refrain, also, from concerning itself with pastoral care of 
the middle class and the upper class. They too are very important. Never to lose sight of the fact that 
beyond the working class exists the middle and upper class. SQ 
It is by no means accidental that such comments are compatible with just about any 
framework one might wish to adopt in relation to the issue of class. In this way the 
Church could continue to give scope to a whole range of conflicting groups and methods 
of action which, in any other organisation, especially a political party, would quickly 
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have tom it to pieces. That is why in all conscience the cardinal could, for example, 
support Waldemar Rossi and describe him as "a great workers leader" whilst in virtually 
the same breath maintaining that "right up until today I give considerable support to Frei 
Maria Luis Sartori. "60 
This apparent contradiction, between a Church official's tacit support for an 
organisation, group, or ideology, and his simultaneous unwillingness to identify directly 
with the positions assumed by the determined group or ideology is a recurrent theme in 
ecclesiastical life (and one that will be tackled in greater detail in later chapters). It has 
much to do with the contradictions inherent in an organisation like the Catholic Church 
which, on the one hand, seeks to encamate the word of God, but, on the other hand, 
denies itself the mechanisms for doing so, preferring instead to leave this to lay 
individuals whom it hopes to "influence". That said, Dom Paulo's decision to empower 
radical militancy had important reperfussions. It gave the reformed and more radical PO 
a much stronger infra-ecclesiastical platform on which to both define and publicise its 
critique of Brazil's labour relations system. In 1973, for instance, PO was used as the 
Church's official publicity organ in four weeks of campaigning and education to advance 
a "Mass for the just wage", to be hele in many of Säo Paulo's Churches on the occasion 
N of the as al round of wage negotiation. Whatever the constraints facing the hierarchy (in 
terms of passing specific judgement upon events) the fact is that the language used by 
Catholic militants themselves was anything but ambiguous. They described the process 
of wage negotiation allowed for by law as: 
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the forcible closing of wage campaigns after the phase of negotiation between bosses and workers 
has run its course. It is a forced curtailment done by means of government intervention which 
resolves beforehand what the wage increase will be. 61 
Earlier in the year, at a seminar which Dom Paulo had again decided to address 
personally, Catholic militants tackled the theme of "participation in neighbourhoods, 
factories, and unions". The real significance of the meeting lies in the clarity of the 
conclusions at which its participants arrived and the fact that they did so at such an early 
stage when a profound public questioning of the Brazilian trade union structure had not 
yet begun. 62 They presented an analysis of union structures which at best could be 
described as a damning indictment. To the question "do the trade unions carry out their 
principal objective? " all the study groups reached the following basic conclusions: 
1. The unions are tied to and dependent upon the Ministry of Labour, 
2. The union tax leads to the accommodation of leaderships, which begin to act more as 
functionaries of the Ministry than as representatives of the workers - it is the phenomenon known as 
"peleguismo"; 63 
3. The unions are under a state of intervention since 1937; 
4. The Brazilian structure of unionism perverted the meaning of unionism rendering it mere 
welfare support, which is paternalist and alienating; one only need cite the fact that for the majority 
of union members the principal motive for affiliating is the medical, dental and other forms of 
assistance; 
5. Current unions are organs of small enclaves, detatched from the working classes: 
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6. There is widespread scepticism amongst workers with regard to the unions; 
7. The workers are not organised in their work places in order to struggle within the unions and 
change the present situation; ... 
64 
The groups also went on to examine in some detail a whole range of factors 
contributing to this state of affairs: recent changes in the composition of the working 
class that contributed to its apathy (i. e., the influx of many peasants who were actually 
now enjoying a marginally better standard of living than previously); the role of the 
media; the lack of education; the precarious economic existence of most workers; "the 
domination of bourgeois ideology, principally through individualism, that leads to 
egoism, isolation and disunity"; repression of authentic worker leaders; intimidation by 
government, bosses, "and even the very clergy itself'. 65 
On the more practical matter of how it might be possible to break out of this situation, 
the groups came to a number of conclusions which encapsulate the essence of PO's 
approach prior to the arrest of leading members in 1974. 
First and foremost, there was the need for the "formation of organized groups inside 
the firms". These groups would carry out the painstaking task of "conscientization 
[conýiousness raising] and organisation, beginning with the smaller problems and 
internal struggles of the firm. " Their "basic method" was to be that of "see, judge and 
act". The second major task groups set themselves was that of: 
carrying out propaganda amongst the w"o±ers on the nature of true unionism. ©arifying, by means of 
courses or debates, the current situation of our unions, and proposing trade union organisation 
beginning with the firms as the fast step required to change this situation. 
This concern with rank and file struggles, which as we have seen was a constant 
preoccupation of radical Catholic action throughout the 1960's, should not be confused 
with "basismo", which is the belief that the base (or grass roots) can resolve their own 
problems without reference to or help from outside forces like intellectuals or political 
parties. The emphasis upon base struggles was not conducted to the neglect of broader 
political issues. On the contrary, there was a clear perception that the ideology of 
depoliticisation that had come to dominate the union by its emphasis upon the "individual 
advantages that the union can offer, like the doctor, dentist, etc", needed to be combated 
and substituted for another that would "lead to the participation of comrades in the trade 
union struggle. "67 Certainly, the acceptance of the grass roots as the primary locus for 
truly democratic action constituted a central element in militant perspectives, but it was 
also one that was well suited to the demands of the time. Given the constraints imposed 
on other more open forms of activity, a grass roots orientation appeared as one of the few 
viable courses of action available. 
In political terms, however, it did give rise to the assertion that factory based trade 
union organisation was, at least for the time-being. "the first step"68 in changing the 
situation. (My emphasis) In other words, these militants were opting for a road of quasi- 
parallel union development akin to that adopted by opposition forces in the Sao Paulo 
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Metalworkers' Union (and in sharp contrast, incidentally, to the road that would be 
adopted by the metalworkers of Sao Bemardo do Campo whose principal vehicle of 
change was the officially recognised union itself). 
1.3.2 Catholic Militancy's Double Identity and the Constitution of an Opposition to the 
Sao Paulo Metalworkers' Union 
The apparent coincidence of radical Catholic analyses with those put forward by the 
strongest opposition group, the Sno Paulo Metalworkers' Opposition (Oposicäo Sindical 
Metalurgica de Sao Paulo, OSM-SP, hereafter to be referred to as the OSM, the 
Metalworkers Opposition, or simply the Opposition), was much more than just the 
fortuitous meeting of two separate approaches under similarly difficult circumstances. In 
certain respects the origins of the two analyses were one and the same. The two 
movements were not only contemporaneous, but the majority of PO's members were 
metalworker activists, and the bulk of Opposition members were of radical Catholic 
origin. In its initial stages, for example, the Opposition was, for the most part, constituted 
by Catholic militants grouped around the figure of Waldemar Rossi who was their 
candidate in the 1967 elections to the union. As he says: 
The inspiration was ours, based on the experience of the factory commission of Cobrasma which 
emerged in 1963 and of a commission of struggle that also emerged in 1963 in Bemardini. These two 
experiences showed a path which came to be confirmed after 1964. So all the work we carried out 
was in an attempt to multiply and develop those experiences and to give this character of a group of 
workers in the sense of an opposition to the union structure. We were the ones who characterized 
thi ; who early on provided a large group of militants - the largest group at first. We were also people 
of the Church, companheiros who had emerged from groups that we had in the Church. 
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It is important to stress, however, that the formation of the Opposition was not an 
attempt by Catholics to set themselves up as a leftist-inspired parallel Christian trade 
union force. Nor, for that matter, were they trying to translate exclusively Catholic 
principles into practice. Rather, they were: 
people who entered into the movement, who had a clear class vision of the struggle, and an 
expectation, in terms of the movement, of creating a class-based movement and not one of Catholic 70 
orientation 
In other words, their aims had a strictly universal, i. e., secular appeal. 
Naturally, there were a series of values that Catholic militants felt they could closely 
associate themselves with: 
the question of liberty, the question of equality, the question of democracy, the democratic process, 
the sticking to the decisions of the majority, the going forward together, the work of the base (not to 
be confused with "basismo") of a process that goes from below to above and not from top to 
bottom71. 
But whilst their faith might inspire them to search for adequate means of realising these 
goals - ones, it should be noted that were by no means exclusive to Catholic militancy - it 
IIN 
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did not dictate the modalities these took. On the contrary, forms of action and 
organisation were harnmered out in the context of broader class struggles, and in the 
context of developments within the labour movement. These were the fundamental 
reference points of radical Catholic labour movement militancy and not, perhaps 
surprisingly, its Catholic origins. 
The above comments would appear to beg the question as to what, then, the distinctive 
features of Catholic militancy were. If radical Catholicism took class and not Church 
attendance or religiosity as its methodological point of departure, then how, if in any way 
at all, could it be distinguished from other brands of labour militancy like those espoused 
by the Communist parties, Trotskyists, independent socialists, etc? 
The short answer is that Catholic militants articulated not on one, but two levels. The 
self-imposed secular/class definition of their actions only applied at the level of labour 
movement practise. This element of subordination to the secular, or respect for the 
autonomy of the secular, was perfectly in accord with recent changes in Church theology 
(in particular, the rejection of the old triumphalist mentalities which had sought to make 
society conform to its own principles and strategy). It was also a continuation of the 
policy first established by ACO in 1962. which emphatically rejected the organisation of 
its own militants under a separate banner from the rest of the labour movement - except, 
that is "in the most unusual of circumstances". 72 Thus, as far as internal labour 
movement dynamics were concerned, there was, indeed, little to distinguish Catholic 
militancy from other forms of militancy. Although there was an undoubted historical 
affinity between radical Catholicism and certain forms of factory struggle (for example, 
an emphasis upon grass roots militancy), there was nothing inherently Catholic about this 
- so much so, that other groups would gravitate to the ranks of the Opposition. 
What, however, did separate Catholic from all other brands of militancy was the fact 
that the day-to-day class struggle was not its exclusive methodological point of 
departure. On the contrary, there were other clearly ecclesiological and transcendental 
dimensions as well. In theoretical terms this form of militancy had always represented 
the crystalisation of a complex series of mediations between the objective labour 
situation of the day and a whole range of subjective responses. More significantly, these 
responses had drawn not merely upon secular theorisations of the challenges posed, but 
also upon religious approaches, ones as diverse as the Bible, Catholic social doctrine, 
Liberation Theology, and the "see, judge and act" method. In practical terms there were 
two highly significant areas of action that lay exclusively within the ambit of Catholic 
militancy. The fast, was the capacity of activists to influence internal ecclesiastical 
changes which were more directly related to the labour movement, such as the drawing 
up of official documents on the subject. The second, was the capacity of militants to 
bring the weight of the Church - at all its levels - to bear favourably upon those sectors of 
the labour movement pushing for radical structural change. As I will show in the 
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following chapter, at various stages this capacity would prove of critical importance to 
labour movement fortunes. 
This dual dimension to Catholic militancy, more specifically, its capacity to 
subordinate its own more specific organisational objectives to those of the labour 
movement as a whole, was not always so apparent. In 1968, for example, during the 
metalworkers' strike at Osasco, there was no question of giving ground on questions of 
movement identity. On the contrary, there was a long and intense period of negotiation 
between two clearly distinct groups - basically a Catholic and a non-Catholic camp - who 
throughout retained a very clear sense of their political identities. As Ze Groff (leader of 
the FNT militants) says: 
when we went about making up the opposition slate to the union it was quite clear which was the 
FNT slate and the Ibrahim slate73. 
Even so, in spite of these clearly defined origins and the negotiated character of the final 
slate, the practical propositions eventually formulated by both the Communists and the 
FNT (i. e., elections inside the factory, legalisation of the factory commission, immunity 
for those elected, etc. ) proved almost identical. 
In cetn senses, therefore, the Metalworkers' Opposition of Säo Paulo represented an 
advance upon this situation. It took matters one step further by quite deliberately 
excluding from consideration the political origins of the various groupings involved. The 
Opposition constituted itself as a front of individal workers rather than as a front of 
tendencies. Initially, it was dominated by Catholic militants with the presence of a few 
militants from the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Communista Brasileiro, PCB) 
only to be followed in later years by Trotskyists and Leninists. But as one non-Catholic 
militant explains: 
we never asked, 'now what does the Church think? ' It did not matter to us in least what the Church 
thought, or what the central committee of whatever organisation thought. Obviously, each one 
discussed in their collectives, but at the moment of sitting down it was the individual. 
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Thus, for example, the choice of Waldemar Rossi to head the 1967 Opposition slate did 
not reflected any attempt by Catholics to impose "their" candidate on the rest of the 
organisation, but simply, the widespread view that he was a first-class factory militant 
and labour leader. Similarly, in teams of the proposals put forward by the slate, these 
would remain of a strictly secular nature. Catholic elements of the Opposition in Säo 
Paulo never considered the possibility of a radical parallel Christian trade union force. 
For them, such a course would have represented a violation of respective spheres of 
influence, a conflation of militant Catholicism's inherently dualistic nature, and, more 
significantly, a profound disservice to the labour movement. 
Naturally, the presence of a dualism, which is perhaps militant Catholicism's most 
distinctive feature, does not mean that Church and labour arenas were always kept 
strictly separate. On the contrary, the raison d1tre of Catholic militants was precisely to 
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bring the two into reciprocal relation with one another. They wanted to make the Church 
responsive to the needs of the labour movement, and, conversely, to give a practical 
testimony of that Gospel commitment within the labour movement. The real question, 
therefore, was about how the two would be brought together, and the limitations that 
should be put upon the process. The key issue was not whether, but the precise extent to 
which, for example, a figure like Dom Paulo would be expected to manifest his support 
for combative unions; the extent to which the Church of Säo Paulo would be expected to 
give verbal declarations of support for structural changes; or, most significantly at that 
time, the extent to which the Church should be called upon to provide logistical support 
for a labour movement that was in deep crisis. 
In the following chapter these limitations will be discussed in the context of the period 
1975-1978, when, more than ever before, the Church was both in a position and actually 
called upon to define itself in relation to these issues. In the next section, however, my 
concern is with those pressures that drove the secular and Catholic dimensions of 
metalworker militancy ever closer. 
1.3.3 The Real and Apparent Fusion of Pastoral Operäria with the Metalworkers'. 
Opposition 
The overlap of membership between the Metalworkers' Opposition and the Workers' 
Pastoral also saw much cooperation between the two. However, this expanded to such a 
degree that one commentator has suggested that "The Opposition came to lose its 
identity. What is Pastoral? What is Opposition? From 1974 to 1977 the groups of the 
Opposition were groups of the Church. "75 Such a statement is, I would argue, more 
confusing than illuminating because whilst it does point to a strengthening of ties which 
took place between the two groups, it simultaneously relegates to the background what 
were a number of highly significant differences between them - differences that were 
never, as the quotation seems to imply, called into question. In this section, therefore, 
these essential defining features will first be examined before moving on to see if and 
how they might have become blurred. 
The most fundamental of all the distinctions that must be made between PO and the 
Opposition concerns the underlying dynamic that structured them throughout their 
existence. If one examines the Opposition it becomes quite clear that despite (in its initial 
stages, at least) a particularly marked Catholic presence, the organisation nevertheless 
operated according to an essentially secular dynamic. Membership was drawn from 
various organisations - including non-Catholic ones - and, more significantly, goals were 
of a purely electoral or political nature. The same cannot, however, be said for the 
Workers' Pastoral. It deliberately sought to embrace both secular and religious dynamics. 
Its very raison d'etre was to address not one but two constituencies: the labour movement 
and the Church. Indeed, if the origins of radical Catholic labour militancy are examined, 
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it becomes evident that it was a product, i. e., a hybrid, of these two constituencies. 
Throughout its existence, radical Catholic militancy drew inspiration from both its 
specifically working class and Catholic heritages. 
We have already seen how religious dynamics profoundly affected the very emergence 
of PO under the cardinalships of Dom Agnelo and Dom Paulo. We can now turn our, 
attentions to the manner in which secular dynamics, in the form of the peculiarities of the 
class situation in Sao Paulo, circumscribed and shaped PO's development. 
The most obvious and significant manifestation of PO's rootedness in these dynamics 
is the dominance enjoyed within its ranks by one group - the metalworkers. The true 
significance of this apparently limited spectrum of growth lies in the fact that it was 
basically but a faithful reflection of, or comrj(in' g to terms with, a series of fundamental 
difficulties and charactetics of the labour movement itself, rather than any failure on 
the part of PO. It can be asserted with some degree of validity that PO merely attracted to 
its ranks members of what was already the single most numerical urban labour group 
within Sao Paulo; in other words, that the issue of metalworker representation inside 
Catholic ranks possessed a quantitative element. It is also clear, however, that there were 
other qualitative dimensions to the problem. Why, for instance, had other large urban 
categories, like civil construction and -commercial workers, been all but left out? From 
interviews with militants there seems little doubt as to the answer. In the words of one: 
it was a category that had a history of struggles therefore it was easier for our proposal to reach the 
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metalworkers rather than other unorganised categories. 
Indeed, when it came to trade union militancy by other non-Catholic groups, these too 
came to terms with the realities of the class situation in Säo Paulo and gravitated towards 
the organisational potential of the metalworkers. Successful militancy could not simply,, 
be grafted from one group of workers to another, it needed favourable conditions under 
which it could develop, and the degree of organisation was one of these. 
A further condition was strategic. As the largest single urban union in the country, and 
with union resources to match, the metalworkers offered a perspective for more 
widespread change which other unions - either by virtue of their lack of organisation or 
resources - could not. Recognition of this fact was implicit in the hotly contested nature 
of leadership elections. The competing political factions within the Säo Paulo 
Metalworkers' Union knew that a change in the leadership of this group of workers 
would not only affect the internal balance of the officially recognised labour movement, 
possibly pushing it in a sharp leftward direction, but also put into question the stability of 
the military's politico-economic project. These facts of life were not lost upon the 
militants of PO - all the more so given that the repression facing labour activists 
demanded that they concentrate their resources in precisely those areas where they could 
have greatest impact rather than that they dilute these efforts over a wide range of labour 
sectors (as it was, on certain occasions, maintaining contact within just the one sector 
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proved exceptionally difficult). 
What the above comments indicate is that secular dynamics acutely circumscribed the 
development of PO's trade union base. The need to adapt to the limitations that were 
either forced upon or were so much a part of the wider labour movement impelled radical 
Catholic militancy to look towards the metalworkers of Säo Paulo. It is important to add, 
however, that the secularity of PO was far more complex than a mere ability to adapt. It 
should be recalled that PO simultaneously represented an intelligent, organised and 
strategic response -a secular response - to the failings of Brazilian trade unionism. Had 
PO simply concerned itself with the need to inspire individual Catholics with a range of 
moral responsibilities, then it is quite conceivable that membership could have been 
drawn from practically any category. What precluded that, however, was the 
organisation's commitment to a structural critique of trade unionism and its belief in the 
role of the militant as the chief agent for bringing that change about. Once embarked 
upon this road, it had to seek to defend and make these goals viable in the most practical 
manner possible. Crucial day-to-day decisions of this kind were essentially mediated by 
secular rather than religious considerations. 
As an example of this, the alliance of PO militants with the Opposition may be cited. It 
came about for two main reasons: (a) an affinity and compatibility of their respective 
trade union goals; and (b), a context of military repression that necessitated the 
regrouping of forces. It certainly did not come about because the clandestine left within 
the ranks of the Opposition had enjoyed a sudden conversion to Catholicism or because 
Catholic activists had discovered the virtues of historical materialism. Quite simply, 
these philosophical differences were irrelevant in the context of the early 1970's. 
Given the ability of PO to insert itself so forcefully within a secular dynamic and set 
aside religious differences, it is perhaps not surprising that conceptual ambiguities of the 
type outlined at the beginning of this section (i. e.. "What is Pastoral? What is 
Opposition? ") should arise. The fact remains, however, that underlying differences still 
remained and these should not be ignored. But when it comes to the actual practice of 
activists exclusively within the sphere of the labour movement, then there was frequently 
little to distinguish Catholic from other left-wing secular. forms of militancy. Viewed 
organisationally, these differences would become even finer as, on a number of 
occasions, the Opposition was forced to abandon its formal identity and don the mantle 
of the Workers' Pastoral. What follows, is a brief discussion of the reasons behind the 
, 
Opposition's apparent weakness and PO's strength, together with the true extent to which 
their identities merged. 
In contrast to the Opposition, PO was not factory based. This may appear somewhat 
contradictory for an organisation that set so much store by the capacity of workers to 
organise in factory commissions; and yet, as the following quote indicates, this was 
entirely in keeping with its philosophy of class expression rather than organisational self- 
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interest. As Waldemar Rossi makes it plain: 
The Workers' Pastoral did not preoccupy itself with the creation of groups within the fines, but yes, 
commencing from the groups in the neighbourhoods and communities the militant concerned himself 
with arocess of organisation within the factories - not in terms of PO, but in terms of the working 
class. 
,/ 
In other words, a strict conceptual separation, or hierarchy or activities existed. In 
essence this simply entailed PO subordinating its own organisational identity to those of 
its class whilst members were engaged in specifically labour movement activities, such 
as trade union or factory militancy. Outside this field, however, especially in the 
neighbourhoods, PO could indeed assume its formal identity quite openly without in any 
way compromising its commitment to class unity. 
In no way did PO's reliance upon community struggles amount to some form of self- 
marginalisation from "the real" struggle. This was so for two reasons. Firstly, because 
neighbourhood activity was always conceived with an eye towards the broader strategic 
issues involved, i. e, to how it could be linked with factory struggles; and secondly. 
because the brutality of the repression suddenly made local community organisation a 
virtual pre-requisite to labour movement militancy. 
Turning to the first of these points, we can see evidence of this desire to act as a bridge 
between the community and the workplace in a 1978 document by PO. It made a number 
of key recommendations for action within the neighbourhoods. These included: 
encouraging the formation of factory commissions and participation within the unions; clarifying the 
labour laws; urging militants of the community to agitate in the factories and the unions; acquiring 
new militants and support groups for the labour movement; education meetings to develop new 
cadres who can work in the organisation of the class; setting up professional schools where one could 
gain a better understanding of the problems of class; discussing problems of the slums, children, 
women, the cost of living; acting upon the issue of transport which presents difficulties for all the 
workers. 
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This emphasis upon community involvement was more than a mere desire to draw 
distinctions between organisational and class aims and suggest where the former might 
be properly excercised in their own right. As we saw in an earlier section, the emergence 
of PO was partly the result of conjunctural factors, i. e., the difficulties encountered by 
traditional apostolic movements like ACO and JOC. But it went beyond this. PO was 
also a response to changes taking place in Catholic social doctrine. It represented an 
attempt to supercede traditional pastoral methods by developing an organic pastoral 
approach, that is, one rooted in the local conditions rather than in an international 
ecclesiastical strategy. As one priest explains: 
It was neither a problem of parallelism, nor of double loyalties, it was that they [movements like 
ACO and JOCI had a mechanism and a methodology that reached only those whom the movement 
had conditions to reach. In other words, a greatly reduced number. The idea was that the Workers' 
Pastoral should be a mass organisation, mass not in the sense of reaching everybody, because it never 
had this characteristic, but in the sense that it shouldpenetrate through the whole of the Church of 
Säo Paulo - reaching the Parishes, communities, etc. 
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Community involvement, therefore, was an integral rather than accidental component of 
PO's activities. 
For the rest of the labour movement, however, involvement in the community would be 
a largely accidental affair since the emphasis had hitherto been upon organised labour. 
Confirmation of this bias comes in interviews with Antonio Flores (a former member of 
the PCB, who was vice-presidential candidate of the Opposition in 1972 and later vice- 
president of the Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Union), and with Aurelio Peres (a former 
seminarist and later a leading member of the Communist Party of Brazil (Partido 
Communista do Brasil, PCdoB). Both acknowledged that the party with real penetration 
inside the organised labour movement was the PCB; but, as Flores explains, "with the 
coming of the dictatorship the grassroots work of the PCB collapsed completely. "80 Yet 
outside the unions and factories there was no consistent record of militancy. As Peres 
says, "the people who monopolised the work of the neighbourhoods were sectors of the 
Church. "81 
This situation of repression led to a fundamental re-evaluation of the Church as a 
possible vehicle for progressive rather than reactionary change. Affonso Delellis was one 
member of the PCB who forcefully argued that despite the Church's support of the coup 
(and, indeed, its partial responsibility for his own demise as leader of the Säo Paulo 
Metalworkers' Union) fruitful cooperation between Catholic militants and Communists 
could take place. It was a view that increasingly came to be accepted for reasons which 
are outlined by Flores: 
at the time, what the Communist militants thought was much the same as what sectors of the Church 
thought. We all needed to fight against the military dictatorship; and the idea, therefore, was to gain 
control of the [Säo Paulo] Union of Metalworkers which was still in the hands of the government 
appointee.... so why not unite the little that remained of the Communist Party [with the Church's 
grassroots community work] so as to fight against the common adversary 82. 
The actual strength of the Church's neighbourhood militancy at this time (the early 
1970's) should not be over-emphasised. It must be recalled that all forms of militancy - 
 whether factory or community based - were proceeding from a position of weakness. The 
precise contours of the Church's Mission to the World of Work, for example. still 
remained to be defined, as, indeed, did the political outlook of PO itself. The atomisation 
of political resistance was the order of the day. 
But even if adequate structures were still in their infancy, neighbourhood involvement 
clearly held out a number of possibilities. As one PO document notes, the neighbourhood 
is "the place in which the worker lives and suffers the consequences of the world of 
work", "where there is greater contact with all the [labour] categories", "where people of 
diverse experiences congregate", and "it is easy to meet one another". 83 Under conditions 
of severe repression, which had and continued to provoke the disintegration of all forms 
of official resistance, such unofficial Points of contact and unification not unnaturally 
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acquired an altogether greater significance. Furthermore, the viability of these courses of 
action was primarily ensured by the one force that was both capable and willing to 
underwrite these activities in its own name: the progressive Church. 
Essentially, then, this was how the paths of the Opposition and the Workers' Pastoral 
would converge. As one priest explained: 
At the time when the question of the Workers' Pastoral emerged in the period of 1970/71/72, there 
was a certain presence of militants who were prevented from acting within the autonomous union 
movement, and even the official union movement, because the latter was under the tutelage of the 
military regime. So there was no possibility of speaking inside the trade unions. Thus, a number of 
churches provided what we used to call an "alternative space" for workers' organisation; and from 
there emerged the Workers' Pastoral. The very Metalworkers' Opposition itself emerges in many 
places - located, equiped, and supported by parishes and by priests who had a certain sensitivity 
towards the workers. 
L 
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It is important to clarify, however, that unlike the Opposition, PO's links with the local 
Church were not simply confined to the dynamics of repression, i. e., to the need to find 
some form of logistical support at a time of difficulty, On the contrary, PO's very 
existence was both predicated upon, and represented a crystalisation of, the concept of a 
more organic and decentralised Church. Militants held to the profound religious 
conviction that the neighbourhood was the place where people "could live as a 
community of dwellers and Church". 
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It was in conformity with this conviction. and unlike groups of the traditional left who 
were slow to perceive the potentialities of making links between small scale/localised 
struggles and the trade union struggle, that PO went about developing ties with what 
were mainly Church inspired groups emerging at this time. Many of these groups were 
short-lived, springing up intermittently and with varying degrees of success around 
single issues, like the need for transport, adequate health care, creches, water supplies, 
sewage treatment, and so on. But throughout. militants from PO sought to draw 
sustenance from these contacts and attempted to broaden discussions by relating them to 
wider trade union and labour issues. 
The second field which PO was able to develop as a matter of conviction, and not 
simply necessity, was in its relations with progressive priests. In many respects the latter 
were to provide the infrastructural backbone to the organisation, a fact which is partly 
evident in the comments of Padre Altemeyer above, but which is also underlined if seen 
in the context of those regions of the city of Säo Paulo where PO succeeded and those 
where it failed. 
In the case of the two most outstanding success stories, the southern and eastern zones, 
both exhibited a marked working class presence - the former particularly notable in terms 
of its high concentration of industry (with an estimated 130-150,000 metalworkers), and 
the latter (despite lower confentrations of industry) for dormitory neighbourhoods with 
high working class densities. However, although these areas provided PO with a natural 
constituency, interviews I conducted with Catholic militants confirmed that the decisive 
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factor which rendered them operationally viable was the presence of networks of priests 
who were politically conscious, sensitive, sympathetic, and above all, willing to involve 
themselves in working class problems. In part they were simply reflecting the concerns 
of their area. 
Radical priests proved invaluable when it came to the propagation of one of PO's 
earliest strategies, the May Day Mass. Such Masses, in addition to being religious 
celebrations, served as a forum for discussion: as a means of identifying potential 
recruits; as a means of generating solidarity and confidence in one another; and as a 
means of generating resistance to the view (prevalent inside the official unions) that May 
Day was just another holiday. Committed clergy were also able to provide Catholic 
militants with a base for their activities (i. e., a church or parish house) that was largely 
immune from government intervention, and, of course, they were also able to provide 
safe-havens for many trade union militants. 
On the other hand, in those areas where a sympathy of this kind did not exist, such as 
in Santana, in the north of the city, militants were left to their own devices and remained 
for the most part isolated and therefore ineffective. The priest charged with the work of 
encouraging the formation of a Pastoral Operäria in this region, Padre Raimundo Lipsk, 
admitted that one of the key problems he faced was that large parts of Santana could be 
characterised as middle class. But he went on to point to certain ecclesiastical limitations 
which tended to reinforce these difficulties. He said: 
The bishop wants to carry out a more general type of work, and the Mission to the World of Work: 
thus does not have priority ... a mentality of investing in this area does not exist, 
it is said that this is a 
job for the priests themselves, it is said that this is an area for Padre Raimundo, its with him. But they 
[the priests] do not engage, they do not commit themselves. Firstly because it is a difficult Mission. It 
concerns itself with wounds, and secondly, there is not much practise. 
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thing that really survived was the Church. "88 
The result of this was that efforts to form groups of PO continued on a sporadic and 
isolated basis. 
In 1972, despite the risks inherent in mounting a slate to contest the Säo Paulo 
Metalworkers' Union elections, the Opposition was able to do so in its own name. By 
1974, however, that limited leeway completely disappeared. A series of mass arrests that 
year - some 70 in all - virtually decimated the organisation. The rationale which had seen 
a cross-fertilisation between Opposition and the Workers' Pastoral suddenly received a 
boost. As one leading non-Catholic militant explains, by 1975: 
the only manner in which one could articulate or combine was through a work of Pastoral Operäria in 
the southern zone spcclcally, where two things combined: the necessity for the movement to have 
some kind of shelter 1K 
, the Church; and a social attitude of various Christian activists and priests that 
lay within a Liberation Theology 
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Flores put matters more bluntly, "one has to be clear: between 1974 and 1978 the only 
The requisite, then, that the Opposition now articulate itself through PO, coming as it 
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did on top of the considerable overlap of individual members and trade union 
perspectives, not surprisingly introduces serious complications for any analysis of the 
two movements. In the light of this substantial realignment, Faria goes so far as to 
suggest that it is only really from 1976 that "The Opposition moves to reorganise its 
sectors on the basis of industrial characteristics and not on the basis of organisational 
criteria of the archdiocese. "89 
Again, however, this overstates the case somewhat and confuses the issues. Firstly, 
because the notion of organising on the basis of criteria of the archdiocese (criteria 
which, incidentally, are never adequately defined or substantiated) implies the presence 
of an altogether more global, i. e, city-wide approach than actually existed. Secondly, 
because the notion is somewhat exclusive. It is clear, for example, that organisation took 
place on the basis of a whole number of criteria. Sometimes a nucleus would spring up 
where a particular militant was working. On other occasions it would depend upon where 
that person was living, or where a safe house, school, or even bar; happened to be. 
Indeed, Faria himself asserts that there were some sectors of the organised left that 
formed part of the Opposition but simultaneously - and quite deliberately - organised 
themselves outside a framework involving the Church. 90 
There is little doubt that those efforts of the Church connected with its Mission to the 
World of Work (from the initiatives of individual priests to those conducted by PO) acted 
as a bonding force - bringing together militants from across the various regions and 
helping to introduce new cadres to the ranks of the Opposition. It is true, furthermore, 
that the formal identity of the Opposition was put into question to the extent that it could 
not use its own name and was unable to mount a slate for the elections in 1975. Such was 
the degree of fragmentation within its ranks. A dependency upon structures of the 
Church developed with tremendous force. One must be careful, however, not to use 
language that ascribes to this dependency (or appears to ascribe to it) a status which it did 
not possess. It is confusing, in the very least, to argue that from 1974 groups of the 
Opposition "were" groups of the Church. Militants with whom I spoke, for instance, 
were under no illusions as to their own, the Opposition's, or the Church's true identity or 
role in the matter. As one said: 
obviously we met in a church, it was the only place where we had any immunity from arrest by the 
police and this made it appear in the eyes of some that the influence of the Church was very great, 
and this was not the case. Now the influence of the Church was always the same via its militants... It 
was not an opportunism on our part to work in this, it was a combination of mutual interests. We had 
interests, and those who were Christians had a double reason, beyond the specific struggle that 
everybody was carrying out. 
91 
It is precisely in order to avoid confusions of this kind that we must remember that 
even on those occasions when the Opposition subordinated its formal identity to that of 
PO, the former continued to pursue purely secular goals. 
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1.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed those conditions, ranging from changes in theology to 
the more immediate series of pressures generated by the advent of the military 
dictatorship, which led to the reversal in attitudes of Sao Paulo's Catholic Church on 
questions of labour and class. The appointment of a new archbishop in 1970 was the 
single most critical intra-ecclesiastical shift. Since institutional recognition could only 
come from above, it was this appointment which above all helped to pave the way for an 
up-grading of left-wing Catholic militant status within the institutional Church. 
In another sense, however, the Church was recognising the limits to its sovereignty. 
Dom Paulo simply began to come to terms (in a positive manner) with an already 
existing state of affairs over which the Church had never excercised any direct control. 
The record of progressive Catholic militancy, especially during the 1960's, shows that it 
did not emerge as a result of changes amongst the local Catholic hierarchy. On the 
contrary, with the support of individual progressive priests it developed and persisted 
inspite of Dom Agnelo's extreme conservatism. The real constraining factor upon 
Catholic militants was the labour situation and not the Church hierarchy. Due to the 
repression meted out by the military dictatorship, the room for manoeuvre of these 
militants was frequently just as restricted as that of their left-wing secular counterparts. 
That is precisely why, even with the appointment of Dom Paulo, their impact upon the 
labour movement did not strengthen overnight. 
I also showed that these secular limitations to Catholic militancy did not imply that its 
impact was marginal. In the specific case of the metalworkers of Sao Paulo we saw that 
there was a considerable degree of interpenetration between radical Catholic 
organisations and individuals on the one hand, and the main opposition force to the union 
leadership on the other. I emphasised, however, that that interpenetration was carefully 
constructed; subject to certain self-imposed rules and dynamics. Inspite of Catholic 
militants dominating the Metalworkers' Opposition in its early phases, they were quite 
clear that class, rather than more narrowly defined organisational objectives, was to be 
the main orienting principle of conduct and organisation within the labour movement. 
This did not preclude specific contributions. On the contrary, even leading Communist 
figures were forced to recognise that Catholic militants' involvement in neighbourhood 
struggles - their access to networks of priests (who were not so easily subject to the 
repression), and the corresponding capacity to congregate large groups of workers 
without risking immediate arrest - afforded significant possibilities of reorganising 
labour struggles. 
In the following chapter, which discusses the period 1975 to 1978, I will show how 
those possibilities would become a potent reality as the hierarchy threw more and more 
institutional weight behind progressive labour struggles in general, and the Sao Paulo 
Metalworkers' Opposition in particular. 
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Chapter Two: Sao Paulo's Preferential Option for the Working Classes -1975-1978 
2.1 Introduction 
The year 1975 marks a historic watershed for relations between the Church of Sao 
Paulo on the one hand, and the constituency composed of radical Catholic and trade 
union militants on the other. If one describes the proximity and nature of relations 
between the Church and militants as hitherto at the mercy of individual bishops - be they 
of a reactionary or progressive orientation - then 1975 witnessed a significant shift in the 
institutional centre of gravity as all lay elements (which obviously included radical 
militants) were given a more meaningful voice in a consultative exercise that would 
directly determine the nature and enactment of the Church's pastoral priorities over the 
years to come. 
The initial sections of this chapter examine some of the processes behind the 
institutionalisation of these hitherto marginalised voices together with the policy outcome 
that this helped to bring about - in particular, the Church's official adoption, in February 
1976, of the Mission to the World of Work, "giving special priority to the labouring 
classes". 
The latter parts of this chapter are concerned with the ways in which these principles 
came to be put into practice in the specific context of metalworker struggles during the 
period 1975-1978. 
2.2 Formal Aspects of the Pastoral Planning Process in Säo Paulo 
In 1975 the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo began a consultation excercise which culminated 
in February 1976 with the adoption of a series of pastoral priorities, or, goals in relation 
to the community. This move was not without precedent. However, its innovative nature 
becomes evident if it is compared to the General Pastoral Plan (Plano de Pastoral de 
Conjunto, PPC), a plan designed to set guidelines and priorities for the Church 
throughout Brazil and published a decade earlier, in 1966. In the introduction to the PPC, 
Dom Agnelo Rossi had claimed with some pride that "This plan was elaborated by 
specalists, and exhaustively discussed, amended and approved by the bishops of Brazil". 
1 
But it was precisely these specialist characteristics that some people criticised. They saw 
it as a plan created by experts for experts; a plan that rendered '"The People of God" a 
mere object in need of enlightenment and quite incapable of forging its own religious 
destiny; a plan that saw the proliferation of dozens of specialist organs with their own 
impenetrable language. Worse still, a plan whose technocratic and authoritarian concepts 
and execution merely masked an underlying political conservatism. As Oscar Beozzo, a 
leading Catholic intellectual and himself a priest commented: 
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there was a clear option for situating the Church less in relation to its historical tasks in the field of 
evangelisation and of its social and political commitment, and more in relation to itself and the 
reorganisaton of parochial and diocesan structures. It was a means of retreating in the face of a 
conflictive reality divided into classes and deeply marked by social, political and ideological 
conflicts. 
X One practical manifestation of this conservatism was the plan's complete ono ission of 
any reference to radical lay Catholic movements like ACO and JOC. 3 
The far more democratic methods adopted during the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo's 
1975-76 planning process provided a marked contrast to the PPC's paternalistic 
approach. In Säo Paulo all sectors of the Church - both in terms of geographical 
distribution (north, south, east and west of the city) and hierarchical function (i. e., both 
clergy and lay as well as the bishops themselves) were "invited to study and manifest 
their opinions with respect to the plan. "4 More significantly, those opinions were given 
practical validity when in November of that year these same sectors were called upon to 
determine by a vote the four priorities the city would adopt. All 38 sectors of the 
archdiocese sent representatives to this meeting (hardly a surprising result given the 
extensive coverage which the issue received in the pages of the Catholic weekly 0 Säo 
Paulo) with the final decision being taken by the College of Bishops "in jointly 
responsible action with the Assembly-of the Church in Säo Paulo"5. In this later meeting, 
the final version was approved. It contained the same four priorities of the first plenary: 
(1) Base Ecclesiastical Communities, (2) Human Rights and the Marginalised, (3) the 
Periphery, and (4), the World of Work. The order, though, was altered slightly with the 
World of Work being moved into second place, whilst the pastoral of Human Rights and 
the Marginalised came to occupy third place, and the pastoral of the Periphery fourth. 
Leaving aside for the moment the nature of the priorities actually approved, it is clear 
that these changes in method were a sign of the times. They bore witness to both the 
maturity of the Church of Säo Paulo, i. e., its desire to embrace in a thorough-going 
manner the spirit of Vatican 11 and Medellin, 
6 and the more favourable objective 
conditions - both internal and external - for the realisation of such an extensive exercise 
in democratic participation. 
Amongst those more favourable internal conditions was the increased rootedness of 
participative practices within the Church itself on an impressively widespread basis. In 
national terms, for instance, it should be noted that January 1975 saw the holding of the 
first nation-wide meeting of base ecclesiastical communities (CEBs7) in Espirito Santo. 
This demonstrated that the CEBs had already achieved a certain level of success 
(numerically, organisationally, and intellectually) and showed every sign of building 
upon this. In local terms it is well known that the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo was one of 
the major growth points for the CEBs. Dom Paulo had long been favourable towards 
initiatives which, like the CEBs, derived their source of inspiration from the needs of the 
grassroots. 
As far as external conditions were concerned, 1975 was the year which saw some 
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abatement in state repression. If one takes the particular example of Catholic militants 
within the World of Work - and it was, after all, militants, whether lay or clergy, who 
would ultimately help to bring the planning process down to a community level - then 
these could be said to be re-emerging following the harsh crack-down of 1974. A 
democratic planning process which could not count upon the the input and support of 
such cadres would have been severely limited, one might even say a non-starter. Indeed, 
as we shall see below, to a large extent, it was the militants who were partly responsible 
for framing the early position documents and then in bringing a heated - and by all 
accounts very rich - debate to the 1975 Sul-1 bishops' conference. 
Turning to the adoption of the World of Work as a top priority, it is interesting to note 
that this originally took place at a state-wide level, followed a few months later by a 
version for the city of Säo Paulo which, in its essentials, was identical. Both versions, for 
example, set out the objective of their mission in the following terminology: 
THE FULL PROMOTION, IN THE LIGHT OF THE GOSPEL, OF THE CONSTITUENTS OF 
THE CLASSES LINKED TO THE WORLD OF WORK, GIVING PRIORITY TO THE WORKING 
CLASSES! 
Similarly, both versions would use identical language to describe the contents of such a 
mission, which was: 
- To seek, without paternalistic attitudes, the self-promotion of the worker in all aspects of his life - 
which is not merely identified with work. 
- To envision the transformation of a society based on egoism, into a fraternal society based on 
justice and love. 
- To give priority to wage workers who work in production without excluding a preoccupation with 
other members of the World of Work. 
9 
What does the identity of language and concepts tell us? Given the more democratic 
and autonomous manner in which policy was formulated (whilst noting that the regional 
bishops of Sul-1 were a far more restricted voting constituency), it indicates that there 
was, during this period, a genuinely close correspondence of views between the two 
epsicopal levels. Naturally, there were differences between the two, reflecting as these 
did a necessarily different response to local and regional realities. Thus, for example, two 
of Sul-l's five priorities - those of Youth and Family - were not chosen for inclusion in 
the archdiocese's list of four main priorities; however, three out of four of the city's 
priorities (CEBs, World of Work, and Human Rights) coincided with those chosen by 
Sul-1 which also put CEBs at the top of its list. 
This coincidence was to be expected for a number of reasons, quite apart from the 
obvious fact that many of the problems were of universal concern. One of these was the 
degree of overlap between the two bodies which understandably resulted in a certain 
echoing of each other's position. It should be remembered, for example, that bishops 
from the archdiocese represented just under 20 per cent of the bishops of Sul-1, and that 
they occupied a number of strategic Posts. 
'0 Added to this was the fact that the brand of 
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progressive Catholicism espoused by the archdiocese, and which had by 1975 helped to 
make Dom Paulo a figure of national and even world 
renown, enjoyed a hegemonic 
position in Sul-1. Lastly, there was a more traditional feature which helped bring about 
this coincidence of outcomes. It was the longstanding desire on the part of the Catholic 
Church to formulate policy which was in keeping with its increasingly collegial nature; 
in other words, a policy that was both consistent and, where possible, universally 
applicable. 
Whilst the above-mentioned features go a long way towards explaining how a policy 
on the World of Work could have emerged in such a unanimous manner, they only give a 
slight indication as to why that policy actually emerged. For the answer to this question 
one must look to the role developed by militants of the Workers' Pastoral itself as well as 
x to changes in ecclesiastical procedures that rendered militants a more potent force. 
By 1975 a profound shift in Church practise had taken place. Instead of trying, in the 
words of the PPC, "To create the means and conditions by which the Church of Brazil 
can adjust itself as fully and quickly as possible to the image of the Church of Vatican 
ll", 11 what the bishops sought to do was to adjust their actions to the Brazilian reality. 
This comes across quite clearly in comments made to me by Dom Mauro Morelli, who at 
the time of the Second Regional Plan -was the Regional Secretary of Sul-1, and 
instrumental in setting up the early meetings that would discuss pastoral priorities in the 
light of the CNBB's National Plan. As he put it: 
An attempt was always made in the Regional [Sul-1] to have an understanding and practice of 
pastoral planning. Hence, many courses and meetings were held in the dioceses and Sul-1, making 
the latter learn the truth that planning strengthens the fidelity of the Church to its mission, that is to 
say, by looking at reality, illuminating it in the light of our faith, and arriving at practical 
conclusions. Through this process of looking at reality the priorities began to emerge, for example, 
the state of Sao Paulo is characterised by the world of work, thus a Church that does not have the 
World of work as its priority is a Church without any sense whatsoever. 
12 
Having opted for such an approach, which had been taking root in the Brazilian Church 
for sometime, 13 one can begin to understand why the militants came to occupy such an 
important role in the eventual outcome. After all, it was they in large part who were 
entrusted with bringing to the attention of the bishops the precise contours of that reality. 
But more than simply reporting upon the past and present situation of labour, activists 
also brought position documents to the meetings that served as a basis for often heated 
debates between themselves and the bishops. 
Their role was anything but passive. Anisio Batista de Oliveira, a leading Catholic 
militant (and later presidential candidate on behalf of the Metalworkers Opposition in the 
1978 Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Union elections), mentions how in the early bishops' 
meetings at Itaici, which led to the first regional plan, himself and other like-minded 
miltants emphasised the importance of the Church developing a coherent approach in 
relation to the World of Work. As he says: 
we carried out a task that was quite individual with many bishops that were present. And inside the 
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discussion groups we managed to sensitise all the bishops towards this question 14 
It is in this way that Waldemar Rossi could with all justice claim that militants 
"participated in the preparation and the actual conduct of the bishops assembly. " 15 
Again, as had earlier been the case with Dom Paulo, the process was one of mutual 
discovery and one might even say a certain suspicion on the part of some bishops as to 
the real intentions of PO. As Rossi comments: 
Our proposal created a certain impact, it shocked, because we have a clearly class-based, i. e., 
conflictual vision. For many people present in the assembly of bishops this was pretty difficult. So 
you see the impact was strong: there were tense moments, but in the decision of the five priorities 
one of them was the Mission to the World of Work. 16 
2.3 Impact and Content of the Church's New Policy on the World of Work 
Whilst the statement by the bishops of Sul-1 represented an important historical 
landmark, its actual effects - particularly within the outlying areas of Sao Paulo state - 
were frequently difficult to perceive. 17 In some instances this merely reflected the 
somewhat parochial attitude, of bishops, priests and even pastoral agents themselves, who 
shied away from any activity that could possibly entail conflict with either employers, 
government, or the official union apparatus itself. There was also the question to consider 
of the divisions that such a move might create within the local Church itself, a prospect 
that was not to everyone's liking. For these reasons, then, some dioceses never even got 
as far as adopting the priority of labour at all. Others, on the other hand, adopted the 
correct episcopal formulae but did so quite cynically - not putting them into operation, 
but merely channeling enough resources and personnel into the field to show that 
"something was being done", and at times never even getting this far. However, in those 
cases where a genuine attempt was made, there were serious obstacles to face. Obstacles 
that had much to do with various forms of repression meted out to workers who might 
wish to organise themselves in a political manner; obstacles associated with trying to 
organise a group in the interior of the state, where communications were difficult and the 
sense of isolation so much the greater; and even the obstacles presented by potential 
recruits themselves who questioned the validity of any form of politcal activity, their 
ability to conduct it successfully, and the degree to which the Roman-Catholic Church 
should indeed be involved in such affairs. 
Although by no means free from such difficulties, the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo 
nevertheless provided a radical contrast to this scenario. Nothing could match the 
resources available to it or, indeed, the resources that an infrastructure of a city the size 
of Sao Paulo could provide for any worker wishing to mobilise. Not a single diocese in 
the interior, for example, could boast a Catholic weekly of the high journalistic quality 
and vast circulation of 0 Säo Paulo. Nor could any city in the interior provide a trade 
union militancy that rivalled the scale and tradition of Säo Paulo's. More significantly, 
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for our purposes, it was clear by 1975, that with the appointment of new auxiliary 
bishops Dom Paulo had acquired a formidable and supportive team - one of whom, Dom 
Angelico Sandalo Bernardino, expressed an interest in and was appointed to be bishop 
responsible for the Mission to the World of Work in the archdiocese. For these reasons, 
and the fact that radical Catholic militancy in the city was one of the country's best 
organised and most articulate, there was little prospect - let alone intention - of somehow 
brushing this pastoral under the carpet. 
Already, by April 1975, Dom Angelico had organised a thorough-going review of 
efforts in the World of Work, bringing together the Archdiocesan Council for the 
Coordination of the Mission to the World of Work and representatives from the south 
and east of the city as well as members of JOC and ACO who offered their views on the 
Mission in their regions and organisations. In the words of the Secretary to the 
Archdiocesan Pastoral, Frei Gilberto Gorguiho, one was witnessing: 
a veritable new surge in the work of the Mission in the World of Work, with groups springing up in 
many neighbourhoods and factories. 18 
The relationship between militants and Dom Ang6lico was most fortuitous. In the 
specific case of Waldemar Rossi, it dated back to his earlier days in Ribero Preto when 
the bishop had been a friend was a family friend. It was a natural step, therefore, for 
militants of PO to invite the new auxiliary bishop (whose sympathies they already knew) 
to work with the organisation, subject to the ratification of Dom Paulo. 
Once installed in his new post, work began in earnest. As Rossi says: 
all the work that we had already been doing before gained impetus with the arrival of Dom Angelico 
x who, inuiuin, stimulated Dom Paulo. He put this question on the list of CNBB discussions. 
19 
For his part, Dom Angelico is quick to stress that interest in the labour question was far 
from new and predated his arrival: 
notwithstanding the violence of the repression, the Workers' Pastoral was increasingly organising 
itself here in Säo paulo. So seeds of JOC, seeds of ACO, all the work of organisation of PO in the 
Archdiocese of Säo Paulo led the [Sul-1 bishops'] assembly of Itaici to emphasise the need for us, as 
the Church, to opt for the World of Work. 
20 
y He did, nevertheless, occupy a privileged place in the Church hierarchy, using it to 
articulate certain interests: 
My work, my function in this, was that of a person already involved in the Mission to the World of 
Work here in Säo Paulo, who also brought to the assembly of bishops all the fears, all the 
expectations and hopes of the Christian militants of the Workers' Pastoral. 
21 
It is ultimately impossible to gauge the precise extent to which changes in ecclesiastical 
policy were either the result of action by progressive bishops like Dom Paulo and Dom 
Angelico, or of Catholic militants. Dom Angelico's own personal view was that the 
testimony of lay persons who had suffered atrocities due to their radical religious 
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commitment "evidently echoed very strongly in the episcopal assembly", and for this 
reason he attributed that decision "above all to the presence and action of these 
militants. "22 What can be said with absolute certainty, however, is that without a 
supportive element of the episcopacy, and most especially, without the insight and action 
of these militants, a change in 1975 in both policy and practical terms would not have 
been possible. 
. To better assess the success - or otherwise - of the 
Church's new priority towards 
labour requires a brief answer to the following two questions: (a) to what extent was the 
proposal a genuinely class-based, one?, and (b), did the proposals succeed in achieving 
their desired objectives? 
Unfortunately, the answer to the first question is ambiguous, a fact which is directly 
attributable to the nature of the text on the one hand, and the Brazilian situation on the 
other. If, for example, we ask the question: does the text present a class conflictual 
analysis in the socialist or Marxist senses of the term?, then the answer is an emphatic 
"no". The vision is utopian - "To envision the transformation of a society based on 
egoism, into a fraternal society based on justice and love. "23 - but there is no hint of 
socialism in it. Certainly the document notes that "There are constant conflicts in the 
World of Work... ", that a "structural change is required in the World of Work", and even 
that the "numerous violations of human rights" in the field of work are caused in part by 
"a structure of the World of Work based on egoism, the pervertion in the conduction of 
one's duty, in profit and not the human person. "24 But it does not analyse these in what 
could be described as a rigorous sociological manner, i. e., setting out a broad analysis of 
the problems, their causes and effects, as well as social tools for overcomyithg such 
difficulties. The word "capitalism", for instance, is conspicuous by its abs//ence. 
Whilst accepting that a document of little more that three sides can hardly be expected 
to provide profound new insights, it is, nevertheless, clear that the plan fails - in a 
manner which is characteristic of the Church - to offer any analysis of the mediating 
mechanisms for achieving the desired goal of "the common good". 
25 Thus, into the 
basket of structural change both employers and employees are neatly placed in a 
seemingly effortless and unproblematical manner. On the one hand, the Church expresses 
its desire to give "priority to the labouring classes", but in same breath it emphasises that 
this should not be to the exclusion of "other members" of the World of Work. Who are 
these other members - bankers, ranchers, large and small businessmen?, and how would 
this work in practice? This is never really clarified. One short paragraph merely urges the 
reflection and action of Christian employers themselves. 
26 For a more adventurous 
(although still basically problematical) analysis of the relationship between the sacred 
and the profane, one must look to other documents, a question which must be taken up in 
later chapters. 
These criticisms aside, there was a very real sense in which the document did contain 
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genuinely conflictive potentialities. Take, for example, two seemingly innocuous 
passages; one of which urged "The constant publication of information on the World of 
Work and the Mission to the World of Work"; and the other which proposed "The 
strengthening of significant dates in the World of Work. "27 
With regard to the first passage it should be remembered that it was at exactly this time 
that the Brazilian government was falsifying statistics on inflation (a fact which later 
served as a catalyst to the Säo Bernardo metalworkers' strike of 1978), and that press 
censorship - especially as it affected a sensitive issue like the labour situation - was still 
quite common. The pages of 0 Sao Paulo, for instance, were repeatedly peppered with 
gaps that were created by the scissors of the local censor. Any attempt, therefore, which 
sought to diffuse in any manner whatsoever accurate information, let alone run 
propaganda for union oppositions, obviously represented a tangible challenge to the 
status quo. 
As for the "strengthening of significant dates" in the labour calendar, there is little 
doubt that the prime objective here was May Day itself. The Church's intention, certainly 
in the case of the archdiocese at least, was to recover this day as a day of profound 
political significance for the labour movement, to wrest it from the hands of those groups 
- be they government, employers, or corrupt union leaders - who had effectively 
hijacked 
it under the dictatorship and rendered May Day just another public holiday, i. e., purged 
of all historical and class meaning. 
Any adequate critique of the theoretical merits of the Church's new policy on labour 
therefore needs to be tempered with a comprehension of the wider historical setting and 
not merely with an understanding of the philosophical issues involved. Otherwise it risks 
being completely static, thereby reducing passages of considerable historical significance 
to little short of banal philosophical utterances. Certainly there were groups within the 
Church who were quite happy to see that happen, and the Mission to the World of Work 
reduced to a collection of platitudes; but there were others who had been at the forefront 
of the document's preparation and were now keen to exploit such passages to their full 
class potential. 
These qualifications apart, it is nevertheless curious, given the presence of left-wing 
Catholic militants in the drafting process, that intermediate structures like the unions 
themselves were not given a mention - an omission that would be quite unacceptable in 
many a party-political document. How does one explain such an apparently obvious 
oversight? How does one explain the presence of a contradiction between the desire to 
come to grips with reality and the simultaneous inability, or unwillingness, to define 
intermediate structures and practices? 
The answer is a complex one which begs a whole series of more fundamental 
theoretical questions. These issues are covered in considerable detail in later chapters. 
For the moment, however, it is necessary to indicate three important explanations. 
Firstly, there is the obvious but still important difference that the Church, unlike a 
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J political party, neither has the goal nor the possibility of assuming direct state power. It 
may seek to influence, even be called into, government meetings, and as observers we 
may question the ways in which it mediates between the divine and the profane. 
Essentially, however, its role is confined to operating through intermediaries and 
structures. It does not produce programmes for political power and neither is it subject to 
electoral exigencies. 
Secondly, it must be noted that the Church's somewhat vague formulations in this, as 
well as in many other documents, derived from the simple political fact that with 
increased specificity, particularly in a controversial area like labour relations, opinion 
was bound to fragment into competing proposals. Broad consensus was, therefore, the 
hallmark and basis for successful policy change within the Brazilian Roman-Catholic 
Church, and like any other group. be they of the left or the right, radical militants had to 
take account of this fact. In effect, then, what passed in the last instance was the policy of 
the lowest common denominator. That should not be taken to imply that the programme 
was of a low standard, but simply that good or bad, the resulting document had to meet 
this criterion. Had a consensus on the need to discuss intermediate structures existed at 
the time of preparation, then this would have been reflected in the final result. 
Finally, if the specific conditions themselves are examined, it is evident that the 
document was a compromise between, on the one hand, those sectors of the Church (i. e., 
lay persons, and in a handful of cases bishops) who had a precise and more concretely - 
or historically - defined vision of the issues involved, and indeed themselves adopted a 
partisan approach; and, on the other hand, the clear tendency of high-ranking Church 
authorities to pass documents that are in some way universally applicable -a paradox in 
the case of labour where the Church uses the discourse of a preferential option for the 
poor. What cemented these competing proposals into a whole, and partly (although by no 
means fully) resolved the contradiction, was the mutual if sometimes uneasy respect for 
the various levels of the Church and their corresponding levels of authority and 
autonomy. Thus, the bishops felt no pressing need to make specific declarations on an 
issue like the Brazilian trade union structure. Instead, that could be left to organs like the 
Workers' Pastoral whose language was designed to embrace such specificities. Nor for 
that matter, did militants in PO feel that they had to get such a commitment. What was 
most important for them was that the general principle was passed and that a framework 
within which these isssues could be tackled was established; and indeed, it could only 
realistically be tackled at a local level. 
K What the preceeding comments clearly indicate is that paradoxically, for an institution 
as bureaucratic and centralised as the Church, its relations in both policy and day-to-day 
practice are almost wholly constituted at a local level, more specifically, whatever 
interpretation a particular bishop or lay movement might wish to put on regional or 
national documents and whatever content he might wish to invest these with. Naturally, 
such interpretations are not made without restrictions. The Vatican can intervene, and has 
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done so with impunity, where it sees fit. Similarly, a higher instance of the Church can, 
where fundamental doctrinal issues are brought into question, restrain a lower one. 28 
However, the exercise of such powers are the exception and not the rule. In the meantime 
a tremendous local diversity does indeed prevail alongside generalised notions which 
bind it to the regional, national and ultimately Roman Catholic Church. 
As evidence of this one only needs to compare the starkly contrasting approaches to the 
question of labour by the archdioceses of Rio de Janeiro, under the cardinalship of Dom 
Eugenio Sales, to that of Säo Paulo, under Dom Paulo. Although this question will be 
discussed in more detail later on, the difference can be summarised as one that involves, 
in the case of Rio, a cardinal who is bitterly opposed to a Workers' Pastoral that is in any 
way conflictive and who has therefore created his own highly paternalistic version, and 
that in Säo Paulo which is both a jealous guardian of its own autonomy (which is 
respected and even encouraged by the hierarchy), and proposes an option which is 
conflictive. 
It is now possible to return to the second question posed at the beginning of this 
section, i. e., the extent to which this new policy was successful. It should, by now, be 
fully apparent that the pastoral plan of 1976-77 could only serve as but a pale indication 
of relations between the Church, the official and unofficial sectors of the labour 
movement. It was a framework of operation, a guide, rather than a plan to be executed. 
"Success", therefore, could only be achieved by those sectors who throughout the plan's 
formulation had intended to invest its declarations with a radical practical content. The 
question, therefore, is whether these sectors (which included bishops, priests, nuns and 
militants alike) were or were not successful in putting their own plans into action. Did 
the Church make good its commitment to "give priority to the labouring classes" and to 
"seek, without paternalistic attitudes, the self-promotion of the worker in all aspects of 
his life"? How did it choose to translate these concepts into practice? What limitations, if 
any, did it set itself? 
These are some of the question must be examined in the following section which deals 
with one of the richest and most controversial manifestations of Brazilian radical 
Catholicism: relations between the Church of Säo Paulo and the metalworkers of the 
region over the period 1975-78 
2.4 The Basis and Limits to Church Intervention in Metalworker Affairs 
Whatever the ambiguities of episcopal policy at a state level, there is little doubt that in 
the Archdiocese of Säo Paulo the Church succeeded in creating the impression amongst 
key participants on both sides of the political divide that it was anything but an impartial 
bystander to metalworker affairs. We have already seen the high esteem in which the 
Opposition held its activities. As for those sections close to the union's president. 
Joaquinzäo, they viewed the Church as meddling in a field that lay completely outside its 
jurisdiction. Indeed, he himself complained of occasions when "companheiros of mine 
74 
went to Mass and witnessed during it, in the homily, the father speaking of union 
elections and attacking me violently. "29 More seriously he made the allegation that:. 
Any person who makes an investment like the clergy did, an investment which was possibly taken 
from the pocket of the poor during Mass in order to defray the expenses of a slate in a particiilar trade 
union [i. e., the Metalworkers' Opposition in the Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Union] pays a very high 
price - not simply in economic terms, but in moral terms, which was the distancing of Catholics from 
the Church due to this practice. 30 
Such comments are clearly designed to call into question the moral legitimacy of the 
Church's stance together with the representativeness of the Opposition itself, but they do 
simultaneously raise a number of questions which merit attention. Firstly, there is the 
question of the extent to which the Catholic Church in Säo Paulo was truly partisan. 
Closely related to this is the issue of what the theoretical bases and limits to this 
partisanship might have been. Can it be said, for example, that the Church was pursuing 
a series of spiritual values which temporarily - for reasons not of its choosing - attracted 
decidely political/electoral connotations? Or, was it straying into a qualitatively new field 
of action based upon essentially electoral considerations? In this section these issues will 
be discussed with special reference to the period 1975-1978 (a time when the triangle of 
Church, union and opposition acquired more precise contours). As regards the problem 
of what costs - if any - the Church may have incurred in the pursuance of its particular 
option, this demands a longer term analysis in the light of successive union elections. 
This question is briefly examined in Chapter Four. 
It would be a profound methodological error to seek to base any analysis of the 
Church's attitudes to the metalworkers of the Säo Paulo solely upon episcopal 
declarations. Two reasons for this immediately spring to mind. Firstly, there is the fact 
that there are so few direct declarations on the subject. Extrapolation of a consistent 
policy on such limited evidence would therefore be mere guess-work. Secondly there is 
the obvious, but nevertheless fundamentally important methodological point which holds 
that the Church is far more than the sum total of its bishops, and therefore deserves to be 
studied accordingly. This is especially the case in an instance like Säo Paulo where there 
was a considerable stress on the democratic, collegial and lay dimensions of pastoral life 
rather than the virtues of purely hierarchically ordained action. Naturally, had the bishops 
in the archdiocese centralised power in their hands and subsequently remained silent on 
key issues, then there might exist solid grounds for inferring a reluctance on their part to 
grapple with a contentious issue like the metalworkers. But they did the exact opposite of 
this. Through the development of a pastoral plan they in effect sought to provide 
conditions conducive to the institution of a suitable framework in which Catholic 
workers could themselves articulate both a theory of action and the practice itself. 
The central issue therefore becomes not so much one of what the bishops themselves 
said (although this is clearly of relevance), but rather, the extent to which they 
legitimised the actions of groups like the Workers' Pastoral, and the degree to which 
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such groups, on issues relating to the metalworkers of Sao Paulo, acquired some 
autonomous voice and could be said to be speaking on behalf of the Church as a whole. 
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the legitimation of the Workers' Pastoral as 
a force for change both within and beyond the Church was high on the agenda of Dom 
Paulo. In 1975 he made it quite plain that "the restructuring of the movements of the 
Mission to the World of Work" (of which PO was one), along with certain forms of 
popular evangelisation in the periphery of the city, was "certainly the greatest hope and 
most pressing task of our Church in Sao Paulo. "31 
Aside from Dom Paulo's personal affinity for this type of work, there was another 
compelling reason for adopting it as a strategic priority. This related to the make-up of 
the city itself. In the same 1975 article, the archbishop essentially argued for the Church 
to come to grips in a positive manner with one simple fact: "we are in the city of work, 
amongst a predominantly working class population. "32 
The restructuring of the workers' movements was, therefore, to be at the cutting edge 
of the Church's response to a series of tasks which, by its own admission, were immense. 
Indeed, the true scale of the challenge came out in a study sponsored by the 
archdiocese's Justice and Peace Commission and carried out by researchers based at 
CEBRAP. In that study, entitled Säo Paulo 1975 - Crescimento e Pobreza(Säo Paulo 
1975 - Growth and Poverty). the metropolis' working class dimensions, together with the 
huge suffering of the people involved, were powerfully argued - frequently using the 
government's own statistics to devastating effect. In accordance with practically all the 
most significant socio-economic indicators (for example, housing, transport, nutritional 
levels, infant mortality, wages, and working conditions), it was argued that for the vast 
majority of the city's inhabitants, conditions of life had worsened, rather than improved 
(as was so often the government's claim) during the years of Brazil's so-called economic 
miracle. 
33 
Not surprisingly, therefore, Dom Paulo's strategic prioritisation of the issue found 
echoes amongst fellow bishops. Asked, for example, why he showed an interest in the 
area, Dom Angelico was quite clear: 
Well because the city of Säo Paulo is markedly characterised by work, and it is in the World of Work 
where the greatest and worst offences against the human person are to be found. ... So it was the 
situation of dramatic inustice in which the working class lives here in Greater Sao Paulo which led 
me to opt for this task. 
Added to these factors of city-wide deprivation and the hierarchy's willingness to 
provide a coherent response was, of course, the question of the grassroots itself and the 
feed-back it was providing on the issue. As the Dom Paulo makes clear: 
When we carried out the first research in Säo Paulo to get to know what priorities the people wanted 
to propose for the Church of Säo Paulo, they proposed as first priority the defence of human rights 
and second justice in the 
World of Work. That was in 1974. And it is for this reason that we have 
adopted this priority and the people always renew this request for us not to abandon the working 35 
classes. 
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Thus, having deliberately sought to encourage a greater degree of lay participation by an 
exercise of this kind, and given the cardinal's general philosophy which accorded the 
grass roots of the Catholic Church a greater say in the running of its affairs, it was only 
logical that the hierarchy should respond positively to the special significance with which 
these sectors in turn invested the problem of the World of Work. In this way, the Mission 
to the World of Work was put very firmly on the agenda. 
The desire to legitimate the work of PO and associated organisations was therefore 
clearly present, but that still leaves open the crucial matter of the extent to which - on 
issues concerned with the metalworkers of Sao Paulo - PO could speak for the whole of 
the Church. Unfortunately, a simple answer to this question is not possible. Whilst in 
formal organisational terms one can say that when it came to the assumption of an 
official ecclesiastical position on a particular subject the bishops had the last word, it is 
simultaneously evident that in the case of Säo Paulo the practice clearly went well 
beyond such a rigid framework. This is apparent from the following highly significant 
comments of Dom Angelico: 
In general, the decisions concerning the World of Work are left to the Workers' Pastoral. Indeed, in 
many instances, the Workers' Pastoral indicates to the bishops a certain problem, a certain situation 
which would be good for the bishops to take a certain position with respect to. There has never been 
here, in Säo Paulo, any taking-up of a position by the Workers' Pastoral which did not reflect the 
position taken up by the Church. On some occasions it is the Workers' Pastoral which speaks, on 
other occasions it is the cardinal, the bishops of Sao Paulo, I who speak - but never without listening 
to the workers beforehand. 36 
In effect, then, what could be witnessed in Sao Paulo was an informal and in this sense 
highly complex division of labour. 
. 
Inevitably, the informal nature of these relations makes their study of a difficult 
undertaking. With diverse centres of power working towards similar objectives one 
cannot talk in terms of a single architect of change. Indeed, looking to the relations 
between the Church and metalworkers for the period 1975-78, where it can be said that 
the Church exerted a powerful impact on events, there is the added difficulty that that 
impact was essentially cumulative in character. 
As an example of the diverse origins and gradual nature of these contributions, one 
need but turn to the role played by the Workers' Pastoral in the re-emergence of the 
opposition as an effective fighting force. All participants in the Opposition - Catholic 
and non-Catholic alike - are agreed that insofar as PO helped to furnish forms of 
logistical support (e. g., meeting places, refuge, contacts, telephones, office space and 
equipment, etc., ) it was of decisive importance. Without this assistance the Opposition's 
own effectiveness would have been more seriously compromised than it already had 
been by the repression a year earlier. It is also evident that PO's contribution went 
beyond purely logistical factors, for it also helped to inject the largest single body of new 
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militants into the ranks of the Opposition. So strong was this contribution and the vitality 
of PO at this time, that one militant even suggested that there was an abortive attempt to 
produce a slate for the 1975 union elections, with PO's younger activists originating and 
developing the proposal. 37 
However, PO's ability to carry out these valuable logistical and membership tasks was 
not the exclusive result of its militants' sheer determination. It was also built upon newer 
foundations, i. e., a favourable shift in official attitudes which led to the recogition of the 
Mission to the World of Work as a top priority in the archdiocese in late 1975. This was 
in sharp contrast to the kind of officalisation process that had begun to take place in the 
latter part of Dom Agnelo's cardinalship which at the time had been widely perceived as 
an attempt to dilute and subordinate progressive Catholicism. Instead, the new radical 
officialisation, long sought after by the militants, contributed to their ability to both grow 
in numbers, reorganise (for they too had been hit by the repression of 1974) and move 
towards an offensive public posture. 
This process of reintegration was partly anticipated by the appointment of Dom 
Angelico as the bishop with special responsibility for the area. Through the Archdiocesan 
Council for the Coordination of the Mission to the World of Work, he helped bring 
together the efforts of radical Catholic organisations throughout the city in early 1975. 
The formal creation of an Archdiocesan Commission a year later simply sustained these 
moves as well as projecting them further into the future. Thus, the Commission was 
involved with all those tasks which pertained to any form of city-wide co-ordination. 
These included: assisting in the development of general guidelines for the militants; 
assessing the strengths of the organisation in particular areas of the city; helping in the 
setting-up of new nucleae; producing internal position papers; bringing the various 
organisations in the field - e. g., JOC, ACO, FNT, PO, - into closer contact with one 
another; helping to diffuse articles and statistics on workers issues; and finally, 
developing proposals for the next pastoral plan. 
The journal, 0 Sao Paulo also played a significant role in heightening general 
perceptions of PO within Catholic circles. Under the directorship of Dom Angelico, who 
had received a journalistic as well as clerical training, the paper threw its pages open to 
the Workers' Pastoral and became a sort of recruiting sergeant. The 1000th edition was 
primarily devoted to the "Dia do Trabalhador" - May Day. Citing Gustavo Gutierrez and 
Paulo Freire (in their respective ways two leading exponents of liberation theology), 
Dom Angelico wrote an article which emphasised how May Day should be seen not so 
much a day of celebration as a day for demanding liberation. 
38 Similar sentiments were 
expressed by PO in an open letter on the issue. Another article entitled "Authentic 
Unionism and a Democratic Base", written by a labour lawyer, argued the need for 
independent unions with the right to strike. Dom Paulo also weighed in with a long 
contribution on the workers' condition. In one section dealing with relations between the 
Church and the workers he noted that "the appropriate methodology for action in favour 
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of the workers is still in its initial phases", and went on to argue that: 
We will not come to form agents of the Mission to the World of Work, nor will we achieve a 
continuous presence alongside the workers, if we do not address ourselves with decision towards the 
evangelisation of this world which today constitutes the majority in the Church and society at 
large. 39 
All these factors helped to give the PO a legitimacy and an efficacy it had hitherto not 
possessed. Naturally, the organisation's unofficial links with priests and nuns, who had 
helped it through the early 1970's, continued to be one of its mainstays. Now, however, 
PO could articulate its views on a regional basis and with the official backing of both the 
hierarchy and the assembled churches of Säo Paulo. 
'A better appreciation of the real contribution of the Church hierarchy and the Workers' 
Mission to the Opposition can he gained by looking at the latter's fortunes three years 
later, during the 1978 elections to the Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Union. This can be 
asserted for two main reasons. Firstly, because left-wing Catholic militancy had had time 
to feed its way through the system. This therefore permits a balance of its achievements 
in relation to one of the Opposition's most important goals, that of contesting elections, 
to be made. And secondly, because the epoch of elections inside this union gives an 
important insight into relations between hierarchy and militants at a determined - indeed, 
determinant - moment in time. 
2.4.1 Church Involvement in the 1978 Metalworkers' Elections 
In the elections of 1978 three slates were standing. Slate One was headed by the 
incumbent, Joaquinzäo, whilst Slate Two (entitled Renewal) and Slate Three (the 
Opposition) stood against him. 
One of the most notable features of the Opposition slate was its selection of candidates 
for the presidency and vice-presidency, always an important decision in Brazilian unions 
because of the considerable weight attached to the presidential figure in any campaign. In 
both cases, the persons chosen (Anisio Batista de Oliveira and Santos Dias da Silva 
respectively) also happened to be leading militants from the Workers' Pastoral. The 
question which therefore arises is whether this selection was mere coincidence or the 
reflection of ecclesiastical influence amongst Opposition ranks. 
There is little doubt that PO was a powerful force at this time. It was precisely through 
the activities of militants like Anisio and Santos Dias that the PO had brought new 
members into the Opposition. It needs to be emphasised, however, that the "power" of 
PO was more associative than direct. By this I mean that whilst the organisation was a 
major contributory force to the revitalisation of the Opposition, it never constituted itself 
as a bloc within the ranks of the Opposition. Neither did it select any candidates of its 
own, nor did it have the power (or the desire for that matter) to impose these upon the 
Opposition. 
The unwillingness of PO to articulate itself as a bloc, and consequently select a 
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candidate of its own derived from, amongst other things, its philosophy of non-parallelist 
intervention (a question that will be examined towards the end of this section). As for its 
lack leverage over the Opposition, this was the result of the Tatter's deliberate articulation 
as a front of workers rather than tendencies. Thus, like other groups involved in the 
Opposition, such as the PCB, PCdoB, and various Trotskyist organisations, PO inserted 
itself within a selection process which took individual factories rather than particular 
individuals or their organisations as its starting point. In practical terms this took the 
form of some 2000 workers from 40 factories firstly discussing the Opposition 
programme, and subsequently selecting some 50 possible candidates on a factory by 
factory basis. And when it came to the choice of the final 24 (a number imposed by 
Brazil's trade union laws) there was no real conflict to speak of. 
Part of the reason for the absence of conflict lay in the qualities of the candidates 
themselves. Interviews with non-Catholic Opposition figures confirms that both Anisio 
and Santos Dias were candidates with excellent communications skills, a solid track 
record of Opposition militancy, and a good relationship with the factory grass-roots. To 
this extent, therefore, their Catholic origins were irrelevant. The comments of Antonio 
Flores (at that time a member of the PCB) are instructive in this respect. 
It was not seen as a slate of the Church, it was seen as a slate of militants who belonged to the 
Church, and who were metalworkers, who were distinguishing themselves, and who had a track- 
record of grassroots involvement... You see, in a slate you have to work upon the names of people 
beforehand. It was not a question that these people were from the Church and therefore would not be 
targeted by the government - we had every certainty that they would be - but that they were comrades 
who enjoyed the confidence of the workers. 
40 
A second factor which contributed to the absence of conflict was the earlier mentioned 
form in which the Opposition had chosen to articulate itself, i. e., as a front of workers 
rather than as a front of tendencies. Thus, Anfsio and Santos Dias were there to represent 
all workers rather than the aspirations of this or that particular tendency. Had matters 
been the other way around, then one might have expected a more conflictual process than 
was the case. Ironically, one element which appears to have helped to sustain this method 
of operation was the dictatorship itself, since it generated a widespread feeling amongst 
Opposition ranks that there was only one real enemy, the military, whose main 
representative among the metalworkers was none other than Joaquinzäo. Groups 
therefore subordinated any philosophical or political differences they might have had to 
the immediate priority of electoral victory. 
From interviews with many figures in the Opposition it also becomes clear that the 
dictatorship exerted profound constraints on the selection process itself. Alternative 
candidates, with what many militants regarded as an even greater ability and wider 
experience, like Waldemar Rossi and Antonio Flores, amongst others, did not even figure 
in the selection process because they were actively precluded from taking part by the 
forces of the dictatorship. Both these men, for instance, were the subject of judicial 
( 
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review. On the day on which the slate was finalised they had to be present in Rio de 
Janeiro for judgement. They could not run for election simply because to do so required a 
certificate from DOPS (the government security agency) which was not forthcomr{iing. 
Their support for the slate eventually chosen was, however, unequivocal since it 
r 
represented the best available cadres at a particularly difficult moment in time. 
Although PO chose not to put forward a specific platform with partiýlar candidates, and 
although it basically articulated a broad set of aims through its individual militants - who 
might have a number of tactical political differences amongst themselves - it did have a 
significance that went beyond that of a mere collection of individuals. At the very least, it 
affected the perceptions of other forces who had a more tightly structured conception of 
organisation. In this regard, the words of one Opposition member, Franco Farinasi, who 
at the time was closer to Trotskyist organisations, are highly instructive. As far as he was 
concerned: 
in this question of the slate's composition the weight of the Church figured heavily, because it is 
quite clear that there were far more able and prepared elements; but the problem was the following: 
e question of the need for the political support of the Church, and we took this very much there was th4t 
into account. 
In other words, whether or not sectors of the Church mobilised themselves within the 
Opposition on a collective political basis, the fact remained that they were, nevertheless, 
a major political actor in the eyes of others. Farinasi explained that in 1975: 
we had a real problem...; obviously the repression had abated a little but there still was not the 
security to act openly, we had to act in semi-clandestinity... we did not have places to meet, so the 
only places to which we had access were churches. In this respect the Church was of considerable 
weight, and elements linked to the Church have a great weight. 42 
That weight could also be translated in terms of the significant numbers of voters likely 
)C to follow partiar candidates. Militants like Wfädemar Rossi, Santos Dias, and Anisio 
Batista all had personal followings irrespective of whether they chose to cultivate these 
or not. When, therefore, one candidate, whom many sectors of the left regarded with 
suspicion, appeared as an important force to be reckoned with, his ecclesiastical 
connections came in for scrutiny. The candidate was Aurelio Peres. He had worked in the 
southern zone of the city in close cooperation with sectors of the Church. Thus, in order 
to counter-balance or neutralise any support he might enjoy amongst these sectors, many 
people within the Opposition favoured the selection of Anisio Batista de Oliveria who 
also had connections with the Church but a view that was regarded as more open. 
This episode is a fascinating one in two respects. Firstly, because it illustrates that on 
one level "the Church" was indeed a force to be reckoned with; that is to say, it was 
capable of posing or neutralising a problem. Simultaneously, however, these events 
conclusively demonstrate that that force was far from monolithic. The fact that Peres and 
Anisio had connections with Catholic militancy certainly had acted as a constraint upon 
the choices excercised by secular counterparts, thus partly demonstrating the latter's 
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weakness insofar as a political debate and manoeuvring had been framed in these terms 
at all. At the same time it had been shown that there were significant political divisions 
amongst Catholics themselves. Paradoxical though it might sound, religion had been 
shown to be of secondary importance to the political content of a particuar candidacy. 
The political support of the Church of which Farinasi speaks was taken into account in 
a broader sense than just those of the dynamics of the individual candidacies themselves. 
As he makes clear with regard to the 1981 election (where, if anything, the Church's 
influence had dimi4shed): 
We knew in 1981 that were we to choose another candidate [in this case one other than Waldemar 
Rossi] we could end up without the support of the Church, the political and other forms of support. 
So the great weight of the Church was a function of this. All the Opposition leaders knew this 
clearly. There was no dispute in terms of candidates, there was no other proposal. 43 
In ascribing such importance to the Church one must be clear as to what the notion of 
political support did or did not entail. What was not sought was officially sanctioned 
ecclesiastical backing in the form of episcopal declarations, but something more 
mundane than this: all kinds of logistical support to help neutralise the vast electoral 
machine which any president of a union like the metalworkers' disposed of. What 
Opposition figures undoubtedly hoped for - for that was what it was, just a set of hopes 
rather than mutually worked out guarantees - was that with two PO militants at the helm, 
Catholic individuals, particularly the clergy in all parts of the Church, would look upon 
their activities favourably and therefore it would be relatively easy to gain access to 
meeting places, type-writers, phones, canvassers, printing equipment, contact networks, 
and so on. There was no guarantee that the selection of Anfsio and Santos would provide 
these resources, after all, PO itself could only provide limited direct help and what was 
needed went well beyond the confines of a single organisation. But their presence was 
certainly likely to encourage an opening up of Church resources, which is precisely what 
happened. 
The attitude of the hierarchy to the electoral contest at this time is indicative of the 
largely harmonious division of labour that had developed within the Church's ranks. 
Bishops did not pass judgement upon whom they felt was the ideal, or, for that matter, 
the worst candidate; instead, they largely confined their activities to the continued and 
vigorous support of PO whilst turning a blind eye to the more partisan activities of its 
members. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, this position was not entirely inconsistent with episcopal claims 
to stand above partisan struggles. The relationship that had evolved between PO and the 
hierarchy was one of mutual respect and, ultimately, the right of autonomous action. 
Ultimately, because action was generally taken with reference to one another. Within 
certain self-imposed constraints. PO was free to choose its own destiny, in the words of 
Waldemar Rossi it was "an integral part of the life of the diocese... not subordinate, but 
part of the body. "44 For the hierarchy to have intervened at this stage would, therefore, 
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not only have constituted an infringement of PO's sovereignty, but also a highly charged 
political act, quite possibly leading to accusations of partisanship. Questions could have 
arisen as to why the bishops had chosen this highly sensitive moment to intervene. 
Furthermore, in the event that they had done so, their grounds would have been most 
shaky indeed, for the position that PO had assumed was one of considerable subtlety. It 
had not, as some might imagine, simply chosen to throw its weight behind the 
Opposition, at least not collectively. Instead, it had left that choice to indviduals, well 
realising, of course, that in practice the vast majority would opt for the slate of Anisio 
and Santos Dias. 
The adoption of this approach was more than the result of tactical positioning on the 
part of PO. Rather, it was the result of a deep-seated - and by all accounts unanimous - 
conviction that PO, rather like the bishops themselves, should hold on to a pluralistic 
concept of action, and avoid closing ranks around a determinate slate, political party or 
trade union confederation. Both groups were in complete agreement that casting aside 
this principle would have constituted an unacceptable form of secularisation, that is to 
say, that the transcendental aspects of Catholicism would thereby have been reduced to a 
single programme. Not merely to one, albeit important, dimension of their faith, but to an 
all too narrowly defined concept of that secular dimension which, moreover, the 
conditions of that time did not warrant. 
This position may come as a surprise to many observers who see in the Catholic left a 
tendency towards historical reductionism and the negation of the transcendental aspects 
of religion. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. There is plenty of evidence to 
demonstrate the serious commitment of left-wing Christians to the spiritual foundations 
of their faith. If one takes the specific example of a document produced by PO to mark 
the October 1978 meeting of its groups throughout the archdiocese (a meeting whose aim 
was to flesh out basic principles) it was emphasised there that: 
Jesus Christ did not wish to tie himself down to one party or ideology. When the zealots want to 
make him the king, the military chief for whom they are waiting, Jesus refuses, for the Good News is 
not to be confused with a socio-political or socio-religious regime. It is universalist. 
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Of course, this kind of perspective is far from unproblematical. It raises a number of 
uncomfortable questions, not least: how can one specify the conditions under which 
support or rejection of a determinate socio-political force will be established; what are 
the factors that can mediate such a decision; and whether these are religious truths or 
ideological formulations? These are fundamental questions which will be discussed in 
considerable detail in later chapters. For the moment, however, the point is that there was 
a conscious desire on the part of militants not to be tied down to a particular programme. 
The origins of this perspective were overwhelmingly religious and rather than tactical. 
Certainly, there were political dimensions to this principle of collective non- 
partisanship. The latter was also crucial in helping to sustain the viability of PO's claim 
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and desire to work "within existing organisations" and "not to develop parallel groups 
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This was a theme that went back to the organisation's ACO/JOC roots and the ', 
reservations these groups had expressed towards any form of political activity that went 
beyond that of the individual. PO's reasoning was a continuation of this theme, not 
holding itself to be "an organ that represents the class, but rather a means of achieving 
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consciousness, of valuing oneself and the class". The key issue was: 
not to dominate the organisation and the struggle, but to encourage the shift from an indvidualistic 
mentality to a dass mentality48 
As with ACO, PO had therefore assumed - almost as an article of faith - the view that 
collectively sanctioned partisan action was inadmissible under other than the most 
exceptional circumstances. What the election of 1978 therefore indicates is that in the 
view of the Catholic militants who took pan, those exceptional needs criteria had not as 
yet been met (a conclusion that may be deduced retrospectively from the arguments put 
forward by militants in 1984 when those conditions were fulfilled). Indeed, so obvious 
did the 1978 situation appear to them, and consequently the correct manner in, which PO 
should insert itself in metalworker affairs, that the question of support never seriously 
arose and long records of discussions are therefore not available. 
By basing ourselves upon the events of 1984 (which shall be dealt with in Chapter 
Four) it may be concluded that what probably constituted the single most important 
obstacle to some form of officially sanctioned collective action at this stage was the fact 
that there were three slates standing, of whom two had some serious claims to opposition 
status. By. this I mean that not only did they have an appreciable following amongst rank 
and file metalworkers (a claim that could be made by the incumbents) but they also had a 
democratic form of conduct and a genuine desire, therefore, to broaden workers' control 
over the union. Had this not been the case and had the choice been between just two 
slates, the current president and an opposition group, then it might have been argued that 
the choice was a simple one between good and evil and that it therefore fell to - indeed, 
under these circumstances was incumbent upon - PO to pass judgement on the 
participants. As it was, however, what the workers had before them were several slates 
and hence a series of political choices to be made. For many within the ranks of PO, the 
support of a determinate slate under these conditions would have constituted a step 
backwards, a return to the Church's earlier paternalistic practices, a subversion of 
working class autonomy and a corresponding violation of PO's own basic rules 
governing political intervention. 
To those outside Catholic circles, especially those in charge of the Säo Paulo 
Metalworkers' Union, the subtle positioning of bishops, clergy and militants appeared as 
little more than opportunistic manoeuvring, i. e., as a crude attempt to give support to a 
particular slate whilst simultaneously pleading impartiality. Even to the most objective 
observer, this did look like a somewhat specialised, i. e., contradictory, concept of 
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impartiality. The fact remains, for example, that by one means or another the resources of 
the Church were thrown open to the Opposition slate, even to the extent whereby nuns 
acted as vote tellers on the latter's behalf. As has been shown, however, for those groups 
within the Church the validity and legitimacy of their actions centred around the 
provision of an adequate response to the following question: To what extent and in what 
precise form is intervention justifiable under the present circumstances? The answers 
given at the time demonstrate that there were a number of fundamentally important self- 
imposed limits governing the action of the Church throughout this episode. These explain 
why the bishops chose not to give official backing; why PO chose not to request it of 
them; and why PO opted for individual rather than collective representation of its views. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In some senses this chapter has sought, especially through its examination of the 1978 
elections, to delineate what is essentially an insoluble paradox. On the one hand, we have 
seen the importance of the Church as a force to be reckoned with. Via complex networks 
of militants, priests, nuns, logistics and so on, radical Catholicism cut across and became 
an integral part of electoral dynamics. At the same time, however, we have seen that the 
force of the Church was not monolithic and capable of simple instrumentalisation by one 
group or another; on the contrary, what the outside observer may perceive as "the power 
of the Church" was, in fact, composed of autonomous (albeit cooperating rather than 
competing) centres of power that could range from the actions of a radical priest or PO 
activist to a bishop. Indeed, at times, that power could even be expressed in terms of the 
perceptions of secular militants. 
The injection of new cadres into the ranks of the Metalworkers' Opposition after 1975 
did not mean that it somehow became a too] of the Church. In this respect the words of 
Waldemar Rossi cited earlier are worth repeating. They put the issue into perspective: 
I think that the contribution of PO, that is to say members of the Church, to the Opposition was 
decisive. I think that the members who came from the Church helped to establish the guiding 
principles, and not only were authors of the proposal, but also able to help maintain it, as they 
nourished it with the largest number of militants... " But: "the people who entered into the 
movement... had a clear class vision of the struggle, and an expectation, in terms of the movement, of 
creating a class-based movement and not one of Catholic orientation... 
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In other words, there was a coincidence and compatibility of values rather than a direct 
transposition or identity of those values. 
These, then, were the intentions of Catholic militants. But what of the Catholic 
hierarchy? Was there any attempt at an instrumentalisation of Catholic forces for a 
determined series of political ends? In an article published at the time of the elections 
Dom Angelico made the following comments: 
Little by little, the Workers' Pastoral is offering to the labour movement militants possessing 
alternatives inspired by the principles of the Gospel, the transformation of men and unjust structures. 
In practice, the labour movement will have a Christian, "pelego", Communist, etc., orientation 
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depending upon its leadership. What interests us is that the labour movement has a Christian 
orientation, hence we work to offer it Christian militants with a real consciousness of class and 
yearning for liberation. It is in the labour movement that the great class dialogue is realised. It is 
there that the most diverse of currents meet one another in the search for a way out of a situation that 
is recognised to be one of oppression. 
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To a large extent this sums up the position of the official Church. It was not a-political, 
but on the contrary was keenly aware of the competing versions of the best forms for 
trade union organisation. Bishops felt that there should be a specifically Christian 
contribution to this process of dialogue. The sustained support of the Workers' Pastoral 
was one way of achieving this. However, PO was conceived in a radical/grassroots 
mould rather than a vertical i Jerventionist one. By this I mean that it was not there to try 
and impose some tightly structured Christian solution to the problems of Brazilian 
labour. Parallelism of this kind had long been rejected. It was there because of a radical 
Christian commitment, to reflect the perceived needs of the working classes, and help 
give a Christian orientation to that labour movement. 
What is of critical importance is that that Christian orientation would take decidedly 
secular forms. One can appreciate this simply by listing some of the criticisms levelled 
by bishops at the labour movement and the solution proposed. In another 1978 article, for 
instance, Dom Angelico was quite specific: 
we know that reality presents us with a picture that is far from ideal. We possess a system of trade 
unionism which is both tied down to the Ministry of Labour and distorted in its functions by virtue of 
welfarist attributes. 
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As for what that ideal should entail. the bishops of Sao Paulo state concluded earlier in 
the year that: 
The Mission [to the World of Work] must contribute towards the unification and organisation of the 
workers with the ultimate aim that they themselves assume their own destiny and find the paths to 
their own liberation. "sz 
These, then, were the paths to a labour movement with a Christian orientation rather than 
the mere presence of Catholics at its helm. And it was for these reasons that Dom 
Angelico regarded the salary campaigns and union elections of 1978 as "beacons of 
hope". In his words, the Labour Movement was "lifting itself in an effort towards greater 
union and better organisation. "53 Again, the comments of Waldemar Rossi are instructive 
in this respect. The following passage, taken from an interview with him during the 1978 
metalworkers' campaign, makes it quite plain as to who enjoyed the order of precedence 
and why:, 
The Workers' Pastoral, which is not a movement of bishops and priests but which in the Catholic 
workers has its greatest 
force, assumes positions in accordance with the views of the the masses. If 
current trade unionism does not represent a force for the expression and defence of the working class, 
the worker - conscious of gospel values, conscious of his rights and all the experience accumulated 
by humanity - will fight for a different form of trade unionism. The option of Christians for a new 
trade union system leads to a form of contestation which, naturally, encourages the formation of 
movements of contestation. 
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Let us now return to a question posed at the beginning of scion four. To what extent 
was the Church either pursuing a series of spiritual values which, for reasons not of its 
own choosing, enmeshed it in political and electoral controversies, or was it, in actual 
fact, deliberately straying into a qualitatively new field of action that was based upon 
what were essentially electoral considerations, as the comments of the metalworkers' 
president, Joaquinzäo, would appear to suggest? The answer is neither. As the 
declarations of the Säo Paulo state bishops, the city hierarchy, and leading militants 
reveals, the Church was pursuing more than just a series of spiritual values which led to 
its somehow being caught up in the events of 1978. It had quite consciously sought - and 
succeeded - in developing a range of what are best described as meta-political policies, 
i. e., an implicit vision rather than explicit/programmatic one. 
By far the most important of these polices, and under which all the others may be 
subsumed, was outlined to me by Frei Gilberto Gorgulho, a close associate of Dom 
Paulo's and secretary to the Archdiocesan Council for the Coordination of the Mission to 
the World of Work between 1975 and 1986. He argued that the Church of Säo Paulo: 
sets out from this fundamental principle: the people must be the subject of their struggle and of their 
liberation. One must respect the people and one cannot substitute them. 55 
But he also admitted the presence of another crucial accompanying element to this 
outlook, namely: 
the necessity of bringing the people to become an active subject and to assume their own struggles. 
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Both these statements are of profound significance. The former indicates an ecclesiastical 
ideal, i. e., that all things being equal, the people can and must be their own masters. But 
the latter statement, especially if inserted in the context of the Brazilian labour movement 
- where all things were 
far from equal, and where. for example, electoral passivity was a 
major hallmark - reminds us of the onerous task which the Church had taken upon itself. 
The "necessity" of bringing people together as an "active subject" therefore demanded 
the creation of a whole range of new instruments and criteria to meet these needs. This 
was precisely one of the major reasons behind the emergence of the various missions in 
general and that of the World of Work in particlar. For its part, the Workers' Pastoral 
was to be the key organisation in helping both to concretise and subject to critical srutiny 
the Church's proposition. 
Judged from the point of view of the participants themselves the strategy of the Church 
appears to have been successful in a number of respects. Firstly, the Metalworkers' 
Opposition, through its links with the Church, was able to develop a machine of 
sufficient electoral strength not only to challenge the union president but also, by all 
reliable accounts, to actually beat him. 
57 Of course, this does not mean that the political 
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dimensions of the Opposition's victory can be attributed to its tactical alliance with 
sectors of the Church; for that to be the case voters would have had to have been made 
aware of such a connection and the Opposition would have had to have made political 
capital out of the Catholic origins of its two leading candidates. This did not happen. 
Only to a more specialised audience, like the readers of the journal 0 Sao Paulo, was any 
overt reference made to the activities of AnIsio and Santos on the regional commission of 
the Mission to the World of Work, or the historical links between PO and the Opposition. 
But even here, no confusion could arise as to the strictly secular nature and origins of 
their demands - the principal one being a wholesale reform of the union structure. 
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Thus, it was not any identification of Church with Opposition amongst the voters that 
contributed to victory, but secular factors. Amongst these were: the logistical support 
which the Church provided; the skillfully conducted nature of the campaign itself; the 
heightened sense of confidence and radicalism amongst grassroots Sib Paulo 
metalworkers in the aftermath of the historic victories scored by their colleagues in the 
ABC region earlier that year; 9 and a general climate of mobilisation and freer debate. 
A second reason for being pleased was the turn around that had been effected in PO's 
fortunes. During the 1978 elections it had passed an important hurdle and manifested a 
remarkable degree of theoretical clarity and practical commitment. This state of affairs 
was in sharp contrast to little more that six years earlier when the organisation had been 
marginalised, deeply divided, and with members in fear of their very lives. Naturally, 
other factors, like the general poli`týal liberalisation that was still in progress and the 
sheer determination of a core group of militants, had contributed to this improvement in 
perspectives; but it is equally clear that the protective and supportive role of the 
hierarchy had played an important part. 
As far as PO was concerned the 1978 elections marked a high point. Not only did the 
organisation provide a decisive contribution to the campaign in terms of leading figures 
and logistical support, but just as importantly from its point of view, it was able to 
provide practical testimony of its evangelical and class commitment without falling into 
the trap of secularism or reductionism. 
In terms of the ideal relationship to be assumed between PO and the Opposition here, 
too, one can talk of a success. That the two groups became so closely involved was very 
much the product of circumstances and not an ideal situation to find themselves in. But 
interviews with the participants make it quite clear that all of them understood that a 
decoupling would eventually have to take place. Discussions were held within the ranks 
of the opposition as to how, in the words of a secular militant, "to eliminate the 
dependence upon the Church". 
60 One solution proposed was the setting up of "Workers 
Associations", which were seen as a natural transition towards an autonomous logistical 
base for the opposition. The same source noted that rather than being opposed to this 
development: 
88 
the militants linked to the Church who lived this process, generally always supported inclusive this 
initiative - Anisio Batista de Oliveira himself always took part in this Association in Ipiranga. 
61 
For their part, the bishops could also be well pleased with the Church's actions in the 
elections of 1978. Firstly, coverage of both the ABC strikes and the run-up to the Säo 
Paulo metalworker elections by the Catholic weekly 0 Säo Paulo indicate that some 
senior Church figures possessed a strategic vision of the desirability ofsa cross- 
fertilisation between organised labour and Catholic doctrine. Although they would rarely 
openly state it in these terms, the hierarchy could, nevertheless, be satisfied with the fact 
that amongst one of the strategically most significant groups of Brazilian workers, the 
metalworkers, there was an active - and in electoral terms powerful - group of people 
very much in tune with their own thinking. Secondly, the partnership between the 
various sectors of the Church had worked extremely well, evidencing few signs of 
friction and, indeed, showing all indications that the parties were in agreement with the 
division of labour as it stood. There was an acute awareness amongst the parties as to 
what they could reasonably expect from one another. The result of this had been 
confidence and consequently a reciprocally reinforcing dynamic. Waldemar Rossi, for 
instance speaks of how militants: 
searched for their inspiration in the dialogue with priests, bishops, nuns, etc., in order to have a better 
understanding of the biblical and theological interpretation of their militancy. 
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And for his part, Dom Angelico put forward the view that: 
we go forward together in dialogue; I learn a great deal from the militants of the Workers' Pastoral. 
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The real bulwark to this successful separation of powers, however, was not to be found 
in the formal division of labour established amongst hierarchy and militants. A pastoral 
planning process, no matter how carefully worked out, could only work in a dynamic 
manner if there was the simultaneous presence of a sufficient series of broadly shared 
ideological positions. To paraphrase earlier comments made by Dom Angelico, these 
common starting points had enabled decisions regarding the Mission to World of Work 
generally to be left to PO; they had enabled the bishops to seriously take on board the 
suggestions of the latter; and they had enabled PO itself to reflect in large measure the 
positions of the Church. Without these elements it would have been a purely paper 
instead of organic Workers' Pastoral. 
In the following chapter the basis and limits to the intervention of the progressive 
catholic Church will be examined in the context of metalworker struggles in the ABC 
region of Säo Paulo. For reasons which will become apparent, there were a number of 
differences in both the instruments and discourses involved. Amongst other things, for 
example, the Church's critique 
in the case of Säo Bemardo came to be directed at the 
conduct of the state, rather than a particular candidate who might happen to enjoy its 
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support. In other words, the stakes were much higher, the issues more polarised, and 
therefore that much clearer. Inspite of these differences, however, it is possible to point 
to continuities between the two cases and a consistency in the forms and limits to 
intervention. 
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Chapter Three: Church, State and Metalworkers - The Roads to Conflict, ABC 1975- 
1980 
3.1 Introduction 
Between 1978 and 1980 a wave of metalworkers strikes engulfed the ABC region of 
Säo Paulo (see note 64 of previous chapter) on a scale and in a form that was quite 
unprecedented in the country's post coup history. All participants agree that the Catholic 
Church of the region was closely involved in these momentous events - indeed, in a 
revealing comment at the time of the 1980 dispute the President of the Republic went so 
far as to suggest that the Dom Paulo was "inciting the'strike", an offence punishable by 
imprisonment. ' Other politicians went even further in their condemnation. One such, the 
secretary of Industry, Commerce, Science and Technology in Sao Paulo state, Oswaldo 
Palma, suggested that he would personally like "to send Dom Paulo Eväristo Ams to 
hell". 2 The reason for the furore was simple. The Catholic Church openly took the side 
of the workers against their employers and against the labour laws themselves. Once 
again it found itself in conflict with the state. 
One of the major aims of this chapter will be to look at the historical and philosophical 
contours of that conflict, in other words, at how the Church of the region progressively 
came to intervene, and secondly, at how it sought to justify these actions. Another related 
aim, will be to compare this intervention with the forms that were chosen in the 
Archdiocese of Sao Paulo. Were there major differences between the two, and if so, were 
these formal or substantive? Lastly, I shall give an assessment of the impact of the 
Church upon the constitution of labour struggles in the ABC region. 
I will begin, however, with a brief historical analysis of the labour movement and 
ecclesiastical terrains of the region. By understanding their specificities one can better 
grasp the true nature and significance of the dynamics that later developed between the 
two, as well as make a more meaningful comparison with the situation in the city of Säo 
Paulo itself. 
3.2 History and Configuration of the Metalworkers and Catholic Church in the ABC 
Region 
3.2.1 The Church 
Adjoining the Archdiocese of Säo Paulo to the southeast, and founded in 1954, the 
Diocese of Santo Andre comprised the municipalities of Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo do 
Campo, Sib Caetano do Sul, Diadema. Maud, Riberao Pires and Rio Grande da Serra. 
More so even than Säo Paulo, Santo Andre (hereafter also referring to the other 
municipalities unless otherwise specified) was characterised by industrial production, and 
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in particular, the presence of a significant number of multi-national enterprises which 
were involved in the vehicle component and assembly industries. 
Set up in the 1950's and 1960's, the distribution of these leading industries which 
formed the heart of metallurgical production was far from even. Rather like Säo Paulo, 
there were certain areas which even by the early 1980's were confined to dormitory 
status - like Riberäo Pires and Rio Grande da Serra, for instance. Maui and Diadema did 
have industrial production but they also served as dormitory towns. This left the big 
three; the cities of Santo Andre, Säo Bernardo do Campo and Säo Caetano do Sul. What 
is of fundamental importance is that these too exhibited markedly differing 
characteristics. In terms of size, for instance, Säo Bernardo had, by 1979, more that 
double the number of metalworkers of Santo Andre, which in turn had more than double 
the workers in Säo Caetano (13 0,000,60,000 and 25,000 respectively). But this was not 
always the case. As the former leader of the Santo Andre Metalworkers Union during the 
1980 strike pointed out to me, his was the union which began production in the region 
and from which, during the 1950's, the unions of Sao Bernardo do Campo as well as Säo 
Caetano were dismembered. In the 1950's and 1960's, then, all eyes were upon the Santo 
Andre Metalworkers' Union. Albeit that Säo Bemardo's metalworker base surpassed that 
of Santo Andre in the 1960's, the latter nevertheless remained the political focus for 
radical Catholic and Communist militancy. 
As well as a major pole for industry, Santo Andre also served as a magnet for labour 
throughout Brazil. The first bishop of the region, Dom Jorge Marcos, speaks of how 
upon his appointment in 1954 he was immediately struck by the: 
overwhelming and unprepared multitude that was arriving from the northeast, Minas [Gerais], and 
from the south of the state of Rio... They were very poor people... who came here, they began in 
totally unspecialised occupations, shifting buckets of concrete for the construction of the factories, 
the automobile industries, or the large buildings that were already springing up here. 3 
He was also struck by how brutally they were exploited by "the men of money who 
wanted to make profits via the use of cheap labour. "4 
In view of the working class characteristics of the region, and Dom Jorge's own 
sensitivity towards these problems, the Church made workers' issues one of its top 
priorities from the outset. Dom Jorge introduced novel aspects into the Church's 
approach. Rather like Frei Sartori, who had foregone the use of the cassock and provoked 
some consternation amongst clerical ranks, Dom Jorge was ahead of his time because he 
too urged the priests to get closer to the workers. Indeed, it was partly in response to such 
an atmosphere that French "worker-priests", whose task was to evangelise the working 
classes in both a factory and parish setting, decided to settle in this part of Brazil. 5. 
According to Heloisa de Souza Martins, who has studied the Church of Santo Andr6 
during Dom Jorge's period of office (between 1954 and 1975), what underlay the 
bishop's outlook was a more modem conception of the Church's social doctrine. Rather 
than stressing the inevitability of poverty, the need to combat Communism, and so on: 
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In the specific case of the Church of the diocese of Santo Andre the social doctrine gave a vision of 
the worker which consisted in recognising him as a 'human person', as 'son of God' with a series of 
'rights': the right to work, to a just remuneration, the right to the distribution of the advantages that 
result from labour, that is to say, the right to health, to medicine, to the constitution of the family, and 
to education. In reality, the Church of Santo Andre demanded for the worker the rights of citizen. 
What was surprising to many was the fact that not only the bishop and the priests said this in the 
pulpits as, also, the fact that they went to the public squares and the doors of the factories to 
accompany the workers in their demands. Truly, an attitude like this one represented an advance 
inside the Church which, up until then, had always been committed to the dominant classes. 6 
She gives the example of a factory strike in April 1956 which lasted 87 days and in 
which the Church "helped to organise a strike fund to assist the workers with food and 
money, as well as carrying out the work of localising them in the neighbourhoods where 
they lived. "7 There is also the example of father Afonso Birk who achieved noteriety in a 
1959 chemical workers strike "due to his participation in the picket lines at the side of the 
strikers. "8 And finally, there was Dom Jorge's own involvement further afield in the 
strike of cement workers at the Perus factory (which itself led to the formation of the 
FNT), and his "assumption of the leadership of the negotiations"9 in the Aymore factory 
strike of 1960 (which again enjoyed the participation of FNT militants). 
In an earlier chapter we noted the ambiguity of the FNT's early doctrine and how, de 
facto, FNT militants came into conflict with their Communist contemporaries inside the 
unions. This kind of dynamic was not absent from Santo Andree where, in 1947, the 
Communists had succeeded in electing more than a dozen councillors, and where 
Communism was also the most powerful force in the organised labour movement. Indeed 
it has led one author to suggest that Dom Jorge skilfully sought first to weaken 
Communist influence within the labour movement, thereby creating a vacuum4 for 
Christian trade-unionism to take its place. 10 This thesis is somewhat difficult to prove or 
refute. Dom Jorge admits, for instance, that there was indeed a conflict between the 
Church and the Communists but he also argues, in a fashion quite similar to the FNT 
militants in Säo Paulo, that it was not the "ideology" as such that was the source of 
conflict, but that: 
It was more a struggle against the Leninism and Stalinism of the absolutist party 
t t, 
I find this neat se aration a little hard to believe, a sort of post hoc rationalisation, since 
to this day the Godless nature of Marxism and Communism remains a significant strand 
in the thinking of an organisation like the CNBB (which is widely recognised as one of 
the world's most progressive bishops' conferences)12. During the late 1950's and early 
1960's, when the cold war reached its peak, that ideological conflict with Communism 
was, if anything, more rather than less accentuated. 
Quite whether Dom Jorge's early motivations were ideological or organisational is a 
difficult question to resolve. There are genuine ambiguities in his poisition. He claims, 
for instance, a considerable degree of respect towards a number of Communist 
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intellectuals as well as for a leader of the metalworkers union at the time, Marcos 
Andreotti, whom he regarded as "practically a Communist leader". 13 To a large extent 
those ambiguities resolved themselves as the 1964 coup liquidated Communist elements 
within the unions, and Dom Jorge became preoccupied with the institutional defence of 
increasingly radical Catholic workers organisations like JOC and ACO, which 
themselves were the subjects of accusations of Communist infiltration. His stout defence 
of these two organisations in particular, at a time when they had very few friends inside - 
let alone outside - the Church, was in sharp contrast to the situation in Sao Paulo where, 
as was shown earlier, militants continued their activities "despite Dom Agnelo Rossi. " 14 
The impact of the military coup on the Diocese of Santo Andre bore a number of 
similarities with the situation in Säo Paulo. Some conservative Catholic militants, with 
principally Workers' Circle connections, were appointed as union leaders by the 
government whilst their more radical Catholic contemporaries either dropped out of 
union activity altogether or went on to form part of the opposition to the government 
appointees. In other words, the process of differentiation between the various ecclesio- 
political groupings was accelerated and accentuated. This is evident in the elections to 
the Santo Andre" Metalworkers' Union in 1965 where, as in Sao Paulo, alliances were 
made between radical Catholics and Communists on the one hand, against leaders of 
more conservative Catholic outlooks on the other. As Heloisa Martins explains: 
two slates ran for the first election after the intervention: one linked to the interventors, beaded by 
Antonio Casagrande, whose general secretary, Benedito Marcilio, was a former Marian 
Congregationalts; the other had Theodoro Thieche in the presidency and Jose Nanci, a Catholic 
militant who belonged to the Marian Congregation of Carmo Cathedral, as secretary. The latter slate 
resulted from a composition of forces between the PCB and the 'progressive wing of the Church', as 
the Communists themselves used to say. 16 
Notwithstanding the bishop's support of ACO and JOC, these groups suffered a fate 
similar to their Sao Paulo counterparts. This was for a number of reasons. Firstly, there 
was the national situation, to which Santo Andre was no exception. One of JOC's 
national advisers described to me how in 1970 he sought out the papal nuncio who asked 
how many JOC members were being detained or persecuted. The answer was 80. The 
nuncio felt that this was nothing given a population of 100 million; but for JOC this spelt 
disaster (as well as a certain disappointment with respect to the nuncio's grasp of events). 
Its room for manoeuvre was severely restricted. The adviser who gave these statistics, 
Padre Agostino Pretto, was himself forced into semi-clandestinity, continuing to act 
discretely and giving safe cover to people who were sought or watched by the authorities. 
Thus, the situation nationally was very much one of retrenchment, wait and see, and, in 
the intervening period, an outflow from the bases. 17 
In local terms the situation was exacerbated by the resistence of some clergy towards 
Dom Jorge's views. The original expansion of ACO and JOC in the area was carried out 
very much on the back of the French worker priests who had considerable expertise in 
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the field but were not all that numerous, amounting to about five. 18 This contrasted with 
the situation in Sao Paulo where in the southern sector alone about 30 progressive priests 
were active. Under Dom Jorge's stewardship the hierarchy led its clerical bases from the 
front rather than followed them, in contrast to Agnelo Rossi in Säo Paulo who tried to 
dampen down radical Catholicism. Thus, when Dom Jorge fell into ill health more or less 
three years before he left, in 1975, a sort of power vacuum was created. Since he was no 
longer able to lead from the front, and given that this had been one of the primary 
instruments of change in Santo Andre, this state of affairs was neither going to be 
propitious to the formation - nor the retention - of ACO militancy as a power in the 
region. 
One of the major questions which emerges in regard to this period is why the Workers' 
Pastoral only came to be formed in Santo Andre (municipality) in 1972, and not in SSo 
Bemardo until 1980, especially given the close ties that would later be developed 
between the diocese and the Säo Bernardo Metalworkers' Union. In part, the answer is 
simple. The Church tended to accompany trade union realities and trajectories of the late 
1960's and early 1970's (and the kinds of socio-economic factors upon which these were 
" based) rather than precelde them. Historically, it had itself begun life in the town of 
Santo Andre, and, following the rapid demographic developments there, later pushed out 
into the towns of Säo Caetano and Säo Bernardo. When the worker priests first came to 
the region in 1961, for example, ` they concentrated the bulk of their efforts in the 
municipality of Santo Andre. It appears that that historical bias was simply reproduced 
until the late 1970's, when it became apparent that the new focus of labour activity was, 
indeed, Säo Bernardo, and the Church therefore made a conscious effort to switch 
activities to that area. As will be shown later, this decision took place under a new bishop 
and a completely new labour situation. " 
These factors help to explain why there was a bias towards the municipality of Santo 
Andre, but it still leaves open the question as to why PO was confined here, and even 
then it proved weak. Some clues are given by Padre Mahon, a worker priest who came to 
the region in December 1961 and who therefore had an insight into the ensuing 
developments. He suggested that the reason why: 
Santo Andre tended more towards ACO than on the side of the Workers' Pastoral could be a little bit 
because we, the Sons of Charity, 
19 came from France with a large experience of ACO, and in France 
the Workers' pastoral did not exist. So we supported ACO, and as there were not many priests who 
supported the workers' movements, Santo Andre grew a lot in terms of ACO. 20 
He went on: 
I think that the support of the priests of Säo Bernardo was a little lacking with respect to these 
movements. In Santo Andre there were more priests absorbed in struggling with the workers, and Sao 
Bernardo, up until today, had fewer. 
21 
Frei Betto, who was put in charge of developing the Workers' Pastoral in Säo Bernardo 
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in 1980, was less diplomatic in his comments. Asked what constituted the greatest 
difficulty facing a predecessor. Padre Carlos Tosar, who was charged with organising PO 
in the ABC region as a whole, Betto answered: 
I believe he faced the largest obstacles inside the very clergy of ABC itself which is predominantly 
conservative and I wonder, even, whether they accept the pastoral priorities of the diocese. 22 
All these comments are highly significant. If one recalls, for a moment, the nature of 
pastoral organisation in Säo Paulo, and indeed, many of the successes it scored in 
relation to the labour movement in general and Metalworkers Opposition in particular, it 
was made clear that the commitment of radical priests was an integral part of these 
successes; in many ways they constivited PO's infrastructural backbone. This 
"dependency" of PO was only to be expected. After all, the very meaning of pastoral 
activity implied, amongst other things, a greater insertedness in the life of the local parish 
Church. Thus, notwithstanding Dom Jorge's own belief that a Workers' Pastoral should 
be created and exist alongside organisations like JOC and ACO, the fact was that the 
absence of a dynamic clerical base mitigated its creation. The bishop, therefore, was 
somewhat dependent upon his French worker-priests for spearheading initiatives in this 
area. 
That priests like Padre Tosar were amongst the very few, capable of developing a 
pastoral is somewhat ironic. There is no doubting his commitment, but in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's, many militants from JOC and ACO were sceptical as to the nature of a 
Workers' Pastoral. In the case of Säo Paulo, for instance, there was the specfic fear that 
Dom Agnelo's version would serve as a strait jacket. That kind of debate does not appear 
to have arisen in Santo Andre. Rather, there was a questioning of why the groups should 
co-exist, whether PO would compete with or complement ACO, and so forth. Padre 
Pretto, who had both JOC and PO credentials, 23 recalls a discussion he had with one 
worker priest from Santo Andre who was not entirely convinced. Pretto argued the 
following: 
Whilst maintaining the methods and content of ACO we have to create a second line of action-we 
must turn towards the inside of the Church " without the support of the institutional Church we will 24 
not be able to sustain ourselves here. 
As a senior ACO figure he was also presenting a new kind of argument: 
We must rearticulate the Church here and overcome all and any temptation to closed militancy, 
create a service and not a movement, an inclusive service - one that deals with the world of the young 
all the way to the world of the old. ACO and JOC are invovled a great deal with the workers - with a 
tendency towards skilled workers; the Workers' Pastoral must involve itself with all the ecclesial 
world; with the liturgy, the catechists, and with the Eucarist.... One cannot simply position oneself as 
a movement because this impoverishes. In the movement I have to enter the movement, in the service 
I circulate freely, organising myself according to my vocation. 25 
By no means should the doubts of the young worker priest concerned be taken to imply 
that this constituted a major obstacle to PO's development. The real obstacle was the lack 
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of support or open opposition of parish priests themselves. However, given 
understandable fears that PO might in some way substitute PO there was a certain degree 
of reorientation and re-education required. People had to be convinced of the fact that, in 
Pretto's words, "The service can never replace the movement". 26 That said, one of the 
leading lights behind the formation of the Workers' Pastoral in the region was Padre 
Mahon, where the reasoning was heavily influenced by tactical considerations. 
Mahon, who was entrusted with the task of coordinating PO in Santo Andre, estimates 
that there were at this time (the early 1970's) anything between 100 and 200 Catholic 
militants, a number that was acknowledged to be relatively small for such a large region. 
It was further accepted, on the other hand, that PO had certain characteristics that could 
help it to aggregate a greater mass of people to its ranks. As he says: 
ACO demands from its militants a commitment of struggle with the workers, the Workers' Pastoral 
encourages its militants to fight but it does not demand it. Thus, it is the movement that attracts more 
people because the movement which makes more demands will obviously receive fewer militants 
than the more open one. 27 
These mass qualities and unification were urgently needed at this moment of acute 
repression. A further advantage during this period was., of course, the fact that in political 
terms it was an easier way for the bishop to manifest support for exactly the same 
militants. As Tosar comments, "ACO was reduced in membership and the people simply 
participated in the wider Workers' Pastoral. "28 
Despite these changes, i. e., the need for a new modus vivendi. and the local bishop's 
willingness to provide it, the fact remains that PO did not acquire the kind of dynamism 
evidenced in Sao Paulo. The greatest obstacle was the conservative nature of the clergy; 
but there was another factor which, as it were, limited PO's dynamism, and that was the 
actual trade union situation itself and the differing ways in which radical Catholics felt 
they could respond to it. 
3.2.2 The Metalworkers 
In Säo Paulo; Part of PO's dynamism, 'and by this I mean a high profile with respect to 
the metalworkers' union leadership, had come from its remarkable degree of insertion in 
an increasingly organised and effective opposition. There was a clear polarisation of 
forces, with the radical left (including Catholics) being forced to organise themselves 
outside the union and, one might add, being happy to pursue this extra-trade union line of 
activity. If one takes the example of the FNT in Sao Paulo, for instance, it will be 
recalled that a fundamental theme running throughout its existence was the idea of 
breaking with the union structure, and, in particular, with the "imposto sindical", or union 
tax. As Salvador Pires explained, the idea was not so much to take power within the 
"fascist" union structure but to break completely with the system. 29 Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the union regarded the FNT as a parallel structure. The Metalworkers' 
Opposition, to the extent that it was able to articulate its forces on a continuous, rather 
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than a purely electoral basis, was also regarded by the union as a parallel entity. Its 
critique extended beyond just the rebuttal of the forces around the president, Joaquinzao, 
there was also a firm belief in the factory commission as a parallel unit of power capable 
of exerting pressure upon the union leadership - i. e., from without. 
30 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explain in detail why the metalworkers' unions 
of ABC followed a different pattern of development from the Säo Paulo union. However, 
there is a striking feature which immediately draws one's attention, and that is the 
contrasting capacity of the union leaders to reform their political discourse before their 
membership. The most classic example of this is that of Luis inäcio Lula da Silva, 
better known as Lula. 
He was the protege of Paulo Vidal, elected to the post of president of the Sao Bernardo 
Metalworkers' Union between 1969 and 1975. Vidal was no great reformer. He is widely 
credited as a scrupulous adherent of labour legislation and as a political operator who 
worked very much through the benefits (i. e., medical, recreational, etc., ) that could be 
provided by the union. Mass mobilisation was the last thing on his mind. In this sense he 
fits very much within the mould of Joaquinzäo in Sao Paulo. Nonetheless, there do 
appear to be significant differences. There was, for instance, a desire on Vidal's part to 
pull his union out of the control of the Sao Paulo State Metalworkers Federation as far 
back as 1970. In part this was simply because the specific demands of the union were 
neutralised in the course of the general settlements obtained by the Federation; but, 
according to Oswaldo Bargas and Luis Rainho, it was also because there was an 
increasing perception amongst the Säo Bernardo union leaders as to the: 
'pelego character of the leaders of the Federation who always ended up selling out... to the bosses on 
the occasion of the wage round. 
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What is significant about these comments is not so much the particular issue at stake 
(whose resolution came at a later point in time) as the fact that it indicates the existence 
of at least some political fluidity within the union during the early 1970's. 
This question of fluidity should not be exaggerated, the union had a long way to go 
before it could be described as openly combative, but it was, nevertheless, in sharp 
contrast to the situation in Säo Paulo where militants from the Opposition felt they were 
frequently given away by their own union. Vidal was never accused of such practices. 
In 1975, Lula was elected president of the Sao Bemardo Metalworkers' Union. His 
own radicalisation is the clearest sign of the contrasting fortunes faced by radical 
militants in Säo Paulo and Säo Bernardo do Campo. Indeed, at about the time of Lula's 
election some of Sao Paulo's Catholic militants expressed their fear that Lula might in 
some way swallow up opposition elements. Militants from Säo Bemardo, on the other 
hand, argued that whilst their union president was politically backward he was certainly 
no "pelego" and that there was real scope for action within the union. 32 
It was upon these objectively differing trade union terrains that radical Catholic 
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militancy went forward and divided. By 1978, for instance, there was a remarkable 
degree of unanimity amongst all political factions in Sao Paulo as to the need to defeat 
Joaquinzäo. A year later this would be followed by a bitter strike in which the Opposition 
acted as a quasi-parallel union to forestall the demobilising tactics of the president. In 
Sao Bernardo, on the other hand, that current which had a natural political affinity with 
the Sao Paulo Opposition was, by 1978, either rapidly gravitating towards activity within 
the union of metalworkers, where it was felt a genuine space for their activities now 
existed, or was already closely integrated. I 
By no means does the above imply that radical Catholic militancy within the ABC 
region did not exist. In the 1965 elections to the Santo Andre Metalworkers' Union, for 
example, Popular Action, (Acäo Popular, AP) which had roots in JOC and Catholic 
student organisations, 
33 was one of the leading factions contesting the elections with the 
PCB and against leaders like Benedito Marcilio (president from 1967 to 1980). AP's 
activities, however, came to an end at the beginning of the 1970's as the dictatorship 
succeeded first in infiltrating and then in liquidating it almost completely. 
Within the union matters were complicated by changes in PCB policy. As Souza 
Martins explains, with the 1967 Santo Andre Metalworkers' Union elections: 
the PCB came to adopt a new trade uniön policy, allying itself with the trade union leaderships that 
had emerged from the [government] interventions as a means of regaining control over the trade 
union. Tbus began a process of the alliances between the Communists and currents more to the right 
of the trade union movement. distancing itself from the more authentic and combative forces. 
34 
It was perhaps, in part, for these reasons (i. e., the integration of certain sections of Santo 
Andre's opposition) that a former leader of the Santo Andre union was moved to make 
the following comments: 
Time Union of Santo Andre (if compared with unions generally known as "pelegos") was a democratic 
union, you had complete freedom within the union. The right of comrades to manifest themselves 
freely, democratically, was never barred. Meetings were held in the union and documents were never 
asked for. There was never any attempt to impede the participation of comrades, it was always an 
open democratic and free union. Even in the difficult years of the dictatorship, there was democracy 
in there ... when comrades were not affiliated, they voted with their employment card, at times this 
was not even requested. 
35 
This would appear to contrast starkly with Sao Paulo where the entry of certain 
Communists into leadership positions only came about in the early 1980's and where, 
according to one source: 
the group of goverment appointees under the leadership of Joaquim dos Santos de Andrade 
[Joaqunizäo], came to annul the affiliation of about 1,800 workers. 36 
Again, one should not overstress the question of latitude for political self-expression 
within the Santo Andre Metalworkers' Union at this stage in time. The wider situation 
rendered this highly problematical, with the AP never being able to project itself openly. 
Moving to the rnid 1970's, however, there it does appear that meaningful room for 
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manoeuvre did indeed develop as leaders like Benedito Marcilio, so to speak, recycled 
themselves. Between 1979 and 1982, for example, he was elected to the Sao Paulo state 
legislature as a deputy for the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT). A major 
part in his success had been his recent record as a combative union leader alongside Lula. 
As with Sao Bernardo, then, a serious extra-trade union, i. e., parallelist, form of activity, 
against the union leadership was not on the political agenda. 
3.3 The Development of a New Relationship Between the Church and the ABC 
Metalworkers - The Development of an Old Conflict Between Church and State, 1975- 
1980 
The last two sections indicated two significant features of Catholic militancy within the 
ABC region. The first was its numerical weakness. By 1974 JOC, ACO and AP were 
broken and it was evident, despite the support of the bishop, that PO did not have the 
conditions to fill the breach. The second feature was the differing trade union situation to 
which this limited militancy had to respond. Its full potential would only be realised in 
the years after 1975. 
Whilst shifts in the trade union situation were fundamental to providing a new 
opportunity and basis for the articulation of Catholic militancy, we must first look at 
some major changes which took place within the Church of Santo Andre itself. 
The most important of these changes came about in 1975 with the appointment to the 
region of the new bishop, Dom Claudio Hummes. As had been the case with Dom Paulo, 
Dom Cläudio's appointment was initially greeted with some trepidation by local Catholic 
militants. As he himself explained, it was mainly because he had the reputation of an 
academic with little if any contact with the problems of workers, "I was a professor of 
philosophy, I was the provincial of the Franciscans, that was how I came here. "37 He 
went on: 
They [the militants] told me later that initially, they even preferred to maintain a certain distance, 
believing that the bishop would perhaps hinder more than help, and for this reason they met at a 
distance; there was no great interchange. 38 
In contrast to the days when Dom Jorge had led very much from the front, the 
following comments of Dom Claudio give a clear indication as to the kind of tone and 
method of action his episcopacy would adopt. 
What there was on the part of this group which was called the Workers' Pastoral was that they kept 
themselves at a considerable distance, and it was I that had to - and ended up - calling them for a chat 
to put forward my initial proposals. But in truth, I was not able to put these at the fast meeting 
because the story - all the matters they put to me - gradually rendered affairs such that I listened 
because my proposals were completely out of touch.... the fast meeting lasted more than two hours in 
which I listened to them 
from the beginning to the end without saying practically anything. I was 
discovering that in reality I did not understand the life of the workers, and therefore I did not have a 
proposal to make. 
39 
Whilst Dom Claudio's apparent willingness to listen to the militants helped to quickly 
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establish a positive working relationship between the curia and these individuals, it did 
not in itself provide an immediate solution to certain long-standing difficulties. Unlike 
the Archdiocese of Säo Paulo, which first conducted a long consultation exercise 
amongst its members in 1975, subsequently produced a pastoral plan, and finally gave 
the Workers Pastoral more teeth and renewed vigour; the Diocese of Santo Andre proved 
incapable of producing such a plan. In the view of the bishop, which is backed up by 
other sources, the reasons for this were clear. As he explains: 
I encountered the diocese here, which was given to me at the end of 1975, and initially there were not 
the conditions to make a plan - at least, at that time I judged there not to be sufficient conditions to 
make a pastoral plan because this is something which demands a series of elements; of mentality, of 
will, of work together, etc. With the passage of time this desire gradually emerged, also on the part of 
the clergy itself, 'as well as the people, to make a plan. And this took some time to do, we must have 
worked on it for at least two years. 
4 
Dom Claudio's explanation of the inability to produce a plan highlights two important 
features of the diocese at that particular moment in time. One was historical, i. e., the 
absence of a sufficiently cohesive and numerically organised group for pushing such a 
plan forward. There was also the added difficulty of a certain degree of resistance 
amongst more conservative clergy to contend with. The second feature concerns the new 
bishop himself and his own evaluation of the situation. As has already been indicated, the 
new bishop was not about to impose a plan upon the region. It quickly became clear to 
him that he would have to "listen a lot more"41 precisely in order to' firstly come to grips 
with and then develop an adequate response to the new situation he faced. Like a 
minister reading him/herself into a new brief, it would be sometime before Dom Claudio 
could make any major proposals. Furthermore, as far as he was concerned, to be worth 
their while, these proposals would have to be successful in practical terms rather than 
mere paper formulations. As he put it: 
One of the theses I have always defended is that there is no rush. What is important is that it is done 
and that it involves the maximum possible and that the people participate. The very elaboration of a 
pastoral plan is already a great innovation, a great participation. At times the best results are those at 
the time when the plan is elaborated - better than what is done afterwards. 
42 
The years following Dom Claudio's appointment were ones of re-education and 
rearticulation. JOC was all but dissolved in the region. This left ACO as the major force. 
Technically, though, the activities of ACO were undertaken in the name of the Workers' 
Pastoral. As Dom Claudio explains: 
beginning with the meetings that we held, from there on ACO had been very present in the group of 
the Workers' Pastoral. So they were no longer like ACO, all of them labelled themselves as PO. They 
were almost the dorsal spine, which is to say the force, the most qualified group, the group that had 
the most vision was this group of ACO within the Workers' Pastoral, only that the Workers' Pastoral 
was composed of other people who were also not of ACO, they were other Christian workers. So it 
was a wider group. 
3 
This turn of events naturally led to some debate and confusion as to what the respective 
105 
functions of the two groups were and should be; a debate which was, if anything, 
heightened some years later when ACO again felt free to hold meetings in its own name. 
As noted earlier, one of the most powerful reasons for the existence of ACO was the 
quality of training of its cadres, as well as their independence vis-a-vis the local 
hierarchy; but with the emergence of bishops like Dom Cläudio, even these issues were 
put into question as he stressed that "a closer communion with the local Church would 
not put at risk its autonomy". 44 Within the Church there was also a wider re-evaluation 
of the virtues of a specialist training. The opinions of Frei Betto, the leading progressive 
priest and Church intellectual who was imprisoned for his militancy in the early 1970's 
and closely involved in the 1980 metalworker's strike, symbolise this shift. In comments 
to myself, he acknowledged that to the extent that ACO was elitist and PO and the CEBs 
more popular, the decision of the hierarchy after 1964 to destimulate ACO was not 
entirely wrong. 5 This was not withstanding his own membership of the Young Catholic 
Student's (Juventude Estudantil Catolica, JEC) national executive back in the early 
1960's. Similarly, as we saw earlier, Padre Agostinho Pretto (who was directly involved 
in the national coordination of ACO between 1968 and 1979), perceived the need for an 
evolution in forms of Catholic militancy. His view was that "if we create a Workers' 
Pastoral - large and inclusive - ACO will be born and reborn". 
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These opinions did not represent a rejection of specialist training. Its virtues, i. e.; the 
ability to provide militants who formed the backbone of PO, had been demonstrably 
evident in Dom Cläudio's own comments. But what was being proposed was a shift in 
the orientation and context into which that training would be inserted. There was also a 
widespread feeling that the efforts of the various Church groupings within the field of 
labour should be better coordinated. Dom Claudio recalled one small incident that 
illustrated the lack of practical integration between ACO and PO when two militants 
stood up at a metalworkers' meeting to debate widely differing proposals. Only 
afterwards did they realise that one was from ACO and the other from P0.47 
All these questions were pushed into the background as a clear set of priorities was put 
to the top of the agenda with the strikes of 1978-80. And it is to these that we must now 
turn. 
By June 1977 PO evidenced greater signs of organisation, with the bishop, lay persons, 
and a number of priests from various parishes particpating in a day of study on the 
question of unemployment. From the report of that meeting it emerges that the group 
which attracted most attention was the metalworkers of the region. From newspaper and 
worker accounts it was found that there were high levels of layoffs in major firms like 
Brosol, General Motors, Volkswagen, Ford, General Electric, Chrysler and Scania, 
amongst others. The report of the day's proceedings went on: 
Regarding the number of unemployed in ABC, the information obtained is not 
coincidental. More or 
less the figures stand at a total of about 12,000 employed [Sic, 
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i report should read "unemployed"]. Just the metalworkers of Säo Bernardo and Säo 
Caetano account for 8,667 unemployed since the beginning of the year, with 
dismissals confirmed by the union 
4 
What is important in this account is not so much the figures as the fact that no other 
group of workers was given such detailed treatment or, for that matter, dominated the 
local economy to such an extent. 
Regarding the leadership of the ABC unions, the report also indicated a certain 
ambivalence of PO members towards their activities. Some felt that the unions "were not 
reacting" to the problem of unemployment, whilst others thought that they were but "in a 
concealed form"49: 
All this provoked an exchange of opinions upon the union, upon its validity and real possibilities. It 
was borne in mind that the union is not the leaderships, nor the headquarters, but that it is the whole 
body of the workers. 50 
All of this began to change in September 1977. In the light of official admissions that 
inflation statistics between 1973 and 1974 had been manipulated by the government of 
the day, the leadership of the Sao Bernardo metalworkers set in motion a campaign for a 
catch-up increase of 34.1% in its members' salaries. It was also joined in this struggle by 
the metalworkers of Santo Andre, under the leadership of Benedito Marcilio. 
5' What is 
of importance to the present study. is that whilst individual Catholic militants welcomed 
the assertion of more radical union policies, they were in no position, i. e.. were 
organisationally too weak, to influence them. Initially, it was the union leaders who set 
the agenda for the movement, and in turn the movement, with the surprise strike of May 
1978, which began to set the agenda for the leadership. For its part the Church, and 
organisations like PO began to take their cue from these wider developments, and not the 
other way around. 
That the stimulus for change came from within the labour movement itself, and the 
Church, whether it liked it or not, was marginal to this process, can be seen not only in 
the rearticulation that was going on within the Catholic militant groupings themselves, of 
which more in a moment; but also in the attitudes of the metalworkers leaders towards 
the Church. 
In the case of Santo Andre, for example, there were memories of the AP slate which 
had stood against the incumbents. Furthermore, for being a leadership which had a fairly 
strong Communist component (approximately 5 out of 24 directors52), there was some 
hostility on their part to any Church incursions of whatever kind. Asked whether prior to 
the strikes of the late 1970's the Church had any pretensions to power within the union. 
Benedito Marcilio was quite forthright: 
They always had that aim, there is no doubt about that. They always had their people attempting to 
take over the union. 
53 
So there was, at least in the mind of the directorship, a clear concept of separate 
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identities: 
we had a movement that came from the left via the Communist Party and another scheme 
altogether. 54 
Furthermore, as will become clear when I discuss the role of the Church in the strikes of 
1978-80, there was a notion that these identities should continue to remain strictly 
separate. 
The case of Säo Bernardo was slightly different. The leadership had neither faced a 
notable opposition from Church sectors, nor was there a particularly strong showing 
from the Communists. But those views that were expressed, however, do not lead one to 
believe that the Church was looked upon favourably. 
Asked, in a February 1978 article, whether he saw any possibility of alliances with the 
Church, Lula gave the following highly critical answer which merits full citation: 
As far as I am concerned, the Church is carrying out the actions of someone who is feeling guilty. I 
was an altar boy, I held the priest's gown, I made my First Communion and a load of things, and I 
got fed up with hearing the priest asking us not to fight, because those who suffer today reach the 
reign of heaven tomorrow. The Church also contributed, and a heck of a lot, to the situation in which 
the working class now finds itself. Now, one part of the Church wishes to redeem itself in the eyes of 
those whom it injured. I have read a few things of the Workers' Pastoral and I did not like them, 
because they are putting the worker at a" low level; he appears there like a 'Mr Nobody' and they as 
the good guys. What the Church cannot do is to create movements that are parallel to the trade union 
movement. It helps if it carries out a good job of educating the worker so that be acts within the 
union. I think that frequently the Church puts itself in the same position as the radicals of 1968, but 
the worker is not prepared for radicalisms. 
55 
Whatever the nature of the rupture Lula might be carrying out with the union apparatus, 
it was clear that as far as he was concerned, the Church had little part to play in those 
designs except, perhaps, by teaching the workers to participate within their unions rather 
than outside them. 
Whilst Lula's comments are rather emotional, there was a certain - if not completely 
accurate - truth to them when it came to the alleged parallel activities of the Church. It is 
possible that Lula had in mind the situation in Säo Paulo, and PO's close alignment with 
the Metalworkers' Opposition. Whether that was truly parallelist or not is a question 
open to debate. But it appears that in Säo Bernardo there was, in fact, an articulation of, 
amongst others, Christians. This was the so-called "Gnipäo", literally, the Big Group. 
The origin and aims of the "Grupäo" are given detailed coverage by Bargas and Rainho 
in their book on the events of 1977-79.56 There, the reader learns that the group was 
essentially aimed at uniting more combative militants as well as focusing more 
specifically upon the union of Sao Bemardo: 
The 'Grupäo' was born from two small groups which had been meeting. One in order to evaluate the 
strike of May 1978, and the other in order to discuss the specific problems of the grassroots inside 
Volkswagen. ... they united with other workers from the other main factories and some who militated 
in the region linked to organised political tendencies. 57 
What is not mentioned, however, is the fact that the various "political tendencies", which 
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numbered militants from the Revolutionary Movement of October the Eighth 
(Movimento Revolucionärio Oito de Outubro, MR8), Socialist Convergence 
(Convergencia Socialista), and Socialist Democracy (Democracia Socialista, DS), also 
included militants from ACO and JOC. More interesting still, is the fact that for a time 
they all met under the name of the Workers' Pastoral. Instead, they confine their 
comments to the idea that the "Grupao" basically united militants who were, to varying 
degrees, critical of the Sao Bernardo leadership because participation in the union's 
policy-making was limited to the directorate rather than offering real possiblities for 
activist input. Apparently Paulo Vidal, who still retained a strong "personal influence" in 
the union, was opposed to any moves that might strengthen the "the conditions of action 
of those workers militating at a shop-floor level. "58 
In an interview with myself Bargas clarified the relevance of the Workers' Pastoral: 
We went to Säo Bernardo in 1978 and needed to find a good excuse to be able to unite the most 
diverse militants from the most diverse factories. So we needed to find a space. I, for example, had a 
certain space in the Church [as a member of ACO], along with my comrades. So we went to the 
Church of the Matriz in Sao Bernardo do Campo and said that we are creating a Workers' Pastoral of 
Säo Bernardo, but this was very much more of an excuse to acquire a space for these militants to 
meet because at the time such a space did not exist within the union. 59 
s 
In other words, the Workers' Pastoral at this time was little more than a shell for the 
activities of the "Grupao". 
When the Third Säo Bernardo Metalworkers Congress was held in October of 1978. 
the "Grupäo"/PO split into two. One faction believed that the Congress had finally 
opened up genuine possibilities for action and that therefore it now made sense for 
militants to participate - on an indvidual basis - in the activities of the union. The other 
faction, which was composed of organised political tendencies, held to the view that the 
"Grupäo" should be strengthened, carry out a vanguardist role, and even proposed that 
they themselves should carry out the 1979 salary campaign independently of the union. 60 
Catholic militants were amongst those who decided to opt for activity within the union. 
Thus, by the time Frei Betto arrived to develop a Workers' Pastoral in Säo Bernardo. in 
1980, all that was left was a rump. As he put it: 
There was a Workers' Pastoral in Sao Bernardo, but it was a Workers' Pastoral in inverted commas, 
it was apolitical group - Communist, anti- clerical, and it disguised itself as the Workers' Pastoral as 
a means of being able to get into the union of metalworkers. This is in 1979/80. In Säo Bernardo 
there was a small political group, linked to MRS, which posed as the Workers' Pastoral. And when I 
arrived there in January 1980 1 found that they had become demoralised to the point of leaving the 
area. Nobody can say they were real Christians. 
61 
Given the apparent disarray of "PO" outlined by Frei Betto, together with the highly 
sceptical - if not openly hostile - attitude of the. metalworkers' leaders of Santo Andre 
and Säo Bernardo do Campo towards the Catholic Church, it is remarkable that little 
more than two years later the selfsame leaders should be acknowledging its importance 
to their struggles and, in the specific case of Lula, that he should have a Dominican friar 
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living in his house at the height of the 1980 dispute. By any account, this was a breath- 
taking pace of change for both unions and Church alike, and it forms the central theme of 
the next section. 
t 
3.4 From the Margins to Centre Stage - The Catholic Church and the ABC 
Metalworkers' Strikes of 1978-1980 
On the May 12 1978, workers at the Saab-Scania factory in Sao Bernardo clocked on 
as usual, put on their overalls, went to their machines and stopped them. This act, which 
came to be known as the strike of the "Bra9os cruzados e maquinas paradas", literally 
meaning, crossed arms and halted machines, was to have wide-ranging repercussions. 
Ostensibly, the workers simply wanted a wage increase of 20% over and above the rate 
of inflation. However, their historic stand went on to spark a wave of similar actions 
throughout the ABC region involving tens of thousands of workers, and later it spilt over 
into other districts picking up hundreds of thousands of strikers on the way (see table I 
overleaf). In all, some half a million workers from various categories would be involved 
in the strike wave of 1978 (see table 2 overleaf). Even more important than the c1}ossal 
numbers involved was the fact that the action represented the most decisive qualitative 
break with the past and the dictatorship since the events of Osasco in 1968, with the 
added difference that this latest action proved an unprecedented success, taking both 
government, employers, and, to a certain extent, even the unions themselves by 
surprise. 
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The importance of the dispute lay in a number of key areas. Firstly, in the fact that the 
unions quickly recognised the legitimacy of their own members' actions (after all, 
technically speaking these began as wildcat actions) and therefore signalled a break with 
existing legislation which limited the right to strike. This was a political statement of 
major significance. Secondly, the employers themselves signalled a willingness to come 
to some kind of accommodation directly with the unions involved, instead of working 
through the existing government machinery. Again, this too represented a break with past 
practice (even if the motive was that of resuming production at the earliest possible 
opportunity rather than wishing to give the workers a fair settlement). And'finally, for the 
government, which was completely taken by surprise and in the throws of a very 
carefully staged "abertura", or political opening, the dispute represented a severe test of 
the real and imagined limits to that opening. An accord was signed directly between the 
Sao Bernardo Metalworkers' Union and the employers on May 31 without state 
intervention of a military or judicial kind. Potentially, this spelt the death-knell of a 
system of labour relations which, since the mid 1930's, had been based on the use of the 
state as a so-called arbitrator, and sometimes the abritrary use of state repression, for the 
resolution of conflicts between organised labour and capital. 
With regard to the Catholic Church, its activities in the dispute of May 1978 were 
principally confined to a number of declarations from various groups involved in the 
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Table I 
Metalworkers' Strikes, Sao Paulo, 12 May-13 July 1978 
Week No. Factories Going No. Workers Going No. Towns Total Workers 
on Strike on Strike Affected' on Strike 
1 24 60.500 3 60.500 
2 12 17,450 3 77,950 
3 21 17,990 5 95.940 
4 27 29,470 9 125,410 
5 38 39,694 9 165,104 
6 32 22,967 9 188.071 
7 17 23,441 9 211,512 
8 21 19,803 9 231,315 
9 21 14,620 9 245,935 
'First and second weeks. Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo, Sao Caetano; third week. SAO Paulo. 
Osasco; fourth week to ninth. Jandira. Taboäo da Serra, Cotia, Campinas. 
Source: Maria Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, University 
of Texas Press, Austin, 1985.11.197. 
Table 2 
Strikes in 1978 
Scctor No. Strikes No. Strikers 
Metallurgical 5 357,043 
Port I 1.200 
Urban transport 1 170 
Tobacco 1 400 
Glass 1 450 
Ceramics 1 2.000 
Textiles 1 5.390 
Chemical 1 2.750 
Banks I 10.000 
Ilealtli I 7.500 
Primary & secondary teaching 3 138.634 
University teaching 1 800 
Medicine (doctors & residents) 5 11,500 
Rural 1 1,200 
Total 24 539,037 
Source: Ibid., P. 196 
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World of Work. As will become clearer when I discuss the disputes of 1979 and 1980, a 
major factor in limiting its involvement was the sheer speed and relatively unpolarised 
nature of the events themselves. In Säo Bemardo, for instance, an agreement was reached 
with the employers in under twenty days. Although the strike was officially declared 
illegal, and hints were given to the employers that troops could be called in, this did not 
happen. Instead, it was the strike law itself that suddenly appeared to become inoperable. 
Union leaders were not removed from their posts, nor were their headquarters occupied 
by government appointees. At this moment in time, employers appeared willing to 
negotiate. They had not adopted a united front. A number of firms, like Otis, Pirelli, 
Alcan, and Scania itself, settled early. Indeed, following the termination of its agreement 
with the workers, the head of Industrial Relations at Pirelli, Emanuele Sessarego, made a 
remarkable admission to a national magazine (which could hardly have helped his 
managerial colleagues in firms still on strike) that "if the workers were not to demand it, 
the increase would not be given. "63 
The unions were both willing and capable of conducting a trade dispute successfully 
without any outside assistance; under such conditions, then, the question of Church 
involvement did not even arise. Consequently, union leaders neither sought its help, nor 
did the Church feel any pressing need to make itself available. 
This does not mean, however, that the Church simply remained a neutral bystander. On 
May 27, militants from ACO. the FNT, PO in Santo Andre, the Mission to the World of 
Work in Sao Paulo, and Church related human rights organisations like the National 
Secretariat of Justice and Non-Violence, and the Justice and Peace Commission of Sao 
Paulo produced a manifesto of "Support for the Workers of ABC". 64 Although this 
document did not provoke much commentary at the time, it was, nevertheless, significant 
in a number of respects. Firstly, after it had been produced by a cross-section of 
groupings from Säo Paulo and ABC, it was shown to Dom Claudio Hummes and Dom 
Angelico Sändalo Bernardino (as the bishop in charge of the Mission to the World of 
Work). In itself this was a recognition that the boundaries of the dispute transcended the 
immediate confines of the ABC region, and that there was a very real link between Säo 
Paulo and Santo Andre. Not only had the strikes spread to Sgo Paulo (indeed, a similar 
manifesto was produced by Catholic groups in Osasco when the strikes reached there 
after three weeks) but also, a large number of ABC workers lived in its eastern region. 
This regional perspective and coordination of the Church's attitude to labour would 
prove a central element in future disputes. ` 
A second feature worthy of note was the desire, on seeing the document, of both 
bishops to sign it. Dom Angelico did not sign it as an individual but on behalf of all the 
bishops in the Archdiocese of Säo Paulo. such was the collegial nature of power there. 
Indeed, later statements by Dom Paulo would be very much in keeping with the thrust of 
the manifesto. As for Dom Claudio, his signature represented a clear confirmation that 
the militants and himself were thinking along similar lines, that earlier difficulties had 
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been ironed out, and that here was a bishop who, like his predecessor, was willing to 
make a public declaration of his allegiances. 
And finally, there is the content of the document itself. Although the manifesto made 
reference to the conditions which had given rise to the strikes, and the illegal conduct of 
the employers themselves before the law, asserting that "Only the salaries are controlled; 
profits are not", its real thrust was a moral critique. On three separate occasions, 
reference was made to the peacefully conducted nature of the dispute: 
the workers have given proof of responsibility and of firmness, continuing with the stoppages 
without violence, demonstrating that the strike is just and legitimate. 
65 
Again, this theme of legitimacy through non-violent action would be a recurring theme in 
later disputes. So too was one Q =the manifesto's concluding points, which suggested 
that the workers were simply in pursuit of a basic human right: 
We believe that the time has come for us to conquer once and for all the right of free trade union 
organisation at the point of the firm, with direct negotiation, as well as the right to strike, which is 
recognised world-wide as a just and legitimate instrument of the workers for the defence of their 
66 rights. 
Perhaps most important of all, the document recognised that altough the strikes were 
technically illegal. this illegality was "based on an unjust and outmoded law". 
67 Such a 
position is never conducive to good relations between its proponent and any state, since it 
challenges - in one of the most direct forms possible, short of actual physical force - the 
latter's monopoly on power and freedom to decide as it sees fit. In effect, it undermines 
the sovereignty of the state from within. And yet, this position merited little media or 
government attention. Quite simply, the eyes of the generals were fixed elsewhere, and 
the weight of the Church within the dispute was too small to provoke closer scrutiny. 
With regard to the involvement of the Church in 1979, one cannot say that it had a 
formidable organisation on hand, ready to swing into action at the behest of the unions. It 
was only nine months earlier that Dom Cläudio had finally succeeded in appointing a 
priest, Padre Carlos Tosar, as the full time organiser of the the Workers' Pastoral. Sao 
Paulo, on the other hand, had its own bishop to do the job. 
This belated public recognition of "the fundamental importance of the Mission to the 
World of Work" in the Diocese of Santo Andre', together with the need "to secure better 
conditions for its implantation and development throughout the area", 
68 only came after 
and was highlighted by the strikes of 1978. An effective specialist machinery was in its 
infancy and, as the earlier comments of Frei Beno indicate, even with the appointment of 
Padre Tosar, the latter still faced formidable obstacles and an uphill struggle. Such 
machinery as existed, then, remained to be proven and even discovered in the course of 
the dispute. 
It is, perhaps, in the very nature of the Church as a voluntary association of individuals 
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with personal rather than mandatable links between one another, that it remains a 
collection of possibilities rather than a well structured machine (of course, here I am 
referring to the activities of its lay rather than clerical ranks, since the latter are, indeed, 
subject to hierarchical control and form part of a highly structured organisation). Whilst 
one can more easily predict the potentialities of a labour movement, which has demands 
and a structure that are oriented around specific factors like pay, organisation in the 
work-place, and so on, such specificities are quite deliberately rarely embraced by the 
Church. This is because unlike a trade union, it seeks to strike the delicate balance 
between the sacred and the profane, preferring the certainties of the former. Paradoxical 
though it might seem, intervention in the profane - even by the Church's most radical 
members - is viewed as a strictly temporary exigency rather than as a full-time 
occupation. For this reason, many of the structures exhibited in the course of a major 
ecclesiastical intervention are by necessity structures that are developed during the 
course of events; that is to say they are new and improvised, at the very least, they 
involve the grafting of new functions onto traditional institutions like the parish Church 
itself. Although by no means unique, the response to the 1979 strike is a particularly 
powerful case in point. It well demonstrates the capacity of the Church to crystallise its 
stance and develop new practices around a particular problem in hand. 
The basic motives for assuming a pro-union ecclesiastical stance in 1979 were quite 
similar to those advanced in 1978. It will be recalled that in the latter case reference had 
been made to the just and peacefully executed nature of the strikers demands, together 
the workers' fundamental human right to take strike action in the face of a law that was 
both "unjust and outmoded". Essentially the attitude taken by the Church in 1979 was a 
repeat of its 1978 stance. In the course of the disute Dom Claudio would make it plain 
that: 
Since the beginning of the strike 1, as Diocesan Bishopp, have supported the strike because I consider 
the demands just and because the strike was peaceful. 9 
and that: 
7be Church, with its participation, does not aspire to any objective other than, as aVstor, to defend 
the fundamental human rights of the metalworkers and support their just demands. 
In terms of rhetoric, then, there was continuity; but in terms of practice there were a 
number of qualitative departures. Most notable amongst these was the front line role 
assumed by the bishop himself, and the infrastructural support given to the unions by an 
extensive network of Catholic activists and churches. 
As mentioned earlier, the basic cause for this shift lay in the pace of events and, in 
particular, the degree to which they became polarized. Only two days after the strikes 
broke out they were declared illegal, and within eight days, on March 23rd, the unions' 
headquarters were in the hands of Labour Court appointees. Arrests and violence against 
114 
the strikers quickly followed. Juridically and objectively speaking, the unions soon found 
themselves in an almost impossible position with their leaders removed from office, and 
offices removed from leaders and members alike. They also faced the legal threat of 
sequestration of their strike funds, with further moves made to ban mass meetings in 
public places. The viability of the strike was rapidly undermined as, from their point of 
view, the government and employers sought to use the full force of the law to bring the 
dispute to a successful conclusion. 
It was in this highly pressured, charged and sometimes chaotic atmosphere71 that the 
rapprochement between the Church and unions took place. 
The initial point of contact, which would later mushroom into a series of others, came 
over the issue of a strike fund. It arose because the union of Sao Bemardo saw itself 
faced with a simple but seemingly intractable dilemma. Although supplies and monies 
for the support of the strikers had begun to arrive at union headquarters in largely 
spontaneous gestures from the public. the union felt somewhat constrained as to what it 
could do with these contributions. This was because technically speaking these funds 
could be regarded as union assets and the courts could in effect sequestrate them if it so 
decided. The dilemma was heightened still further when it became apparent that a quick 
settlement would not be forthcomming, and therefore that alternative funds would be 
crucial to the sustenance of the dispute. Finally, when the spectre of intervention within 
the union itself did, indeed, appear a distinct possibility, a solution had to be found. It 
was in this context that Catholic militants from the union of Sao Bernardo, accompanied 
by a number of other activists, first approached Dom Claudio with the idea that the 
Church should help directly. 
The origin of a number of these militants was the "Grupäo" i'PO", in other words, that 
faction which had chosen to throw in its lot with the union leadership of Sao Bemardo, 
and which had maintained active links with the Church. The real significance of these 
individuals did not lie in the novelty of their proposal, which in any case had been 
anticipated by Dom Claudio's publicly stated willingness to help the strikers in the 
collection of foodstuffs should it arise. Rather, it lay in their first-hand knowledge of 
Church and union militancy, together with a basic understanding of what the needs of the 
two organisations were, what their respective structures could offer one another, and how 
they could be brought together most effectively. In other words, they could act as a 
bridge between the two. 
This meshing function is apparent from the events themselves. It was a Catholic 
militant from within the union who first latched onto Dom Claudio's earlier press 
statement of support. The commission which subsequently went to see the bishop 
discussed various forms by which the Church could help gather funds. For his part, Dom 
Claudio made it clear to the unionists that the Church was: 
disposed to collaborate in services which were at our level and that we could do, and that they might 
. 
72 
need 
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However, that did not entail coming up with a plan of its own. 
The Church never proposed anything because we always thought that it was they that must propose, 
if not we would make new plans that we thought superb, but that in reality were not the best. In short, 73 
the necessity to listen. 
Thus, the commission fleshed out some basic proposals for cooperation with the Church 
and went back to the union leadership to discuss these more fully, and make any 
amendments if necessary. Given that the mediating function of the militants was between 
two camps which wanted to cooperate, agreement was quickly reached and, as Dom 
Claudio continues: 
it was from there that we made available our parishes where collection of goods could be made... 
71iis was later centralised by the union. 74 
Initially the role of the Church was confined to that of providing a network by which 
foodstuffs could be gathered, centralised and then passed on to the union for distribution. 
This was in keeping with a desire to preserve their mutual autonomy. However, with the 
rapid pace of events, the two organisations soon found themselves caught up in the need 
to reassess that relationship by deepening it still further. As Dom Claudio explains, it 
quickly became apparent that: 
the government had the right to intervene within the union and therefore it could simply lock up all 
the accounts and take all that had been collected and give it another destiny. In fact it did intervene. 
Thus, so that there would not be any risk that all this collection was diverted, the Church, in 1979, 
assumed the strike fund as if it was its own, so juridically speaking this was material of 
the Church.... this was a juridical instrument which the union proposed and which we accepted. 
7s 
The improvised nature of cooperation between the Church and the union of Sao 
Bernardo can also be seen in the comments of a priest who was based at the Church of 
the Matriz in Säo Bernardo (the principal distribtition point). As his account makes clear, 
whilst there was a real sense of urgency on the part of those most closely involved, none 
of them could have forseen the precise course events were about to take, or, for that 
matter, their sheer speed and scale: 
on the eve of the intervention in the union.. . 
Dr Maurico [a union lawyer for the Säo Bernardo union] 
rang me saying: 'Look, we have a lorry load of provisions and we predict the arrival of troops to take 
over the union, we do not have anywhere to store these provisions... Do you have a room to look 
after these provisions? The day after tomorrow the boys will be along to distribute them to the 
families. ' .... 
Not even I imagined that on the following day we would have here, on the ground floor 
of the parish hall, two hundred metalworkers, with a queue of a kilometre, or so, of metalworkers 
requesting food and the police already circling the square... 
76 
Furthermore, on that day, with the security net tightening around the union leadership 
following the intervention, a union director informed the priest that he was now 
provisionally in charge of the organization and distribution of foodstuffs. 
In the Santo Andre Metalworkers' Union, on the other hand, matters developed 
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somewhat differently. The determination of the union leadership to maintain an 
independent relationship with respect to the Church appears to have been that much 
greater, and in certain instances this critically affected the nature of their cooperation. As 
Benedito Marcilio explains: 
in Santo Andre we formed a strike fund with an independant commission. The Church would 
subsequently come and ask how it could help, and we gave it the ground rules. 
77 
In other words, these union leaders, who had never been keen on a close relationship 
with the Church, quite consciously sought to circumscribe its activities. Whilst Lula, and 
the trade unionists grouped around him, might be a little more open, or even sympathetic, 
to the overtures of certain Catholic militants, Santo Andre's leadership was far more 
wary - coming as it did from a decidedly secular, infact, Communist, tradition. Marcilio 
notes, for example, that: 
In the whole of our leadership we did not have one person that was linked to the Church. Not one. 78 
Further evidence of these contrasting perspectives can be seen in the differing ways in 
which the two unions handled the issue of personal appearances by Dom Claudio and the 
correct role he should adopt. 
Initially, Dom Claudio's physical presence in the dispute came as a direct result of 
union appeals to forestall a mounting tide of police violence. As Bargas and Rainho 
explain: 
The repressive action [of the police] was principally directed towards the pickets where, day by day. 
the violence was progressively increasing. For this reason, the leaders of the SSo Bernardo , Metalworkers' Union asked Dom Claudio Hummes to appear at the gates of Volkswagen. At four in 
the morning, on Tuesday the 20th, the bishop drove to the headquarters of the Sao Bemardo 
Metalworkers' Union, where he met with leaders of the union, activists and some parliamentarians 
from the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement]. Immediately afterwards they went to the gates of 
Volkswagen. The bishop and members of parliament talked to the senior officer, requesting him to 
avoid violence against the pickets. 
" 
With this emergency over it was suggested by, amongst others, Bargas himself (who 
had been a leading Catholic militant from the now defunct "Grupao"), that the bishop be 
invited to address union meetings. The idea behind this invitation was simply to inject 
new drive into the regular series of mass meetings which frequently lacked a concrete 
agenda. Dom Claudio accepted the request and, as Bargas explains: 
it was from there, in the assemblies, that we began to recite the Lord's Prayer, and we saw that 
everybody was Praying- Thus. the trade unionists began to discover the religiosity of the masses. 
80 
To the extent that the religiosity of the masses might foster conditions through which 
the Church could somehow dictate the pace of events, and undermine what was seen as a 
lay tradition, these moves were not at all welcome by the Santo Andre leadership. 
Comparing the two unions, Benedito Marcilio was quick to point out that: 
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In our case we did not have the support of the mayor, so soon after, we had to organise our people on 
the patio of the Church of the Bomfim [as no municipal space was available] - but on the patio; no 
priest or bishop came to speak, no one came. 
81 
Asked directly why the bishop did not pray in Santo Andre as he did in Sao Bernardo do 
Campo, Marcilio was quite forthcomming: 
It was the view of the leadership itself, we did not want it. ... our movement was very well secured, 
well coordinated, so there was no necessity to have a calling from without the movement to be able 
to organise it. 82 
In his Masters Thesis on the 1979 metalworkers' strike of Santo Andre, Eli Pimenta 
suggests that the Church may: 
on occasions have stopped being an instrument of government, but we do not believe that it has 
abandoned the desire to govern, and an effective route by which it can realise this aim is to place 
itself opportunistically in the midst of great human masses who are going through critical moments 
in search of "new" forms of self-government. 
83 
The question of whether the Church had any desire - or really possessed any independent 
capacity - to organise the strikers from without is open to serious doubt on a number of 
counts. Firstly, because not only does it run counter to the rhetoric of the Church, but, 
more importantly, also to its practice. -Secondly, and most crucial of all, it also 
overestimates the power of the Church whilst underestimating the autonomy of the 
unions concerned. Thirdly. it is an undifferentiated concept of the Church which, as I 
have indicated throughout this thesis, is not a monolithic institution. 
With the exception of prayers at meetings and the structures of the respective strike 
funds, in actual fact there appears to have been little that separated the conduct of the two 
unions in relation to the Church. An examination of bulletins from the Santo Andre 
Metalworkers' Union quickly confirms that Churches were a central point of union, 
especially after the government took away its headquarters. Even the strike fund operated 
from behind the Church of the Canno, in the centre of Santo Andre And Marcilio was 
quite open in affirming that "Like it or not, the Church gave a big support to the 
movement. "84 Indeed, it should be recalled that any differences which arose were - albeit 
with the mediating function of Catholic militants - at the ultimate behest of the union 
leaders themselves, rather than the Church. In any case, neither of these differences 
appears to have been of critical importance in shaping the precise politics or outcome of 
the dispute. That was something exclusively for the unions themselves to decide in 
relation to the objective constraints of the day. To this extent, the Church was of 
marginal significance. 
It cannot be denied, however, that the Church, especially through the person of the 
local bishop, enjoyed a remarkably high profile. At one point Dom Claudio even came to 
sit at the negotiating table with the government, employers and representatives of the 
unions. But whilst the role of the Church was rapidy and qualitatively upgraded in the 
course of the dispute, there was one principle which throughout regulated its mode of 
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conduct, providing it with continuity of purpose, consistency in action, and a very clear 
set of parameters. This benchmark concept, upon which all the Church's own actions 
were to be judged accordingly, and which is fundamental to any understanding of the 
institution, was the view held by the bishop that it must recognise the absolute 
sovereignty of the unions. As the following comments indicate, he held the principle to 
be inviolable, almost sacrosanct: 
In the past it was quite possible, when a bishop supported a strike, that he felt he had the right to tell 
the workers what they should do and he would thus end up leading the strike... He became the 
strike's reference point, or the local parish priest, etc. Just as it could be the exact opposite, which is 
to say, it was he who would denounce the strike, at times in the pulpit, saying that this strike makes 
no sense, that the workers should do this, that, or the other. Which is to say, ascribing to himself the 
right, in the pulpit, to tell the workers what they should or should not do. The worker was thus not 
given the right - even if he was wrong - to decide; but I had to respect this decision of the worker. 
This for us was very clear. And it is for this reason that we always rejected the idea of making a 
programme for the workers... but we proposed working with them. And this signified listening to 
them and what they really needed. And, on the other hand, to respect absolutely what they decided or 
what they said in this respect - they being the union leaders (what was at the level of the leaders), and 
the assemblies of the workers (that which was at the level of the workers' assemblies). It could be 
that the Church did not agree with the decision, but it had to respect it. It could not wish to impose 
another decision. 
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It is against this background that Dom Claudio's subsequent actions need to be judged. 
Those actions can be listed in terms of three key areas: (a) Church involvement in 
material and logistical support; (b) involvement at private and public union meetings; and 
finally (c), involvement in the negotiating process itself. In all three cases it will be seen 
that throughout the unions were in control. Their political autonomy was never 
undermined. 
With regard to the first of the fronts, i. e., material and logistical support, the Church 
was not in the business of writing a blank cheque. Union autonomy was a fundamental 
principle but it also had to be reconciled with the Church's own criteria for involvement 
and continued support. The Church initially entered the 1979 conflict because as far as it 
was concerned, a number of basic criteria for doing so had been met. In essence, it 
continued to subscribe to the view held in 1978, i. e., that the workers, in trying to 
improve their conditions of pay and employment, were also merely seeking a number of 
basic human rights. Amongst these were the right to strike, a free trade union, and 
democratic representation. The difference now, of course, was that because of violent 
employer and government resistence, the unions and their members were physically 
prevented from exercising these rights. Their leadership was barred from office, 
headquarters confiscated, public meetings banned, possible meeting places occupied by 
the military police, and extensive arrests of strikers made. 
For this reason, on March 24, one day after the intervention in the metalworkers' 
unions, Dom Claudio made it plain that in his view the strikers: 
have a right to a place whereby they can continue to meet freely... in support of this fundamental 
right... and faced with the impossibility of their meeting, the Church of ABC has been offering the 
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parish rooms of the diocese as a place for the workers to meet, discuss and decide. Furthermore, the 
parishes have been opened in order to receive foodstuffs destined for those families of strikers 
undergoing hardship. 
86 
Although the Church's support of the strikers was whole-hearted, it nevertheless 
retained its right to qualify that support as it saw fit. This was of fundamental importance 
to the preservaton of its own autonomy and religious mission. In his Note of Clarification 
on the strike, Dom Claudio made it clear that: 
x 
The parish halls of our Churches remain open for meetings of workers who are trying to maintain 
their organisation, on condition that they do not mix with other ideological or party political ends. 87 
In other words, theoretically speaking those halls could have been withdrawn had those 
conditions been breached. No records exist to suggest, however, that this issue ever 
became of any weight as far as relations between the Church and strikers were 
concerned. The former was not imposing a real constraint upon the latter since both were 
in agreement on the principle. Instead, the statement was directed at another constituency 
altogether. It was intended not only to clear up any genuine misunderstandings, 
reservations and fears that might exist in the minds of the general public - i. e., to clarify 
the contingent nature of ecclesiastical intervention; but also to head-off all those forces - 
be' they employers, politicians, or indeed, conservative elements within the Church itself 
- who might seek to attack the Church for supposedly meddling in politics. 
With regard to the second major front of action, involvement at union meetings, there 
is no evidence to suggest that the Church departed from its principle of respecting union 
autonomy. Again, this was tempered by certain basic prerequisites to support, like, for 
instance, its view that the strike should remain a peaceful undertaking. At a service given 
in honour of the strikers, and attended by some 10,000 of them who were awaiting the 
symbolic return of Lula to the head of the movement. Dom Clgudio emphasised the need 
to continue along a peaceful road. In his view: 
violence builds nothing. It will simply put at risk the gains of the metalworkers. And violence has 
never built and never will build anything. 
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Again, there is nothing to suggest that this represented a constraint upon the union 
leadership which had previously and publicly stated that its dipute was a "just and 
peaceful" one, and that it too "had never been interested in a radicalisation of 
positions". 
89 On the contrary, there was a very real desire amongst the leadership that 
conflict be avoided with the police. As for the membership, Dom Claudio let it be 
known to the same crowd that: 
'I-ne Church is trying to stay on the side of those suffering injustices, it wants to give the utmost 
possible. But it is you who must take the reins of the movement, to assume your destinies-91 
These comments leave little doubt as to the priority the Church accorded to both the 
opinions and the sovereignty of the mass gatherings. 
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In spite of this, Pimenta suggests that towards the end of a decisive meeting, when the 
leadership of Sao Bemardo urged its members to accept an offer that was virtually 
identical to the one it had earlier rejected, the Church played a less than impartial role. As 
he explains: 
The speakers were strategically distributed, as much in the order of address as in its content: it was 
necessary to sweeten the pill... And who better to lead with fire, especially when the burnt are 
someone else, than an official of the Society of Jesus, and for this reason the first speaker of the 
assembly was the bishop Claudio Hummes. The bishop said that the strike movement 'was (sic) a 
historic struggle of the Brazilian worker', and that the accord made with the Ministry of Labour had 
the intermediation of the CNBB. 92 
Infact, as Dom Claudio himself would make clear in his March 30 statement: 
Throughout the whole of the strike, and above all in the decisive assembly which decided upon the 
return to work in the factories of the workers, at no moment have I said to the workers what they 
should decide, in other words whether or not they should continue the strike, but I always insisted 
that the decisions and orientations should depart solely from themselves, and that they should 
maintain themselves united with their leaderships. 
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But even if the Church had wanted to, it is doubtful whether it could have done 
anything to sweeten what was an exceptionally bitter pill for both directorship and 
members alike to swallow. The strikers' sense of taste was not that easily dulled, nor 
were they so easily convinced. Instead, much of the hard discussion which followed was 
both directed by and concentrated upon the union leadership's view that its headquarters 
must be restored if the movement was to stand any chance of success. There was no 
question of appealing to religious sentiment - and by implication obfuscation - in order to 
help secure the required result. Such mystificatory actions would have been in total 
conflict with the whole spirit of the movement to date, a movement one of whose major 
characteristics was precisely that of the validity of mass particiaption in key decision- 
making. This was, after all, one of the principal features which rendered the unionism of 
Sao Bernardo worthy of the title "new unionism". 94 
As for the Church's role in the matter, it seems curious in the very least for Pimenta to 
argue that the Church was a strategic actor in trying to get the strikers to accept what was 
by all accounts a universally unpopular decision, and yet at the same time argue that in 
its desire to govern it will "opportunistically place itself in the midst of great human 
masses". 
95 Opportunism and allying oneself with an unpopular decision hardly seem to 
go hand in hand. In the case of Santo Andre, neither of Pimenta's arguments are proven. 
Instead there is a tendency to overstate, or rather over-imply, the importance of the 
Church. 
The peripheral nature of the Church in the substantive decisions at mass meetings is 
further exemplified during the most important of these on May 13. At this meeting, 
which finally elected not to go back on strike, accepting the government accord instead. 
once again the central issue which dominated was that of regaining control of the union 
headquarters. On this occasion, however, the leadership of Säo Bernardo backed up its 
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argument in the clearest possible terms. Lula turned the vote into a vote of confidence in 
his leadership. In this way, the issues were starkly and, one might add, honestly put to the 
members. There was no trickery. The decision was thrown back into their hands and they 
chose to support him and thereby reject calls for a resumption of the strike on May 15. In 
short, they swallowed the bitter pill without reference to the Church. The fact that 
prayers were or were not held made no difference to this central political fact; the 
leadership of the union traded on its own resources rather than on external ones. - 
When it came to dealings with the government and the employers, however, there it 
can be said that, to varying degrees, the unions were indeed willing to trade upon 
external resources, including those of the Church if it proved necessary. Quite simply, 
the unions needed all the resources they could possibly muster. 
As has already been indicated, this was certainly the case as far as material and 
logistical support was concerned. But the weight of the Church also came to figure in the 
negotiating process itself. In the latter instance, however, it is important to point out that 
this weight was very much on behalf of the unions and their members rather than instead 
of them. In other words, the Church acted as a junior partner - taking its cue from the 
unions themselves - rather than acting as an independent force in the negotiations. 
This is graphically illustrated in two key instances. The first concerns a meeting 
organised by the CNBB with the Minister of Labour to which Dom Claudio was invited. 
The meeting took place two days after the government appointees took over the unions. 
Ironically, that last move had not only created serious difficulties for the unions 
concerned (as was the state's intention) but it had also deprived the Minister of worker 
representatives with whom he could effectively negotiate. For this reason, one of the 
Minister's requests was that the CNBB should help to reopen lines of communication 
between the various parties. But as far as Dom Claudio was concerned he was not there 
as an honest broker but rather to represent the workers, given that they were legally 
impeded from doing so themselves. It must be noted that that representative function did 
not and was never intended to entail the capacity to negotiate, the bishop was most 
emphatic about this. 
When I was invited by the CNBB to go to Brasilia for a meeting with the Minister of Labour, at no 
point in time did either myself or the CNBB present ourselves to the Minister as mediators or 
conciliators, but yes, we went there purely in order to defend the rights of the metalworkers, and we 
insisted in the%rompt suspension of the intervention in the unions and the immediate reopening of 
negotiations. 
This position is confirmed by the bishop's actions immediately prior to his visit. 
Although technically the meeting was one arranged exclusively between the Church and 
the government, he anticipated it by holding a long discussion with both Lula and 
Benedito Marcilio. During those discussions, the two union leaders stated their basic 
positions and the need to resume negotiations. What Dom Cläudio therefore presented to 
the Minister was these views plus his own criticisms as to the hasty nature of the 
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intervention, the brutality of police action, and the partisan nature of government action 
generally. 97 Dom Claudio was, in effect, acting as a line of communication, even if his 
sympathies were well known to all the parties concerned. In the event, however, other 
lines of contact were opened up that same day with informal discussions held between 
Lula, some employers and the Minister back in Brasilia. 
The second major instance in which the weight of the Church figured prominently was 
in the tri-partite commission of government, employer and worker nominees, set up in 
order to hammer out an accord. Although in practice the union leadership continued to 
enjoy the full confidence and loyalty of the strike movement, juridically speaking it was 
still barred from speaking for itself. For this reason, three trusted nominees were 
appointed to constitute the workers' element of the commission. One of the three (who 
included Dr. Mauricio Soares de Almeida and Dr. Almir Pazzianotto (two union 
lawyers)), was none other than Dom Claudio himself. As Rainho and Bargas indicate, the 
motive behind the appointment of the latter was the belief that: 
his presence would help the employers to act with greater seriousness in the negotiations. 98 
Whether this was a correct assessment of the influence of the Church is debatable. , 
Although key figures in the negotiations like Murillo Macedo and Dilson Funaro, vice- 
president of the Federation of Industries of the State of Sao Paulo (FederaFäo das 
Indüstrias do Estado de Säo Paulo. FIESP), were also colleagues in the Association of 
Christian Directors of Firms (Assnciqäo de Dirigentes Cristäos de Empresa. ADCE). 99 
and whilst this Christian component may have influenced their individual actions, 
' 00 it 
most certainly did not influence the actions of either the presidential palace or the Sao 
Paulo employers as a whole, from whom these men took their cue. Nonetheless, Dom 
Claudio's presence was an important symbolic gesture since he went on to the 
cornmission not at the request of the government, but at the express request of the leaders 
of all the unions involved and with the sole purpose of representing their views. Here 
was yet another graphic instance in which at least one section of the Church quite 
deliberately shed any pretensions towards any form of supra-class conduct in the national 
interest. As Dom Claudio emphasised at the time of his appointment: 
I participate neither as a mediator, nor as a conciliator, but as a defender of the rights of the 
metalworkers, giving voice to those who no longer have a voice. 10 i 
Once again, it is important to emphasise that Dom Claudio's presence on the 
commission did not imply a usurpation of union power. Firstly, because he was put there 
at the behest of the union leaders. Secondly, because the commission's own power was 
from the very beginning circumscribed by the built in requirement that it present its 
findings to a union mass meeting for ratification. And finally, because in practice, the 
commission's own power was quickly undermined by the attitude of the employers and 
the pace of events themselves. An informal arrangement grew up in its place which 
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involved direct negotiations with the two workers' lawyers (Almir Pazzianotto and 
Mauri: cio Soares de Almeida) together with other leading union figures. For all these 
reasons, and Dom Claudio's own view that his role should remain basically an auxilliary 
one, the Church was not involved in the substantive and detailed negotiations which took 
place. Nor, as was shown earlier, did it have any weight in the eventual decision to go 
back to work. 
3.4.1 The Church and the Metalworkers' Strike of 1980 
To many rank and file members of the metalworkers' unions as well as activists, the 
absence of an economic victory in 1979 itself represented a political defeat. 102 A head of 
steam had been built up for the resumption of strike action on May 15, but the leadership 
won the day on Mayý13 and dashed these hopes. That tactical victory, however, was 
tempered by the realistion on the pan of the union leadership of SSo Bemardo that 
confidence in their sincerity had been undermined. As Lula himself later commented: 
I have beard thousands of interviews: 'Blimey, Lula, in 1979 you were cowards' 103 
This realisation was to temper the actions of the leaders in the 1980 dispute. As Ricardo 
Antunes convincingly shows, they did not so much lead the strike as: 
create the organic conditions for its realization and effective conduct. 104 
In contrast to the 1979 dispute, when the leadership decisively sought to bring it to a halt, 
Lula admitted that in 1980, when a similarly critical juncture was reached: 
Not even those who were leading the strike, neither the advisors and the people who were in pnson, 
had the stomach to take a decision. ... nobody had the courage to arrive in one of these assemblies and 
say: everyone, let's stop, let's go back to worm. 105 
It is not the concern of this study to assess the merits and demerits of the leadership's 
position. That is a matter with which Antunes deals in considerable detail. Our concern is 
with the fact that the Church, by renewing its support for the ABC strikers in 1980, 
effectively wedded itself to a movement that could go on indefinitely if the strikers so 
wished. In conformity with its actions during the two previous years, it did not befall the 
Church to dictate or influence the terms upon which any possible settlement might be 
based. As had already been made clear on repeated occasions, the Church felt that ihat 
was a question whose solution lay within the exclusive realm of the workers and their 
elected representatives - albeit that the balance between the latter two had changed 
somewhat in 1980. Whether a strike lasted five or 25 days was irrelevant, the task of the 
Church was to stand shoulder to shoulder with the strikers for its duration. As it was, the 
1980 dispute lasted an historic 41 days. 
In its essentials, the basis for Church cooperation with the unions continued as before. 
It provided symbolic and logistical support whilst they carried out their executive 
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functions, However, a number of factors would contribute to a heightening of its profile 
beyond the levels reached in 1979. 
Not least amongst these was the lengthy duration of the strike itself. As a function of 
this, the issue of solidarity action would prove of tremendous strategic importance and 
once again the Church would be the principal channel of support. As the distributor of 
foodstuffs and supplies it was at the heart of a network that stretched nation-wide and 
even internationally. Although that network was certainly not confined to Church 
organisations, the dispute was noticeable for their presence. The actions of the base 
ecclesiastical communities achieved nation-wide and even international fame. 106 
Ironically, perhaps the single most significant factor which raised the profile of the 
Catholic Church during the dispute - sometimes out of all proportion - was one which 
was completely extraneous to the dispute itself. Indeed, it only occurred some months 
later when the newly elected Pope, John Paul II, paid his first visit to the country'. Were 
the strike not to have occurred media attention would have been upon the Church all the 
same. As it was, the impending visit provided the more conservative elements of the 
media (of which there is no shortage) with a wonderful opportunity to juxtapose the 
radicalism of the Säo Paulo bishops, and even the CNBB itself, with what they portrayed 
as the exclusively spiritual and therefore more level-headed concerns of the new Pope. 
And in truth, as we shall see, it must be said that that conflict was no mere figment of the 
media's imagination. Although newspaper editorials frequently sought to exploit 
differences in the crudest possible terms, the fact remains, nevertheless, that a number of 
those differences were real and profound ones - even if the Brazilian Church sought to 
minimise them or deny their existence. 
During 1980, then, the Church was not simply the subject of media attention, it was the 
subject of overwhelmingly hostile attention. As the dispute between the unions. 
employers and government once again gathered pace and polarised, so too the Church's 
decision to throw in its lot with the workers became the subject of intense scrutiny. More 
than ever before, all aspects of its support, including, for example, the actions of the 
Archdiocese of Sao Paulo and Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns, were subject to concentrated 
and critical debate. Before addressing these issues, however, let us now turn to a brief 
analysis of the Church's motives for renewing its support. 
One of the most interesting aspects of the 1980 dispute, which illustrates the, 
transformation which the Church of Santo Andre had undergone in the course of the 
previous strikes, is the more offensive nature of its intervention. Dom Claudio did not 
wait for the legalised decapitation of the union leaderships before he intervened. Instead, 
within forty-eight hours of the strike's commencement, on April 1, and almost a full two 
weeks before a second sitting of the Regional Labour Tribunal would declare the strike 
illegal and thus open the way to intervention in the unions, he issued a note to all the 
priests and coordinators of the communities. In it he once again asked them to collect 
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foodstuffs and donations for the strike fund. Amongst the reasons cited in favour of 
support were the fact that the struggle was "just and peaceful". But he also used language 
which indicated a hardening of attitude. Not only did he offer his support for the strike 
but he also made it clear that:, 
1..:. I believe that everyone must support it. 
2. The struggle of the metalworkers is not merely theirs, neither is it purely for their benefit, but it 
helps all the workers because, in virtue of the power that the metalworkers of this region possess, 
they put pressure on the government itself so that the social and economic structure of this country 
are changed. 
3. The government and the army are clearly on the side of the employers. Thus, the strike 
negotiations are rendered all but farcical if not completely so. 
4. Already, before the Tribunal was about to declare the strike illegal, today, April 2, the helicopters 
of the army circle at a low level above the peaceful assemblies of the metalworkers, in a clear 
provocation towards violence. 
5. The Ministry of Labour has never intervened in a union of the bosses, which are constantly 
infringing the law in the day-to-day treatment of the workers in industry, but the moment the 
workers' unions even begin to stir already the Ministry of Labour threatens with intervention. 
6. People speak in terms of political opening and the right to strike, but all strikes are almost always 
declared illegal and the strikers, therefore, handed over to the whims of the repression. In reality, the 
strike law is so convoluted that it cannot be observed and thus the government can always declare 
strikes illegal. 
7. 'It is necessary to educate the people to participate in and support all just and peaceful strikes so 
that the unity of the people becomes strengthened 107 
Points 2 and 7 are notable in that they indicate a strategic perspective on the part of the 
Church. That is to say, Dom Claudio was not merely seeking to defend the existing rights 
of the workers, but also aiming to assist in their longer term organisation with the 
ultimate goal of major social-structural change in mind. Points 3 and 5 are significant in 
that they laid bare the blatantly partisan, i. e., class character of the Brazilian state. And 
finally, points 4 and 6 illustrate the more offensive character of the Church's posture in 
relation to matters generally, i. e. by anticipating a series of events which, on the basis of 
recent history, were likely to happen. 
In fact, the Regional Labour Tribual took everybody by surprise by ruling itself to be 
incompetent to judge the case. By 13 votes to 11 it held to a 1979 judgement of the 
Superior Labour Tribunal with the result that "neither the Constitution nor any law give 
normative competence to the Labour Court to declare the legality or illegality of the 
strike". 108 The immediate consequence was that the strikers' action would remain legal 
until another authority found otherwise. 
In part this represented a victory for the workers. As a direct result of the decision, both 
government and employers agreed to pay a recommended increase of seven per cent for 
workers recieving up to three times the minimum wage, and six per cent for those who 
recieved over and above three minimum wages. That was a slight improvement on the 
employers original offer of a top rate of five and a half per cent. As far as certain sectors 
of the media were concerned, this was the moment at which the unions should have 
settled. In the words of one 
leading magazine, Veja: 
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there was a certain moment at which the employers and the strikers had a minute difference of 0.8% 
separating them... At that moment Lula put forward the issue of employee stability of a year. If such 
a demand were to be accepted, for the period of twelve months labour turn-over would be restrained 
tog and not one factory could dismiss any employee even if he was of proven incompetence. 
The Church's perspective on this issue was somewhat different. Frei Betto, whom Dom 
11 udio appointed as the key link-man between the Church and the unions during the Cla 
dispute, summed up the decision of the Tribunal as a partial victory in that for the 
workers: 
It signified that the strike was just. But not a sufficient victory to justify the return to work. The 
Tribunal refused important demands which the employers themselves had already accepted, like 
accident insurance, like the payment of 100% for Sunday and holiday overtime, and the base wage 
rate of each category. The press did not give this coverage.... The workers wanted an increase of 
15% ... it was not a real increase, it was simply a readjustment capable of compensating the workers 
for the erosion of their salaries suffered in the last twelve months. 110 
And with regard to the question of stablity of employment, which Veja's article reduces 
to an irresponsible eccentricity, Betto also had another approach. He pointed out that: 
The rate of labour turnover in ABC is extremely high, 4% a month. One of the highest in the world. 
This rate of turnover is responsible for the low wages. With it, the wage increases conquered by the 
workers on paper never reach their pockets. 111 
For his part, Dom Cläudio was to note, one of the features which rendered the strike of 
1980 yet another milestone of labour struggle was the fact that workers were not: 
simply struggling for a quantitative issue, like a wage increase, but above all for a qualitative 
question, such as the stability of employment, the trade union delegate, and the 40 hour working 
week. These are social guarantees which, for the fast time, acquire priority in the demands of the 
category. 
But perhaps the most most revealing indication of the clarity with which the Church of 
Santo Andre saw the issues involved in the 1980 strike would come in Dom Cläudio's 
own summing-up for the Permanent Council of the CNBB. Two points in particular. 3 
merit citation. The first concerned the question of the Church's support for a movement 
which the state regarded as illegal. The bishop's explanation was clear and simple: 
it is necessary to distinguish between legality and legitimacy. The criterion is that of justice. A strike, 
merely because it is declared illegal, does not necessarily lose its legitimacy nor does it stop being 
just. A right does not automatically receive the adherence of the Church for the simple reason that it 
is rendered legal, as is the case of the law of divorce in our country. 113 
The second point concerned the political implications of the Church's support, an issue 
over which the government, media and employers made much play during the dispute. 
Again, Dom Claudio was quite direct: 
no attitude is politically neutral. Even those which seek to affirm themselves as neutral, assume a 
political stance. We do not fear the political consequences of our support, especially considering the 
liberating character of these consequences. 114 
All the above comments - both in terms of their willingness to embrace detailed issues 
127 
as well as in terms of their broader strategic perspective, powerfully illustrate what a long 
way the Church of Santo Andre had come. When the bishop had first arrived in the 
region he had been very much aware that "I would have to position myself within this 
problematic of the workers". 115 And already in 1976 he went so far as to make 
pronouncements in favour of the workers, but by his own admission these had been "very 
generic and very timid". 116 His comments in 1980 demonstrate that the Church had 
moved from the generic to the specific, and from the defensive to the offensive. It not 
only gave a tactical/reactive definition of justice, i. e., that of defending certain rights, but 
also began to define its broader strategic contours. For example, as far as Dom Claudio 
was concerned, one of the great lessons of the dispute was that: 
it showed us the limit of the government's political opening which, in fact, excludes the most 
humble, the poor. This therefore demands a new form of conduct by the Church in the current 
situation which is within the line of the options of Medellin and Puebla. 117 
This process of self-criticism and increased self-awareness on the part of certain sectors 
of the Church was bound to prove a controversial option since it ran counter to the 
interests of many of the nation's most powerful groups. like the army, large sectors of the 
state bureaucracy, and industrial capital. It also ran counter to the perspective of certain 
leading conservative Catholics, including some grouped around the figure of Pope John 
Paul II himself. Finally, the Church's stand proved controversial because it took place 
against the background of a supposedly emergent democratic regime rather than a 
dictatorial one. Some forces at the time regarded the actions of the strikers as a threat to a 
stable democratic transition. As such, the Church was urged by these self-appointed 
arbiters of democracy to keep its distance rather than pledge its support. In the following 
section some of the key points of controversy focused upon by the leading participants 
will be examined. 
3.4.2 Conflictive Implications of the 1980 Metalworkers' Strike -Polarisation Within the 
Church, Polarisation Between the Church and State 
On most occasions the instances of conflict concerned the presence or actions of 
particular individuals, for example, Dom Paulo, Dom Cläudio, Frei Betto, etc; but 
underlying these detailed instances of attrition was: (a) the conflictual relationship 
between the Church and the state; and (b) the conflictual relationship between the 
Church's own progressive and conservative wings. The basis of these conflicts was a 
differing interpretation as to the philosophical, and, more importantly at that time, 
practical definition of both the general limits to Church intervention together with the 
precise political colouring that this should or should not assume. 
Elements of all these issues are clearly apparent in the question of Frei Betto's 
participation in the dispute. As indicated earlier, Frei Betto was the Dominican Friar 
appointed by Dom Claudio in January 1980 to revitalise the Workers' Pastoral within 
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Säo Bernardo and Diadema. He had chosen to work in the ABC region and Dom Claudio 
had recommended to him that he work in Säo Bernardo do Campo because it was the 
most important labour pole but still virtually bereft of pastoral support. Frei Betto had 
already met Lula in 1979, and the two would later strike up a close personal friendship 
which helped the former to act as a sort of bridge between the leadership of the Church 
and the leadership of Säo Bernardo during the 1980 strike. 
The most controversial aspect of Betto's involvement was the fact that he lived with 
Lula's family, especially after the union president was arrested. This move gave rise to 
press suggestions that Lula was being advised by radicals, an indirect reference to 
Betto's past political activities and imprisonment for four years for alleged links with the 
clandestine left. 118 The government's Minister of Social Communication, Said Farhat, 
even went as far as to affirm that: 
Some priests from Säo Paulo are leading the auto workers' strike, breaking Canon Law, and ignoring 
the recommendations of Pope John Paul II. 119 
Although the Minister declined to comment upon which of John Paul II's norms of 
conduct had been broken, he went on to stress that "as priests and citizens everbody owes 
obedience to the current laws of the country". 
120 Nor did Said Farhat specify whether the 
government would take measures against those individuals who did not comply. 
The Minister's comments were nothing short of a calculated mixture of 
misrepresentation, insinuation and veiled threats. For example, with regard to the issue of 
a leadership role for priests during the campaign (or any other sector of the Church for 
that matter), Betto's openly radical views were quite consistent with the line adopted in 
previous years. Betto was emphatic that the Church: 
must not influence the destiny of the campaign, it must not attempt to direct the campaign, it must 
not get in the way of the campaign, but must simply put itself at the service of that which the 121 
category, which the workers are deciding. 
And in point of fact, if one looks at Betto's role during the dispute (which the press chose 
to ignore), it becomes apparent that he regularly visited the houses of all the imprisoned 
leaders, not just Lula, giving pastoral support to their families, making sure that there 
was a meal in prison, keeping in touch with lawyers, helping to organise news for the 
outside world, and helping to mobilise international support. Whilst such activities 
constitute affirmative forms of solidarity, which was one of Betto's primary objectives, 
by any criterion they fall a long way short of constituting part of a leadership role, let 
alone any fictitious subversive conspiracy. 
In order to lend legitimacy to Farhat's charges, to give, as it were, a blessing to the 
Minister's views, John Paul II's alledged views had been raised without actually being 
substantiated. This curious form of argumentation betrays a serious underlying issue; that 
was the attempt by the state to coopt papal versions of Catholicism, or more accurately, 
this particular Pope's version of Catholicism, as a means of delegitimising and ultimately 
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silencing more progressive views. The strike of Sao Bernardo was so important simply 
because it was a test case on the eve of the papal visit and was thus the subject of 
everbody's attentions. 
On April 23, the conflict between the Church and state reached its climax. That day 
saw three important events. The issuing, by both Dom Paulo and Dom Claudio, of an 
official note pledging support for the strikers; a heated debate in the Senate over relations 
between the Church and the state; and finally, an interview with President Figueiredo in 
which he commented upon the actions of the Church. 
The note rebutted the charges of Farhat: 
With regard to the precepts of Canon Law, the priests of ABC and also of Säo Paulo know them very 
well and that they are not infringing them, quite apart from being absolutely certain in the knowledge 
that they are not contradicting the guidance of Pope John Paul II. The rights which are being violated 
at the moment are those present in the Constitution and the laws of the country and it is not the 
priests who are violating them. 
12-1 
It also made crystal clear its order of priorities: 
The Church does not propose strikes; it does not organise strikes; it does not seek to orient the 
decisions of the strikers; and it never attempts the absurdity of deciding for the workers. 
Carrying out its spiritual mission, which it realises on the temporal plane, it is offering spiritual and 
material support so that the strikers may decide as free men... 12-3 
The bishops also argued that it was in defence of fundamental human rights, rather than 
any desire to impose a defeat upon the regime, that the Church continued its support even 
after the strike was declared illegal: 
there is no sense of challenge to the authorities or incitement to practise illegalities. With the 
declaration of the strike's illegality and the intervention in the unions, the workers continue to be 
human bein, whose fundamental rights, affirmed and guaranteed by the Constitution, must be 
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protected. ' 
These tempered words could not avoid severe criticisms in the Senate which debated 
the role of the Church in the strike. Senator Jose Lins suggested that: 
What is hpening is not the responsibility of the Church, but yes of a few priests and their 
leaders. 125- 
Much more serious even than the senate debate were the comments made by the 
President of the Republic himself. In a brief interview. Joäo Figueiredo expressed 
sentiments similar to those of Senator Lins and lent his support to the view prevalent 
amongst more conservative sectors of the establishment that the actions of the Church in 
the Säo Paulo region were those of a tiny and irresponsible minority. 126 Asked what he 
thought of the Church's participation in the strike, Feigueiredo answered: 
I see it badly. very badly. But it is not the Church, they are merely certain elements of it. Man), 
bishops have sought me out and manifested a position contrary to that assumed by the Church in Sao 
paulo, saying that they do not agree with it. 12F 
130 
This notion that there were two Churches, a responsible and an irresponsible one, was 
bluntly elaborated when Figueiredo made it plain that as far as he was concerned "The 
CNBB is not the Church-the Church is divided. " 128 
Although Dom Paulo counter-attacked and demanded that the President produce 
concrete evidence, divisions - albeit from quarters from whom it might be expected, and 
in predictably small numbers - did exist. Cardinal Vicente Scherer, amongst Brazil's 
most outspoken conservative bishops, suggested that: 
Now that the [Labour] Tribunal has already judged the situation, then evidently its sentence must be 
adhered to by all, by the strikers and all the more by the Church. We speak in terms of respecting the 
law and an intense movement was conducted in the last few years in order to establish the law as a 
criterion for all activities. Now the laws are in place which are not adhered to, evidently there is no 
coherence for lack of logic. 
1 29 
There is little doubt that these sentiments were very much in line with Figueiredo's own 
view that the priests were: 
giving the impression to public opinion that they are placing themselves against the law. 130 
But perhaps the most controversial aspect of the President's interview were comments 
reserved for the Cardinal of Sib Paulo himself. Figueiredo said: 
I do not know him. I have never had contact with him, but from the information that I have be is 
inciting the strike. 131 
It is difficult to overstate the seriousness of all these comments. If found guilty of 
inciting the strike, Dom Paulo could be charged under article 36 of the National Security 
Laws and, in the last instance, be imprisoned. Indeed, Dom Claudio was himself included 
in a security service report for possible charges along these lines. 132 As for the CNBB, 
the President had suddenly declared that, to all intents and purposes, this, the single most 
important organ of the Brazilian catholic Church, was irrelevant. 
Although the leader of the government in the Senate, Senator Jarbas Passarinho, 
attempted to backtrack with a series of verbal gymnastics, 
133 there is little doubt that this 
episode represented one of the most serious breaches in relations between the Church and 
state since 1964. 
In this instance, priests were not being arrested, imprisoned, tortured or deported, as 
had occured repeatedly throughout the past 16 years. What rendered this conflict such a 
serious one was the fact that it came under what the government claimed to be altogether 
new conditions, i. e., ones in which the conflicts of the past had been left behind in favour 
of a democratic and socially consensual transition. Instead, the exact opposite happened. 
Social conflict was on the increase and had assumed mass proportions. Furthermore, in 
the case of the metalworkers. the agenda of contestation was progressively being 
expanded. By 1980 they 
had moved from primarily quantitative questions in their list of 
demands to include qualitative ones, such as a union delegate, stability of employment 
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and a 40 hour working week. That the Church, as a major pillar of society, did not 
condemn, but, on the contrary, sanctioned these moves, whilst at the same time 
criticising the actions of the state, was obviously the source of considerable concern to 
the government. 
The involvement of the Church in the 1980 strike most dramatically illustrated what a 
long way leading sectors of the institution had come from the cold war rhetoric and 
pratice of 1964. Now, instead of supporting claims that Brazil was in the throws of a 
democratic transition, the Church questioned the validity of these assertions. In the words 
of Dom Claudio: 
the strike helped to show us the limit of the government's political opening. 134 
It was not only from the state's point of view that Church actions represented a critical 
landmark. Paradoxically, these moves also caused serious difficulties for the Roman 
Catholic bishops themselves. For the most part, the dramatic historical changes which 
had taken place within the Catholic Church during the 1960's and 1970's came about as 
a direct response to the Brazilian situation. However, they had also taken place against 
the background of equally dramatic shifts in international theological thinking, 
powerfully represented firstly by Vatican II, and later by its Latin American re-workings 
at Medellin in 1968 and Puebla in 1979. 
At the Latin American meetings one central concept in particular had come to the fore. 
This was the "preferential option for the poor". Many commentators rightly saw the 
attainment of this priority as an important step forward for Liberation Theology and, one 
might add, a step forward for the vast majority of Brazilian bishops who had supported 
its adoption. Similarly, they also regarded the 1978 appointment to the papacy of the 
conservative Polish cardinal of Cracow, Karol Wojtyla, as a partial reaction to such 
developments. Certainly, over the coinming years the relationship between, on the one 
hand, Liberation Theology in general (and its Brazilian exponents in particular) and, on 
the other, the Holy See, would be fraught with difficulties. 
By 1980, the new Pope's conservative credentials were public knowledge. For the 
Brazilian state, this shift in perspectives at the highest levels of Roman Catholicism 
presented it with an important opportunity to coopt and seek solace in a particular 
theological reading which carried weight with the Brazilian public. 
This process of attempted cooption, at the expense of more radical and critical 
perspectives, can be seen most clearly in the controversy which surrounded comments 
made by Pope John Paul II to a correspondent from Reuters in May 1980 regarding the 
actions of the Brazilian Church at that time. 
Q: Your Holiness is going to Brazil in July... 
A: Yes. 
Q:... where the Brazilian bishops are involved in a struggle on behalf of the unions and against the 
government. Does your holiness support this policy of the bishops? 
A: I think that above all it is necessary to make ... let us say, an analysis of the words you used in 
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order to be able to say what I do support and what I do not support, what the bishops are doing and 
what I should do going to Brazil, because it is a case of a social problem which has its ethical 
dimension and this is the role of the Church, in which it may be interested. And it cannot be any 
other way. Another thing altogether is the politicization of this. This is something that the Church 
must avoid. 135 
Sectors of the government and the conservative media immedately took these words to 
be a vindication of their stance, whilst progressive sectors of the Church, including the 
Catholic weekly journal 0 Sao Paulo, were left to define and contextualise them and 
give emphasis to the ethical aspects of Church intervention. 136 
This incident gives an indication of how the papal centre of gravity had moved 
significantly to the right, for whilst it must be admitted that the question asked of the 
Pope was a loaded one, he could, nevertheless, have chosen to give the simple answer 
that he stood by his bishops. In itself this would not have precluded a subsequent and 
more subtle definition of precisely what the role of the Church should be. Such a course 
of action, however, would not only have sent a clear signal of support to the bishops 
concerned at a critical moment in time, but it would also rightly have been construed as a 
less than veiled criticism of the Brazilian government's policies on the eve of an 
important state visit. Quite simply, this the Vatican was not prepared to countenance. 
Instead the Pope opted for a looser definition of the problem which left sufficient scope 
for the government to carry on as before. As for the issue of whether it truly gave the 
government sufficient grounds to suggest that it now had papal backing. is a secondary 
and highly debatable proposition altogether. Of much greater significance was the 
political impact of the Pope's carefully constructed phraseology. Quite clearly, it was 
hard to reconcile his comments with Dom Cläudio's view that: 
no political attitude is neutral... We do not fear the political consequences of our support, especially 
given the liberating characteristics of these consequences 137 
It was precisely these kinds of differences that the government would seek to exploit to 
the full. And it was on this occasion that a spokesman for the government concluded with 
evident satisfaction that "Rome has spoken, the subject is closed. " 
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In fact, the subject, or rather, the real tension which underlay relations between the 
Brazilian Church, the government, and the Vatican, was far from closed. On the contrary, 
it was only just beginning. As we shall see in a later chapter, conflicts of a similar nature 
would re-emerge during the papal visit itself when he addressed a primarily working 
class audience in the Morumbi stadium in Säo Paulo. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen how from the late 1970's onwards the Catholic Church of 
Santo Andre came to forge strong links with one metalworkers' union in particular, that 
of Sao Bernardo do Campo. and how thereby a radical form of Catholicism assured itself 
a privileged place in the development of what later came to be termed "new 
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unionism". 139 It must be emphasised, however, that significant though the Church's 
contribution came to be, the approximation between Church and unions was contingent 
upon a fundamental restructuring and reappraisal of union organisations and strategies 
which was carried out: (a) by their own leaders and members, and (b), in response to a 
primarily secular, i. e. working class dynamic. The simple fact is that "new unionism" 
preceded any significant Catholic interpenetration. Indeed, one may go even further than 
this and say that "new unionism" significantly contributed to the rearticulation of radical 
Catholic struggles within the ABC region. 
This basic priority of the secular over the religious is particularly evident in the 1978 
dispute where, to all intents and purposes, the weight of the Church was negligible. 
Certainly, in terms of the leadership make-up of both the Sao Bernardo and Santo Andre 
unions the Church carried little weight or favour. And at a grass roots level all evidence 
points to the lack of a well articulated or numerous militant body of the kind seen in Sao 
Paulo. Such as it existed, for example, the Workers' Pastoral of ABC was on the 
periphery of union affairs. 
There is little doubt that the major qualitative shift in these relations came about in 
1979. All key participants agree on this point. 1979 was the year in which the Church 
threw itself fully behind the demands of the strikers in both a public and a practical form. 
The reason for the change was not so much a spontaneous rethinking of attitudes on 
either side (in fact the Church had already made its favourable disposition towards the 
strikers clear in 1978). Instead, it basically arose under the pressure of circumstances. In 
the light of a progressively polarizing situation, the various union leaderships came to the 
view that cooperation with the Church was essential for the succesful pursuit of their 
dispute. The hope, which proved well-founded, was that the Church would constitute an 
important weapon in what was a rapidly diminishing armoury. 
It must be stressed, however, that the invitation to participate was not an unconditional, 
i. e., open-ended one. This is most powerfully illustrated in the case of Santo Andre's 
union leadership which actually debated the pros and cons of the issue and, in the light of 
this, made a conscious effort to limit the influence of the Church. But even in Säo 
Bernardo, where a political sensitivity of this kind did not exist and the perceived danger 
of Church support was not such a big issue, there was no question of the Church 
usurping executive functions. On the contrary, in these matters one can say that the 
wishes and role of the Church were strictly subordinated to the decisions of the union 
leadership. To this extent there was little to separate the two unions from one another. 
One crucial element which permitted the forging of a viable and sustainable 
relationship between the unions and the Church was the personality of Dom Claudio 
himself and, more precisely, his view that support for the strikers should be made more 
or less unconditional; in other words, from the outset he accepted the principle of union 
sovereignty. This view stemmed from his basic philosophy that: 
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the Church must respect the autonomy of the legitimate organisations of the workers and of civil 
society generally, the temporal society not just civil society .... in the same way that it must respect the 
autonomy of the sciences... 
As he openly admitted, the ultimate practical consequence of this perspective was that: 
It could be that the Church did not agree with a decision [of workers and their elected 
representatives], but it had to respect it. It could not wish to impose another decision. 14 1 
As I have shown, a detailed examination of the record of the 1978-80 disputes well 
illustrates this point. Despite the Church's very high profile there is no available 
evidence to suggest that it developed a private agenda of its own which it sought to 
impose upon the union movement from without. On the contrary, it accompanied the 
peculiartities of all three disputes from one year to the next. In the first it accompanied 
with declarations of solidarity; in the second. it accompanied the Sao Bernardo executive 
in its recommendation to go back to work; and in the third, if one accepts the earlier 
comments of Lula, it accompanied the executive in its decision not to confront the 
strikers in a similarly courageous manner to the year before. Evidently, therefore, the 
course of these disputes was dictated by the political and economic exigencies of the day 
together with the unions' own varying capacity to respond adequately to these. Indeed, 
even if, for the sake of argument, one'accepts Pimenta's argument regarding Church 
participation in the 1979 strike, then it too may be cited as yet one more example of how 
the Church was drafted into the dispute in a secondary capacity. Whether this constituted 
opportunism is a question I shall come on to later. 
For a number of reasons, the Church's supportive role did not imply a loss of its 
sovereignty. Firstly there is the obvious, but nonetheless highly significant point that 
leading figures in the Church did not identify themselves with just any form of unionism, 
but rather with a historically significant variant which was a practical critique of past 
structures and modes of conduct. As far as radical Catholic currents were concerned, 
then, the phenomenon of "new unionism" represented the most powerful translation to 
date of many of the views which they themselves had long advocated. If, for instance, 
one takes the case of Dom Claudio it is apparent that he did not cede the right to 
adovcate a systemic break. On the contrary, his view, like that of many others at the time, 
was that the metalworkers were actually helping to bring this about: 
in virtue of the power that the metalworkers of this region possess, they put pressure on the very 
government so that the social and economic structure of this country are changed. 
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The bishop's approach was not one of uncritical support; essentially what had 
happened was that a critical evaluation of the situation had been made prior to giving 
support. The movement was seen not merely as compatible with the Church's own social 
criteria, but also a means by which they could be advanced in a secular form. It is in this 
sense, therefore, that offering solidarity can be regarded as a means by which the Church 
could actually extend its sovereignty - though not so much over the unions themselves as 
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much as over general paths of national development. In other words, whilst the Church 
could not and was even reluctant to influence the body of union opinion143 it could at 
least help to ensure that the movement had a greater chance of success. As a direct 
consequence, the government and Church eventually found themselves on a collision 
course. 
Far from being diminished, then, ecclesiastical sovereignty, in the sense of the power to 
influence society at large, was extended by its alliance with the unions. 
The Church's refusal to engage in any form of conduct that might undermine the 
sovereignty of the union leadership or membership (for example, telling the strikers what 
they should or should not do) did not prevent it from making certain fundamental criteria 
quite clear. The most important of these criteria was that of the need for non-violent 
action. Had the policy of the union leadership been to encourage or defend a tactic of 
violence then there would have been a serious conflict of interests; but as it was, the 
Church was able to sustain its own deeply held conviction whilst supporting this 
operational aspect of union policy. 
The Church also passed judgement on a number of the strike's other operational 
aspects. For example, the need to maintain unity between the leadership and membership 
and a democratic form of conduct. Again, the basic reason why it could pass judgement 
upon what in point of fact was an internal affair of the union (and which in other 
historical situations would quite possibly be regarded as overstepping the limit of its 
authority), was the fact that the expression of its sovereignty was compatible with that of 
the union leaderships. In reality. the Church was not telling the unions what they should 
do. Instead, it was reaffirming and publicising an accomplished fact. 
A similar approach also underlay the Church's comments in 1980 to the effect that 
infiltration from outside groups was to be avoided (although here there was the additional 
desire to combat slurs upon the movement coming from reactionary quarters 1W). As an 
official note of the CNBB accurately pointed out: 
The authentic workers' leaders have always repudiated infiltrationist manoeuvres of those interested 
in manipulating the people for objectives foreign to the very popular consciousness.... 145 
Hence, the Church was not introducing anything new onto the strikers' agenda, but 
backing it up. At one mass meeting, for instance, the workers physically ejected what 
they themselves regarded as an infiltrationist and provocative element within the crowd. 
This was with the full and impassioned backing of Lula. 
From the above examples it is clear that the Church would only pass judgement on 
operational matters which were already accepted by the unions and to this extent within 
the public domain. No instances of conflict arose precisely because the Church was 
pursuing an openly partisan line. Its principal job, therefore, was not to question the 
conduct of the strikes but to support them provided, of course, that they retained their 
democratic and non-violent character. 
136 
To many observers the proposition put forward at the beginning of this section, i. e., 
that the emergence of "new unionism" significantly helped in the rearticulation of 
progressive Catholic struggles, might appear as a somewhat radical formulation, even as 
an inversion of reality. In putting forward this view I am not seeking to minimise or deny 
the existence of a Catholic contribution but the opposite, to put it in as accurate a 
perspective as possible. 
In the case of Säo Paulo, it was shown that the links between radical union perspectives 
and Catholic militancy was an organic one, that is to say: (a) Catholic militants were at 
the forefront of articulating certain trade union values; (b) they were historically 
significant, being amongst the first to do so; (c) they were numerically significant, 
accounting for a large proportion of the Metalworkers' Opposition membership; and 
finally (d), they were strategically significant - at the time of the 1978 metalworkers' 
elections, for instance, two leading Catholic militants contested the presidency and vice- 
presidency of the union. 
Taking a wider view, it was also shown that progressive Catholic articulation in general 
was at a considerably advanced stage. Already, in 1975 a pastoral plan was produced for 
the city of Sao Paulo which placed orkers' issues very high up on the agenda, and it 
was as an indication of this priority that a bishop was appointed to oversee its progress. 
The relationship between hierarchy and militants was a highly productive and mutually 
educative one. As for the relationship between militants and priests, this too was very 
well advanced with a solid and quite numerous core of clergy providing a major support 
to all militant initiatives either through well developed networks in the communities, or 
more directly in terms of infrastructural support. There was, then, a striking degree of 
cohesiveness and complementarity between the various echelons of the Church. In the 
case of the 1978 Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Union election, for example, there was a 
highly sophisticated and relatively friction free division of labour amongst these various 
groupings. 
It is given these continuities that one can say that not only was there an organic 
relationship between Catholic militants and radical sectors of the labour movement, but 
also a more organic relationship between the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo as a whole and 
the labour movement. 
Turning to the ABC region, it is apparent that a large number of these elements were 
absent when the strikes broke out in 1978. It is in this very real sense that "new 
unionism" was to precede any form of Catholic interpenetration in a manner that was in 
marked contrast to the situation in Säo Paulo. 
Taking the strategic and numerical significance of radical Catholicism within the ABC 
unions first, what emerges there is essentially a picture of relative marginalisation. For 
whatever reasons, the leaderships of the unions in Sao Bernardo and Santo Andre 
regarded any form of ecclesiastical involvement with a mixture of scepticism and 
hostility. Lula's comments three months before the strike of 1978 left little doubt that he 
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regarded the Church generally, and the Workers' Pastoral in particular, with considerable 
scepticism. The best they could do would be to educate the workers to join the union. As 
for the leadership of Santo Andre, here there was the added determination to preserve 
what they saw as the secular political integrity of the movement. 
With regard to the numerical significance of Catholic militancy within the ABC region 
one cannot speak with equal certainty simply because there is an absence of available 
statistical data. However, there are certain important circumstantial factors which 
strongly suggest a weakness. For historical reasons, which were detailed earlier, the 
development of militancy within the region had primarily come via ACO and not PO. 
This was in sharp contrast to Säo Paulo where already by the mid-1970's PO was the 
principal motor and expression of Catholic militancy. 
Dom Claudio is one amongst many other key observers who has noted that one of the 
defining charactersistics of PO, as opposed to ACO, is precisely the fact that it: 
aims much more to reach a greater mass, which is to say, to be able to unite workers in larger groups, 
even if they do not have the commitment of being militants immediately. 146 
But when he arrived there in 1975, the ABC region had the much more specialised 
training - and therefore restricted membership potential - which was to be associated with 
a militant infrastructure that was primarily based around ACO. 
147 Compounding this 
internal qualitative constraint was a powerful external limitation: the military repression. 
Whilst this had not eliminated ACO in the region, as had all but happened in Rio de 
Janeiro and Porto Alegre, the fact was that ACO remained in the sights of the military. 
This had hardly acted as a recruiting sergeant. 
Paradoxical though it might appear, further evidence which points to the absence of a 
truly organic relationship between Catholic militancy and progressive unionism in ABC 
is available if we look at another vital aspect of how militancy constitutes itself, that is, in 
relation to the Church. Quite simply, many of the sorts of continuities which I mentioned. 
earlier in relation to Sao Paulo, i. e, the close relationship between Catholic militants and 
all levels of the clergy which helped militants to project themselves to much greater 
effect within the union movement, were absent in the Diocese of Santo Andre Perhaps 
the most graphic example of this lack of practical ecclesiastical integration, and a 
powerful indicator of the state of health of the diocese, is the fact that it took three years 
to produce a pastoral plan of Santo Andre. Even when it was produced, those aspects 
which related to the Mission to the World of Work frequently met with a mixture of 
resistance and indifference from local priests. Again, this was not the ideal base from 
which to articulate and launch initiatives, or to act as a pole of attraction for new 
members. 
The suggestion that the advent of new unionism" significantly helped in the 
rearticulation of radical Catholic militancy in no way implies that a gelling of 
ecclesiastical forces was not already underway. Dom Cläudio came in as a cautious 
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reformer and caution was gradually exchanged for mutual commitment as militants 
taught him many of the realities of the diocese and he in turn actively responded. But 
there is little question that these processes of reorganisation and realignment received a 
tremendous qualitative boost with the eruption of labour militancy in the region. The 
history of the Workers' Pastoral in Sao Bernardo is the most notable example of this. 
As we saw, the earliest record of PO in Sao Bemardo is that of its formation in 1978 as 
an umbrella organisation for radical Catholics and secular militants alike (also known as 
the "Grupao"). It should be emphasised, however, that this was after the May strikes and 
not before. In fact, it was a direct response to the ferment that these events had generated 
and the susequently overwhelming need felt by activists from numerous factories to 
come together and discuss trade union issues. This cross-fertilisation continued when 
Catholic elements left PO (the "Grupao") and passed directly into the union because to 
them it appeared that Lula was opening it up to more combative perspectives, like theirs. 
By the time Frei Betto arrived in Säo Bernardo, PO was a spent force. 
That he should have been sent to this city rather than to those of Santo Andre or Sao 
Caetano was far from coincidental. Santo Andre already had a history of Church activity 
whilst Säo Caetano apparently offered little scope for organisation. Sao Caetano had a 
history of repeated failures at forming a PO. One priest with a good knowledge of the 
area described it to me as the "centre of reaction in trade union, religious and political 
terms. " 148 
Quite why this should be so is difficult to say. One possible factor might be that the 
municipality had one of the highest incomes per capita in the whole of Brazil. Frei Betto 
described the city as encompassing a rising working class, i. e., with improving housing 
and graduating towards a lower middle class. Thus perhaps the clergy did not feel or 
even need to respond to the anxieties of the people in quite the same way it had to in 
places like the eastern zone of Sao Paulo or Säo Bernardo do Campo with their many 
slums. PO's own statistics (taken from the Jornal do Brasil, September 13,1987) found 
average anual incomes in Santo Andre, Säo Bemardo and Sao Caetano to be $2.366, 
$3,866, and $4,231 respectively. Unfortunately, however, this question of the 
progressive Church's apparent failure to gain a foothold was the one and only area of 
enquiry which Dom Claudio refused point-blank to comment upon. 
With regard to Sao Bemardo, according to Frei Betto, the view taken by Dom Claudio 
was that since it was an area of such strategic importance and lacking in any serious 
pastoral support, then it was here that he should go. Subsequent events would appear to 
vindicate this decision because it did not take Frei Betto long to get a Workers' Pastoral 
off the ground. By December 1987 the municipalities of Sao Bernardo do Campo and 
Diadema (the area covered by the Sgo Bernardo union) had between them nine active 
groups, three groups under formation, and an average total of 115 participants. This 
compared most favourably with Santo Andre's (municipality) total of three active groups 
(plus another two in formation) and an average number of 32 participants. Indeed, by 
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1987 Sao Bemardo do Campo and Diadema had between them the majority - some 61.5 
per cent of the diocese's PO activists. 149 
Why did Frei Betto succeed where others had failed before him? The answer to this 
question is complex since essentially it entails an historical process rather than a single 
individual, event or conscious act. Thus, for example, whilst Dom Claudio's decision to 
concentrate on the region and Betto's skills as an organiser and communicator improved 
PO's chances, there was another important factor which lay beyond their direct control, 
which was essential to any chance of success, and which, happily for them, was moving 
decisively in their favour. That was the receptivity of workers to such an initiative. 
A survey carried out at the time of the 1980 strike found that people in the Sao Paulo 
and ABC regions generally had a positive view of the Church's actions. In answer to the 
question did the Church act rightly or wrongly in the position it took up, 69 per cent of 
the sample answered yes, 17 per cent no, and 14 per cent either did not know or did not 
pass an opinion. 
150 Another question. which from the point of view of my study has 
limited value, supplied a list of personalities and asked people to identify the ones whom 
they "most admired". 151 Significantly, it was Dom Paulo who came second only after 
Lula. A third question, which asked respondents whose side they thought the Church was 
on during the dispute left no doubt as -to the institution's partisan image. Whilst 23 per 
cent of the sample felt that it had not taken sides, an overwhelming 73 per cent felt that it 
had taken the side of the workers as opposed to a mere three per cent who thought it had 
taken the side of the employers. 
In order to give greater forcus to this generally favourable picture, I interviewed 50 
Catholic metalworkers (from within the boundaries of the Säo Bemardo Metalworkers' 
Union) to see what effect the actions of the Catholic Church of Santo Andre had had 
upon them during the strikes of 1978-80 - in essence, whether it had left a positive or 
negative impression of the institution. Clearly, the results of such a proceedure. taking 
place as it did eight years after the events, and amongst such a comparatively small group 
of workers, must be viewed with caution. The results should merely be treated as an 
observation of the 50, and as a complement to my detailed interviews with militants, 
rather than taken as the basis for hard and fast generalisations about Catholic 
metalworkers as a whole - 
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In spite of the eight year gap, consciousness of the Church's involvement was 
extremely high. To the question "Did you know that the Church supported the strikes of 
ABC in 1978%19 and 1980? ", 46 out of the 50 interviewees answered yes. To the 
question "Do you think that the Church of Santo Andre was right in taking this attitude 
towards the workers? ". a similarly high number, 45 out of 50, replied yes. The rest were 
divided into three who did not know, and two who thought it was wrong. Amongst this 
group of 50 rank and file metalworkers, at least, the Church's decision was an 
overwhelmingly popular one. Amongst those who participated in the strikes (39 
interviewees) this also proved to be the case. Only one felt that the Church should not 
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have intervened on grounds of principle. i. e., because, in his words. "it is political. " This 
individual also happened to be the same and only one who answered yes to the question 
"Did the fact that the Church supported the strikes of 1978-80 affect your attitude 
towards it - for the worse? " Quite remarkably, 23 workers said that it had changed their 
attitude towards the church "for the better". An equal number said that it had not changed 
their attitude, whilst the remaining three did not express an opinion either way. 
All this provides at least some grounds for suggesting that there was considerable 
scope for an improvement in the Church's image prior to its intervention, and despite its 
history of involvement in labour struggles. In the instances of activists who subsequently 
joined the Workers' Pastoral, whom I interviewed in detail and did not form part of the 
survey, this certainly proved the case. The example of Vicente Paulo da Silva (also 
known as Vicentinho), a member of the Workers' Pastoral and elected leader of the Sao 
Bernardo Metalworkers' Union in 1987. is typical and worth citing in detail because his 
case powerfully indicates how, from a relatively low esteem enjoyed by the Church 
within the union, the two would increasingly intermesh in the light of the strikes and the 
Church's positive apporach. 
Having been forced to leave his home state of Rio Grande do Norte for economic 
reasons in 1976, Vicentinho came down to Sao Bernardo at the invitation of relatives and 
began working in a small metalworking factory. He moved to the multinational Mercedes 
Benz in 1978, where he works to this day. In his home town of Acari he had participated 
in the local Church's young persons group, but on arriving in Säo Paulo he did not feel at 
all comfortable with the Church. This was partly because he had already begun to 
question the nature of the group which was somewhat introspective and had no global 
perspective. A second reason was that on arriving in Säo Bernardo he realised that: 
the priest here was worse than the one back home; firstly the priest back there was a friend, the one 
here had absolutely nothing to do with reality. no correspondence whatsoever. 
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All that, however, was to change: 
and suddenly, in the strikes, in the strike movement of 1979 and 1980I re-encountered with the 
companheiros of the Church here, only with another vision, they are companheiros of the Workers' 
Pastoral. 154 
In other words, for an activist like Vicentinho, what would bring him out of his two years 
of local ecclesiastical isolation was the erruption of the strike movement. With the 
support of Dom Claudio and Betto amongst others, progressive Catholics were 
encouraged to manifest their opinions and a radical practice. They also had a framework 
in which they could do this openly despite the resistence of some local priests. 
Although the testimony of another PO member and union official, Adair Boy, is not as 
critical of his local parish ("1 always used to go with the priest to celebrations because he 
was ill" 
155)he also left it in no doubt that: 
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I came to feel more at home to the extent that the Church opened its door to us the workers. The 
Church had to gain, indeed, I myself was a Christian who did not participate in the Church. 136 
Thus, in a manner that was quite unprecedented the strikes permitted the Church to 
activate its bases, both in the sense of bringing militants out of their isolation, and in the 
sense of acting as a pole of attraction to less committed Catholics by projecting a new 
vision that corresponded more favourably to the realities faced by the mass of Catholic 
metalworkers. As one PO activist put it to me: 
many workers who had a vision of a conservative Church, a Church that was always on the side of 
the employers, always on the side of the exploiter, at that moment they saw something different. 
They saw, for example, the presence of the bishop in meetings, the presence of priests, nuns, of 
workers who were leaders of the base communities also present in demonstrations. ... So it created a 
new fact. A new vision of the Church came to be held, one that was no longer the one of the bishop 
hidden in the diocese, inside the curia, inside his house, or the priest only there at the altar, or the lay 
person, who was the leader in the community, remaining in his little group; instead it was of another 
Church that was present in the conflict together with the workers. 157 
Thus, it was not simply a question of "new unionism" of the late 1970's opening the 
way for the Church, rather, that had to be combined with decisive action on the latter's 
part. The strong lead taken by the hierarchy, together with its progressive colouring, 
helped open the way for worker initiatives like the Workers' Pastoral because it showed 
that practical connections could be made between Catholicism and the workers' day-to- 
day existence. To this extent, the Church was an architect of its own destiny rather than a 
passive observer of changes to which it sought to adapt. 
Of course, none of this means that every Catholic metalworker became a member of 
PO overnight. That said, it should be noted that activists do not spring from thin air. In 
almost all instances they are initially drawn from the rank-and-file. Thus a significant 
improvement in grassroots attitudes is likely to favour the emergence of militancy 
through a qualitative and a quantitative widening of its potential recruitment base. 
It was on a progressive ecclesiastical terrain, which had been considerably 
strengthened, that Frei Betto could now go forward and develop a Workers' Pastoral. 
Whilst in the past the idea of a Mission to the World of Work might have appeared 
somewhat alien to workers, i. e., ranging from an irrelevance to an unwarrented 
intervention in their affairs and an unacceptably politicised role for the Church to carry 
out, recent events had done much to reverse this current of thought. To his credit Frei 
Betto conceded that: 
many workers who were not close to the Church, to the pastoral action, beginnini with this testimony 
of the Church, became more sensitive and more open to the pastoral proposals. t 
One of the most interesting issues which surrounds this whole episode is the question 
of what would have happened if the Church had not given the support that it did. Frei 
Betto's own opinion was that had Dom Claudio refused union requests in 1979: 
I think that it would have created a divorce between the Church and the working class. The costs 
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would have been almost irreparable. ... To be a participating worker could not be 
synon ous with a participating Christian, one would have to choose between two 
roads. 
It is difficult to prove or refute this proposition definitively because it is a counter-factual 
conditional. In the specific case of the 50 rank and file workers themselves, the survey 
showed a more complex picture. Their loyalty to the Church transcended both events 
close to home, and the stance it took. Asked the question: "If the Church of Santo Andre 
had not supported the strikes of 1978-80 would you have distanced yourself from the 
Church? ", 42 workers said no. Only two workers said that they would have left, whilst 
five either did not know or were unsure. (One person did not reply. ) The motives for this 
loyalty varied. In some instances it was immutable. As one worker put it to me "I have 
faith independently of the Church so I would not change. " And another made it clear that 
he would "never leave". But other respondents were more qualified in their answers. As 
one commented, although he would not have left, such inactivity on the part of the 
Church "would have left a bad impression " Another said that "I would have stayed to 
see if their vision was in the interests of the workers. " His opinion of his colleages was 
that "They would become critical but they would not leave. " 
Betto's notion that a contradiction would have arisen between individuals in terms of 
their radical working class identity and a Christian identity certainly holds true in the 
cases of all the union militants whom I interviewed. In certain instances (for example an 
official in the Säo Bernardo Metalworkers' Union) people said they would have 
contemplated leaving the Church. In the vast majority of cases, like Vicentinho's, the 
Church would have maintained its staid image and not acted as a pole of attraction. As 
for those individuals who were already both union and Catholic militants, like Oswaldo 
Bargas, it is quite probable that they would have continued their dual role but that this 
would have been rendered highly problematic - if not completely unsustainable - with 
scepticism encountered from both rank and file metalworkers and union militants alike. 
This is quite apart from the self-questioning and division that could have arisen amongst 
Catholic activists themselves over the question of the Church's viability as an organ for 
progressive social change. 
In the light of the views expressed by militants above, it would appear that the 
Church's exisiting militant base could have been internally weakened at the same time as 
its potential external bases. i. e., as represented by its ability to act as a pole of attraction, 
were undermined. For these activists, the institution would have been widely perceived 
as at best an irrelevance, and at worst as aii instrument of the bourgeoisie. More 
specifically, it is hard to imagine that the links which came to be established between the 
Sao Bernardo Metalworkers' Union and the Church would have come about. That is 
symbolised by the dramatic about-turn in Lula's own attitudes. In an interview given to 
Frei Betto at the end of the 1980 dispute, and published in the journal 1srve, the 
metalworkers' leader asserted that: 
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The conduct of the Church in the last few years, and especially now, leaves no doubt that, after 
Medellin and Puebla, a large part of its members put themselves effectively on the side of the most 
needy. It is pre isely this which irritates the government and the employers. They know that on the 
side of the people the Church has much to contribute towards our liberation. One only has to look at 
the good that people like Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns and Dom Claudio Hummes do for our people. In 
. 
contrast to the conservatives who accuse these bishops, the CNBB and even yourself as interfering in 
our struggle, I think that precisely what the Church needed to do was to define itself. Its place is at 
the side of those who suffer and the exploited, as we see in the life of Christ. The boss and the 
employee, the torturer and the tortured cannot sit together on the same Church bench. I am convinced 
that Brazilian society will gain a great deal with the rapprochement between the Church and the 
working class. 160 
To sum up. The aim of this chapter has not been to negate the weight of the church 
during the momentous events of 1978-80, but rather, to contextualise and define it more 
accurately. As a result of this I have contrasted the more organic nature of links between 
radical Catholic labour militancy in Säo Paulo and progressive unionism, with the less 
organic links which existed in the ABC region at the time of "new unionism's". 
emergence. 
I have primarily concentrated on organisations like PO and ACO; however, even if the 
scope were to be extended to include CEBs, Neighbourhood Friends' Associations 
(Associapoes de Amigos de Bairro). and other grass roots movements where the action of 
the Church is unrivalled, then here too the qualitative differences persist. In 1980, for 
instance, when the union leadership of Sao Bernardo was removed from office and a 
highly decentralised form of activity in the neighbourhoods became the order of the day, 
it was the eastern zone of Säo Paulo - with its well established grass roots networks - 
which became the principal support for the strike movement, 161 and not Santo Andre 
where such work was comparatively limited. 162 This was one of the major reasons why 
cooperation between Dom Paulo and Dom Claudio was an essential and indeed 
characteristic feature of the Church's role in the dispute. 
I have also argued that "new unionism" significantly helped in the restructuring of 
radical Catholic militancy within the region. At times this entailed pulling existing 
militants out of their isolation and aggregating their previously disparate struggles; but 
above all it entailed attracting new members to their ranks. 
Evidence of this upsurge is given in Padre Oscar Tosar's 1979 annual report where he 
noted that the fortunes of PO had considerably improved with "many new militants who 
" 163 are full of enthsuiasm. Amongst the external reasons he cited for this positive result 
Was: 
the growth in working class consciousness and the desire for justice for the working class which 
there was 013 the occasion of the strikes of metalworkers, public transport, teachers, etc... 164 
This does not mean the church was not an architect of its own destiny, or partly 
responsible for this turn about in its fortunes. On the contrary, the lead taken by Dom 
144 
Claudio was essential to a revival in militant fortunes; but it was a lead taken in the 
context of a major new historical development that was beyond his control. One can only 
view such actions as opportunistic, as Pimenta does, if we divorce them from those 
agents who took them. This, in my view, is a major flaw since it was not "The Church" in 
general which intervened on the side of the metalworkers, but a particular concrete 
manifestation allied to the Theology of Liberation. Indeed, it was precisely in its 
willingness to pursue policies of this kind, i. e., of a clearly working class character, that 
the Church in Greater Sao Paulo would come into serious conflict with increasingly 
powerful conservative elements inside the Vatican. For all their apparent parallels, the 
Church of Santo Andre should not be confused with the Church inside Poland of the 
early 1980's, or subsumed under the abstract, and in this case erroneous notion of the 
"desire to govern". 
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Chapter Four: The Restructuring of Relations Between the Church and the Trade Unions 
-1979-1985 
4.1 Introduction 
In the period 1979 to 1985 a fundamental rearticulation of relations between the trade 
unions and the Catholic Church took place. In some senses it had to happen because both 
parties were forced to define, adapt, and reorganise themselves in relation to a new 
political and economic moment. Amongst other things, this moment brought with it a 
political amnesty (1979); new political parties (1979); a prolonged and deep recession 
(1980-85); a decline in worker confidence immediately following the ABC 
metalworkers' strike (1980); and free elections (1982). This new situaton not only 
demanded, but it also offered the opportunity for the creation of new instruments of 
struggle long sought after by many militants. 
Although, therefore, the timing and conditions were not of their choosing, ' militants 
did manage to seize and create new opportunities for the articulation of workers 
struggles. Foremost amongst the instruments that would be created were (a) the Workers' 
party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT)(1979), and (b), two trade union confederations - 
the CUT (1983) and the CGT (1986) - which reflected sharply polarized strategic 
visions. 
Whilst the creation of the Workers' Party had repercussions for Catholic militancy and 
vice-versa, a detailed sociological analysis of this issue is not the concern of this study. It 
has - and continues - to receive extensive treatment elsewhere. 
2 The last chapter will, 
however, tackle the question in a more thematic manner, i. e., as part of the debate over 
the relationship between the Church. the party-political, and the ideological. In the 
present chapter the main concern is with the much neglected issue of the changing 
reciprocal relationship between the trade unions and the Church during the former's 
extensive restructuring period of the early and mid 1980's. 
This topic will be tackled principally in terms of metalworker struggles and Church 
relations in the Greater Säo Paulo region. As stated in my introductory chapter, the 
validity of such an apparently narrow focus lies in the disproportionate political weight 
historically attached to the metalworkers' unions and oppositions of the region. Many of 
the most significant national trade union conflicts and debates that marked the period 
took place within this category, and ii was far from coincidental that the first General 
Secretaries elected to the CUT and the CGT were none other than presidents to the Säo 
Bernardo and Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Unions respectively. Thus, how the Church of 
the region situated itself within this overall conflict is of special importance. Indeed, the 
uncertainty over the 
Church's role would be accentuated still further as a new dynamic - 
Brazil's painfully slow move away from an unelected dictatorship and towards greater 
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electoral accountability - brought into question the automaticity of relations between 
corrupt trade union leaders, the dictatorship, and thereby the Church's own function as 
an umbrella for opposition elements and democratic values. 
4.2 1979 - The Assassination of Santos Dias da Silva - Condemnation and 
Polarisation 
In late October and early November of 1979, the metalworkers of Slio, Paulo conducted 
a short but extrememly bitter strike. In a manner akin to 1978, there was a serious split 
between the official union leadership. who were supposed to be conducting the strike, 
and the Sao Paulo Metalworkers' Opposition, which in practice took the initiative and 
went onto the offensive. The Opposition partly achieved this by organising effectively 
through union meetings, but mainly by mobilising its real power base, the factory 
comissions, many of which had sprung up the year before in the context of a more 
confident and combative labour force. The bitterness crept into the dispute for two 
reasons. Firstly because the leadership of the union was widely perceived as not having 
any real desire to fight but, on the contrary, of wanting to demobilise its own members, 3 
and secondly, because, as had happened in the ABC region, both government and 
employers showed a preparedness to fight back with all the tools at their disposal. One of 
these tools was violence, and along with arrests and beatings it brought the death of a 
metalworker and leading figure of the Opposition, Santos Dias da Silva. 
For the most part the Church's response to these events was uncompromising, echoing 
views expressed during the ABC strikes. At a national level, whilst on a solidarity visit to 
Säo Paulo, the then president of the CNBB, Dom No Lorscheider, commented that: 
It is not the role of the Church to call strikes, neither did it call for a strike here in Säo Paulo. It was 
not the Church which organised the pickets. But the Church wishes that the workers feel its sport, 
clear support, that it is on their side when they ask for what is just, as is the case in this strike. 
However, he also added that: 
The Church preaches the autonomy of the unions and for this reason does not wish to diminish nor s 
substitute the workers' leaders. 
A closer look at the history of Sao Paulo shows this last sentence not to be entirely 
correct given that the word "authentic" was not placed before the term workers' leaders. 
We have already seen, for example, that whilst the Church of Säo Paulo did not directly 
engage in electoral union politics, it was, nevertheless, heavily involved in the support of 
what it regarded as authentic workers' leaders in various struggles, including that against 
the incumbent leadership headed by Joaquinzäo. Indeed, it was precisely Santos Dias da 
Silva, both in his life and his death, who would become one of the most potent 
expressions of this fact. 
The untimely and brutal manner of his assassination, by a police bullet on a picket line 
outside a factory in the city's southern zone, led to his adoption as a symbol of resistance 
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by both Church and the Opposition. This was hardly surprising in view of his history as 
both a leading militant of the Church and of the Opposition. Apart from his grass-roots 
ecclesiastical work with CEBs and the Movement Against the Cost of Living 
(Movimento Contra A Carestia), he had been active in PO's (Sao Paulo) radical 
reorganisation of the early 1970's, moving on to assume executive functions at regional 
and Sao Paulo state levels. In so doing many bishops came to know him well and he also 
became a close personal friend of Dom Paulo. Within the Opposition Santos Dias was a 
leading and much respected figure. Particularly active from 1975 onwards, such that by 
1978 he was able to dispute the vice-presidency of the Sao Paulo Metalworkers' Union 
in what became the Opposition's most succesful election campaign ever. 
Neither of these two groups would therefore permit his death to go unnoticed. For the 
Opposition the loss of Santos Dias was a painful blow. His memory would be revitalised 
two years later when they fought the 1981 union election campaign under the heading of 
the Santos Dias Slate. As for the Church, on hearing of the assassination, Dom Paulo and 
Dom Angelico Bernardino rushed to the Instituto Medico Legal and demanded access to 
the corpse, which they eventually got. The impact on both was profound to say the least: 
I found myself with Santos. He was naked on the table, and the bullet of the soldier crossed his 
breast. [At this point Dom Angelico points to his own rib cage and gestures as to where the bullet 
entered and left the body of the victim. ] At Sunday Mass I said that I had never in my life 
experienced such a strong sense of Christ, dead - that one, the historic, when the lance of the soldier 
pierced his side, this one, when the bullet of the soldier crossed from side to side. 6 
For Dom Paulo, who was the first person to gain access to the corpse - even placing his 
finger in the bullet hole - the fact that Santos Dias had been shot in the back whilst 
restraining workers hit home powerfully: 
Thus, in my view he was a perfect model: a father of a family, he was a perfect model of a 
Christian... and a perfect model of struggle, but of non-violent struggle. I was the first to arrive at his 
corpse and I thought that I should pay homage throughout my life to this figure because he appears to 
me to be one of the most perfect figures of modem times; of a worker who knows how to be good in 
the home, who knows how to be good to the poor, but who knows how to be very strong against 
oppression. 
During his homily at Santos Dias' Mass, Dom Angelico not only criticised Brazilian 
capitalism in the most clear-cut possible terms, but also linked this general problem with 
the struggle for a particular vision of trade unionism as a vehicle for social change. 
Santos Dias, he said: 
understood that to opt for the working class, for the oppressed, for the poor, signifies being in 
struggle against the factory which manufactures the poor, that is to say, the savage and dependent 
capitalist system, responsible for the wealth of the privileged few; for the selling of the nation to 
interests of foreign groups at the cost of the misery of our people. ... 
he was always on the side of 
those who fight for a trade unionism free from ties with the ministry of Labour and from false leaders 
of the very class itself; for a trade union with deep roots in the factory, totally given over to the cause 
of justice, truth and fraternity. 
Although for various reasons the Church itself was reluctant to assume the banner of 
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the struggle against "false" leaderships, Dom Angelico's comments underline the de 
facto existence of a relationship and close ideological identity between the Church and a 
specific current of trade unionism. In a later interview the bishop would acknowledge 
that: 
The strike was a truly difficult time. The Church, through the Workers' Pastoral, was, in my opinion, 
marking a very serious frontal position - not because by definition we wanted to be at the 
frontiers. ... the Church does not wish to command, it never had this aim, it had the aim of being 
inside the workers' movement with its contribution of Christian militancy, it knows that it is not its 
mission to command, to dictate rules. 9 
In other words, the situation at that time was particularly difficult. In the view of bishops 
throughout the region it demanded a critico-prophetic form of action on the part of the 
Church. Prophetic, here, can be defined as including physical acts of solidarity as well as 
verbal ones like those mentioned above, i. e., criticism of the system and even of 
individual acts. As one close adviser to Dom Paulo explained to me: 
The prophetic role should always have in itself two parts; to denounce what is wrong, and to 
announce ways out. 10 
The problem with this concept, of course, lies in the fact that the process of 
annunciation, if it goes beyond all but the most generic and platitudinous of comments, 
brings with it a whole host of contradictions associated with the concretisation and 
increased specificity of ecclesiastical options. In theoretical terms, for instance, there is 
the very real difficulty of the extent to which, once embarked on a road of this type, one 
must concretise such options, but without falling into purely ideological formulations 
(thereby undermining the spiritual dimension of the Catholic faith together with the 
autonomy of civil society itself). It was precisely this kind of problem, only as 
manifested in the specific context of the 1978-80 labour disputes, with which Dom 
Claudio had had to grapple. The particular solution he reached was the support of the 
strikers. 
Although the hostility and difficulties he faced should not be minimised, there was a 
certain simplicity to the problem in hand; that is to say, the choice was essentially 
between workers united behind their democratically elected leaders, and employers. But 
in Säo Paulo, on the other hand, the situation was far more complex. The labour 
movement was fragmented and polarised between, broadly speaking, two main currents 
each of which could claim at least some degree of representativeness. A partisan struggle 
as between labour and capital the Church was willing to undertake; but as between 
various factions of labour itself, now this was a more delicate issue about which all levels 
of the Church - both bishops and militants alike - were aware. They did not wish the 
Church to be construed as a union faction, either within the intstitution itself, or from 
within various sectors of the local labour movement. Instead, Catholic militants were to 
be the principal mediators of ecclesiastical perspectives and agents of change. 
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Furthermore, they were to retain absolute autonomy of thought and action in the 
execution of these roles. 
4.3 The 1981 Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Union Elections - Innocence by Association 
One only has to look at the internal politics of the Metalworkers' Opposition itself to 
begin to appreciate why the Church sought to stay one step removed from embracing 
particular workers' factions. Whilst there were fundamental points of agreement which 
shaped the Opposition's identity, (e. g., democratisation of the union, rejection of 
centralised union organisation, criticism of the labour laws, emphasis on organisation 
within the factory, emphasis on the formation of factory commissions independent of 
union control - in short, a break with existing union practices) there were, 
simultaneously, clear differences of emphasis upon tactics. These differences were not 
merely present as between the different groupings that went to make up the Opposition 
(e. g., supporters of the journals "0 Companheiro", "0 Trabalho", "Em Tempo", 
"Convergencia Socialista", militants from the PCB, Trotskyist groupings, and 
independent socialists). They frequently also penetrated Catholic circles themselves. 
This latter situation was far from extraordinary in view of the fact that Catholics had, 
quite deliberately, never organised themselves as a political grouping or bloc, choosing 
instead to immerse themselves in the dynmamics of the movement. That was precisely 
why, for instance, at the First Congress of the Metalworkers' Opposition in 1979, Santos 
Dias was able to side with those who withdrew from the proceedings, whilst Waldemar 
Rossi chose to stay - without either of them in any way undermining or calling into 
question their links with PO. 
11 
By 1981 there was a considerable degree of reconciliation between the two positions 
and this permitted the construction of the "Santos Dias da Silva" slate led by Waldemar 
Rossi. That unanimity, however, did not extend to the group focused around the journal 
'"Tribuna da Luta Operaria" which chose to back the candidacy of Aurelio Peres instead. 
Once again, as had been the case in 1978, the Church did not formally take sides. Apart 
from the fact that the election contest was run between three slates (of which at least two 
could claim some degree of representativeness) there was the added complication that 
Aurelio Peres was a figure close to Church circles. He had been an active member of PO 
in the city's southern region where, amongst other things, he had been heavily involved 
in the Movement Against the Cost of Living. Whatever differences might have arisen 
between himself and the Opposition, 12 and himself and the Church, 13 the fact was that 
he enjoyed considerable popular support. In 1979, for instance, he began his Sao Paulo 
state deputy's mandate - officially as a member of the PMDB, but in reality closely 
aligned to the PC do B. That mandate was heavily oriented towards workers' issues, and 
would eventually constitute an important base of support during his 1981 metalworkers' 
campaign. 
In terms of the indirect nature of Church support, the 1981 campaign was quite similar 
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to the 1978 campaign. Once again, the Opposition was the principal beneficiary of 
Church support whilst no such links were established with Joaquinzäo's slate. One major 
difference, of course, was that the campaign took place in a climate of considerable 
labour uncertainty. The recession was biting hard, and strikes had dramatically fallen off 
from their 1979 peak. For the time being at least, the heady and highly confident 
atmosphere of 1978 was over. So too, was the degree of mobilisation, with many 
militants being thrown out of their jobs. It was in this context that the Opposition sought 
for the first time in its history to make an issue of its links with the Church during the 
campaign process itself, clearly in the belief that this would be electorally advantageous. 
As we shall see in a moment, this was a tactic rich in irony. 
Only one year earlier (1980) the Pope had visited Brazil. On that tour he had stopped 
off in Sao Paulo and given a speech to a vast crowd of workers at the Morumbi stadium. 
He received homage from an individual chosen to represent the workers. That individual 
was none other than Waldemar Rossi. The content and controversies surrounding their 
respective speeches is not the subject of this chapter, that will be discussed in detail later 
on. For the moment, suffice it to say that there was a clear difference in orientation and 
that the meeting of Rossi and the Pope on stage had been anything but a meeting of 
minds. Indeed, so great was the difference that Rossi was unable to deliver the full text of 
his speech. 
These conflicts notwithstanding, when it came to propaganda for the election the 
Opposition printed hand bills which made reference to the meeting and showed a 
photograph of Rossi embracing the Pope. The Opposition also produced wall posters 
with the slogan "Vote Slate 2- Santos Dias da Silva - with Waldemar Rossi, the worker 
who welcomed the Pope". Beneath this was a very large photograph of the Pope, Dom 
Paulo, and Waldemar Rossi giving his speech and below the photograph appeared the 
slogan "A forty hour working week, without reductions, to defeat unemployment". 
Whilst the Opposition was not tyring to depoliticise the campaign, there is equally little 
doubt that it was trying to introduce an element of sanctity, or innocence by association, 
into the proceedings. 
14 No other slate was in a position to do this. The choice of the 
martyred figure of Santos Dias da Silva as a figure-head for the Opposition was quite 
legitimate and consistent with its history; he was, after all, a man who had died fighting 
for their cause. But the quasi-cooption of the Pope, whose outlook was somewhat at 
variance with both the Opposition's and PO's class'perspective, was another matter 
altogether. 
This tactic was immediately criticised by the supporters of Joaquinzgo. Under the 
heading of "Rossi, the Anti-Christ", an article in Slate One's bulletin noted that. 
The pope puts his message of peace and love in the service of humanity. To put it at the service of a 
trade union slate is an offence to all good men and Christians. This merely shows the contempt Rossi 
has for the principles of the Catholic faith, breaking the second commandment of God's law: 'Thou 
shalt not take thy Lord's name in vain. 't5 
160 
The significance of this contoversy must not be exaggerated, but it does raise two 
important issues. Firstly, there is the question of how Opposition militants themselves 
viewed this tactic, and what this says about their view of Catholic influence amongst 
ordinary metalworkers. And secondly, there is the question of how that squared with 
reality, i. e., did the tactic succeed, as they hoped, or backfire, as the supporters of 
Joaquinzäo hoped it would? 
Taking the first of these points, I found that the concept of ecclesiastical support in 
itself was both appreciated and relied upon by activists. Internal documents talk of "the 
need to involve" the Church because "it is very strong"; others mention the need to 
request space within the centre of the city from Dom Paulo. The participants at internal 
meetings frequently read like a who's who of Church related organisations, ranging from 
PO, ACO, the FNT, and the Youth Pastoral, to more research oriented organisations like 
the Centro Pastoral Vergueiro and the Centro Ecumýnico de Documentaräo e InformaSSäo 
(an ecumenical religious organisation). But this kind of support, which was internal, was 
only to be expected in the light of the 1978 elections when similar support had been 
forthcomming. However, the idea that religious conections should be rendered explicit 
represented a departure from past practise. Surprisingly, perhaps, this new tactic - with 
its emphasis upon the links between Waldemar Rossi and the Pope (two figures who in 
reality were ideologically far apart) - was adopted with little resistance from within 
militant ranks. Those activists who expressed doubts did so more in hindsight and from a 
strategic point of view than a tactical one. As one activist put it to me: 
I thought that it showed the very weakness of the Opposition and the very weight of the Church. So I 
agreed and I disagreed. ... many thought that it could even give us victory; but I think that the 
majority of more prepared militants thought that it was a backward step. But it was accepted like that 
in a more or less tranquil form . 
16 
Although the above interviewee was not a Catholic militant, and therefore prone to 
questioning the weight of the Church in the workers' struggle, his point is not a sectarian 
one. It could just as easily have come from a member of the Workers' Pastoral. He went 
on to develop his criticism as follows: 
To the extent that you develop a policy in this manner you are leaving aside a series of other ideas 
that people have. From the question of paternalism to the question of creating a process where the 
people participate from a conscious stance. So when you begin to develop a political action in this 
manner it is evident that these ideals, these objectives, are prejudiced - there is not the slightest doubt 
of that. 
17 
It is in the nature of elections generally, of which Brazilian trade union elections, with 
their emphasis on presidentialism, are no exception, that there is a bias towards 
personality. The genuinely educational and participatory aspects which were so much a 
part of the opposition's raison d'@tre were therefore forced into the background while 
the electoral machine ran its course. Militants appeared to realise this, and therefore the 
use of the pope was merely seen as a short-cut to support. In a poll conducted by the 
161 
Opposition prior to the metalworkers' elections, one of the key conclusions arrived at 
was that: 
only a small portion of metalworkers know Waldemar Rossi by name, and that percentage rises when 
we mention that be was the person chosen by the workers to bring the political message to the Pope. 
This indicates that we must strengthen his name amongst the category. 
The question which now arises is whether the tactic of linkage proved well conceived. 
Was there a receptivity amongst the metalworkers themselves to these Catholic 
overtures? 
Of one thing there is little doubt, the Pope's visit to Brazil had had a great impact, 
receiving extensive media coverage. Not surprisingly, therefore, when I interviewed 103 
Catholic metalworkers from firms within the jurisdiciton of the Säo Paulo Metalworkers' 
Union to see whether they had witnessed the events in Morumbi - be it on television or at 
the stadium itself - 87 answered that they had. However, when it came to the question of 
whether they knew that a metalworker had addressed the Pope, these figures dropped off 
considerably. Only 37 metalworkers out of 103 said they were aware of such a meeting. 
Clearly, for reasons which are similar to those mentioned in relation to the 50 Säo 
Bernardo do Campo metalworkers surveyed earlier (i. e., elapsed time and the relatively 
small numbers involved), data of this kind needs to be treated with some caution. 
Nonetheless, the data is useful in helping to question assumptions which are rarely tested. 
From the point of vie A of the Opposition the picture is much better than might at first 
appear. It is a fact common to much of Brazilian trade unionism that numbers voting in 
elections represent but a fraction of those in any particular category. 19 The crucial 
question, therefore, is not so much what the general levels of consciousness were, but 
whether those who voted either saw the Pope and/or were aware of the meeting of a 
metalworker with him. In my sample, 42 metalworkers out of 103 voted in the 1981 
elections (not an inconsiderable number in view of the fact that just under 43,000 
workers actually voted in the final round). Of the 42 voters questioned, 38 saw the 
Pope's speech, and 21 went on to affirm that they knew of the meeting between the Pope 
and a metalworker. This compares very favourably with the 59 metalworkers who did 
not vote, of whom only 16 were aware of such a meeting. It is impossible to say with any 
certainty whether such an elevated figure was due to the 1981 campaign itself, or to the 
fact that such a large proportion of voters had accompanied the visit. Nor is it of central 
concern. Far more relevant instead is the question of whether, once in possession of this 
information, this did indeed affect voting patterns. 
The answer appears to be that it did not make any difference whatsoever. When asked 
the question: 
Did the fact that one of the candidates of the Opposition, Waldemar Rossi, met the Pope in Morumbi 
and that his slate mentioned this in its campaign affect your vote in any way at all?, 
not one of the 21 respondents who was aware of a connection said that it had affected his 
162 
vote in any way at all. As for the other 21 who had voted but were not aware of a 
linkage, they were asked whether possession of this knowledge would have affected their 
vote. Three were "don't knows" and one person did not give a reply. The other 17 said 
that it would not have made any difference. In other words, nobody amongst the 42 
voters questioned said that the Opposition's tactic had or would have affected their vote. 
These results are interesting because they appear to strongly suggest that religious 
loyalties are not as transferable or electorally useful as is so often assumed. Frequently, 
particularly at governmental elections, it is asserted by observers that the Church holds 
enormous sway over the faithful, as if somehow a radical religious perspective will 
automatically lead to a radical political position and thereby deliver a vote. Indeed, it was 
based on hopes of this kind (although in this case by using a conservative religious figure 
to enhance the reputation of a radical) that the Opposition played its religious card. What 
these results indicate, however, is the highly mediated nature of Church influence. This is 
not to deny substantial ecclesiastical influence amongst grassroots activists. There is 
plenty of evidence to demonstrate extensive links between the two - be it in the party 
political sphere, the sphere of rural unionism, or, as is the case with this study, in the 
sphere of urban trade unionism. But it is to question the precise nature of those links and 
the influence of the Church over non-militant grassroots individuals. In effect, not even 
the Pope embracing the figure of Waldemar Rossi could help to get the latter elected; and 
Aurelio Peres, who neither made reference to nor had the support of Church sectors was' 
able to secure a quite respectable vote of 7,000 in the first round of voting. 
20 
One question which arises is whether this tactic backfired on the Opposition thereby 
assisting in Joaquinzäo's victory. In the course of interviewing, one respondent put it to 
me, for example, that "Religion and elections do not mix" and there is no doubt that the 
campaign of Joaquinzäo tried to exploit these sentiments by asserting that the followers 
of Rossi were - quite literally - committing a cardinal sin. Even close advisers to Dom 
Paulo have questioned the advisability of overt references to the Church within union 
campaigns and suggested that it might have played into the hands of Joaquinzäo. 
It may come as a surprise, therefore, to fmd that not one respondent suggested that he 
was negatively affected by the Opposition's tactics. Other matters were fierily to the 
fore. In the context of Säo Paulo's union ballot, and in sharp contrast to the Säo Bemardo 
strikes of 1978-80, the issue of religious involvement was largely viewed by the workers 
as an irrelevance. Neither the Opposition nor the union president's slate were able to 
change that fact and exploit religious feeling to their advantage either in this or future 
union elections. 
21 Innocence or guilt by association proved a failure. 
4.4 1979-1986: CUT versus CGT; the Polarisation of Brazilian Trade Unionism and the 
Reproduction of Religious Polarities in a New Trade Union Framework 
At the beginning of this chapter I indicated that the emergence of a new political and 
economic conjuncture both 
demanded and offered the possibility for the creation of new 
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instruments of union struggle. The necessity was not of itself new; as we shall see in a 
moment. Many of the inadequacies of Brazilian labour relations were inscribed in and 
dated back to the Labour Laws of 1943. The context of the early 1980's recession 
therefore merely served to provide yet one more graphic example of these structural 
inadequacies, i. e., labour's legislative and de facto weakness in relation to capital, 
thereby highlighting the need for change. What was qualitatively new, however, was the 
context of organised labour itself. 
With the massive strike waves of the late 1970's the labour movement had become 
immensely politicised. The very emergence of the Workers' Party -a party dedicated to 
the interests of the working classes - was but one manifestation of this process. Another 
was the profound re-examination of labour's structural inadequacies. 
Certainly, the events of the late 1970's alone did not provoke that re-examination. A 
look at the experiences of the factory commissions at Cobrasma and Contagem (in 
1968)22 together with the activities of the Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Opposition 
powerfully demonstrate that searching questions were being asked and alternatives put 
forward by workers themselves a long time before. What was new, however, was the 
quite unprecedented level of labour mobilisation - not just a few factories or a particular 
category, but millions of workers throughout the country. This major shift, and the 
widespread nature of the upsurge in political consciousness, turned the issue of 
developing labour organisations able to function at a national level into a real historical 
possibility for the first time in more than a deacade and a half. The events of the late 
1970's then were not so much the fuse as rather the explosion of long-standing 
grievances on a massive and enabling scale. 
The political and legal problems facing Brazilian trade unions were formidable, and 
what follows is a very schematic summary. 
23 Since 1943, the government of the day 
could (if chose to use its Ministry of Labour powers) so restrict a union's scope for 
action to the point where the strike weapon was rendered inoperable. A network of laws 
was established which, amongst other things, forced unions (a) to deposit all their monies 
in a government bank; (b) to receive income via the government rather than directly from 
members; and (c), to subject union expenditure to state scrutiny. 
The real and potentially crippling effects of these fiscal arrangements only become 
more evident when set alongside the range of other laws which establish the parameters 
of legitimate union conduct. These parameters are extremely strict. To exist, a union 
must receive recognition from the Ministry of labour. The basic unit of association is the 
municipality. Workers from a particular category are normally represented within this 
geographical area. Thus, in the case of the metalworkers of Greater Säo Paulo, for 
example, there is an artificially imposed division between the unions of Osasco, Säo 
Paulo, Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo, Sao Caetano. Guarulhos, etc. Once in existence there 
are a whole host of other restrictions to face. Unions cannot affiliate to international 
labour organisations; they cannot bargain directly with management but must do so via 
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the government - the so-called "dissidio coletivo", which frequently amounts to state 
imposed arbitration against the workers' interests; they cannot coordinate activities 
between different occupational groups, i. e., solidarity or secondary strikes are ruled out, 
as is the weapon of the general strike. Even coordination between unions of the same 
category is restricted since it is the state which decides upon when the annual round of 
wage negotiation will be phased. Taking the metalworkers of Greater Sao Paulo as an 
example, in practice that has meant that the metalworkers of the ABC region negotiate 
and, where necessary, conduct strike action; but they may only do so at a different time 
of year from their colleagues in the city of Sid Paulo. Solidarity action between the two 
groups is thereby ruled out. Finally, those elements of unity which the law does allow 
for, at regional, state and national levels, are confined to federations and confederations 
of workers belonging to the same branch of production; for example, the National 
Confederation of Industrial Workers (Confederacäo Nacional dos Trabalhadores na 
Indüstria, CNTI), the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (Confederal o 
Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura, CONTAG), and so on. In other words, no 
legal provision is made for cooperation between these confederations. 
The extensive provisions made by these laws, together with the military dictatorship's 
appetite for using them, saw to it that union bureacracies were largely purged of left- 
wing, and most especially Communist influence. Even with the emergence of a 
combative union movement in the late 1970's in such a strategically significant area as 
Säo Paulo's industrial heartland; and even with the ruptures which this caused, it 
remained clear to most participants that the odds were stacked decisively against them. 
Any attempt by a union to break with these laws, could, if the government of the day so 
chose, lead to the termination of funds, arrests, imprisonment, sequestration, and so on. 
Whilst the Catholic Church was a useful and important ally in those struggles, it was no 
substitute for major structural changes. Since external legal changes were unlikely from 
the government at that time (although that was one goal which the Workers' Party set out 
for itself), unions had to push for certain de facto changes in the same way that they had 
done in the period 1978-80. In other words, the only real option available was an internal 
restructuring of the movement which would more adequately respond to its own needs. 
It was precisely in this definition of Brazilian trade unionism's needs that the polarities 
so long present within the movement emerged with renewed vigour. Amongst those at 
the forefront of the debate and discussion were sectors linked to (a) the Sato Paulo 
Metalworkers' Opposition, (b) the union leadership of the Sao Paulo metalworkers, and 
(c) the combative unions of Säo Bemardo do Campo and Santo Andre - all three with 
their own distinctive approaches to the question. Essentially, these groups would quickly 
coalesce into two opposing camps; the first composed of currents (a) and (c), and the 
second headed by (b) - in what later became to be known as the Single Workers' 
Confederation (Central 
l nica dos Trabalhadores, CUT) and the General Workers' 
Confederation (Central Geral dos Trabalhadores. CGT) respectively. 
165 
Prior to this, all these forces had moved forward together in search of some form of 
national organisation that would assure the unity of the working classes. An intensive 
series of preparatory meetings involving literally thousands of activists were held at local 
and state levels. These culminated in 1981 with a national meeting to hammer out 
strategy, the first National Conference of the Working Classes (Conferencia Nacional das 
Classes Trabalhadoras, CONCLAT), which brought together more than 5,000 delegates 
from over 1,000 organisations. However, ideological divisions and incompatibilities 
quickly emerged. One group (of which the Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Union leadership 
was a part) favoured the postponement of the second CONCLAT (planned for 1982) 
under the argument that more preparation was necessary. The other camp (which 
included in its ranks the Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Opposition and the union leaders from 
Säo Bernardo do Campo) felt that there was no time to lose and that this was a 
rationalisation by what were, in fact, more conservative sectors of the labour movement. 
These divisions manifested themselves in a multiplicity of forms and on a number of 
issues. To add to the difficulties, these were cross-cut by a series of very complex party- 
political dynamics. For instance, there were fears on the parts of forces like the PCB, PC 
do B and MR8 that, in the words of the PCB's regional president in Rio de Janeiro: 
The CUT can transform itself into the läbour department of the PT, and by its underestimation of a 
policy of alliances, lead to the tendency of isolation, which is also one political line of the PT, and 
the underestimation of the democratic question. 
' 
For their part, sectors of the PT saw the manoeuvrings of these groups as part of a crude 
attempt to secure hegemony over a newly emergent labour movement. 
There was also a genuine conflict over what the attitude to the democratising process 
should be. The stagist conception of these clandestine parties, i. e., that first the bourgeois 
national-democratic revolution had to come only then to be followed by a socialist 
transformation, brought with it a policy of political alliances (principally via the Party of 
the Brazilian Democratic Movement, (Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro, 
PMDB)) in order to defeat the forces of the dictatorship's nominee, the Social 
Democratic Party (Partido Democratico Social, PDS). Any detraction from this goal, they 
thought, amounted to divisionism. As such, the very formation of the PT was divisionist; 
so too was the decision by some sectors, principally aligned to the PT, to push for a 
union confederation at the earliest possible opportunity. 
These sorts of conflicts were inlaid by more detailed controversies; for instance, over 
whether Joaquinzäo or Waldemar Rossi should be put on the National Commission for 
the formation of a national union confederation. Supporters of the former argued that he 
had a recent election and a union structure behind him and that this trade union criterion 
should be the basis of selection. Their detractors pointed to Rossi's long track-record of 
grassroots militancy and argued that this democratic orientation towards the bases should 
be a fundamental constituent of a future trade union confederation. Amongst other 
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things, they characterised the trade unionists from the former faction as: (a) class 
conciliatory, (b) too interested in occupying union machinery as the principal locus of 
power and to the detriment of grassroots activism, (c) unwilling to use the general strike 
weapon, (d) supportive of "pelegos" and reformists, and (e), unwilling to construct a 
union confederation via delegates - choosing instead to subject it to the control of 
cliques 25 
These divisions finally culminated with the formation of the CUT in August 1983 by 
the more radical sectors of the Brazilian labour movement. Only in January 1986 did the 
CGT formally bring itself into being and complete the circle of polarization. 
In view of the network of reciprocal relations established between radical Catholic 
militants and the more combative elements of Brazil's union movement, it is not 
surprising to find that radical Catholic militants polarised along similar lines to their 
secular counterparts, thus passing directly into the CUT as it would later emerge. 
The joking comment of Gilmar Carneiro (CUT's National General Secretary) that "we 
have a holy trinity here in Brazil which is the Church, the PT and the CUT"26 perhaps 
exaggerates the connections somewhat. But there is equally no doubt that an affinity in 
terms of ideas, and a considerable identity in terms of militancy, exists between this 
union confederation and radical sectors of the Church. As he also rightly points out, "It is 
a complementary and not a dependent relationship. "27 
As we shall see in a moment, this kind of relationship and attitude is almost wholly 
absent from the CGT for both historical and philosophical reasons. 28 Joaquinzäo, the 
organisation's first president, was much keener to emphasise the separation that exists 
between Church and workers struggles than his CUT counterparts, although they too 
make distinctions. Joaquinzäo's comment was that: 
I think that the CGT bases and forms itself on trade unionism and not at the door of the Church. 
2° 
Just to what extent the CUT might have formed itself "at the door of the Church" is a 
matter of debate since it very much depends upon the observer's conceptual starting 
points of which there are number of quite different but nevertheless complementary 
possibilities which need to be taken as a whole. 
If we take as our starting point the formation of the constituent components of the CUT 
(remembering that our focus is exclusively upon metalworkers from the region of 
Greater SSo Paulo), then it is evident that a very real connection exists. One segment 
from the Metalworkers' Opposition of Sao Paulo was directly composed of Catholic 
militants, whilst other, secular strands, are quick to acknowledge that they too quite 
literally had to use the Church as a logistical framework for articulating their stniggles. 
In this sense, therefore, it was not merely a question of forming oneself at the door of the 
Church, but actually in and through the Church. 
If we take the metalworkers of ABC, one of the most important groups inside the CUT, 
then once again it is plain that the success of their struggle was at the very least partially 
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contingent upon Church support. On several occasions, the leadership of Säo Bernardo 
actually had to form itself within the doors of a Church. In both the instances then, i. e., of 
Säo Paulo's Metalworkers' Opposition and the Säo Bernardo Metalworkers' Union, the 
power of these groups was partially underwritten, and to this extent articulated, via 
grassroots Catholic networks. The union of Joaquinzäo, on the other hand, neither 
needed nor desired such links. His contribution to the CGT (i. e., a union representing 
some 400,000 metalworkers) was made without reference to the Church - if anything, it 
was made in contradistinction to it. 
A second level of association concerns the extent to which the proposal to form a 
national workers' confederation was channeled through Catholic activist networks. In 
this case, what needs to be recognised at the outset is that the historical moment was a 
different one altogether. As we have already seen, the Church's contribution to many of 
the CUT's constituent organs was a formidable one indeed, but it took place primarily 
against the background of severe government repression, a repression that ranged from 
the banning of meetings to the torture, imprisonment, and even assasination of activists. 
Put simply, this was not the kind of context that would later be faced by the CUT during 
its formative years. On the contrary, activists were basically free to deliberate upon the 
formation of a national entity without- the hindrance of the state. Although technically 
speaking they were breaking the law, no moves - certainly not comparable to the 
treatment handed out to the metalworkers of ABC and the Opposition of Säo Paulo 
during the 1970's - were made against them. The State Meetings of the Working Class 
(Encontros Estaduais da Classe Trabalhadora, ENCLATs), CONCLATs, and finally 
plenary meetings which set up the CUT and CGT, took place openly. 
Another dimension to this historic change was the re-emergence of trade union and 
party-political identities with their own potent set of dynamics. A liberalising political 
climate facilitated the articulation of radical trade union, opposition, and party political 
discourses. These groups thereby increasingly found themselves able to develop their 
own cadres rather than being physically forced into the arms of the Church. Certainly, 
this did not in any way imply that progressive Catholic sectors abandoned their activities. 
On the contrary they continued to encourage their own followers to perceive the 
necessity of trade union activity. But it did mean that an alternative and unmediated 
discourse was simultaneously available for the articulation of resistance, and more 
particularly, of workers' struggles. 
With these changes in mind, one can now examine the issue of a Catholic contribution 
via activist networks. Although more qualified than during the 1970's, it is clear that the 
contribution was quite substantial. One progressive Catholic militant and a leader of the 
Rio de Janeiro Metalworkers' Union in 1988 put it thus: 
The majority of these people participated in meetings or seminars at a national level where they met 
other militants - be they of the north, east, or south, who acted in the CUT, in the union movement, in 
the pastoral movement, which gave a certain national vision of the Christian in the construction of 
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the CUT30. 
Another militant, Anisio Batista de Oliveira, from the Säo Paulo Metalworkers' 
Opposition, explained how apart from giving support towards national and regional 
initiatives like the CONCLATs and ENCLATs, Catholic militants also brought 
discussions concerning the importance of forming a CUT down to the grassroots. He 
personally put the question and defended the proposition of a national trade union 
confederation to worker meetings in his factory, also raising the question in his 
neighbourhood, where workers from various categories (including metalworkers and 
bank employees) met to discuss this and other issues 
31 
This localised form of cross-category reunion, where historically speaking the Church 
had been in a class of its own, represented an important contribution since the CUT was 
not only seeking to break out of single category legal constraints, but also hoping to do 
so by generating a truly active local membership rather than national alliances with a 
fictitious base. By contrast, even supporters of the CGT (at that time known as the 
National Coordination of the Working Class (Coordenagao Nacional da Classe 
Trabalhadora, also CONCLAT, and not to be confused with the National Conference of 
the Working Class) like Ivan Pinheiro, were willing to admit that the organisation tended 
towards "cliquishness", "immobilism", a "lack of combativity", and "an underestimation 
with respect to grassroots organisation". 
3- 
This brings us on to the question of whether radical Catholic sectors made, as it were, a 
specific ideological contribution to the formation of the CUT. 
Of the fact that a contribution was forthcoming there is no doubt. As to whether it was 
uniquely Catholic is another matter altogether. In an earlier chapter I discussed in detail a 
number of the defining features of radical Catholic militancy as opposed to other forms 
of militancy. There, we observered a basic characteristic, i. e., its dual theoretical and 
practical orientation to both the labour movement and the Catholic Church. One 
charactersitic which did not receive or merit such great attention at that point was the 
issue of its commitment to grass roots activism. This was for the simple reason that it is 
not a feature unique to Catholic militancy although it is very much a part of its make-up. 
Historically, other individuals and groups with a secular conception were perfectly 
willing and capable of developing grassroots discourses and practises. The Brazilian 
tradition of anarcho-syndicalism, for instance, is a very rich and long one which well 
preceded a widespread radical Catholic approach by several decades. And the more 
recent histories of Osasco's factory commission, Säo Paulo's Metalworkers' Opposition, 
and the metalworkers of ABC, similarly demonstrate that that spectrum of commitment 
to grassroots activism extended far beyond just Catholic circles, whether or not the latter 
initiated, acompanied, or joined in the struggles at a later date. 
With these important qualifications in mind, we can now address the issue of a 
Catholic contribution. Asked what he thought this might be, CUT's General Secretary 
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said that: 
I personally see militants who were trained by the Church as much more open, far less prejudiced 
than the militants of the organised left, a lot less. They are a group of people whose work is more 
oriented towards everybody than oriented towards the priority of strengthening their particular 
organisation; this is a very marked characteristic. 
33 
Although the use of the word prejudiced is emotive, it is, nevertheless, evident that a 
real difference between Catholic sectors and sectors of the organised left did exist - 
indeed, it was bound to do so, by definition. As was noted earlier, a fundamental 
characteristic of radical Catholic militancy, in contrast to more conservative neo- 
Christendom visions, was precisely its renunciation of narrowly defined private (in this 
particular case specifically Christian) - organisational aims within the labour movement. 
It is difficult, on the other hand, to see how any vanguardist party could possibly have 
embraced an approach of this kind, i. e., the renunciation of private organisational 
objectives, since that would have amounted to relinquishing its very identity. Of course, 
this could be done under temporary circumstances, as in fact happened with Trotskyist 
groups and others like the PCB, PC do B in the Sao Paulo Metalworkers' Opposition of 
the 1970's. But tensions did arise, with the some groups fording it particularly difficult to 
co-exist within the framework of a front of workers rather than as a front of tendencies 
negotiating with one another. From an organisational point of view, however, members 
of the Workers' Pastoral had no such difficulties or reservations. There was no 
incompatibility, if anything, quite the reverse. The Opposition was a natural extension of 
the pluralistic aspects of their philosophy. 
Whether this represented a virtue or a drawback is not the issue at present. It is 
generally accepted, for instance. that there is a certain lack of ideological coherence to 
Catholic sectors. Again, however, rather like the clandestine political parties, this 
difference is an inevitable one. It therefore needs to be judged on its own terms. That is 
to say, the Church is not in the business of equiping militants with a distinct ideological 
framework; it openly renounces this task. Thus, to say that it fails at a task which it never 
set out for itself is a meaningless form of comparison. To criticise the nature of that 
venture, i. e., the equiping of militants with a limited set of theoretical tools rather than a 
global framework of analysis, is another matter altogether and one that has begun to 
receive the attention of some leading Catholic scholars. 
34 
To recapitulate, then, there were certain inherent differences which made it easier for 
Catholic militants to engage in the construction of a CUT. To the extent that persons 
were not - and could not be - mandated to join this or that particular organisation. and 
Catholic organisations did not have a specific list of demands to extract from the union 
confederations before support would be forthcoming, the intra-organisational dynamic 
was attenuated. Catholic groups subordinated their identity to the interests of the broader 
projects in hand since individual rather than collective commitment continued to be the 
primary basis upon which association was decided and defined. 
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Whilst the principle of radical Catholicism's organisational openness is an important 
one - which can if necessary be made to stand on its own - it would be artificial to do so. 
Instead, it must be related to another major concern of the time, the question of 
grassroots activism. Put simply, it is very difficult to imagine that progressive Catholic 
activists could have gone any other way than with those forces ranged behind the 
formation of the 1983 CUT given their own and these other forces' solid commitment to 
an active and interventionist membership base. To this extent, a de facto collective 
identity did indeed assert itself. There is no question, for example, that a discussion was 
taken to the grassroots of the Church. As one former metalworker and member of the 
Youth Pastoral explained: 
I remember people comming to the community [CEB] and talking about CUT, and they called people 
to discuss the importance of a national confederation of unions, ... we had this discussion, and those 
unionised comrades who were leaders of the union movement and were inside the CUT effectively 
participated in the construction of CUT. 3S 
In other words, whilst the CEB was not made to vote on the issue, there was a high 
degree of unanimity amongst its membership over certain basic values, and a 
corresponding desire by Catholic union activists to activate these forces in a certain 
direction. An analysis of internal and publicly available Church documents reveals a very 
real bias on the part of these key activists. I 
A March 1986 letter to bishops signed by, amongst others, Dom Angelico Sandalo 
Bernardino, Dom Claudio Hummes, and Waldemar Rossi, for instance, included the 
following comments: 
Agreeing with the exclusion of the "CUT T-shirt", we underline the fact that the previous suggestion 
of placing it on "one of the arms of the cross" at the side of "the shirt stained with blood" is due not 
to mere ideological motivations, but yes, to the fact that to this Union Confederation (and not the 
others) of the workers' movement, identified with principles of the social doctrine of the Church (by 
way of example: trade union autonomy, the 1987 convention of the ILO), belong innumerable 
martyrised militants in this country; only last year more than 200 were victims. 
6 
These are particularly interesting comments because they illustrate (a) that a favourable 
attitude on the part of progressive Church sectors was held towards the CUT, (b) the 
belief in a certain identity between this union confederation and the social doctrine of the 
Church, and (c), the balance struck between the first two points and the general principle 
that the Church should not be ideologically motivated. The net result of all this was that 
an explicit reference to CUT via the T-shirt design was withdrawn. 
A recapitualation of this theme of the theologically rather than ideologically motivated 
nature of Church support and affinities comes in Dom Claudio's own speech to the 1983 
plenary of the CONCLAT (which went on to found the CUT). He said: 
It is one of the biggest advances of the last few years in Brazilian trade unionism. Everything that has 
been achieved in these last years in terms of trade unionism which is combative, of the base. 
democratic, and which defends the liberty and autonomy of unions, the participation of the very 
workers in their unions and in national life, is reunited here in the CONCLAT. They are things which 
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the Church has supported and defended, in the name of its own faith, of human rights. If we are here it 
is because we are happy. The Church is not here to direct, but to demonstrate its happiness and 
support 37 
When it came to the attitude of the Workers' Pastoral, there was equally little question 
as to where its real sympathies lay. A 1983 editorial in PO's National Bulletin made plain 
its view that the CONCLAT and subsequent formation of CUT were to be seen: 
as a step forward in the organisation, conscientisation and independence of trade unionism and of all 
the working class. ß 
This contrasts starkly with the analysis of some parties on the left that it was a divisive 
and damaging move. As for PO's own role in the proceedings, the editorial was also 
quite specfic: 
PO positions itself not as a mere observer of the facts, neither as a promoter of them. It places itself 
as a participant of a struggle which it assumes even more with everyday that passes. It does not take 
possession of this struggle, it does not take control, let alone dictate norms or obligations. It merely 
positions itself as a participant which serves and, as such, serving, helps, gives means, indicates 
avenues, guides. It is not a group or movement of people which turns itself into an entity with power 
and decision. It is, without doubt, a pastoral. Understood as on pasture, the road forwards, in search 
of sustenance, of rest, of protection for the flock. 
39 
In other words, whilst openly supporting the formation of the CUT (a position which was 
reaffirmed in its December 1983 National Assembly which urged members to "support 
the emergence of combative union leaderships" and "reinforce and strengthen the 
CUT"40) it too held back from any analysis that might be construed as a complete break 
with its pluralist organisational and ecclesiastical philosophy. In the last instance, it was 
for the individual member to decide his or her loyalties. This they overwhelmingly did in 
favour of the CUT. 
Of course, the question of whether these various propositions did in fact constitute a 
non-ideological stance is a very debatable one; but this is a theme which will be tackled 
in greater detail in Chapter Five (which discusses theology and ideology). What can be 
noted at this stage, however, is that the ability of progressive Church sectors to assume a 
quite specific trade union stance - without threatening internal fragmentation - was both 
contingent upon, and the natural outcome of, a dominant view held at that time, namely, 
that the CUT was a natural extension of their own struggles. Given that grassroots 
oriented union struggle was such a dominant charactersitic of radical Catholic activism, it 
was difficult to stop this from articulating and asserting itself at a national level during a 
time of rapid polarization. Under these historical conditions any theological misgivings 
were, for the most part, pushed to one side as members joined in the struggle. 
In spite of this, some readers may be surprised to find that there is considerable 
unanimity in both the outlooks and practice of the CUT and the CGT over one - perhaps 
the fundamental issue; the question of the de-secularisation of Brazil's labour movement. 
Indeed, this common outlook, i. e., an open and emphatic rejection of any Church 
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demands or encroachments upon union autonomy, even extends to radical Catholic 
militants themselves. Despite their clearly differing rhetorics and conceptual starting 
points, parties concerned appear in agreement over the need to preserve union 
independence from the Church, or any other external forces like political parties for that 
matter. 
4.5 The Rhetorics and Realities of Secular Unanimity - From CLAT to the Sao Paulo 
Metalworkers' Union Elections of 1984 
The philosophical basis of this unanimity is well illustrated by the attitudes of these 
groups to the formation of the Latin American Workers' Confederation (Central Latino- 
Americana de Trabalhadores, CLAT), which is basically the trade union arm of Christian 
Democracy throughout South America. 
Although this trade union confederation has links with Brazil dating back to the 
1950's, it has met with little success in spite of attempts in the late 1970's and early 
1980's by more conservative elements of the Latin American and Brazilian Catholic 
Church to revitalise it. Thus, it only embraces a handful of union leaders. It was against 
this background that I asked the president of the CUT, Jair Meneguelli, why he thought 
that a CLAT type proposal had been so firmly rejected by the overwhelming majority of 
Brazilian unions. His answer was as follows: 
I think that it was and must continue to be rejected because in Brazil I do not think that we should 
have a confederation of the PT, of the PDT, of the PMDB, or of the PSDB, in the same way that I do 
not think that we should have a confederation of Catholics, a confederation of protestants, a 
confederation of who knows what, Jehovas Witnesses. This is not the role of the Church. The Church 
must work with its faithful. It must educate its faithful so that they participate in the social 
movement, so there will be Christians in the CGT, in the CUT. Now it is widely known that CLAT 
had and still has the intention of making a Catholic confederation, i. e., which restricts or limits the 
participation of the workers, or identifies or labels the participation of the workers, and this we 
cannot agree with. 41 
Albeit in a different context Joaquinzao, president of the CGT, expressed almost 
identical pluralist and class defined sentiments. Indeed, his own trajectory and move 
away from the Workers' Circles movement in 1958 (which themselves enjoyed links 
with the CLAT) had partly come about because these were confusing the unions with the 
Church; in his view, there was a concerted attempt by Workers' Circles in Säo Paulo and 
other Brazilian states to "substitute the unions". He objected when they began to 
complain about working conditions and organise workers into cross-category groups: 
I believe that this was material that belonged to the unions to carry out and on this question I never 
confused things; Circle is Circle and union is union. 42 
On the more general question of class and pluralism versus an exclusivistic religious 
definition of worker loyalty he was equally forthright: 
I think that the clergy gains a greater space from the moment that it shares, not attempting to 
substitute itself for the union, but attempting to strengthen the unions and advising the Catholic 
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workers to a greater militancy, a more permanent one in their class organisations 
43 
CLAT's acceptance of Church/religious leadership thereby represented a deviation from 
this path. 
Significantly, by far the most explicit and forthright of all CLAT's critics are none 
other than radical Catholic militants themselves. This is all the more telling in view of the 
fact that the latter's practice was historically predicated upon a break with and the 
supersession of both the forms and contents of neo-Christendom. 
In an important move which entailed the production of a detailed and carefully worded 
eight page document (signed in February 1986), the executives of, amongst others, ACO, 
JOC, the Pastoral Land Commission (Comissäo da Pastoral da Terra, CPT) and the 
Workers' Pastoral Commission (Comissäo da Pastoral OperMria, CPO) made plain their 
strong reservations over CLAT's implantation in Brazil. Whilst defending the principle 
of CLAT's right to organise, they asserted their corresponding right to question its real 
motivations. Politically they noted the organisation's "anti-Marxism" together with its 
narrow and "reductionist" interpretation of the social doctrine of the Church, i. e., 
exclusively through the "eyes of Christian Democracy". Despite a superficial and 
beguiling radical rhetoric, this outlook left the organisation deaf to, or conspicuously 
silent about the failings of Christian Democracy in Latin America: 
In its practice, the CLAT appears more interested in the %bt against... Marxism and Communism in 
Latin America, than against the oppression of capitalism. 
Worse still, in their view, was the fact that: 
by setting itself up as the one and only legitimate representative of Christians (a sort of "trade union 
amt" of the Church in a vision of neo-Christendom the CLAT establishes a dangerous division 
between these active Christians - and between Christians and non-Christians - which signifies, in the 
last analysis, a grave danger for the advance of the workers' struggles. 45 
The proof of this, for example, was the attempt by sectors linked to the CLAT to 
approach: 
young unionists or trade union entities who still have not positioned themselves between the two 
large blocs extant within the trade union movement, the CUT and the CONCLAT. 46 
With regard to their own strategy, the authors emphasised that: 
as Christians, we do not wish to build parallel organisational entities (trade unions or parties of 
Christians) closed in upon themselves and competing in terms of power with other movements. Nor 
do we wish in the least to create socio-politico-cultural models that are exclusively ours. The 
political and historic models must be created inside the very struggle and together with our people. 
inside their organisations and not merely departing from principles. 47 
From all the above comments, be they from radical Catholics or leading figures in the 
CUT and CGT, it is evident that a widespread consensus exists over the need to make 
class the fundamental starting point of trade union organisation whilst simultaneously 
174 
making sure that this is not overlayed or defined by either party-political or religious' 
criteria. Even Dom Paulo was exceptionally forthright on this question: 
I am radically opposed to a Christian trade union. I believe that the word of the Gospel is that the 
Christian must be ferment, light and salt, this is the only solution for a pluralist world. Now if the 
Church wises to unite a group and defend it, it will always be a faction and will not reach the people, 
to the soul of the people. Thus I am opposed to Christian parties, to Christian trade unions. 
In view of this apparent unanimity over what is at first sight a fairly simple proposition, 
it is most ironic indeed that nobody - not even, at times, radical Catholic militants 
themselves - can agree as to what this really means; that is to say, the rhetoric of secular 
unanimity gives way to a conflictual reality, or more accurately, a conflictual practise. 
Rather than produce abstract typologies of how various groupings mediate the prinicple 
of secular integrity, it is perhaps easier to examine a concrete instance, in this case the 
Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Union elections of 1984. 
There are several reasons for choosing this in preference to other examples. Foremost 
amongst these is the fact that matters became so polarised that the standpoints of the 
various parties, and thereby their respective arguments, came out with greater clarity. 
Basic principles of how, why and when ecclesiastical intervention should or should not 
take place were laid bare. A second reason is that the Church hierarchy itself chose to 
intervene in an explicitly partisan manner -a very rare and therefore significant event. 
Thirdly, there is the fact that Catholic militants not only chose to intervene in a partisan 
fashion but - in a move which threw up very real theoretical dilemmas and represented a 
break with the practice of the recent past - they opted for an official collective line 
instead of the usual individual choice approach. Finally, there is the fact that the elections 
took upon themselves an added dimension, i. e., they represented a classic conflict, a 
division of forces along CUT-CONCLAT lines, with each camp throwing its weight 
behind one of the two leading candidates. 
It was this CUT-CONCLAT conflict which would set the political tone and framework 
for the 1984 Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Union elections. Only two slates ran; the first 
headed by Joaquinzao, and the second by Helio Bombardi, a worker at the Irlemp 
factory. The contest was very much a heavy-weight one. Ranged in the CUT camp were 
not only members of the Opposition slate itself, but also figures of considerable-national 
prestige like the veteran Communist leader, Luiz Carlos Prestes, the PT president and 
former Sao Bernado Metalworkers' Union leader, Lula, and now younger figures like 
Jair Meneguelli, elected president of the Säo Bemardo do Campo Metalworkers in 1981 
and later president of the 
CUT itself. The forces ranged behind Joaquinzäo included all 
those who had opted for the CONCLAT's cautious approach, i. e., the PCB, PC do B, 
MR8 and figures of the traditional right. Everybody from both camps recognised that 
securing the Säo Paulo 
Metalworkers' Union would represent an important tactical and 
psychological victory 
for whichever party won the day. Quite apart from the historical 
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significance of a change of leadership at this particular moment in time, there was the not 
insignificant matter of a wealthy union (with jurisdiction over 400,000 workers) to be 
gained by one or other camp. 
It was in this context that on February 26 1984 the Workers' Pastoral for the 
Archdiocese of Säo Paulo finally decided to give explicit support to the slate led by Helio 
Bombardi. It set out its motives for this historic decision in the following terms: 
- The Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Union, the largest in Latin America, has an enormous importance in 
the national conjuncture in socio-economic and political questions. Therefore, it is in the interests of 
the whole of the Brazilian working class that its leadership corresponds to the anxieties of the 
workers. 
- The current union leadership does not correspond to these anxieties, and Slate 1 which is competing 
for the leadership of the union represents the continuation of this situation.... 
- The union practice and proposal of Slate 2 represents the guarantee of a class-based unionism and 
the strengthening of the most combative pole of Brazilian trade unionism. 
It also represents the guarantee of the participation of the workers in the decisions and quesions 
which have to do with them. It is, therefore, a frontal and courageous combat against trade union 
peleguismo. 
- In view of this, the group of workers who form the Workers' Pastoral of the Archdiocese of Säo 
Paulo, in conformity with the Church's evangelical option for the workers, supports Slate 2... 
- Thus we ask all those who fight for justice to unite in support of Slate 2 in this historic moment for 
the metalworkers and for Brazilian trade unionism. 
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In what proved an equally if not more unusual step, the ecclesiastical hierarchy of Säo 
Paulo, with Dom Angelico as its spokesman, added its voice of support to the line 
adopted by the Workers' Pastoral. I am basing this direct linkage between Dom Angelico 
and the position of the hierarchy on an answer Dom Paulo gave me when I asked him 
what he thought of Dom Angelico having taken a personal decision to support Slate 2 in 
1984. Dom Paulo's immediate answer was as follows: 
I think that Dom Angelico never acts on his own behalf. He always acts in the name of all the 
bishops of Sao Paulo. and if there is a question of greater importance we the bishops meet and decide 
together. 
There is little doubt that this decision was of exceptional importance. The archbishop 
also added that although Slate 2 did not win, "it had a great deal of influence over the 
elections because it is not always a victory that indicates whether or not it was 
worthwhile "51 In other words, in the course of the interview Dom Paulo did not seek to 
distance himself from these actions of Dom Angelico but, on the contrary, viewed them 
positively. As for Dom Angelico himself, he made the position of the hierarchy crystal 
clear in the elections with the following comments. 
Normally, the Church does not enter into party-political and factional questions. This specific option 
is the job of militants in the day-to- day of life, and not for the Church as an entity. However, in 
determinate historical instances, certain movements and pastorals of the Church are led to adopt 
positions which we could call exceptional. That is what is happening now with the attitude of PO in 
the case of Slate 2. For innumerable reasons, we cannot accept the permanence of the current 
president of the Union of 
Metalworkers and his band, just as we cannot accept the continuity of the 
regime which took power 
in '64. The current president of the Sao Paulo Metalworkers' Union is a 
result of the military movement of 
'64.1 really mean it when I say that whoever is with Figueiredo, 
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with Maluf, should vote with Joaquinz7o. 
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Perhaps even more significant than the decision to take a stand, was the willingness of 
the Säo Paulo hierarchy to go beyond the usual Biblically and theologically couched 
discourse to reveal other strategic components as well. We can see this in an answer Dom 
Angelico gave to the question of what the consequences of a Slate 2 victory would be. 
He said: 
It would signify a push forward for combative and authentic trade unionism and a blow for 
"peleguismo". It would signify the strengthening of the bases and of a participatory trade unionism 
and not privileged minorities fortified by continuous power, well paid and surrounded by luxuries. 
Can you imagine what would happen with a victory of Slate 2- the union in common struggles of 
metalworkers unions from Sao Paulo, Säo Bernardo, Santo Andre, and Säo Jose dos Campos? 
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What concerns us is how and why the Church of Säo Paulo (militants and hierarchy 
alike) came to adopt these partisan positions at this particular moment in time. Why, for 
example, was there a sudden move away from the delicate division of labour which had 
been the hallmark and bedrock of previous intra-ecclesiastical relations, as well as 
relations between the Catholic Church and different sectors of the Brazilian labour 
movement; and was this shift away from a delicate balance achieved without conflict 
inside radical Catholic circles? 
Taking the last question first, it emerges that this shift in PO's position was achieved 
with relatively little conflict. This is perhaps rather unexpected in view of the seriousness 
of the move involved; but as Padre Fernando Altemeyer, a participant in and supporter of 
the February 26 decision explains, the reasons were not hard to find: 
There were more good guys and bad guys. The reality was not grey at that time. Perhaps we had not 
evolved enough in our formulations, we had greater ardour, we had come out of a very difficult 
situation, the dictatorship. Many young people in the trade union struggle were supporting [Slate 2] 
as were priests, seminarists, and student militants. It appeared very clear, 'we want to take the 
union'. ... 
Citicising Slate I was so easy due to its traditionally reactionary and reformist position. 
The Workers' Pastoral, almost in its totality, was [informally] suporting [Slate 2]; thus it was a very 
easy jump for the Workers' Pastoral to make from almost all supporting to officially supporting. 
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In other words, from a practical perspective, in the heat of the moment, it appeared a 
natural step. The key feature in this instance, rather like in the Diocese of Santo Andre in 
the late 1970's, was polarization. In the eyes of most militants it was a simple question of 
good versus evil. As Waldemar Rossi explains, the assembly of militants which 
discussed the question of support took the following majority view: 
saying that it is a difficult hour, that on the one hand we have a pro- capitalist/pro-exploiters bloc, 
and on the other hand we have a bloc that struggles against exploiters. So we do not have three or 
four camps, we have two that are defined. One negates evangelical values, the other applies 
evangelical values, so at this hour we do not have any choice. It is support. 
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Ironically, both Waldemar Rossi and Dom Angelico were against partisan support. In 
their view, the principle of individual sovereignty should remain sacrosanct, i. e., the 
Workers' Pastoral should educate, inform and assist, but not organise as a bloc. To some 
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extent, however, this kind of objection and possible source of conflict was circumvented 
by making it clear at the meeting that the assumption of a partisan line by PO would not 
preclude any of its militants from supporting or even running in other slates which did 
not receive that official support. Instead, a member of PO who did this would be unable 
to speak in the name of the organisation, but would be speaking and acting in a purely 
individual capacity. 56 
In view of the theological dilemmas and contradictions thrown up by this episode, it is 
remarkable just how forthright the Church was in its support for the line adopted by PO. 
Two factors appear to have weighed heavily in this decision. One was the Church's own 
appraisal of the problems at hand, which to a large extent coincided with PO's own 
analysis. As Dom Angelico explains: 
in that concrete situation, the historical conjuncture led one to give some support, it was truly a 
serious struggle, for a value of unionism truly committed to the grassroots, not cliquish. I do not want 
to slander other comrades, no, but we had, as we have, a work of the grassroots, respecting the 
grassroots. So given these principles, which could advance still further with the conquest of the 
union, which was in the hands of inveterate "pelegos" who played with the working class in their 
own interests, I felt that in that conjuncture I could support [Slate 2]. 57 
What appears to have weighed even more heavily, indeed decisively, were the internal 
politics of the Church, or more accurätely, ties of solidarity, rather than its external 
evaluations. Despite Dom Angelico's reservations over the taking of a partisan line by 
PO, he felt an overriding necessity to remain faithful to the militants. This was in spite of 
the fact that he was an independent actor - indeed one of the most powerful - and could, 
therefore, have chosen to have maintained a sort of relative autonomy. In no way was he 
bound by the decisions of PO's special conference. 
Asked why he went beyond what was technically necessary by offering explicit rather 
than tacit support for a line with which he personally disagreed, Dom Angelico answered 
in the following ten ns: 
I and the Workers' Pastoral, especially at that time, felt that my presence, as one of them, was to be 
with them. Whilst clear that fundamentally with the Workers' Pastoral who acts is the worker, I 
believed that it was not coherent with my beliefs simply at a moment like this to say - 'No'. No, 'you 
went, I am going with you'. this was the gesture, and knowing that on that occasion I was pledging 
my authority also as a pastor, as a bishop of the Church, I felt that it was really what had to be done. 
And if today I were to be in those circumstances I would do the same thing. with tranquility. 58 
In other words, at what was a decisive moment for the Workers' Pastoral and for the 
wider trade union movement, Dom Angelico made the conscious decision of adhering to 
PO's wishes (reached after extensive internal consultations and a democratic vote) rather 
than distancing the hierarchy from the result. In the words of Waldemar Rossi, he 
thereby "guaranteed unity" . 
59 By so doing, the bishop also gave a powerful 
demonstration of how PO could influence the policy undertaken by the Säo Paulo 
hierarchy itself, as well as the high esteem in which the bishops held the organisation. 
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What principle conclusions can be drawn from this highly unusual episode? One is that 
with Dom Angelico as the bishops' nominee for workers' affairs, and with Dom Paulo's 
strong backing, relations between militants and hierarchy could approach the organicity 
desired by militants who originally entered PO. In other words, there was real substance 
to the notion that not only should there be a reciprocal interplay between Catholic 
militancy and the labour movement, but also a reciprocity between hierarchy and 
Catholic militancy. On this particular occasion it proved of decisive importance to the 
conduct of the hierarchy. 
A second conclusion is that the mediation of gospel principles, in this particular case 
their forging into a radical Catholic practice, is an inherently conflictual and 
contradictory exercise, whether it is inside any given group or amongst competing 
groups. Quite simply, there are vast grey areas. Rather like an unwritýen constitution, the 
guidelines which orient the precedence that should be accorded to particular aspects of 
the Catholic faith are, in the last analysis, unavaliable (this is notwithstanding Catholic 
social teaching which, if anything, complicates the picture further because its own status 
is far from sacrosanct or immutable). Instead, the creation of an interlocking reality or 
hierarchy of principles is dependent upon human practice and interpretation for its 
concretisation. Hence that structured and contradictory whole is in a process of constant 
flux. 
It is in this way that for the majority of PO's militants in 1984 the choice became one 
of a camp which put evangelical principles into action and another which negated these 
values. This polarised characteristic overrode traditional reservations about 
official/collective partisan statements (although an attempt was made to address the latter 
issue by permitting individual choice). On the other hand, other situations could, and 
historically did, see a precedence accorded to the latter aspect (for example the 1978 Säo 
Paulo Metalworkers' Union elections). 
It is important to note that to the extent that each instance involved a real choice that 
was (a), mediated by individuals and (b), taken under the specific conditions of the day, 
then there was was nothing inevitable, self-evident or self-regulating about the outcome. 
There existed a sort of open contingency, a contingency of possibilities. Simultaneously, 
however, there also existed certain very clear constraints which critically governed the 
latitude of those decisions. A sort of closed contingency. In particular, there was the 
existence of a structured theological and ideological approach -a series of givens - which 
placed factors like class combativity, an emphasis on grassroots autonomy and 
sovereignty, and so forth, high up on the agenda of Catholic labour militancy. This 
effectively precluded an alliance of progressive Catholic forces with what they openly 
regarded as the "pelego" forces supporting Joaquinzäo. It also rendered the construction 
of the CUT a top priority. In this context, the issue of whether that construction should 
take place on an individual or official/collective basis became of secondary importance. 
The principle of collective non-partisanship was not abandoned but, in response to the 
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particular correlation of forces at the time, it was subordinated to other objectives that 
were widely perceived as overriding. 
We can now return to the question posed a little earlier concerning the rhetoric of 
secular unanimity versus its conflictual realisation. The mystery which originally 
surrounded this issue is now shown to be nothing of the sort. Like other basic principles, 
that of the secular integrity of labour is subject to permanent qualification in its practice 
and, one might add, largely in accordance with the interests of various groupings. 
Therefore if these groupings are in conflict with one another, then it is hardly surprising 
to find that the ways in which they mediate these principles are frequently - although 
certainly not invariably60 - also found to be at variance with one another. Thus, whilst 
everybody is agreed that the unions should not become the tool of the Church, it is quite 
another matter when the Church offers them support, since this is not considered the 
same thing as penetration or subordination. 
For this reason, Jair Meneguelli. Vicentinho, Anisio Batista de Oliveira, the majority of 
PO militants, and the majority of Opposition militants whom I interviewed, agreed with 
PO's and Dom Angelico's decision. They did not feel that the secular integrity of the 
labour movement was violated by the Church's decision. And indeed, objectively 
speaking - from their point of view - it was not undermined since they did not tailor their 
actions to suit the needs or criteria of the Church. However, seen from the point of view 
of Joaquinzäo and his followers it w,. s - both subjectively and objectively speaking -a 
violation of their secular integrity since their slate was not free to conduct matters as it 
saw fit without the interference of the Church. As for the Church, its stance represented 
yet one more manifestation of the perennial problem of how to mediate the religious and 
the theological with the secular and the profane. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen the complexity, contradictoriness and multi- 
dimensionality of the processes involved in the restructuring of relations between the 
Catholic Church and the urban trade union movement during the late 1970's and mid 
1980's. In national terms these above all involved a decline in the Church's functions as 
the primary broker of resistance. That is to say, to the extent that the labour movement 
increasingly found itself capable of articulating its own struggles through autonomous 
structures, the Church correspondingly abandoned these functions. Dependency - the 
necessary outcome of a highly restricted room for manoeuvre on the part of left-oriented 
trade union forces - was progressively exchanged for a relationship of complementarity. 
However, what confuses the picture somewhat is the fact that the boundaries between 
the articulation of affinities and open support are not always so clear cut - neither to the 
participants themselves nor to those whom they criticise. Viewed from the perspective of 
Joaquinzäo (firstly as president of the Sao Paulo Metalworkers' Union and later as 
president of the CGT) the 
difference was really one of semantics since the net result in all 
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cases was opposition to his rule. Whether this opposition came with the public or private 
blessing of the Church, whether or not it violated the delicate internal codes of radical 
Catholics, was of secondary importance. By any other name it was opposition and 
thereby constituted an unwarrented interference on the part of the progressive Church. 
For radical Catholic sectors, on the other hand, there were real differences, dilemmas and 
balances to be struck. In essence there was a conflict between their genuinely held desire 
to maintain the non-partisan characteristics of Catholic militancy, and simultaneously 
make these desires adequate and responsive to their own partisan trade union militancy. 
The tools for bridging this gap changed over time and were bound to do so precisely 
because the existence of radical Catholic militancy had always been predicated upon its 
insertion in the profane. This linkage was conceived as a fundamental constituent 
element of its identity, i. e.. militants were not dealing with abstract theorizations of 
Catholic doctrine. Instead, they were deliberately setting out to apply those principles 
from an historical perspective. In the last instance, then, both the precise weight ascribed 
to Catholic doctrine and the form of its practise was and (as we shall see in the following 
chapter) is negotiable. 
All this does not mean that Catholic ideals were abandoned. On the contrary, they were 
the basic points of departure and of return, but their theoretical and practical weight was 
constantly qualified. That is why, for example, in 1978 the concept of non-partisanship 
remained intact. It was felt at the time that individual militancy (e. g., through the 
leadership of Anisio Batista de Oliveira and Santos Dias da Silva in the Opposition slate 
and the infrastructural support of the Church) not only was an inherently fine principle, 
but was also compatible with the challenges of the day. By 1984, however, the Workers' 
Pastoral reached the conclusion that a non-collective stance would be inadequate for the 
tasks at hand. It does not matter whether this was a correct evaluation. The main point 
that needs to be emphasised is that an incompatibility had arisen. Or, put another way, 
the distance between the pluralistic and the partisan positions was reduced as electoral 
polarities increased. With the latter came a corresponding increase in the stategic weight 
of a collective partisan stance amongst Catholic circles, such that it finally became, in the 
words of Padre Altemeyer, "a very easy jump. " Indeed, it is by the same historically 
defined token that in 1987, when conditions had reverted to several slates contesting the 
Sao Paulo Metalworkers' Union elections, the Church and the Workers' Pastoral did not 
take an official stance. The ideal of non-partisanship was thereby reasserted in practice. 
Given this framework of analysis there is nothing contradictory in the assertion made 
by the majority of militants with whom I spoke (as well as Dom Angelico himself) that 
were the conditions of 1984 to repeat themselves they would again assume a similar 
stance without any hesitation whatsoever. 
If one tries to sum up what for both the progressive institutional Church and Catholic 
militants would constitute the 
ideal relationship between themselves and the trade union 
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movement, then we actually have an example. This is the relationship between the CUT 
and radical Catholicism. There is a relationship of complementarity between the two. 
Over a period of time that complementarity has been expressed in a number of ways, for 
example, in terms of similar strategic objectives and forms of conduct; a coincidence of 
personnel (which from the point of view of the progressive Church entails a virtual bloc 
transfer of its followers into the CUT as opposed to the CGT); a deliberate opening out 
of Church structures to the project of a union confederation prior to 1983, and so on. At 
times their affinity has even spilt over into open ecclesiastical declarations of support for 
the CUT. If we regard the CLAT as the trade union arm of Christian Democracy, then 
the CUT can legitimately be regarded as the autonomous secular expression of many of 
the ideals which progressive Catholicism also holds most dear. 
Whilst Dom Paulo and Jair Meneguelli's calls for the Church to open itself out to both 
the CUT and the CGT is a valid concept from those ecclesiastical and trade union points 
of view which stress plurality as against factionalism and reductionism on either side; in 
point of fact, this notion that there could ever be an ideal relationship between the 
Church and the union movement as a whole is bound to remain a fiction - at the very 
least, for as long as that movement remains divided. The call is made for pluralism, but it 
is a decidedly hollow even if honest one. 
In the following chapter this problem will be taken one stage further by looking at how 
the Church attempts to come to grips with the problem of class. Unlike the trade unions, 
which are traditionally constituted along class lines, the Church must attempt to reconcile 
its universalist discourse with a reality which is anything but ideally constituted. As we 
shall see, for sectors of the progressive Church in particular, that dilemma is most acute. 
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Notes 
1 By this I mean that not only was the economic situation unfavourable to the structuring 
and maintainance of any - let alone new - forms of trade union power, but also that the 
government and military exercised a powerful role in defining the rules and regulations 
of the political opening precisely with the aim of hampering the opposition groups' 
capacity to mobilise in mind. See, for example, Maria Helena Moreira Alves' chapter on 
"The 'Abertura' Period" in State and Opposition in Military Brazil., Texas the University 
Press, Texas, 1985, pp. 173-251. 
2 The amount of literature on the Workers' Party (PT) and the Catholic Church, 
especially the observed natural affinity between CEBs and the PT's structure, method of 
conduct, and political proposals, is copious if not always analytically rigorous. This 
theme is regularly updated at every major election, of which the 1989 presidential 
election was no exception. See also Antonio Ricardo Knippel Galleta's Pastoral Popular 
e Politica Partidaria no Brazil (Masters Thesis, Universidade Metodista de Piracicaba, 
Säo Paulo, 1985), which is one of the most useful detailed treatments of the relationship 
between the PT and radical Catholicism on a nationwide basis at the time of the 1982 
gubernatorial and municipal elections. See also Margaret Elizabeth Keck, From 
Movement to Politics: The Formation of the Workers' Party in Brazil., Doctoral Thesis, 
Columbia University, 1986, especially pp 134-140, "The Church and Popular 
Movements". See also Luiz Alberto Gomez de Souza, "A Politica Partidaria nas CEBs", 
Revista Eclesiastica Brasileira., Volume 41, Fase. 164, December 1981, pp. 708-727, 
which provides a careful analysis in some detail of the question of links between political 
parties and the CEBs. For the official Church view, see also Confereencia National dos 
Bsipos Brasileiros, "As Comunidades de Base no Brasil", Documento da CNBB., No. 25, 
Edicoes Paulinas, Slo Paulo, 1982, which warns against the ideologisation of the CEBs, 
the reductionism that can happen, and the necessity of making CEBs a cross-class 
phenomenon. 
3 An article in the Folha de Scfo Paulo noted that at the mass meeting which opted to go 
out on strike (a) "the meeting was effectively led by the representatives of the sectoral 
commands - North, South, East, West, and Ipiranga - into which the city was divided [by 
the Opposition]. "; (b) that "harsh criticisms and accusations were made against the union 
leadership, remembering in particular the acceptance of the accord after three days of 
general strike in the previous year, considered by the Opposition as a betrayal of the 
category. "; and (c) that "Joaquim [Joaquinzäo] practically only spoke after the strike was 
approved. " ("Os metalurgicos em greve", Folha de Säo Paulo., reprinted in Sindicato dos 
Metalürgicos de Säo Bemardo do Campo e Diadema, Suplemento Informativo da 
Tribuna Metalurgica., October 29,1979, p. 1. ) During the strike too, there were constant 
conflicts symbolised by the difference between the General Strike Command's [in effect 
the Opposition's] own assessment of the numbers of workers on strike, and the official 
union's estimate which invariably was considerably lower. On this question of divisions 
between the strategy and analysis of the Opposition and leadership of the Säo Paulo 
Metalworkers' Union, see especially editions of the Suplemento Informativo da Tribuna 
Metalurgica., October 29 to November 12,1979. 
4 Quoted from "D. Ivo: 'a Igreja so quer paz"', 0 Säo Paulo., November 9-15,1979, p. 1. 
5 Quoted from Ibid., loc. cit. 
6 Author's interview with Dom Angelico Sändalo Bernardino, 26/10/88. 
7 Author's interview with Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns, 26/01/89. 
8 Quoted from "Nao estä certo", Tempo e Presenca., No. 155, November 1979, p. 6. 
9 Author's interview with Dom Angelico Sändalo Bernardino, 26/10/88. 
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10 Author's interview with Professor Ana Flora, 1417/88. 
11 For a brief but very useful summing up of these positions in the late 1970's and early 
1980's see Heloisa de Souza Martins, "Da Uniäo a Divisäo: A Eleici o dos Metalürgicos 
de Sao Paulo" in Centro Ecumanico de DocumentaciXo e Infonnaräo, '"Trabalhadores 
Urbanos no Brasil: 1981 ", Aconteceu Especial No. 11., CEDI, Sao Paulo, July 1982, pp. 
20-21. In the article Martins makes clear that both sides progressively moderated their 
original positions: "Those who stayed in the Congress and had in the Factory 
Commission their ideological banner, gradually perceived in practice the gains, 
limitations and difficulties of the Factory Commissions. Especially beginning with the 
struggles of the unionists in Säo Bernardothey could perceive the possibility of action 
within the "fettered union". And those whom they in turn called "basistas" also came to 
review their positions, moderating their criticism of what they believed to be parallel 
unionism. " (Ibid., p. 21. ) 
12 Peres was a figure increasingly close to the Communist Party of Brazil. Many 
militants with whom I spoke regarded his actions as emanating from and primarily 
responsible to that party rather than the Opposition, which had chosen to constitute itself 
as a front of workers and not tendencies. On certain occasions Peres would agree with a 
particular position but his party would then change its line and Peres with it. In large 
part, then, the conflict over the 1981 elections emerged from the desire of those forces 
backing him to negotiate certain guarantees and a presence for themselves in the slate. 
Their detractors, the vast majority, were simply not willing to give guarantees of this 
kind. 
13 He commented that at the time Dom Mauro Morelli (bishop responsible for Sgo 
Paulo's southern zone) was most preoccupied that the Movemen Against the Cost of 
Living should not be instrumentalised by the Communist Party of Brazil. (Source: author 
interview with Aurelio Peres, 7/8/89. ) 
14 In one of its bulletins the Opposition captioned Dom Angelico in the following 
manner: "Dom Angelico, Bishop of the Workers' Pastoral, gives his support". The 
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that "Supporting his candidacy to the Metalworkers' Union for Slate 2 is a joy for all 
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Pope was considered of relevance in part because, according to the survey, some 70 per 
cent of workers had not, at that stage, decided upon which slate to support. (Source: 
Oposicao Sindical Metalurgica de Sao Paulo, "ExperiEncia da Zona Leste", mimeo, 1981. 
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60 The variability arises from the fact that conflicts can arise within organisations as to 
what constitutes their own "objective" interests. In other words, the objective is 
subjectively mediated. Taking the dominant view within the Opposition during 1981 
elections, this was that ecclesiastical support would indeed contribute to their success. 
But one source close to Dom Paulo and Dom Angelico suggested that "you may regard 
the support of Dom Angelico for Slate 2 [led by Waldemar Rossi] as excellent, but Slate 
2 lost because it had this support, and because it was people of the Church that led this 
slate. If it had not been so, they probably would have won the election. ... It needed 
someone much more linked to the metalworkers generally. " (Author's interview with 
Professor Ana Flora, 14/7/88. ) As we saw earlier, my survey indicated that this view is. 
at the very least, debatable. What is important here, however, is that the objective 
electoral terrain is subject to differing interpretations as to precisely what constitute its 
politico-religious dynamics. There is the second difficulty that even if one is able to 
assume that there is unanimity as to what these dynamics are, there still remain the 
problems of what constitute the objective interests of the group. Frei Betto, for instance 
took a critical view of PO's 1984 decision to support the Metalworkers' Opposition, 
saying that "I believe that we cannot compromise the name of the Church, the credibility 
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of the Church, and the pastoral sense of our work by identifying ourselves with a dispute 
with a partisan character of one slate against another to the extent that the two slates 
which emerge and are clearly representative. " (Author's interview with Frei Betto, 
18/8/88. ) Betto himself was willing to admit that "If it was a bosses slate then that is 
another matter. " (Ibid. ) Thus, given that objective interests may be conceptualised in the 
short, medium and longer term, there is nothing unusual in the fact that conflict may arise 
within a group sharing the same basic interests. 
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Chapter Five: The Theology and Ideology of Class - An Uneasy Compromise 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine some manifestations and causes of intra-ecclesiastical 
conflicts regarding the question of class - more specifically, the question of what stance 
the Church should take and how it should orient its faithful in relation to the issue of 
class conflict. 
Once again, Sao Paulo provides one of the best examples for analysing this type of 
question. Not only is the local Church's history one of a marked orientation towards 
workers' issues in both documentary and practical forms, but there is also the added 
dimension of the current Pope's own keen interest in this particlar geographical region 
and issue -a fact which makes it of more universal significance. 
Evidence of this interest comes in various forms including: (1) John Paul 11's visit to 
Sao Paulo's Morumbi stadium in 1980 where, amongst other things, his discourse made 
explicit reference to the issue of class struggle; (2) the request of the Vatican that Dom 
Claudio should account for his and the Church's actions during the 1980 metalworkers' 
strike; (3) the "ad limina" visit made by bishops of the Säo Paulo region to the Pope in 
January 1986. On this occasion he took the opportunity to lecture them on "the great 
deviations that certain 'theologies of liberation', bring with them". 1 (4) The sequel to this 
meeting, John Paul's written reply to the bishops in April 1986, where once again the 
question of Liberation Theology was raised; and finally (5), the break-up of the 
Archdiocese of Säo Paulo in early 1989 -a break-up that was opposed by the local 
Church and which involved the transfer of Dom Angelico Sändalo Bernardino (the 
archdiocese's most outspoken member of the hierarchy on workers' issues) out of the 
area. 
From the point of view of this study, what is most significant about the Pope's attitude 
is that it was and continues to be at variance with the outlook of many Säo Paulo bishops. 
Indeed, it is at variance with a large swathe of ecclesiastical opinion throughout Brazil, a 
divergence which came to a head with the silencing of the liberation theologian Leonardo 
Boff. 
At a brief glance many of these conflicts are not apparent, at least if one takes rhetoric 
as the basis for judging the extent to which they exist. This is partly attributable to the 
Church's long-standing tendency - shared, one might add, by the vast majority of 
conservative and progressive bishops alike - to conceal conflict behind closed 
doors. 
There is, therefore, an absence of available material. Even when intra-ecclesiastical 
debates do enter the public domain there still remains the distinct tendency - again, 
shared by bishops of both conservative and progressive persuasion - towards the 
presentation of the issues through a highly refined diplomatic discourse which has the 
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ultimate aim of preserving a united front. Thus, ` what to the outsider may pass as conflict 
is frequently presented by ecclesiastical circles as nothing of the sort - witness, for 
example, the constant attempts by progressive bishops and the CNBB itself to argue that 
their actions are perfectly in accord with those of the present Pope even when common 
sense indicates otherwise. Similarly, common sense would also suggest that there is a 
certain divergence or discontinuity between theory and practice when on the one hand 
the Pope silences Leonardo Boff, as he did in 1985, and then a year later publicly 
declares that: , 
the Theology of liberation is not only opportune but is useful and necessary 2. 
It is important to emphasise that this tendency to present a united front is more than just 
mere rhetoric or the obfuscation of serious difficulties, although there is plenty of that. 
The phraseology of collegiality, loyalty, and communion between the various echelons of 
the Church possesses a substantive as well as purely formalistic or superficial 
significance in a way that is quite distinct from, say, a political party. These notions 
represent far more than just democratic principles or part of a democratic discourse. They 
primarily belong to a multi-, rather than uni-dimensional universe. That is to say, they are 
held to be an integral part of a divinely ordained scheme of things, a specifically Catholic 
vision of things. 
To this extent it must be recalled that whilst cut across by class divisions which 
decisively mark it, the Catholic Church possesses an additional series of dynamics which 
are specific to it. Inevitably, therefore, certain aspects of conflict are mediated in forms 
which are unique. If one takes the case of Leonardo Boff by way of example, 
3 there we 
can see that the Vatican was not adverse to using the range of instruments at its disposal 
in order to ensure silence. At the same time, however, it is evident that Boff himself was 
willing to accept - or more accurately, to submit to - papal authority, and in so doing 
reaffum his loyalty to the mother Church. An act of this kind can only be partially rather 
than fully understood in terms of a framework of class or power, since it also took place 
in the light of other related, i. e., theological assumptions, like that of papal infallibility, 
which are inexplicable solely in terms of a purely rational framework. The doctrine of 
loyalty and obedience to the higher authority of the Church forms part of Catholic faith 
as presently constituted. (Naturally, this in no way detracts from the fact that such 
doctrines can and, indeed, do constitute powerful instruments for controlling public 
opinion and dissent in the Church. ) 
For a combination of theological and political reasons, then, conflict between parties 
inside the Church is an immensely problematical issue. In essence, inside the institutional 
Church there exists an ideology of consensus. By this I mean that there is widespread 
acceptance of (a) the inherent virtues of both certain hierarchical structures; and (b), 
largely as a consequence of this, non-conflictive modes of conduct. Quite simply, the 
ideology of democratic contestation, and its corollary, the practice of democratic 
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contestation, do not constitute a part of Roman-Catholicism's institutionalised 
ideological universe or make-up. 
In sharp contrast to civil society for which, ironically, Roman Catholicism extols the 
virtues of democracy, the Church possesses its own strict notions of hierarchy and 
subordination which are most potently expressed in the quasi-divine figure of the Pope. 
Were one dealing with a democratically constituted organisation, such contradictions 
would be unworkable, or at the very least, more openly questioned than they actually are. 
But in the Church such difficulties are largely avoided precisely because undemocratic 
practices are forcefully underpinned by notions of divine sanction. In other words, unlike 
most other social organisations and hierarchies, ecclesiastical hierarchy possesses its own 
natural/other-worldly verticality rather than a verticality which is of this world; Roman 
Catholic ecclesiology possesses a pyramidal structure of authority with the Pope at its 
peak and the lower orders (the laity) at the base. Thereby, in the last instance, it becomes 
unchallengeable by non-religious criteria whether excercised from within its ranks or 
from without. 
Perhaps the most graphic recent instance of this constant blurring of the divine with 
institutional powers involved the Fransican Leonardo Boff. In an article written well 
before his enforced silence, the theologian cited a phrase from his own book Church 
Charisma and Power. 
'The issue at stake is not the legitimacy of the authority in the Church; it exists and is desired by 
God; what is questioned is the exclusionary historical form of its organisation. ' 
It is precisely here where the real question lies. ... The forms with which this power was excercised 
and organised varied historically. 4 
In effect, what Boff was seeking to do was to make a conceptual separation between the 
divine and the historical. This was rich in irony since conservative critics usually accuse 
liberation theologians of conflating the divine with the historical or material. Boff's real 
"error" was to separate the institutional from the divine, and it was this which ultimately 
led to his being silenced. 
It was exactly this quality of divinely ordained and strict subordination, an 
unquestionable subordination, which for centuries made the Catholic Church such a 
powerful bulwark of feudal society and ideology. That power no longer exists in society 
at large. Indeed, in the case of Brazil, the Catholic Church has taken upon itself the task 
of questioning the status quo rather than slavishly supporting it. Within the Church, 
however, it is still difficult to question these issues closely since such examination risks 
bringing into question key aspects of the whole edifice as presently constituted. In spite 
of Boff's careful theological lines of argumentation in his book Church, Charisma and 
Power, these ultimately proved too much for the Vatican to take. 
Whilst, then, genuinely far-reaching changes of a decentralising nature are taking place 
in the sphere of lay-ecclesiastical relations (for instance the mushrooming of CEBs and 
the moves towards increasingly participative pastoral organisations), most of the 
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theological fundamentals remain in place, especially as these affect intra-ecclesiastical 
organisation and conduct. The fact is that even when progressive bishops like Dom 
Paulo, Dom Ang6lico or Dom Claudio speak out, they do so as members of an 
immensely conservative institution; a point reinforced by the fact that they speak with a 
special or superior authority which no lay person (or priest, for that matter), can be said 
to possess. However democratising they may be as individuals, they form part of a 
particular institutional - and in the sense described above - undemocratic framework 
which not only continually constrain -I them, but to which, paradoxically, they also 
continually reaffirm their unfailing commitment. As we shall see, the balance found is 
frequently an uneasy one. 
None of the above should in any way be taken to imply that the Catholic Church is 
somehow devoid of or removed from conflictual processes. Quite the contrary. Upon 
closer examination it quickly becomes evident that controversy is not infrequent nor 
contestation unknown. That this is not always apparent in terms of public declarations 
principally stems from the fact that the Holy See, bishops, priests, and even lay Catholics 
themselves (albeit to a much lesser extent), are for the most part at pains to avoid open 
polarizations and juxtapositions. As indicated already, the language aims at a form of 
universality. Nevertheless, conflict is evident in terms of the simultaneity and above all 
incompatibility on a practical level, of the various global discourses realised. By way of 
an example one may cite the Vatican's increasing stress upon faith as opposed to politics; 
theology as opposed to ideology; and the sacred or spiritual as opposed to the profane. It 
feels that it has to redress the balance. 
Of course, the discourse it employs is far more refined than a crude juxtaposition of the 
sacred to the profane: witness the Pope's comments on Liberation Theology above. But 
periodically, as in the case of Leonardo Boff; as in the case of the break up of the 
Archdiocese of Säo Paulo and the removal of Dom Angelico; as in the case of Waldemar 
Rossi's speech in the Morumbi stadium (see below); or in the assertion of papal authority 
over the Sao Paulo bishops, the lines of power and the ideologies of contestation become 
more readily discernible. In short, the theory gives way to a practice which removes the 
ambiguities. 
Similarly, whilst those currents associated with Liberation Theology may use a non- 
specific or universalistic institutional discourse (witness, for example, Dom Cläudio's 
unwillingness to discuss the issue of divisions within his own diocese), they too feel the 
need to redress the balance - only this time in favour of a Catholicism which is firmly 
committed to a preferential option for the poor. Furthermore, just as the rhetoric of their 
conservative colleagues gives way to a specific, i. e., partisan practice, so too does their 
own, thereby dispelling many theoretical ambiguities and doubts. By way of example 
one need but recall the openly partisan attitude of the Church in Sao Paulo to the 
Metalworkers' Opposition throughout the 1970's; the attitude of Dom Paulo and Dom 
Claudio to the workers, government and employers during the ABC strikes of 1978-80; 
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the stance taken by the Sao Paulo hierarchy during the 1984 metalworker elections vis-a- 
vis the issues at hand, and vis-a-vis their own active lay members; and the attitude of 
radical Catholic militants towards trade unions which, in their view, must be both secular 
and conflictive rather than formed along neo-Christendom lines with a policy of class 
conciliation. 
What this chapter seeks to do, then, is to examine these positions with specific 
reference to the issue of class. To see, in other words, where the principal points of 
consensus lie throughout the ethico-political spectrum, as well as what the nature and 
principal points of conflict are in practice. Throughout, the underlying question will be 
that of what the Church's preferential option for the poor means, i. e., the real content 
with which it is invested, whether this is a class option, and finally, whether such an 
option is compatible with an institution like the Roman Catholic Church, which 
simultaneouly possesses universalistic aims, structures and discourses. 
5.2 Points of Consensus 
Uniting the vast spectrum of Catholic opinion (a spectunn in which, as I indicated in 
my introductory chapter, I would place both Pope John Paul II, the bishops of Säo Paulo, 
the CNBB, radical Catholic militants; and leading liberation theologians) are a series of 
basic propositions concerning the role of the Church in relation to society, politics, and 
ideology. Broadly speaking, these points (which appear throughout much of post Vatican 
II social teaching as well as in the statements of Latin American bishops and the writings 
of liberation theologians) converge upon the inherent specificities of the Church's 
mission, i. e., as an institution entrusted with fostering the word of God, together with the 
need for a social mission which claims universality and at the same time possesses 
clearly defined limits. 
What follows is a schematic and selective summary of what I believe to be amongst the 
most important of these orienting principles. These are. 
(1) The Church's aims are transcendental. 
(2) An integral part of that transcendental vision is a profound social commitment, 
so that there is also a material base. 
(3) Given that all socio-political organisation belongs basically to a moral order, 
the Church has the right and duty to offer socio-moral guidance. 
(4) Political organisation and conduct must at all times be the servant of the 
"common good", and subject to the Church's judgement in terms of a theory of 
justice. Any deviation from this path will therefore elicit or permit comments from 
the Church, provided that these are based in Gospel criteria rather than ideological 
criteria. 
(5) Faith is neither reduceable to, nor exausted in, the political; it is much wider 
than this. The demands of faith include social justice, but go beyond it. 
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(6) Hence the Church cannot allow itself to be reduced to a political faction or to 
partisanship except under the most exceptional circumstances. 
(7) On no account does the Church possess an independent political project. Its 
social teaching cannot be reduced to any one economic system, or ideology, or 
political party. It is not a "third way". 
(8) Nor can the Church's message be reduced to a single single class, its message 
of salvation is addressed to all classes. 
(9) This universalism does not imply a neutrality in the face of injustices. 
(10) It IS for this reason, amongst others, that the Church engages in a preferential 
option for the poor. 
(11) It also asserts the priority of labour over capital. 
(12) The pressing need to supercede the conflicts of classes. 
(13) The unacceptability of liberal capitalism and collectivist Communism as 
presently constituted. 
(14) And finally, that Catholicism is a faith and not an ideology. As such it is not 
the job of the institutional Church to instigate social change in its own name, rather, 
it must seek to illuminate reality according to the principles of the Gospel and 
encourage others to conform as closely as possible to those principles. 
What quickly becomes evident in these points is just how much Catholic conservatives 
and progressives have theoretically in common with one another. What makes this 
common ground all the more remarkable is that it is precisely over these kinds of 
questions, i. e., the temporality of the Church and its relationship to society, politics 
ideology and class, that conflict seems to centre. 
How can this paradox be explained? The answer is twofold. Firstly, the observer must 
be careful not to frame conflicts in terms of false juxtapositions. The fact is that on a 
large range of theoretical issues, persons throughout the ethico-political spectrum stand 
together rather than in mutually divided and antagonistic camps. This can be summed up 
in the notion (not always as self-evident as it might appear) that prior to being 
conservative or progressive these individuals and groups are Catholic. This is why, for 
example, an organ as comparatively progressive as the CNBB was able to declare that: 
The appeal to "Marxist analysis" as an instrument for the' comprehension of reality particularly 
preoccupies us as well as the appeal to the class struggle as the fundamental law of social changes 
It is also why, for instance, one of the most radical and politically involved bishops, Dom 
Helder Cgnara, could affirm that: 
The Church will not opt for a political party. ... Today the Church orients 
its lay followers in the 
direction of each freely making his own party-political option. 6 
It is why the Workers' Pastoral of SSb Paulo argued that: 
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the Good News is not to be confused with a socio-political or socio- religious regime. It is 
universalist. 7 
And it is also why a more conservative figure like Pope John Paul II could make such an 
apparently radical affirmation that the Church supports: 
the principle of the priority of "labour" in confrontation with "capital" .8 
What unites these statements and lends them a considerable degree of coherence and 
consistency is the long tradition of moral philosophy which is basic to Catholic social 
teaching. And because they are far from atypical statements, this dimension of common 
foundations must never be forgotten. 
But, to address the second part of the paradox posed, these positions do simultaneously 
belong to quite different totalities. That is to say, when seen in terms of their broader 
theoretical and practical settings, they are found to be inconsistent with one another. In 
essence, this is because they undergo or arise from a series of practical and theoretical 
secular mediations which differentiate them, often quite profoundly. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in relation to the question of class, to which I now turn. 
5.3 The Preferential Option for the Poor and the Mediation of Class Conflict 
Although by no means the sole source of Catholic attitudes towards the issue of class, 
there is little doubt that throughout Latin America in general, and certainly in the case of 
Brazil, the preferential option for the poor (which was given formal standing in the 
conferences of Medellin and Puebla) has proved of central importance. It should be 
stressed at the outset, however, that this option is a clearly non-Marxist formulation. As 
one leading liberation theologian put it to me: 
In the first place, the option for the poor in the Church has a non-political, i. e., religious-ethical root, 
which is to say, it bases itself upon the faith of the Church in Christ, for the Messiah, who was poor. 
who loved the poor, who surrounded himself with the poor, privileged the poor, etc. This is the 
fundamental root. 9 
Indeed, it is upon these ethical foundations that the Latin American bishops at Puebla 
noted the following in their discussion of the preferential option for the poor: 
When we draw near to the poor in order to accompany them and serve them, we are doing what 
Christ taught us to do when he became our brother, poor like us. Hence service to the poor is the 
privileged, though not exclusive, gauge of our following Christ. The best service to our fellows is 
evangelisation, which disposes them to fulfill themselves as children of God, liberates them as 
children of God, liberates them from injustices, and fosters their integral advancement. 
10 
Given such a strong identification with the poor, whom John Paul II has described as 
"God's favourites", 11 it stands to reason that the definition of the poor is of critical 
importance. Herein lies the linkage with social class and the source of much conflict. For 
having stressed the religious rather than political roots of the Church's option, Frei 
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Clodovis Boff, like all leading liberation theologians and much of the progressive 
Church, goes on to partially define (i. e., in a non-exclusivistic sense) the issue and 
answer it in the following manner: 
How are these poor seen, experienced and encountered historically? ... The poor are constitued in 
classes.... Ibis concrete historical content of the poor organised in class is also incorporated within the 
option for the poor. 12 
This concretisation of the option for the poor does not represent a break with the 
Church's transcendental telos or any form of reductionism; it simply represents the 
necessary crystallisation of that option under specific circumstances. Neither, as its 
proponents are the first to admit, does it represent the last word on the subject. On the 
contrary, whilst the concept of the poor is inclusive of class, it is more than merely 
equivalent. It embraces other dimensions as well and in this sense, to use the words of 
Boff, "overflows the concept of class". He cites two principal reasons for this, one 
sociological and the other religious. The sociological he explains as follows: 
In Latin America, class does not account for, does not include, all the phenomena of the oppressed 
masses due to the kind of dependent associated and exclusive capitalist development that we live 
here. So much so that we prefer to speak in terms of popular classes than in the proletariat. In order 
to include the proletariat, but also the "pobretariado" - which is to say the under-employed classes, 
the unemployed classes, the peasants. and all that sector which is not incorporated in a formal 
capitalist economy. 13 
The second reason he explains as follows: 
the concept of poor, especially commencing from its Biblical and religious content, is richer than the 
concept of exploited or class. It also highlights the person who is rejected, who lives in anonymity. 
who is segregated due to his/her race, sex, etc. So it incorporates all these elements - not only 
infrastructural economic, but at times superstructural, of a cultural character. ... So it is a richer and 
more coloured idea, it has more internal determinations. And this is important at a practical level 
because it assumes that the task of liberation is not done only at the level of the class struggle and of 
economic emancipation, but is also done at the cultural and religious levels, the relations between the 
two sexes, at the level of race, black, white, of culture, if he is indian, if European immigrant, if 
Brazilian born here, etc. 14 
Clearly, then, the concept is a highly sophisticated one; but, in the view of progressive 
Catholic sectors, that richness and complexity does not divorce it from specific socio- 
political contents and consequences. As Boff goes on to explain: 
This option for the poor, which incorporates the question of class and the class struggle, is globally 
opposed to a supra- or inter-class interpretation, because it considers that the poor person cannot be 
understood outside the context of the oppression of the struggle; which is to say that the poor person 
is produced, the poor person is impoverished, is marginalised, is maintained poor. So the poor is a 
conflictive reality. 15 
It is precisely this language of class and conflict, that on occasions uses Marxist 
analysis and gains Marxist overtones, which conservatives in particular find so hard to 
swallow. 16 They would have observers believe that, amongst other things, this is because 
it reduces the motor of history to that of class and thereby denies the transcendentalism 
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of the Church, i. e., renders it materialistic. But, as I have already indicated at the 
beginning of the second section (to the present chapter) and as the comments of Clodovis 
Boff clearly indicate, the principle of the transcendental is not in question; on the 
contrary, it represents both a common point of departure amongst Catholics - and, 
indeed, differentiation between Marxists and Christians. I 
Perhaps more controversial and far-reaching, therefore, is the argument which the 
Puebla conference itself makes, namely, that the mere usage of elements of Marxist 
analysis is highly problematical because these belong to a totality which is at variance 
with Gospel teaching: 
Some believe it is possible to separate various aspects of Marxism - its doctrine and method of 
analysis in particular. But we would remind people of the teaching of the papal magisterium on this 
point: "It would be foolish and dangerous on that account to forget that they are closely linked to 
each other, to embrace certain elements of Marxist analysis without taking due account of their 
relation with its ideology; and to become involved in the class struggle without paying attention to 
the kind of violent and totalitarian society to which this activity leads" (Octogesimo Adveniens34). 
17 
What is all the more remarkable about this statement, quite apart from the fact that it 
originates from a conference with such major implications for the Catholic Church 
throughout Latin America, is that it apppears to owe less to genuine theoretical analysis 
of the issues involved and much more to the resurgence and reassertion of traditional 
ecclesiastical hostility towards Marxism. After all, having questioned the feasibility of 
separating Marxist method from doctrine (a perfectly legitimate and necessary issue to 
raise), the bishops merely go on to imply that this cannot be done rather, than to actually 
explain why this might be so. '8 Although this is achieved by citing an encyclical written 
by Pope Paul VI (who, incidentally, was not adverse to a little political intervention and 
ideologisation of his own, when for example, during Italian general elections he 
effectively campaigned on behalf of the Christian Democrats and against the Communist 
Party), the Latin American bishops themselves leave little doubt as to where they stand. 
In the following paragraph they say: 
We must also note the risk of ideologisation tun by theological reflection when it is based on a praxis 
that has recourse to Marxist analysis. The consequences are the total politicization of Christian 
existence, the disintegration of the language of faith into that of the social sciences, and the draining 
away of the transcendental dimension of Christian salvation. 19 
Once again, these comments owe more to assertion and less to rigorous analysis. Their 
one saving grace, it has to be said, is that at least they do not use the term inevitable 
when talking of the havoc - intellectual, practical and moral - which Marxism is 
supposed to wreak upon Christianity. 
Is there, then, a radical incompatibility between Marxism and Christiantiy? In one key 
respect, Le, that of Marxism being closed to a transcendental vision, the answer is 
undoubtedly yes. But in other respects the answer appears to depend very much upon the 
standpoint of the observer: a fact which conservatives in particular find much harder to 
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admit than their more radical colleagues. 
The problem can be summed up as follows. In order to approximate the principles of 
faith to reality, i. e., to operationalise them, Catholics must of necessity interpret that 
reality and therefore have recourse to social scientific data and frameworks of analysis. 
Ideally, from a radical Catholic perspective, the result is a permanent dialogue between 
faith and social science (which may on occasions include Marxist frameworks of 
analysis) - each respecting the autonomy of the other, but also each informing the other. 
As one Sao Paulo bishop who has extensively examined this question comments: 
An evangelical vision of reality will always be interpretive and not simply descriptive. Whilst 
necessary, the cold statistical and economic data of a situation are insufficient. Economics is also a 
human science. It possesses its own methodology which confers upon it a certain scientific 
autonomy. But its indications are not final conclusions which can, alone, guide human life in society. 
Jesus has given us other criteria for seeing the reality which surrounds us. 20 
What is of equal - if not greater - significance is the view held amongst some sectors of 
the progressive Church that this notion of a constructive dialogue between faith and 
social science must also extend to the relationship between faith and ideology. For them 
this does not mean the ideologisation of faith, in the sense of its total identification with 
one or other given theory of social action, but rather the recognition that faith is 
ideologically mediated, that is to say, ideology contests and purifies faith at a practical 
level, as praxis. This should not, however, subvert the primacy of their respective 
functions and status, i. e., ultimately it is up to faith in a negative sense to discern, select, 
and exclude certain proposals; but it is, amongst other things, the task of ideology to 
provide these positive proposals. One of the most succinct summaries of this position is 
provided by Dom Candido Padin where he argues the following: 
The ideal would be that Christian values, rendered explicit by theology, would come to inspire 
ideological projects assumed by determinate groups of militants. One is talking, however, of an 
inspiration and not an identification. Every ideological formulation is always partial and historical. It 
searches for an answer for a determinate social situation and a certain historical moment. It is never 
the only formula possible for the fostering of social change. It admits variants and, therefore, 
legitimate options. That is where the healthy freedom of the Christian is exercised, engendering the 
creativity for the best ideological formulations. The latter, however, are linked to his personal or 
group option, incapable of being presented in the name of the Church. 
21 
if one uses this criterion of not presenting specific options in the name of the Church. 
but instead in individual or group capacities, it soon becomes apparent that conservatives 
fall far short of their pretensions to a non-ideological Church. The Pope's 1980 discourse 
to the workers in the Morumbi stadium is a classic example of this. Firstly, he 
categorically rejects the class struggle, - this in front of many metalworkers who only a 
few months earlier were being viciously attacked by the state and employers: 
'Ibe class struggle is not the path which leads to social order, because it brings with it the risk of 
elevating the disfavoured to privileged, creating new situations of injustice for those who until now 
had the advantages. One does not build upon a base of disaffection and still less upon one that sees 22 the destruction of others. 
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Having ruled out one weapon for the articulation of workers' struggles the Pope 
immediately goes on to offer his own substitute: 
Repelling the class struggle is also to opt resolutely for a noble struggle in favour of social justice. 
The diverse centres of power and the different representatives of society must be capable of uniting, of 
coordinating their own efforts and of arriving at an accord over clear and effective programmes. In 
this consists the Christian formula for creating a just societyl23 
This "Christian formula" appears to, bypass a number of quite fundamental questions, 
most importantly that of what happens if these diverse centres of power are, in actual 
fact, mutually opposed to one another, as was shown to be the case in Brazil during the 
strikes of that year. And yet the Pope's formula (given to a specific audience soon after a 
highly acrimonious labour conflict of which he had been personally made aware) seems 
to take no account of this possibility. Indeed, it virtually rules it out of order as a matter 
of principle. 
This crucial, and, I would argue, highly political evasion is rendered all the more 
problematic when one takes account of the fact that during the 1980 metalworkers' 
dispute both the Minister of Labour who negotiated in the dispute on behalf of the 
government, and the vice-president of the key employers federation involved were 
members of the Christian employers association, the ADCE, which itself was ostensibly 
devoted to the propagation of Christian social teaching in these circles. Now either, if 
one uses papal criteria, this implies a failure on the part of the ADCE and its members at 
a critical moment in time, or, as I think is far more likely, it suggests and shows that their 
faith was mediated in a highly specific, i. e., class related manner. By the same token, one 
may either choose to believe that Lula did not do justice to his Christian beliefs, or, on 
the other hand, see those beliefs as being critically related to and mediated by his class 
situation. As for the Church, it simply had to choose sides. In short, there was no 
"Christian formula" for the creation of a just society, at least not as the Pope sought to 
conceptualise it in his address. Quite simply, the interests involved were antagonistic 
and, therefore, totally incapable of arriving at any kind of accord. In this particular 
instance, therefore, the Christian solution lay very much closer to Clodovis Boff's notion 
of an ecclesiastical insertion into a conflictive reality. 
Does this elimination of certain options, especially Marxist ones, betray an ideological 
bias to which conservatives are unwilling to admit? Epistemologically it is noteworthy 
that whilst the Church, particularly in the formulation of its social doctrine, is highly 
eclectic - borrowing particular concepts from political economy, sociology, and so on, 
without worrying too much about frameworks of analysis which give rise to terms such 
as "democracy", "under-development", "Third World", "capital", etc., - it feels unable to 
extend that same pluralism to Marxist terminologies or frameworks of analysis. 
Perhaps this helps to explain one incident in the Morumbi stadium, the truncation of 
Waldemar Rossi's address to the Pope. 
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Rossi was selected to give a speech because of his status as a leading Catholic militant. 
The official reasons given for its curtailment (only the first two and last three paragraphs 
were read out of the total of 14) were the pressured nature of the Pope's schedule, that 
there was rain, and that the Pope's health had to be borne in mind. But, as has been 
pointed out, there were other occasions during the visit when the Pope was either late or 
opened up his schedule quite unexpectedly. What seems to have been of greater 
relevance, was the openly denunciatory tone of Rossi's speech which discussed the 
Brazilian labour situation in the most uncompromising of terms. Significantly, in those 
parts of his speech that were cut, he spoke of the "fascist, corporative and vertical 
model", which inspired Brazil's labour codes and which "represses and impedes the 
independent organisation of the workers" 25 He also noted how in Brazil: 
capitalism imposes violent conditions of work, it subordinates and corrupts, it decides its own laws. 
It is the savage capitalism of the multinationals. 26 
He also noted the Brazilian Church's, and especially the Archdiocese of Säo Paulo's, 
strong commitment to the struggles of the Brazilian workers' movement. This language - 
its degree of specificity and angle of attack - hardly squared with the Pope's 
substantively non-conflictual vision and non-specific terminology, let alone with Vatican 
diplomacy. One priest therefore explained the truncation of Rossi's speech in the 
following terms: 
it was the decision of the Pope's advisers due to the pressure of the Ministry of the Army that it not 
be read. Even the salutation was not to be read! It was a concession of the cardinal [Dom Paulo], a 
fight of the cardinal, that at least it would be possible to read that which was relevant. So it was not 
the rain or the delay.. it was that it was not of interest to have transmitted to 120 million inhabitants 
via national network a discourse which laid bare the capitalist system. It was a boycott of the army 
and the advisers of the Vatican.. a deliberate manipulation. 27 
However, during his own cardinalship of Cracow in Poland, where the authoritarianism 
of the state came from a Communist regime, the then cardinal Karol Wojtyla went out of 
his way to give space to opposition elements linked to dissident trade unionism. In May 
1978, for example, speaking before 150,000 miners and metalworkers, he publicly 
attacked the official (i. e., Communist) unions. Later that same year he championed the 
Church's support for the so-called Flying University, a group of dissident intellectuals 
linked to the opposition and whose activities the government of the day considered 
illegal. 
Under these conditions, the future Pope recognised that an even-handed condemnation 
of the conflicting parties, i. e., a call to the centres of power and the different 
representatives of society to unite and reach an accord rather than collide with one 
another, was a complete fiction. Not only did he recognise that a trial of strength was 
inevitable, but he also emphatically staked a claim for the Church's openly partisan 
involvement in that struggle. 28 Apparently, in the case of Brazil, he did not feel the same 
way, or at the very least, he thought that under no circumstances could any such conflict 
200 
be allowed to be articulated in terms of the class struggle. 
This shift in perspective on the pan of the Pope away from a partisan stance'should not 
solely be attributed to any political bias (although as one associate of Dom Paulo's 
admitted to me, the Pope's view on the subject in a conversation with the cardinal was 
that "'I believe in the Theology of Liberation, but I do not believe in the usage of Marxist 
analysis by Christians., "29), for there simultaneously exists a genuine difficulty regarding 
the question of hierarchy and the specificity of language that can be employed. It may be 
summed up in the simple proposition, a tendency rather than cast-iron law, which is that 
to the extent that one moves up the Church hierarchy and power becomes exclusive and 
specialised, so too language shifts in the opposite direction, becoming universalistic and 
all-inclusive. Similarly, if one moves down the scale, there is a corresponding increase in 
the specificity of formulations, albeit a specificity that is ultimately constrained by the 
widely accepted notion that a direct identity, i. e., between the party-political, 
programmatic, and ideological on the one hand, and Christian doctrine on the other is 
impermissible. 
Although they move in opposite directions, these tendencies need not necessarily be 
incompatible insofar as they are merely technical, i. e., insofar as they reflect the differing 
breadth of the constituencies to whom they are addressed as well as the particular 
instances of application. It is a sort of division of labour. Thus, the language of the Pope 
carries with it not only a special symbolic weight, but also a series of special functions, 
amongst which is the capacity to address all the faithful at one and the same time. In 
short, it possesses a spacial and temporal universality; it attempts to be a living extension 
of Catholic doctrine. 30 Equally, to the extent that the Church renders itself locally 
concrete (from international bishops' conference, to national, state and city levels, as 
well as the move from bishop to priest. activist, Church to CEB, and so on), that 
language of necessity becomes ever more concrete, moving from the theoretical to the 
practical and applied. Even Waldemar Rossi was willing to assert this in relation to 
differences that arise between the CNBB's notion of class and PO's: 
This is normal, you know, because the Workers' Pastoral is made up of workers who directly live 
exploitation. Our language is a concrete language; but the whole of the Church is more than this. 
There are other experiences. Elaborations upon reality are frequently more theoretically reasoned, 
even if we assume the same presuppositions. 31 
The key question, however, is whether they do indeed assume the same 
presuppositions, or rather, whether certain mediations proceed to set them apart. Can the 
concrete particularities really be encapsulated in a language of theoretical universality? If 
one inverts the question and relates it to a number of the 14 points listed in the second 
section of the present chapter, then the issue hinges upon just how one defines and then 
makes real the Church's profound social commitment; upon how one defines the ethical 
and moral aspects of a given problem as being worthy of inclusion in Church 
commentary; upon how one defines the "common good" and any subsequent deviations 
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from it and then proceeds to criticise these using gospel rather than ideological criteria; 
upon the underlying choices involved in the conceptual elevation of ordinary to 
exceptional circumstances, and hence the selection of the point at which partisanship 
becomes legitimate; upon how one firstly defines and then reconciles the Church's 
universalism with its preferential option for the poor; upon what one understands by the 
Church's assertion of the priority of labour over capital, and what content this notion is 
given; and finally, upon how, at any given moment in time, one is to ascribe an order, 
i. e., precedence, to these principles given that they may conflict with one another. As the 
following comments from Dom Cläudio make absolutely plain, whilst the conceptual 
points of departure may be relatively clear, the relationship between Christian theory and 
practice nevertheless remains an inherently ambiguous one. 
I believe that you have to have certain theoretical clarities. For us this signifies having clarity as to 
what are the criteria of the Gospel - thus our faith, what are the criteria of human reason, what are 
human rights, etc, you must have a certain clarity, this is one thing. On the other hand, this clarity 
does not realise itself in the concrete, in history normally, it is always bound up with concrete 
ambiguities, which is to say, when something happens this event is never absolutely clear. You 
cannot assume a certain Cartesianism there, of having clear and distinct ideas when you act in 
history. History is full of ambiguities and in the meantime you have to decide something within the 
3 
ambiguity ... this 
is much more risky because you end up dirtying your hands as well. 
A powerful example of this ambiguity, or dirtying of the Church's hands, can be seen 
in its varying practical and theoretical conceptualisations of the notion of the priority of 
labour over capital, to which I now turn. 
5.4 The Catholic Church and the Priority of Labour in Relation to Capital 
The concept has been given currency within the Roman Catholic Church through John 
Paul II's encyclical Laborem Exercens (Human Labour). In that encyclical he makes a 
strong plea for the subjectivity of labour: 
the primary basis for the value of labour is man himself... Whilst it is true that man is destined and is 
called to work, however, above all, work is "for man" and not man"for work". 
33 
He counterposes this Christian concept of subjectivity, which also includes the idea that 
man should be a "free and conscious subject... a subject who decides for himself "34 to 
liberal capitalist and Marxist visions. His argument is that: 
labour is always a primary eicient cause, whilst "capital", being the totality of the means of 
production, merely remains an instrument. or instrumental cause. 35 
This "priority of 'labour' in confrontation Kith 'capital, '36 is a principle which must 
hold irrespective of the socio-economic system. That is where a conflict arises between 
the Pope's vision and what he terms: 
"rigid" capitalism, which defends the exclusive right of the private ownership of the means of 
production, as an untouchable "dogma" in economic life. 37 
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The latter position he calls "unacceptable". 
3K 
What is interesting about the Pope's comments is that whilst they represent a strong 
critique of what he terms "rigid" capitalism, they do by implication simultaneously leave 
the way open for a concept of flexible capitalism, a notion long advocated by Catholic 
social teacing. Indeed, he even goes on to assert the need for the: 
participation of the workers in the management and/or the profits of firms, the so-called worker 
"shareholder", and similar things. 39 
The requirement, then, is merely "to continually submit "rigid" capitalism to a 
revision". 0 As for its outright elimination, not a hint of this appears in the encyclical. 
On the contrary, John Paul II proceeds in the opposite direction and emphasises in 
italics that: 
these multiple reforms so eagerly sought cannot be realised with the aprioristic elimination of private 
property and the means of production. 
41 
This is because he notes that groups: 
inspired by Ma xist ideology like political parties... tend towards the monopolisation of power in 42 every society... 
which is a negation of man's subjectivity. The ideal, or at least one ideal as he perceives 
it, is that: 
the right to private pro erty is subordinated to the right to common use, subordinated to the universal 
destination of goods. 
Earlier, I mentioned that aspect of papal discourse which attempts to project universal 
values, to speak to all the faithful, and which therefore has a functional tendency to lose 
its specificity. What I think is noticable in Laborem Exercens is just how far from this 
principle John Paul II departs. By way of a few brief examples we should note the 
following. On the one hand, the Pope devotes much attention - frequently italicised - to 
the historical tendencies towards the centralisation of power in Communist societies, and 
he cites the dynamics of revolutionary situations as one cause. On the other hand he 
turns a blind eye to the historically observable and inherent tendency of capital towards 
monopoly within capitalist societies, including its transnational monopolisation. There is 
no analysis whatsoever of the tyranny of the market, i. e., those dynamics which do not 
allow capital to stand still but which, on the contrary, impel it in the direction of yet 
greater concentrations. A systematic critique is replaced by an abstract moral postulate 
the existential basis of which is exempted from serious consideration. To attack 
"primitive" or "rigid" capitalism, as he undoubtedly does, is no substitute for addressing 
this vital issue. Rather, it represents a diversion of the Church's denunciatory resources 
in the direction of a nineteenth century straw man. As for the twentieth century, the call 
becomes one of reforming capitalism. 
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The encyclical also fails to address itself to the equally important question of how 
small capital has and might historically co-exist in alternative social structures, why it 
should continue to remain small, and what the implications of this would be for the 
totality of capital, let alone society as a whole. This, surely, is particularly important 
given the social convulsions that have rocked a country like China (since the 
introduction of its small scale capitalism), and the social convulsions through which the 
Soviet Union will increasingly go, and through which the Pope's own native Poland is 
already going. Questions of this kind possess ethico-political dimensions, and yet they 
are not the subject of papal consideration. This would appear to indicate a more narrow 
rather than universalistic series of priorities are at work. 
With regard to the question of trade unions, John Paul's priorities once again speak 
for themselves. He makes little secret of the fact that he wishes to divest them of any class 
dynamic: 
Catholic social doctrine does not believe that unions are merely a reflection of a "class" structure of 
society, just as it does not believe that they are the exponent of a class struggle, which inevitably 
governs social life. They are, yes, an exponent of the struggle for social justice, for just rights of the 
men of work according to their diverse occupations. 44 
His vision is one of social harmony for: 
In the last analysis, in this community as much those who work- as those who dispose of the means of 
production or are the owners thereof must unite. 45 
By now, the outlines of the Pope's agenda. in particular its strong ideological bias, 
should be clearer. He adopts a neo-capitalist perspective. i. e., the notion that its 
"primitive" version can and should be reformed but not abolished. Communism, on the 
other hand, is beyond redemption. 
If for the moment these ideological questions are put to one side, then perhaps the 
main theoretical issue to emerge from the analysis of this encyclical is whether the 
postulation of ends - without at least giving some indication as to the means by which 
these are to be achieved - is an adequate basis upon which to proceed. 
What makes this notion of ends without means of such fundamental significance is its 
almost universal acceptance throughout the ethico-political spectrum as both the correct 
and only practicable manner by which the Catholic Church can hope to proceed. As I 
indicated earlier, whilst the Church does not seek neutrality in the face of injustice 
(hence it engages in critico-prophetic action), neither does it believe that it can afford to 
propose or be directly identified with positive projects for the improvement of those 
conditions; by this I mean that it cannot afford to be equated with totalising political 
visions (e. g., party-political) or ideological (i. e., philosophical) projects. It can, however, 
be identified with piecemeal efforts for change - not in the sense of being isolated. 
ineffective, or short-term - but rather in the sense of being carried out on the basis of 
strictly ethical or Gospel oriented criteria. That may even necessitate long term projects 
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and open cooperation with party-political groupings, but throughout, the lines of 
subordination must remain clear. Any ethical incompatibilities which arise should 
ultimately lead to a break and the reassertion of those ethical criteria rather than their 
subordination to political or ideological loyalties. 
A typical assertion of this division was given to me by Dom Paulo in regard to his own 
actions and the way in which both his critics and allies perceive them: 
They think that I am very much of the left. In certain things I openly criticise the government, I am 
not at all reluctant to do this. This morning I spoke with Erundina [the candidate of the Workers' 
Party and elected Mayor of Säo Paulo in November 1988, a victory for which the Church was partly 
credited], but this afternoon I could complain about her... I think that is where we must guard our 
Christian independence and liberty, if not it will become a sort of ecclesiastical totalitarianism. ` 
As a formulation, Dom Paulo's words possess a certain simplicity and therefore 
power. They seem to offer a clear way forward. They avoid the kinds of pit-falls 
associated neo-Christendom approaches. i. e.. the representation of particular instances - 
be they trade union, party-political or ideological - as manifestations of divine will. In 
this way, it is hoped, the Church neither becomes a tool of outside forces nor a crude 
manipulator of social actors. Its own integrity and that of civil society are preserved. 
In terms of a positive proposal, however, his statement appears to beg as many 
questions as it answers. If taken to its ultimate conclusion, for instance, one could argue 
that all that is being offered is a sort of political relativism. In other words, from the 
moment that an ethical disagreement arises then a break should take place. But this in 
turn raises the question of what criteria a supposedly free-floating and independent 
Christian will use to cope with the fact that political change necessarily operates in 
different forms and longer time-frames than moral postulates alone can handle or offer 
solutions to. What for instance, should be the attitude of a Christian towards a long-term 
policy whose immediate results are prejudicial to the "common good", particularly if it is 
a matter of political rather than moral judgement that this temporal separation exists 
and that the suffering will indeed come to an end? If one accepts, as Catholic social 
doctrine does, that institutional politics is a viable and necessary means of achieving 
social change, i. e., that it constitutes a legitimate method of obtaining certain results, 
then surely it is highly contradictory to advocate an immediatist or atomised critique 
(albeit from a Biblical perspective) which fails to adequately take account of these 
mediations? 
The answer is that whilst theoretically speaking independence is guarded as an ideal in 
itself, in practice it is constantly mediated by political and ideological loyalties. Dom 
Paulo did not stand in equidistant relationship to Luiza Erundina of the Workers' Party 
or the Samey government as his quote implies. Quite the opposite, political centres of 
gravity and dynamics made themselves felt. The Pope does not approach a Communist 
government with the freshness of a newborn baby, judging each and every act on a 
purely case by case basis. On the contrary, both figures (and, for that matter, all 
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members) of the Catholic hierarchy, put matters into an historical, political and even 
ideological perspective. They need to, if they are to make any sense of the world. Indeed, 
when pressed on this issue of a non-ideological Church, the Dom Paulo was quite 
forthcoming: 
I think that it is very difficult for someone not to have an ideology. Everybody has an ideology. We 
try and be Christians and pass over ideology, but when we discover we always discover with a 
certain ideology. For example, my ideology is that labour should prevail over capital, or that the 
centre of the world is the working man. For others this is an ideology, but forme it is an evangelical 
consequence, a consequence of all evangelical doctrine. 
7 
The aim, then, is to try and reassert the specificities of Christian identity in a 
recognisably profane world. Paradoxically, this theory of a religious balance must 
constantly be reasserted despite the open admission in some quarters that its practice (be 
that in terms of how one interprets reality or acts upon it) is anything but simple. One is 
dealing with a permanent tension. Dom Claudio gives a succinct summing up of this 
position: 
The criteria of faith and of the Gospel are not and cannot be ideological. Now the moment that it is 
put into practice, it is clear that it, too, suffers ideological injuctions; in one way or another we all 
suffer from this. What we must always be alive to is to have a sufficient critical distance from our 
ideologies and not permit ideology to predominate the criteria of faith. This is what is important in 
terms of ideology. But ideology is something we all have because it signifies a concrete form of 
proposing solutions for a community48. 
If one expands this notion of ideology to include the Church's own analytical and 
denunciatory dimensions, rather than simply limiting it to the specifically programmatic 
(i. e., concrete solutions for a community which lay members of society themselves 
propose), then the tensions are rendered that much more complex. No longer is one 
dealing with a series of pure theories or doctrines which are separate from or which 
preceed ideology and subsequently inspire it. Suddenly the very process is partially 
reversed and theological reflection itself is seen to be imbued with ideological 
ambiguities. 
But why should our definition be expanded? In essence the answer to this question is 
that the process of religious denunciation entails the de facto presence or affirmation of 
(at the very least) partially concrete ideals, and not just the annunciation of abstractions 
which it is the job of lay individuals in society to interpret. Were it merely the latter then 
all hierarchical pronouncements would simply be a repetition of biblical texts. One might 
even go so far as to say that there would be no need for hierarchy (except for the 
propagation of future cadres). But as it is, all the Catholic Church's deliberative 
documents - from the Pope's encyclicals to the CNBB's discussion papers - are 
adaptations and interpretations of reality. They are contingent upon an accurate analysis 
of its contours. Furthermore, they represent a constant re-prioritisation of themes. 
5.5 The Contradictory Mediation of Catholic Social Teaching - The Case of Laborem 
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Exercens 
A powerful instance of the sorts of difficulties which arise from non-mediated and 
supposedly non-ideological discourses is evident in the reception that was accorded to 
Laborem Exercens by progressive sectors of the Brazilian Catholic Church, as well as 
socially concerned Christian employers. Here the emergence of contradictions between 
global discourses can be more readily seen 
Obviously, by virtue of its status as a papal pronouncement, the Church's progressive 
sectors could hardly criticise Laborem Exercens openly. But in the case of Dom Claudio, 
he went on to hail the document as "a great encyclical which made fantastic 
advances. "49 More significantly still, he went on to attack capitalism in the name of the 
encyclical. In a Mass held for workers in ABC he said: 
we condemn all forms of capitalism, not merely its most brutal forms, as is our case, but all forms of 
capitalism: this is a radical condemnation. " 
Radical words indeed, which is probably why the following week he felt the need to 
qualify them in a letter to the journal 0 Sao Paulo which stated the following: 
I based myself explicitly upon an affirmation of the Pope in Laborem Exereens. There, the Pope 
affirms that the Church teaches the priority of labour over capital. In this way I conclude that the 
Pope condemns at the root, that is to say, radically, each and every capitalism, because the essence 
of all capitalism is to give priority to capital over labour, that is why it is called capitalism "s1 
Were the Pope to have made the important and valid connexion which Dom Cläudio 
makes, namely that "the essence of capitalism is to give priority to capital over labour". 
then the Pope's support for the principle of the priority of labour over capital would 
indeed be a profoundly radical statement. But this does not happen, the concept is left in 
isolation. Whilst specific variants of capitalism are directly criticised, the systematic 
critique of its essence is not even touched upon. How else, for example, could John Paul 
propose the idea of submitting "'rigid' capitalism to a revision"? 52 
Albeit carried out in the name of Laborem Exercens, Dom Cläudio's line of reasoning 
appears to follow a radically different course. He argues that whilst amenable to social 
demands these cannot be fully met without putting into jeopardy the priority of capital, 
its metabolism. Even neo-capitalism gives priority to capital. He argues that: 
It is not a question of humanising, it is a question of giving priority. ... At the moment 
be puts man in 
the first place it stops being capitalism in its essential sense. 53 
Furthermore, and once again in sharp contrast to the whole tenor of the encyclical. Dom 
Cläudio recognises that capital and labour, and the respective representatives thereof, 
are in antagonistic relation to one another. For labour there is no great moral dilemma 
to the extent that: 
in the labour-capital conflict, the wronged one is labour and not capital. 54 
But for the employer, especially the Christian employer, matters are more complex: 
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I profoundly believe that in the first place he must recocnise that he is in a game of antagonistic 
interests, and one where the other side is being harmed. 
S 
Viewed from a radical Christian perspective, the ultimate consequence of this process of 
increased consciousness must be that: 
he too must make an option for the poor. That is where the big conflict comes for him because he 
ends up making an option against his class. 56 
Not surprisingly, the Christian employers take a somewhat different view of the papal 
encyclical and the correct interpretation that should be placed upon it. They take solace 
from and focus upon the Pope's notion of the direct and indirect givers of labour 
(capitalists and workers respectively) and see no allusions to any structural antagonisms 
within the capitalist system, or any personal dilemmas for that matter. 57 On the 
contrary, they view John Paul's words as entirely compatible with their own desire to 
find a more humane balance in the firm. Hence their attempt to develop concepts like the 
"social balance of the firm". In their view, however, the search for greater humanity 
within the firm is of necessity circumscribed by certain capitalistically defined economic 
limits, an issue which the Pope manifestly fails to address. One leading member of the 
ADCE put this contradiction to me thus: 
I think that whoever lives the preoccupation of living this link [i. e., between their faith and work or 
personal life] does not have any way of not having a more humane position before those who work 
with him. But this does not necessarily translate into his paying more - i. e., above the market - for his 
collaborators, because this also implies that the firm cannot lose competitivity. 
S8 
What is interesting about these two positions is that in their own ways they are far 
more coherent than the document in which they seek to base at least part of their 
justification. Furthermore, which is again quite remarkable, in their coherence they 
come to two mutually incompatible conclusions (again, using the same document): one 
represents a radical critique of capitalism's essence, whilst the other seeks to attenuate 
its excesses. As to the question of identifying which is closer to the mark, this is 
complicated by a number of factors, not the least of which is that the mark itself, i. e. the 
encyclical, is repleat with ambiguities and mutually contradictory propositions. I have 
already made clear where I believe one of its major thrusts lies, namely - in the 
sustenance of a neo-capitalist perspective. But the fact of the matter is that there are 
several propositions which, if taken to their logical conclusions, would indeed lead to 
major structural changes; which would, in effect, negate or suppress other propositions. 
One of the most notable of the former is, of course, the principle of the priority of labour 
over capital itself which Dom ClMudio made clear stands radically opposed to any and 
all forms of capitalism. And yet, John Paul simultaneously champions the cause of 
private property without adequately defining how the two propositions may be 
reconciled. The result is an incoherent synthesis which it is the job of others within the 
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Church to give coherence to. The task becomes more akin to the selection of particular 
propositions and their reconstruction in mutually exclusive but coexistent totalities. 
These contradictory theoretical totalities, moreover, closely reflect the Church's own 
organisational dilemmas, i. e., its attempt to embrace mutually exclusive groups 
(sometimes mutually antagonistic ones) within its ranks. 
One of the pivotal concepts which lends a highly qualified unity to otherwise opposed 
concepts of class and class conflict is the principle of non-exclusivity. This is a 
fundamental element of Catholic belief throughout the ethico-political spectrum. It even 
applies to those groups or individuals who denominate themselves as "classista", i. e.,: 
as recognising the existence of the class struggle caused by the very structure and nature of 
capitalism. 59 
The connection between conservative ecclesiastical perspectives and a non- 
exclusivistic class perspective is readily observable in the following comments made by 
John Paul II to slum-dwellers in Rio de Janeiro: 
The Church of the poor speaks firstly and above all to man. To each man and for this reason to all 
men. It is the universal Church. The Church of the Mystery of the Incarnation. It is not the Church of 
one class or one cast only. ... 
The Church of the poor does not wish to serve that which causes 
tensions and makes struggles explode between men. The only struggle which the Church wishes to 
serve is the noble struggle for truth and justice and the true good, the struggle in which the Church is 
in solidarity with each man. ... 
In its evangelical struggle, the Church of the poor does not wish to 
serve immediate political ends, the struggles of power, and at the same time, it seeks with great 
diligence to avoid its words and actions being used for such ends, in other words, that they are 
"instrumentalised". The Church of the poor speaks, then, to "man": to each man and to all. At the 
same time it speaks to societies, to the societies in their globality and to the diverse social layers and 
to the social structures, socio-economic and socio- political. 
The doctrine of non-exclusivity fits well with these words which are at pains to stress 
the univeralism of the Church especially in relation to class and class conflict. How, .,, 
then, do radicals, with their much greater emphasis on the necessarily class conflictual 
nature of Brazilian society, seek to square this belief with a non-exclusivistic option? 
The answers to this question do, of course, vary considerably, but as the quotations 
below will indicate, there is much common ground between them. 
Clodovis Boff explains his own position thus: 
they [rich and poor] do not oppose one another in an absolute manner, because in a Christian vision 
there exist certain points, certain margins of contact between the rich and the poor, between 
exploiter and exploited in the following sense, that the two have a humanity. And for this reason the 
Church invites the exploiter, the rich man, to conversion and to associate himself with the work of 
the poor. The Church does not have great illusions as to the result from this kind of invitation, but 
there always exists the call to conversion, to change to justice in such a manner for the rich person 
to encounter his humanity in the fraternity with the poor person - but converting himself at the 
level 
of class, obviously. Stopping the reinforcement of his class in order to join with the people. 
61 
For Waldemar Rossi, who uses the word "classista" to describe the work and 
perspectives espoused by Pastoral Operäria: 
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The universal dimension does not really exclude anyone, but it does not include as a matter of 
obligation. -any person can be on a mistaken side and tomorrow change 
his position. The 
opportunities are given. The minute be wants to change position he stops being your enemy. This 
includes from the class perspective and the evangelical perspective as well. 62 
Frei Betio puts the issue thus: 
in the'Ibeology of Liberation you only make universal salvation by means of the preferential option 
for the poor. In the practice of Jesus the option for the poor is preferential but does not exclude the 
world of the rich. However. every time that someone from the world of the rich approaches Jesus, the 
first demand of Jesus is that first you have to assume the cause of the poor and afterwards you will 63 be my disciple. as in the parable of the young rich man. 
If one takes the case of Dom Claudio, he rejects the self-denomination of certain 
pastoral organisations within the Church as "classista" but does not negate the necessity 
of taking a clear stance: 
The Church is not "classista". The Church, by being in solidanty with the workers, of putting itself 
on the side of the workers, of being in solidarity with the poor, is not "classista" in virtue of this. I 
think that the "elassista" option is a sociological analysis; it is not a pastoral-evangelical analysis. 
So when the Church says that the consciousness of class must be promoted, 
[] it is to make clear 
to Christians and to people in general where each one is situated, so that each knows how to act in 
order to supersede this conflict. This does not contradict community (and that's where the ambiguity 
of the word "classista" lies), because the Church seeks a community where in fact all can participate 
as brothers. Now the consciousness of class is one of the apriori conditions for arriving at this, 
which is to say that you must recognise where you stand in order for you to finally make a step in the 
direction of a truly human community; while the word "classista" can suggest that you are simply 
limiting your horizons to the sphere of your class, the rest does not interest you - on the contrary, you 
are in antagonistic relation to the rest and you have a proposal for the struggle against the other 
people. -. The struggle should never 
be against the others. The struggle should be in favour of all, 
only that for being in favour of all at times in practice it ends up generating conflicts. 
65 
In short, then, there exist permanent calls to conversion by Christian radicals of those 
whom they regard as unjust and exploitative. However, those calls are systematically 
subject to temporal qualification, that is to say, they simultaneously exist alongside both 
theories which recognise conflict and, on occasions, practices which are themselves 
conflictive. 
One of the most institutionally significant elaborations of this perspective, a 
perspective which is most akin to that put forward by Dom Claudio, was produced by the 
General Assembly of Säo Paulo state bishops in their 1984 document entitled "A Igreja e 
o Mundo do Trabalho Urbano" ("The Church and the world of urban work"). This was a 
wide-ranging statement which addressed the state's local economic situation as well as 
how the Church should be inserted in that reality. In the section devoted to the question 
of "social conflict" they noted the following: 
This World of Work is in conflict. it is in class struggle, not on account of the very nature of human 
labour, but by the form in which man structures it socially. Our temptation is to ignore this conflict 
or attempt to camouflage it in order not to disturb the "peace" of our community, when in fact this 
conflict is ever present. It does not help in the least to camouflage it.... 
The Church, in truth. does not promote the struggle of classes, let alone the armed class struggle 
as the only path of liberation. 
But if it does not promote, it cannot, on the other hand avoid marking 
its presence within that conflict. following the example of the Incarnation of the Lord. The question 
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is: what is the role of the Church within the conflict? It will concretely and efficiently have to stand 
in solidarity with the unjustly treated and put itself at the service of human and evangelical values, 
as well as illuminate and articulate the process of overcominj the conflict with the project of God, 
with basic reference to the death and resurrection of Christ. 
In effect, this represents one of the clearest institutional calls for the Church to 
recognise the existence of class struggles and to insert itself within those struggles, albeit 
using an essentially evangelical perspective. Like the other statements above, it differs 
from current conservative ecclesiastical doctrine insofar as the category of class is used 
as a fundamental interlocutor towards, concepts of universal salvation. Margins of 
contact-are established between various classes, but so too are the prerequisites for their 
fruitful interaction. Ultimately, a concrete stance is taken. For John Paul II, on the other 
hand, the universality of the Church is asserted here and now and very much to the cost 
of a concrete stance. His emphasis is upon the non-instrumentalisation of the Church, 
upon its non-conflictual orientations, and its elevation from the immediate. This is 
presented as a statement of the obvious, i. e., as basic Catholic creed, rather than a 
partisan and ideologically mediated version of Catholicism; and it is against this 
institutional background which progressive Catholics in Säo Paulo must act. 
5.6 Conclusion - Institutional Conflici Between the Church of Sao Paulo and the Vatican 
A key theme running throughout this chapter has been the need to avoid making false 
polarisation of the various Catholic groupings most closely associated with the question 
of class. I affirmed, for instance, that prior to being conservative or progressive these 
individuals or groups are Catholic and, to this extent, defy simple categorization along 
political lines. I also listed a number of major themes (by no means all-inclusive) which 
they have in common. Furthermore, I described the existence and widespread acceptance 
of an ideology of consensus over certain hierarchical structures, and even non- 
conflictive modes of conduct. The power and legitimacy of these structures - and 
consequent practices - was said to be further reinforced by their semi-divine status, 
thereby severly constraining, although not completely eliminating, the process of 
theoretical contestation. 67 
A second theme running throughout the chapter has been the de facto presence of 
conflict. One most certainly can speak in terms of an ethico-political spectrum, of 
progressives and conservatives, who take major themes of Catholic dogma and insert 
them into altogether different theoretical and practical totalities. Contradictory totalities. 
Taking the example of the preferential option for the poor, it was noted from the very 
beginning that this is an option firmly rooted in ethical rather than political foundations. 
It is now a commonly accepted part of Catholic discourse throughout the ethico-political 
spectrum. The point of conflict or differentiation, however, arises in its mediation. Whilst 
progressives within the Church of Säo Paulo are unwilling to reduce this option to a 
question of class, they are also keen to stress its necessary linkage to such a category 
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which. furthermore. is conceived antagonistically. In the words of Clodovis Boff: 
Ibis option for the poor. wbicb incorporates the question of class and class struggle, is globally 
opposed 10 a suprs- or inter-dis interprrtation. 
But, as was indicated earlier. it is exactly this kind of linkage with class and Marxist 
terms of analysis which cone vatives find so hard to accept. As various citations from 
the Pope's 1980 speech in the Motumbi Stadium and the encyclical Laborem Exercens 
show, he holds to an altogether different view of social relations whereby objective 
antagonisms are capable of being superseded by mere moral postulates. In the case of 
Brazil, for instance, the class struggle is explicitly rejected in favour of a conception 
which holds to the notion that: 
'Ibe divusc centres of power and the different representatives of society must be able to unite, to 
coord, nste their own efforts and to arrive at an agreement over clear and effective programmes. 69 
Now is a reconciliation - or integration - of these objectively and globally opposed 
ecclesiastical positions to be achieved? 
One of several answers to this question appears to be critically dependent upon the 
location, in terms of seniority within the Catholic hierarchy, of the individuals involved. 
In common with the vast majority of their episcopal colleagues elsewhere, Sao Paulo 
bishops reject theoretical juxtapositions, particularly if these are posited in terms of 
major ecclesiastical personalities. This is a strange separation to make (but one which I 
indicated at the very beginning of this chapter is a fundamental part of Catholic 
practice) in view of Roman Catholicism's own emphasis on the ideas and personality of 
the Pope. The result. paradoxically. is that the bishops of Säo Paulo are forced to 
validate their own theories and practices in terms of a papal discourse which is 
substantively opposed. Dom Cläudio. for instance. makes the claim that Pope John Paul 
II engages in a truly radical critique of capitalism, and the Säb Paulo state bishops 
argue that the Pope "recognises and confronts"70 the issue of social conflict when in 
fact. as I have already pointed out, he does neither of these things. In the last analysis, 
therefore. there is no integration or reconciliation - nor indeed can there be between 
these mutually contradictory propositions. One kind of supersession which is frequently 
attempted, therefore. is merely semantic. 
For other. i. e.. lay sectors of the Church of Sao Paulo, like the Workers' Pastoral, the 
problem is somewhat different. since they are afforded considerably wider room for 
manoeuvre. Thus, whilst their language makes reference to and cannot ignore papal 
doctrine, it is certainly not subject to its strictures in the same way that ordained 
members of the Church are. As Waldemar Rossi indicated, PO's language is deliberately 
more specific and structured around conflictive concepts. Furthermore, any form of 
censorship by any senior Church figure is "inadmissable". 
71 At the heart of this 
situation. however. is an altogether different power structure; the assembly of PO is 
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sovereign and the relationship established between militants and hierarchy is one of 
dialogue rather than dependent subordination of the former to the latter. 
If one looks beyond Pastoral Operäria as an organisation and includes the interface 
between lay organisations in the World of Work generally and the Church, i. e., the 
Mission to the World of Work, then of necessity the lines of control and the nature of the 
discourse used shift considerably. Suddenly one is dealing with the institutional rather 
than purely group oriented prioritisation of certain themes. As Frei Gilberto Gorgulho, 
who was closely involved in this area for more than a decade notes: 
pastoral action is the way of crystallising in a determined place and in determined circumstances, 
the concrete struggle of the people, which in the Archdiocese of Säo Paulo is concretised through the 
struggle for the pastoral priorities. The Mission to the World of Work manifests itself as one of those 
priorities; that is to say, it is an urgenccaused by the problems raised, the very political reality, 
and the situation of the working class. -12 
As was noted in an earlier chapter. militants from PO had considerable input and 
influence upon the final outcome of the state and archdiocesan plans of 1975 and 1976 
respectively. Although in both these documents the language used was less specific than 
PO's (since it reflected the Church's own hetereogeneity and tendency to provide 
statements of apparently universal appeal), what was most important, certainly in the 
case of Sao Paulo, was that these statements provided a genuine framwork for progress. 
Whatever the latter's analytical shortcomings, the fact was that over the years 
progressive bishops within the Archdiocese of S'äo Paulo were able to help Catholic 
militants give it real weight - to the point, for instance, whereby the outlook of the 
hierarchy over the 1984 metalworkers union election was critically affected by the vote 
taken at PO's special assembly. As was shown in an earlier chapter, what was essential 
to the viability of this process was a basic affinity of perspectives which was able to 
transcend differences of detail. It was only with this fundamental compatibility of 
purposes that a truly effective division of labour between hierarchy and militants could 
exist throughout the mid 1970's and early 1980's. 
But what happens in those circumstances where such basic affinities do not exist and 
where there is, on the contrary, an apparent collision of interests? The short answer to 
this is that hierarchical authority tends increasingly to assert itself at the cost of the 
Church's so-called plurality. In other words, the fact of one group's subordination to 
another is increasingly brought out into the open and 
the real lines of power become 
more readily discernable. 
There are repeated examples of this. In the first chapter, which discussed the conflict of 
the late 1960's between progressive militancy and a reactionary hierarchy, we noted 
how radical Catholics found their institutional bases completely undercut, how they were 
marginalised and weakened, and finally, how they were invited back into the fold but 
only under conditions which many feared would lead to their complete subordination. 
Rather than abandoning their struggle, those groups at variance with the prevailing 
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episcopal outlook chose to remain marginalised. The local Church hierarchy proved 
both unwilling and ultimately incapable of providing an adequate vehicle for the 
retention of these conflicting forces. 
Ironically, the tables were later turned upon Dom Agnelo Rossi himself when Pope 
Paul VI saw fit to install Dom Paulo in his place thereby marginalising Rossi from 
Brazilian affairs 73 Although on this occasion the net effect of the intervention was an 
opening up of the Church of Sao Paulo rather than a loss of pluralism, what must' also be 
noted is that the lines of control were once again forcefully reasserted. In other words, it 
was only intervention from above, in the form of the Pope's nomination of Dom Paulo to 
lead the archdiocese, which could finally help to break the deadlock there. And although 
events were moving in their favour, subordinate levels of the Church continued to remain 
powerless. So much so, in fact, that at first there was considerable iritation felt amongst 
some priests at the very manner of Dom Paulo's appointment, i. e., without regard to 
their views. 
Equally, it was a sovereign decision of Seo Paulo's Church hierarchy alone. and not 
the direct result of any pressure that militants were able to exert upon the bishops, which 
led to the institutional lines of gravity being shifted in favour of lay Catholics during the 
mid 1970's. Even after those changes-had taken place, nothing could alter the simple 
underlying truth namely, that it continued to remain the hierarchy's exclusive 
prerogative to define the framework or relationship which lay sectors of the Church 
could or could not enjoy with the institutional Church. Consequently those lines of 
gravity could, in theory at least, be shifted back at any moment in time. 
Given the presence of ethico-political conflicts within the Roman Catholic Church of 
the type outlined in the present chapter, this centralised power structure, and in 
particular the critical nature of episcopal appointments to any diocese, is an issue that is 
once again assuming greater importance. Elsewhere in Brazil, for instance, John Paul 
has shown himself to be a Pope who is willing to appoint highly conservative figures who 
are eager to bring about their particular vision of social and ecclesiastical change. One 
of the most notable examples of this was his appointment of a successor to Dom Helder 
Camara in the Archdiocese of Recife. In the matter of a few months, 
, 
the new cardinal 
succeeded in reversing many of the progressive changes painstakingly made, over the 
course many years. He even went so far as to expel priests who did not toe the line 
despite clear evidence that they enjoyed widespread local support and that their 
communities wished them to stay. What was particularly frustrating for these priests and 
local community activists was that the new archbishop possessed full legal authority to 
act in this way. 
As yet, Säo Paulo has not suffered the same fate, but there area number of signs which 
indicate that the archdiocese is firmly in the Vatican's sights, and that a staged reversal 
of policies is already underway. 
In their January 1986 "ad Limina" visit to the Pope, the bishops of Säo Paulo state 
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were personally informed by Pope John Paul II of his desire to "reaffirm the 
communion" which exists between them and: 
the perfect union of mind and heart which exist between your particular Churches and the Church of 
Rome. 4 
He spoke, for instance, of "episcopal Collegiality" 
75 Later on, however, collegality and 
perfection was given a special, i. e., highly centralised, slant as he reminded the bishops 
of Sao Paulo about a few home truths: 
The well known canon 333 of the Code of Canon Law, in noting that the Roman Pontiff is always in 
communion with the bishops and with all the Church in the advancement of its task, also notes the 
right which befalls him of determining the best way of carrying it out; and in the following canon it 
makes reference to, the people and the institutions, which he can mandate, in diverse forms, in order 
that, "in his name and for his authority", they carry out tasks, "for the good of all the Churches". 
76 
This emphatic reassertion of papal prerogatives was coupled with a number of carefully 
phrased warnings. The Pope went out of his way to remind the bishops of the need for 
the Church not "to reduce its mission to the socio-political" as well as the "great detours 
that certain 'theologies of liberation' bring with them. "77 He also reminded them of the 
great care that needed to be excercised in the education of new priests. In his follow-up 
statement to the bishops a few monthi later the Pope 
went on to indicate that his idea of 
a "useful and necessary" theology of liberation would be one which was in close 
connexion with and fell within the parameters set by the encyclicals Rerum Notiarum and 
Laborem Exereens. 78 
All this was by way of a prelude to changes which were finally' imposed upon the 
Church of Säo Paulo. One such, which related to teaching practices within local 
seminaries, involved an investigation into these practices to see whether they conformed 
to Vatican standards. In effect, the seminaries were put on strict probation. But by far the 
most important change was the redrawing of the archdiocese's boundaries. In the past 
this had involved a consultation excercise with the bishops and local activists to see how 
best the archdiocese might be restructured to take account of changing conditions (e. g., 
demographic) and needs. In 1989, however, the restructuring took on an altogether new 
and more polemical aspect, betraying as 
it did the conflict of perspectives between the 
Vatican and progressive Catholic sectors. What was at stake was not whether a division 
should occur for, quite contrary to gen; ralised reports, Dom Paulo had in fact 
advocated the division of the city since 1971. 
Instead, the issue was the manner of its 
implementation. 
The proposal of the bishops was a division into 10 dioceses whilst conserving for each 
bishop a pastoral for the whole city, and allowing for the transfer of individuals between 
different regions of the city. 
79 The Vatican's final response, however, entailed the 
dismemberment of the archdiocese into five smaller and separately administered 
dioceses leaving a much smaller portion directly under Dom Paulo's control. Already in 
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1988, one of Dom Paulo's progressive auxiliary bishops, Dom Luciano Mendes had been 
transferred to a more conservative diocese in the state of Minas Gerias; but with the 
redrawing of the boundaries two more progressive auxiliaries, Dom Angelico Sändalo 
Bernardino and Antonio Gaspar Fernando Penteadö, were transferred out of the region. 
Three new conservative bishops were brought into the newly created dioceses. The net 
effects of all these changes were drastic. Dom Paulo's own influence was reduced at a 
stroke. As for those areas, like the southern and eastern zones of the city, which had 
major social problems and, especially during the 1970's, had provided the major 
bulwark of progressive Catholic militancy, these were now administered by conservative 
figures. In the specific case of an organisation like Pastoral Operäria, the transferal of 
Dom Angelico Sändalo Bernardino out of the region altogether, suddenly deprived 
militants of their principal episcopal ally. Furthermore, and in common with all the other 
pastorals, the Workers' Pastoral now found its efforts truncated between what were now 
separate dioceses. 
Although these changes stem from a broader range of conflicts than simply that of 
class, this issue is a major part of the problem. The question of class conflict sits most 
uncomfortably within the Roman-Catholic Church. Not only are there theoretical 
incompatibilities between the positions espoused by progressives and conservatives, but. 
as the case of Säo Paulo illustrates, these theoretical incompatibilities ultimately give 
way to head-on confrontations. Pluralism is seen to have its limits. With the backing of 
the Vatican, conservatives have begun to gain the upper hand and have forced their 
radical counterparts either onto the defensive or, when a more amenable stance is not 
forthcomming as in the case of Dom Angelico Sändalo Bernardino, out of office. 
In the light of these changes quite what the future holds for the Workers' Pastoral in 
Säo Paulo is difficult to say. Much may eventually depend upon the successor appointed 
to take the place of Dom Paulo. What should not be underestimated, however, is the 
inherent vitality of the organisation - rooted as militants are in not only Church but also 
workers' struggles. 
This is evident if one takes the case of the Archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro which is 
closely associated with current papal doctrine. There one encounters a generalised 
situation of conflict between a conservative hierarchy, led by, Dom Eugenio Salles, and 
radical activists and clerics. 
80 In moves that are reminiscent of Sao paulo in the late 
1960's, Dom Eugenio has sought to create a conservative version of a Workers' Pastoral 
which is both closely under his tutelage and reflects his outlook. He has even gone so far 
as to change the name from "Pastoral Operana", which has openly working class 
connotations, to the "Pastoral do Trabalhador", a term which refers to just about 
anybody who works. For this reason, then, there are regular contacts between the 
cardinal's organisation and the ADCE. As one member of the, "Pastoral do 
Trabalhador" explained: 
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He thinks that the Church is a whole, that everybody must be together. 8 t 
In spite of the cardinal's strong backing for a class conciliatory approach, the results 
have not been entirely successful. This appears to have much to do with the trade union 
make-up of the area. As one Catholic and leading union activist familiar with the 
situation in Rio explained: 
Even in the "Pastoral do Trabalhador", to the extent that the worker engages himself there is 
increased conflict, a conflict between the line of the diocese and the union line, because a large part 
of the militants - even of Dom Eugenio's Church - are active in unions linked to CUT, and many are 
in the Workers' Party. So this conflict, this contradiction appears. It's true that a large number of 
these militants do not open a conflict with Dom Eugenio, but at the same time they are far from being 
his mass de maneuovre. Why? Because there is a conflict between his orientations and the reality of 
commitment. 82 
It is this dual, i. e., class as well as religiously defined characteristic of Catholic labour 
militancy which, in a comparatively hostile ecclesiastical environment like Rio de 
Janeiro, allows it a considerable degree of autonomy and independence from'an 
otherwise very intrusive hierarchy. This is in sharp contrast to organisations like CEBs 
which one leading theolgian, and former adviser to Dom Helder Camara, Joseph 
Comblin, has described as "controlled by the bishops and the priests". 83 Clodovis Boff, 
who has extensive experience in both'CEBs and PO, explains these basic differences 
thus: 
the sociological status of a CEB is completely different to the sociological status of a Workers' 
Pastoral because the Workers' Pastoral is a movement, oriented towards the workers, which is to say 
it is a pastoral. The CEB is not a movement, it is an ecclesial community, it is a Church in minature... 
Thus being a Church it needs a communion, a communion with the pastors, with the larger Church 
infrincir fn if 
.'ý, 
The militant of the CEB enjoys an organic and much more profound relationship with the institution 
than the militant of ACO and PO because one is situated within an ecclesial dynamic, the other is 
situated within a social dynamic. The dynamic is more social; it is ecclesial in its inspiration, in its 
spirituality, but in the concrete struggles, in the programmes, in the unions, in the elections.. it only 
carries with it a spirituality ... but it does not bring technical solutions apart. Indeed, there is the 
whole critique of colateralism, parallelism, neo-Christendom..., '84 
In attempting to explain why the Workers' Pastoral developed a class conflictual 
outlook in contrast to the institutional Church's clearly non-Marxist formulations of the 
preferential option for the poor, the leading Workers' Party deputy, Plinio de Arruda 
Sampaio, offered an answer which I believe is equally applicable to the situation in Rio. 
the Workers' Pastoral [read the Pastoral doTrabalhadorl is very influenced by the hegemony that 
Marxism has conquered amongst Or union vanguard. Tinos, for a Christian worker to have any voice 
in the union, any voice in the factory, either lie assimilates this Marxism or he speaks from 
without. 85 
The comments of Padre Agostino Pretto, who still retains extensive contacts with 
Catholic worker militants in Rio de Janeiro, also suggest that the insertion of these 
activists in union struggles and dynamics is of decisive importance. So much so, indeed, 
that: 
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the workers do not even think of themselves as being different to the workers of other dioceses. They 
have their great reference which is the working class, and they go forward with the working class, 
and they reflect with the working class, they assume the struggles of the working class. . -Groups of 
PO at the base do not ask themselves whether it is the Workers' Pastoral or the "Pastoral do 
Trabalhador", for they are meetings of workers who reflect in the light of the gospel. ... the existing 
groups of the "Pastoral do Trabalhador" in Rio are in perfect accord with the content of the 
Workers' Pastoral. They assume the process of a "new unionism" 86. 
A concrete instance of this dynamic was given to me by a member of the Opposition to 
the leadership of the Rio de Janeiro Civil Construction union. The union bore many of 
the classic halmarks of "pelego" management. At the time of the interview (1988), for 
instance, its president had been in power for a remarkable 38 years. The formal base of 
the union was some 350,000 members, but in the 1986 elections only about 3,000 had the 
right to vote. The victory secured on that occasion was roughly 1,850 votes to the 
Opposition's 550. And finally, in a situation akin to the metalworkers in Sao Paulo, it 
was the 1,200 voting pensioners who helped to secure his victory. 
87 
What is most significant from an ecclesiastical perspective, is the fact that both this 
militant - and the Opposition itself - emerged from a core group of activists who .". 
participated in Dom Eugenio's "Pastoral do Trabalhador". In a manner that was quite 
similar to the metalworkers' Opposition in Sao Paulo, these activists had throughout the 
1970's received the support of certain progressive priests and thereby used the 
infrastructure of the Church to assist in their own organisation. 
The idea, then, that a change in the ethico-political composition of Säo Paulo's 
hierarchy towards more conservative ideals may put an end to PO's radical trade union 
activities is far from certain. The example of Rio de Janeiro, where the cardinal is not 
adverse to using the full range of the powers at his disposal, is a case in point. Quite 
simply, lay individuals are not subject to the same lines of control as 
, their clerical 
counterparts and to this extent the Vatican's offensive is bound to be muted. But what is 
possible, of course, is that their field of action within the Church may be severely 
diminished. This danger, however, is ever present for as long as current power structures 
are left intact. As I indicated earlier, essentially it is the exclusive prerogative of the 
hierarchy - irrespective of its ethico-political outlook - to define the framework and/or, 
relationship which lay sectors of the Church can or cannot enjoy with the institutional 
Church. In their turn, the bishops, short of a revolt (which is most unlikely in the 
foreseeable future) are incapable of defining their own relationship with a Vatican which 
is determined to use its powers to the full. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout the course of this thesis I have been concerned with two intimately related 
but distinct themes. The fast was how, within the context of metalworkers' struggles in 
Greater Säo Paulo, the Roman Catholic Church practically and theoretically reconciled 
such contradictory elements as its own unity and universalising doctrine with the fact of 
a society divided by class conflicts. The second, was to chart the precise extent; forms, 
underlying motives and general limitations to Catholic intervention in metalworker 
affairs during the period 1970-86. 
With regard to the extent of intervention we have seen that if the experiences in the 
Archdiocese of Säo Paulo and Diocese of Santo Andre are taken as a whole then it is 
difficult to find any aspect of metalworkers' struggles and politics with which the Church 
did not become involved at one stage or another. Clearly, the forms of intervention 
varied from moment to moment. Not every labour dispute, for example, was' ! '°": 
characterised by episcopal participation at mass meetings or negotiations with employers 
and government, as was the case during the metalworkers' strikes of 1980. But what is 
equally clear is that the Church, especially via its militants, had a remarkably consistent 
presence amongst this category of workers during the period 1970-86. That militant ==' 
presence, furthermore, was supported rather than hindered by the Church hierarchy 
especially after the departure of Dom Agnelo Rossi in 1970. 
As to the impact of the Church upon the metalworkers, that too was remarkable for its 
depth. Once again, due weight must be given to the regional and historical variability of 
that impact. In the Diocese of Santo Andre, for instance, I argued that "new unionism" - 
as evident in the 1978 strikes - preceded any significant Catholic interpenetration and 
acted as a major catalyst to the rearticulation of Catholic struggles; whilst in Säo Paulo 
there was a more organic connection between radical Catholic and trade union struggles 
well before the 1978 strikes. Overall, however, in both dioceses the impact of the Church 
- through its militants and hierarchy - was marked. Significantly, the critique of Brazilian 
trade unionism advanced by Catholic militants was one of only a handful of approaches 
that was able to constitute itself as a practical alternative to the status quo and not just as 
an intellectual protest against it. Indeed, in many ways it may be said that Catholic -` ; - 
militants anticipated and crystallised many of the themes later associated with the "new 
unionism" of the late 1970's. They performed a range of important functions which, 
amongst other things, included: (a) questioning root and branch the nature of the labour 
relations system; (b) doing so at a time when such questions were considered subversive; 
(c) sustaining their proposal in the face of more than a decade's government repression; 
(d) offering support to other left wing militants not of Catholic origin; (e) making use of 
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the neighbourhood and its churches as a strategic locus of organisation; (f), pushing the 
institutional Church in the direction of articulating demands complementary to their own; 
and (g), acting as a bridgehead between the working class and the church. 
For its part, the Catholic hierarchy took on board many of the demands made by the 
militants. The bishops came to articulate a discourse on the Brazilian trade unions which 
not only challenged military persecution, but also the whole system of government -. 
tutelage. That translated itself into a range of important practical actions. These included: 
(a) the attempted legitimisation of left-wing union militancy amongst Catholic circles; 
(b) verbal and logistical support for the Säo Paulo Metalworkers', Opposition; (c) 
occasional direct criticism of the Säo Paulo Metalworkers' Union leadership; (d) verbal 
and logistical support for the ABC metalworkers' unions in their struggle with employers 
and government between the period 1978-80; and (e), verbal support for those sectors of 
the labour movement which opted for the construction of a nation-wide trade union 
confederation in 1983, again, in defiance of government legislation. 
In the course of the thesis, then, we have seen that the Church played ahighly 
interventionist role and to great effect. This may appear somewhat at variance with 
another finding, namely, the existence of the widespread conviction amongst both 
progressive hierarchy and Catholic militants, that the autonomy of the workers should 
not be encroached upon. It should be recalled, however, that these sectors defined 
autonomy in relation to two key criteria. 
The first was the rejection of any triumphalist Catholic mentality that might entail the 
subordination of trade union struggles to Catholic social teaching and the institutional 
Church. Amongst other things, this precluded the creation of parallel Catholic 
organisations within the labour movement; it fostered the struggle of working class 
Catholic militants on an essentially class rather than a more narrow competitive 
organisational basis; and it confined the role of hierarchy within labour disputes to an 
auxiliary one. In this sense, worker autonomy was not undermined. Indeed, radical 
Catholics were amongst the most vociferous opponents of the CLAT-type proposal ' 
precisely because they regarded it as an attempt to 'somehow Christianise the Brazilian 
labour movement and subordinate it to a narrowly defined concept of Christianity. 
The second definition of worker autonomy, however, was related to other more directly 
secular or political considerations. Whilst the institutional Church began from the 
premise that other things being equal it should avoid partisan involvement, it came to the 
conclusion that things were not equal. As such, it felt bound to intervene not in order to 
undermine worker autonomy, but rather to preserve and extend it in the face 'of what 
were seen as unfavourable odds - odds which ranged from the military regime's illegal 
use of violence against left-wing union militants, to the panoply of legalised means for 
ensuring labour's aquiescence. 
There are several striking features about the Church's intervention. Firstly, it not only 
sought to affect the balance of social forces, but it attempted to redress the balance in 
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favour of the working class - even if that brought with it the prospect of social conflict. 
In itself this represented a fundamental qualitative break with a past in which the Church 
had feigned neutrality when it was convenient, had weakened the organisational capacity 
of the working classes, and had done so in the name of the need to preserve social 
harmony. From the experiences of Si o Paulo between 1970-86 it is evident that the 
Catholic Church substantially contributed to, and was an integral part of, the working 
class' alliances and struggles for liberty. This is one instance which lends support to Otto 
Maduro's thesis that: 
Religions do not necessarily constitute an obstacle to the autonomy of subordinate classes, or to their 
... alliances against domination. 1 
Another striking aspect of the Catholic Church's involvement with the metalworkers of 
the region is the finding that the Church did not simply seek to redress the balance in 
favour of some generalised concept of the poor, let alone the working class, but that it 
also differentiated between different political factions of the same class. Put another way, 
for all its talk of universalism and use of a multi-class discourse, the Church carried out a 
partisan role as between and within social classes.. 
How does this apparent contradiction between theory and practise arise? In part I have 
argued that it is unavoidable. There is, as I emphasised earlier, a generally accepted 
desire to preserve the transcendental and universal apsects of the Catholic faith. This, as 
it were, constitutes the core element that unifies people throughout the ethico-political 
spectrum and gives them their specifically Catholic identity. However, there 
simultaneously exists the recognition that these ideas need to be adapted to historical :r 
conditions. It is not only the theologians of liberation who stress Catholicism's historical 
dimensions; even Pope John Paul II - for all his orthodoxy and talk of the constancy of 
Catholic doctrine - says that the latter must be "subjected to necessary and opportune, 
adaptations, which emerge from the change of historic conditions"?, 
Herein lies the heart of the problem, for it is precisely beginning with these historical 
mediations of the Catholic faith - necessary and inescapable mediation- that conflict is 
generated. From the evidence of this thesis, at least, class constitutes one of the critical 
elements in this process of mediation. ,.. 
The subjection of the Catholic creed to the realities of any class divided society pose 
difficulties for the Church; but in the case of a country like Brazil, where the divisions 
run so deep, these problems are particularly severe. As we have seen, the practical 
implementation of a universalising or multi-class discourse proved unsustainable on 
repeated occasions. In the context of acutely polarising social conditions leading 
ecclesiastical figures felt compelled to 
define more clearly their stance on issues of class 
and religion. In effect, they were forced to take sides and thereby qualify - or concretise - 
the universality of Catholic doctrine. Thus, for example, it was in the increasingly 
polarised social situation of the mid 
1960's that the bishops of Säo Paulo originally gave 
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their backing to the military coup and its project of liquidating left-wing union militancy. 
Later still, in the context of the military repression of the early 1970's, Dom Paulo, 
Evaristo Ams came to clarify his own hitherto ambiguous identity and gave his firm 
support to militants from the Workers' Pastoral. It was in this situation too, that the 
suffering of Catholic militants would exert a profound impact upon the 1975 Sao Paulo 
bishops' conference; by all accounts, helping to push it towards the formal redefinition of 
the Church's stand on workers' issues. Similarly, militants contributed to Dom Claudio's 
own move away from what he himself admitted had been "very generic and very timid"3 
comments on labour. Above all, it was under the polarised conditions which 
accompanied the metalworkers" strikes of 1978-1980, that Dom Claudio felt impelled to 
make his comments in support of workers' rights. 
In some respects the appointment of Dom Paulo in 1970 represented an attempt to re- 
establish unity within a deeply divided Church. The critical question, though, was how to 
restore unity within a divided social sphere. Dom Paulo's rhetoric represented a-; 
continuity with tradition to the extent that he emphasised to Catholic worker militants 
that the "Mission to the World of Work cannot refrain, also, from concerning itself with 
pastoral care of the middle class and the upper class. "4 This non-exclusivistic multi-class 
approach is, as we have seen, a fundamental point of departure for Catholics throughout 
the ethico-political spectrum. Making it a reality, however, even under Dom Paulo's 
expert hand, proved another matter altogether. Under the conditions of military' 
dictatorship, the upper and middle classes were in no urgent need of a specialised 
pastoral organisation - certainly, not in the sense that it would develop for the workers in 
Sao Paulo, i. e., as a group for the defence of its members interests. Dom Paulo himself 
recognised that this was "a time of the persecution of the working class". where "there, 
was almost no possibility of organising here in Säo Paulo" .5 The Workers' Pastoral 
sprang out of these developments. The specificity of its language, the composition of its 
membership, the nature of their activities, all were very much geared to the active., 
defence of workers' interests. In the process, workers' voices became a more powerful 
force within the Church of Säo Paulo and thereby reinforced its defence of their interests. 
.1ý. Whilst the maintenance of a non-eclusivistic multi-class discourse had to be maintained 
by the institutional Church, and was even accepted by its most radical followers, we have 
seen that the mediation of Catholic social teaching in accordance with class interests, in 
effect its selection to correspond to certain needs; 
was an ever-present and extremely 
powerful factor. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, for instance, we saw how more 
progressive Catholic employers, like members of the ADCE, advanced a class 
conciliatory vision of Catholic social teaching which, 
amongst other things, preserved 
their role and that of private capital. In their view, workers formed part of a Christian 
community and the firm should reform in order to reflect this. Tb' I envisaged 
liberalisation, however, could not be used as a pretext for giving workers a voting place 
on the board of directors or too high a wage. In effect, the sustenance of vertical power 
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structures and fostering profitablity within the firm became fused with the Catholic 
notion of the "common good". Radical metalworker leaders, on the other hand, advanced 
an altogether different vision of the Church which corresponded more directly to their 
perceived interests. Their vision was of a Church which, in the words of Lula, should be 
at the side of those who suffer and the exploited". 6 Similarly, rather than seeking to 
submerge class differences and offer palliatives, Waldemar Rossi argued that "the class 
struggle is a reality, and the struggle to overcome class divisions is a Gospel 
imperative.. "7 Finally, for its part the Brazilian state advanced its own highly, selective 
version of ecclesiastical doctrine and papal teaching. During the course of the 1980 
metalworkers' strike the government made it quite plain that, as far as it was concerned, 
the main Gospel imperatives facing the Church were those of obeying the law of the land 
and keeping out of the dispute. 
We have seen that far from simply inspiring the ideologies of others, 
the Church constantly had to make political and not just theological choices of its own. 
Pope John Paul U's non-conflictive so-called "Christian formula" for the solution of 
social problems was completely unworkable in the Brazilian context (indeed, as I already 
mentioned, it had proved unworkable even under Polish conditions). Furthermore, in the 
Brazil of the 1970's, the Church did much more than simply defend the workers from the 
excesses of the dictatorship; it also possessed a strategic (if not completely well defined) 
conception of society. Hints as to such a strategic conception, specifically in relation to 
the metalworkers, are evident in many of the comments made by the bishops of Sao 
Paulo. During the 1980 dispute, for instance, Dom Claudio said that: 
The struggle of the metalworkers is not merely theirs, neither is it purely for their benefit, but it helps 
all the workers because, by virtue of the power that the metalworkers of this region possess, they put 
pressure on the government itself so that the social and economic structure of this country are 
rs-ý changed. ' 
Similarly, during the 1984 Sao Paulo Metalworkers' Union elections, Dom Angelico 
Sändalo Bernardino asserted that a vote for a particular slate: , 
would signify a push forward for combative and authentic trade unionism and 
a blow for 
.. 9 ., peleguismo . ,,. 
Whilst it is certainly true that these comments were made under exceptional 
circumstances, they can in no way be deemed uncharacteristic. The evidence contained in 
my thesis shows that there was an underlying conception of what constituted "good" 
trade unionism and that this constantly regulated the actions of the Church throughout the 
1970's and into the mid 1980's. That was precisely 
why, for example, when the labour 
movement was so deeply divided over the formation of a national union confederation in 
1983, Dom Claudio Hummes showed no such reserve and affirmed that'the formation of 
the CUT was "one of the biggest advances of the last few years in Brazilian trade 
unionism. - 10 Other groups. who went on to form the CGT in 1986, saw the matter quite 
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differently. 
In the course of this thesis I have emphasised that whilst the Church sought to 
influence these developments, it was not seeking to desecularise the Brazilian trade union 
movement or somehow govern it. Apart from anything else, the mechanisms and will to 
govern had been challenged from within the institution by new theological perspectives. 
We have seen that in the specific case of Säo Paulo left-wing Catholic militants had 
played a key role in helping to redefine ecclesiastical perspectives on trade union issues 
and that their own trade union vision was an essentially radical secular one. Had the 
Church wanted to govern, it was these sectors that would have had to have been 
mobilised, but it was precisely these individuals that were not prepared to be 
instrumentalised by the official Church which in any case - for reasons of conviction 
rather than opportunism - had come much closer to their vision. What the progressive 
Church did seek, however, was a compatability of objectives and this emerged with the 
formation of the CUT which was a clearly secular organisation. 
The Church's repeated ability to embrace short term partisan commitments does not 
mean that it effectively abandoned its theological roots. In spite of dramatic shifts in 
episcopal attitudes, we have seen that these actions - however intimately connected with 
the events of the time - were said, by their authors at least to have been carried out on 
the basis of essentially Gospel or theological criteria. Bishops like Dom Claudio and 
Dom Angelico, for instance, saw the CUT as more closely corresponding to the 
principles of Catholic social teaching. Support for such initiatives, and others like the Säo 
Paulo Metalworkers' Opposition and the strikes of 1978-80, were not, in the minds of the 
bishops, pushed through on the basis of class or ideological criteria. I have suggested that 
class influenced the reading of basic texts and, furthermore, that this manifested itself as 
a latent and sometimes open conflict of the religious agents involved; but I have also 
emphasised the specificities of the Catholic Church, that its organisational and doctrinal 
features actively mediated those social forces which circumscribed it. Thus, for example, 
the fact that the Catholic churches of Säo Paulo and Santo Andre'came to articulate a 
discourse in favour of the working class should not be confused with the wholesale 
adoption of class politics. As I have repeatedly emphasised, the Church's message was 
addressed to all social classes; in the words of Clodovis Boff, rich and poor "do not 
oppose one another in an absolute manner, because in a Christian vision there exist 
certain points, certain margins of contact". 
11 It is in this ultimate sense that the Church's 
point of departure - even when it entailed the recognition of the class conflictual nature 
of society - was a pastoral-evangelical one. Indeed, taking the Church's preferential 
option for the poor as a whole, it was noted that whilst this option arose as 'a direct 
response to the sufferings of the vast majority of Latin America's people, its proponents 
at all levels of the Church - whether on the left or the right - stressed that it possessed, in 
the words of one liberation theologian. "a non-political, i. e., religious-ethical root". 12 It 
was not a Marxist formulation. 
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That said, neither could the concept (nor any of the bishops' actions, for that matter) 
remain free from earthly injunctions. As we saw, Clodovis Boff asked the key question 
of how the poor are encountered historically, to which he gave the answer that, amongst 
other things, they are constituted in classes. To many Latin American bishops, his 
subsequent assertion that "This option for the poor, which incorporates the question of 
class and class struggle, is globally opposed to a supra- or inter-class interpretation"13 
constitutes an ideological rather than a theological formulation. What we have seen in the 
course of the thesis, however, is that it is most difficult - if not completely impossible - to 
neatly separate theological and ideological formulations from one another. Dom Paulo's 
own view that "labour should prevail over capital", or that "the centre of the world is the 
working man" was, for the archbishop, "an evangelical consequence, 'a consequence of 
all evangelical doctrine"; but, he admitted, "For others this is an ideology". 14 Equally, I 
indicated that Pope John Paul's encyclical, Laborem Exercens, was much more than an 
exercise in moral philosophy, it owed a great deal to a free market analysis of society. 
Even the universalism of papal discourse possessed ideological constituents. 
Dom Cändido Padim echoed the sentiments of Catholics throughout the ethico-political 
spectrum when he suggested that "The ideal would be that Christian values, rendered 
explicit by theology, would come to inspire ideological projects assumed by determinate 
groups of militants". 15 That certainly would appear to be a fair - if only partial - 
description of the trade union role of militants from the Workers' Pastoral. However, it is 
the comments of Dom Claudio Hummes which draw attention to the practical constraints 
upon, or double-sidedness of, these Gospel ideals. Whilst he maintained that "The criteria 
of faith and of the Gospel are not and cannot be ideological", he argued that they are 
"always bound up with concrete ambiguities... You cannot assume a certain Cartesianism 
there, of having clear and distinct ideas when you act in history.... ideology is something 
we all have because it signifies a concrete form of proposing solutions for a 
community". 16 His solution to what, I would argue, is an intractable dilemma, was for 
Catholics to attempt "to have a sufficient critical distance from... [their] ideologies and 
not permit ideology to predominate the criteria of faith. " 
17 The task of this thesis has 
been to indicate, with special reference to the struggles of Sao Paulo's metalworkers, the 
importance of these issues and the difficulties involved in working out practically viable 
and lasting solutions. 
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